Penalty
23 Section 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act, which I set out earlier in this judgment, provides for the imposition of civil penalties on unregistered individuals and unregistered bodies corporate which provide tax agent services. The maximum penalty for an individual is 250 penalty units and, for a body corporate, 1,250 penalty units. Section 90-1 of the Tax Agent Services Act provides:
penalty unit has the meaning given by section 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914.
24 At all material times s 4AA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provided that a "penalty unit" was $110. It follows that the maximum penalty for one contravention of s 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act by an individual is $27,500.
25 Where an individual or a body corporate contravenes a civil penalty provision under the Tax Agent Services Act, s 50-35(1) provides that the Tax Practitioners Board may apply to the Court for an order that the person pay a pecuniary penalty. Section 50-35(2) empowers the Court to order payment of a pecuniary penalty for each contravention.
26 In light of the agreed facts, it is clear (and, indeed, not in dispute) that Ms Munro has contravened s 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act. The parties agreed in orders submitted to the Court that Ms Munro should be subject to a pecuniary penalty of $40,000, payable in instalments over six years from the date of judgment, in respect of all contraventions of the Tax Agent Services Act.
27 In Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2010] FCA 977 Barker J summarised principles relevant to consideration by the Court of the imposition of civil penalties:
[4] Sentencing (which the imposition of a civil penalty is an instance of) is one of the most, if not the most difficult tasks that judicial officers perform: CFMEU v Williams [2009] FCAFC 171; (2009) 262 ALR 417 (Williams) at [28].
[5] The overriding principle is to ensure that the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct: Attorney-General (SA) v Tichy (1982) SASR 84 at 92-93.
[6] The purpose to be served by the imposition of penalties is at least threefold:
(1) Punishment, which must be proportionate to the offence and in accordance with prevailing standards;
(2) Deterrence, both personal (assessing the risk of re-offending) and general (a deterrent to others who might be likely to offend); and
(3) Rehabilitation.
See Ponzio v BP Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 65; (2007) 158 FCR 543 (Ponzio), Lander J at [93]-[94].
[7] The task which a sentencing judge is faced with is one of "instinctive synthesis": Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8; (2008) 165 FCR 560 (Australian Ophthalmic Supplies), Gray J at [27] and Graham J [55]. Such a process requires that a court take into account all relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all: see Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [74]-[76]; Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 (Markarian), Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [37]-[39]. The penalty must not be so great as to crush the person upon whom the penalty is imposed or reveal the person as a scapegoat: Ponzio at [93] (Lander J); McDonald v R (1994) 48 FCR 555 at 563. The maximum penalty is reserved for only the most serious of contraventions: Markarian at [31]. Proportionality and consistency commonly operate as a final check on the penalty assessed: Australian Ophthalmic Supplies at [53].
28 I respectfully adopt his Honour's summary as a useful guide in this proceeding.
29 In relation to the appropriate penalty figure, I also note that Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 explained the proper approach of the Court to the imposition of penalties in particular circumstances. In summary, their Honours observed that:
the imposition of an appropriate penalty is at the discretion of the sentencing judge, who must take into account all relevant considerations (at [27]);
careful attention is required to be given by the Court to the maximum penalty in each case (at [31]);
in general, a sentencing Court will, after weighing all relevant factors, reach a conclusion that a particular penalty is the one that should be imposed (at [37]); and
an arithmetical process is unlikely to be appropriate where there are numerous and complex considerations to be weighed (at [39]).
30 In this case I consider the following factors relevant to consideration of the quantum of penalty appropriate in this case:
Ms Munro has admitted to 14 contraventions of s 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act occurring over a period of 13 months. For each service Ms Munro received $60. While the remuneration received by Ms Munro was relatively small, she nonetheless engaged in multiple contraventions of the Tax Agent Services Act over a reasonably long period of time.
It appears from the Statement of Agreed Facts that on 4 July 2011 Ms Munro pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court of Queensland to 16 offences relating to charging or receiving a fee for preparing income tax returns while unregistered, in contravention of s 251L of the ITAA. Accordingly, it is clear that the admitted contraventions of the Tax Agent Services Act were not isolated events. It is also clear, and Ms Munro admits, that she has been aware, for some time, that she is required to be registered under the Tax Agent Services Act in order to lawfully provide the services the subject of the current proceeding.
Each contravention of the Tax Agent Services Act was engaged in as a separate act. It is reasonable, therefore, to treat each contravention as a separate contravention.
It is clear that Ms Munro was aware that the relevant taxpayers were relying on her experience and knowledge in relation to taxation matters and preparation of ITRs when she provided the relevant services, and that she provided services including suggesting and claiming deductions.
The applicant submits, and I accept, that, in fact, Ms Munro did not have the necessary expertise to be registered as a tax agent under the legislation. This is clear in light of the events following the audit of two of her "clients", which I have described earlier in this judgment. As a result of those audits, amended assessments were issued in respect of those "clients". Ms Munro has conceded that these events resulted from her own error.
Ms Munro agreed to and executed the Statement of Agreed Facts filed on 10 August 2012, and has consented to orders provided to the Court on 14 August 2012 to resolve this proceeding. This cooperation has significantly limited the time and expense of litigation.
While the penalty of $40,000 is not insignificant, it is small when compared with the maximum combined penalty which could be imposed on Ms Munro for the 14 contraventions which she has admitted (that is, in the sum of $385,000). I also consider that the arrangement agreed by the parties to permit Ms Munro to pay the penalty in instalments over six years, and to apply to the Court if she encounters difficulties making these payments, potentially relieves hardship Ms Munro could suffer from a penalty of this amount.
In relation to the issue of specific deterrence, the size of the penalty is sufficiently significant to deter Ms Munro from engaging in future contravening conduct.
In relation to the issue of general deterrence, I accept the submission of the applicant that the contravening conduct in this case goes to the heart of the relevant legislative scheme, and that the scheme of registration of practitioners can only operate properly if those involved in the area of work submit to the statutory regulatory system. To that extent, penalties imposed for contraventions of the legislation should be sufficiently serious to discourage individuals from offering services without complying with the statute.
31 In my view the sum of $40,000 is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct and provides both specific and general deterrence in respect of similar future conduct, without being oppressive.
32 At the hearing on 7 November 2012, the respondent indicated that she would have difficulty paying the penalty in accordance with the agreement reflected in the consent orders submitted by the parties. I have considered Barker J's comment in Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) at [7] that a penalty must not crush the person on whom it is imposed. However while it appears that the respondent does not have significant assets, she submitted at the hearing that she owns her own home and receives an aged pension. I consider that, given the respondent's previous signed consent to the orders provided to the Court, the inclusion in those orders of liberty to apply to the Court to vary the payment dates, and the requirement for general deterrence (cf Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 377 at [43]), the proposed penalty is appropriate.
33 Accordingly, I am prepared to order that a penalty be paid by Ms Munro in the sum of $40,000 in respect of her contraventions of the Tax Agent Services Act.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.