Applicable principles
14 The parties referred in their oral and written submissions to a number of cases that have considered applications for discovery of documents that are broadly similar to the documents sought by Teva in this case. The cases referred to include: Schutz DSL (Australia) Pty Ltd v VIP Plastic Packaging Pty Ltd (No 14) [2011] FCA 1159; DSM Nutritional Products LLC v Suntory Holdings Ltd [2013] FCA 675; and BlueScope Steel Limited v Dongkuk Steel Mill Co Ltd [2017] FCA 1537 (BlueScope). Reference was also made to The Wellcome Foundation Limited v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 262 and Nichia Corp v Argos Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 741.
15 In BlueScope, Beach J made observations about the applicable principles at [30]-[38]. His Honour stated in part:
30 First, there is considerable force in McKerracher J's observations in Schutz DSL (Aust) Pty Ltd v VIP Plastic Packaging Pty Ltd (No 14) [2011] FCA 1159 at [10] to [15] that Aickin J's approach in Wellcome more resonates with the Peruvian Guano test which the current Federal Court Rules do not enshrine. Further, as McKerracher J also noted, Wellcome and its ilk were decided at a time when one did not have to concern oneself with the consequences of electronic information and communication including its storage, reproduction and exchange, which has considerably magnified the burden of giving discovery as compared with the benefit. Such a burden has been compounded by the incidences of different electronic forms, locations, computers, servers, email accounts, metadata issues, and retrieval problems. More generally, the idea that one should order general discovery of material of only tangential or second order relevance is unpalatable in the electronic age, particularly where the Peruvian Guano paradigm has no relevance to contemporary case management theory or its practice.
31 Second, Jacob LJ's observations (albeit in dissent) in Nichia carry significant weight. As he expressed the matter, determining whether there was an inventive step "does not involve expressly what the inventor actually did or thought" (at [13]). As he said in relation to the UK analogue, "the test is not what he did or thought but whether the step would have been obvious to the man skilled in the art" (at [13]). And that "whether it actually was inventive depends on the expert evidence establishing the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art and the teaching of the cited prior art" (at [15]); of course such observations need to be adapted to the Australian context. Ultimately though, Jacob LJ accepted that material as to what the inventor actually did or thought could not be said to be irrelevant to the question of obviousness, but that it only rose to the level of secondary significance, with questions of proportionality coming into play in determining whether the material should be required to be discovered (cf DSM Nutritional Products, LLC v Suntory Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 675 at [16] per Tracey J).
32 I must say that when one analyses Aickin J's observations in Wellcome, there is much to be said for the view that his observations are not that inconsistent with the view that Jacob LJ strongly expressed about the secondary relevance, in relation to the question of inventive step, of material as to what the inventor actually did or thought. So, at pp 280 and 281, Aickin J said that such evidence might show that the experiments devised for the purpose were part of an inventive step. And that it might show that the experiments were of a routine character. And that it may be that the perception of the true nature of the problem was the inventive step. But such statements are not directly inconsistent with the characterisation of such material as having secondary significance or relevance. Indeed, Aickin J's observations at 286 to 288 in some respects resonate with such a secondary characterisation.
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36 Now in the paradigm of the Peruvian Guano approach, one can appreciate the conclusion reached by Aickin J. But that conclusion is not now as readily transposed to the present approach to discovery.
37 Third, s 7 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) deems an invention to involve an inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art. Such a test is not assessed by direct reference to what the inventor actually thought or did. Nothing in the plurality's reasons in AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324 at [200] to [217] (per Besanko, Foster, Nicholas and Yates JJ) supports the notion that what the inventor actually thought or did could have anything other than secondary significance or relevance to the question of inventive step.
38 Fourth, there are examples of trial judges having treated as relevant and admissible, on the question of inventive step, evidence of what the inventor actually did. I do not need to dwell on these examples as I am prepared to accept for present purposes that what an inventor did or thought may have secondary significance or relevance. And indeed when one analyses such examples, it seems that the inventor's evidence was used more to fortify the primary evidence and analysis on inventive step, consistent with the characterisation of secondary significance.
16 Immediately after that discussion, Beach J stated at [39] that, in summary, he was prepared to treat the category 1 documents sought in that case as being relevant, but of secondary significance only. His Honour then stated that, in light of that conclusion and the fact that the Peruvian Guano test no longer applies, he would only permit discovery of "such a category that is targeted, proportionate and over a relatively tight time frame".
17 His Honour indicated that, but for the fact that certain discovery had already taken place, he would have made an order for discovery of documents of the type sought in category 1, but over a narrower period of time than had been sought. However, the evidence showed that documents falling in that narrower category had already been discovered. It was therefore unnecessary to make the discovery order.
18 I adopt, with respect, the observations of Beach J at [30]-[38] of BlueScope.