Discussion
21 It may be accepted that it can be an error of law for the Tribunal to ignore guidelines which have been formulated by an administrative authority as a guide to the exercise of a discretion or power and which are within power. The status of guidelines was discussed by a full court of this Court in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 ("Drake") at 590 where Bowen CJ, and Deane J said:
"In a matter such as the present where it was permissible for the decision-maker to take relevant government policy into account in making his decision, but where the Tribunal is not under a statutory duty to regard itself as being bound by that policy, the Tribunal is entitled to treat such government policy as a relevant factor in the determination of an application for review of that decision. It would be contrary to common sense to preclude the Tribunal, in its review of a decision, from paying any regard to what was a relevant and proper factor in the making of the decision itself. If the original decision-maker has properly paid regard to some general government policy in reaching his decision, the existence of that policy will plainly be a relevant factor for the Tribunal to take into account in reviewing the decision. On the other hand, the Tribunal is not, in the absence of specific statutory provision, entitled to abdicate its function of determining whether the decision made was, on the material before the Tribunal, the correct or preferable one in favour of a function of merely determining whether the decision made conformed with whatever the relevant general government policy might be."
22 As the Court explained in the comments which followed the above passage, consistency of administrative decisions meant that it was appropriate to take into account policy matters in exercising discretions, although an uncritical acceptance of policy and giving that policy automatic effect could represent an abdication by the Tribunal of its responsibilities itself to make a decision.
23 In Nikac & ors v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 16 ALD 611 ("Nikac") at 625 Wilcox J said:
"Although a non-statutory policy is not binding upon a decision-maker, in the sense that he or she may decide in the particular case not to act in accordance with that policy, a policy applicable to the case is always a relevant consideration in the making of a decision. Unless it can be said that the policy is so insignificant that it could not have materially affected the decision … any failure to take that policy into account will lead to invalidity."
24 These cases were both cases where the policy in question was a policy of the decision maker. Neither were cases which considered whether the Tribunal might commit an error of law in failing to take into account a policy formulated by the decision maker whose decision is the subject of review by the Tribunal. However, since the Tribunal itself has the power to exercise the discretion or power otherwise vested in the decision maker, it must follow as a matter of principle that if the decision-maker was bound to take a policy formulated and applied to ensure consistency of decision making, so too must the Tribunal. There can be little doubt that misconstruction of the policy would include a failure to have proper regard to it: BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service [1998] FCA 1346.
25 There are three questions, however, which arise in the present case. The first is the status of the so-called "Guidelines"; the second is whether the Tribunal "misconstrued the Guidelines" and the third question is whether any error involving misconstruction of, or failure to consider, the Guidelines actually effected the decision the Tribunal reached or, in other words, it is necessary to determine what the basis of the Tribunal's decision was. Before considering these questions it is useful to consider the role of the Tribunal on a review of a decision of the Board.
26 Under the AAT Act the Tribunal is authorised to review the Board's decision here to refuse registration to an applicant. In exercising this review and for the purpose of that review, the Tribunal is authorised to exercise "all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on the person who made the decision": s 43(1) of the AAT Act. It was accepted by counsel for the Board that in the present case that meant that it was for the Tribunal to decide whether, for the purposes of Regulation 156(1)(a)(iii), a particular course which had been undertaken by the applicant (ie Mr Aqabani) was "acceptable".
27 It might have been suggested (although it was not) that the question whether a particular course of study was acceptable was a decision that had to be made by the Board and that it was irrelevant in making that decision whether the particular course was or was not, when regard is had to the particular applicant, acceptable. Thus, once the Board had decided that a particular course was acceptable, it was acceptable in all cases. That this is not the proper construction and that the concession made by counsel was correctly made follows, I think, from the fact that the content of courses may change from year to year. It also can be said to be, otherwise, a strange policy that would require courses to be accepted without regard to other qualifications of an applicant. An intensive one week course conducted at postgraduate level by a particular tertiary institution may suffice (ie be acceptable) in the case of an applicant with particular qualifications (for example because the applicant lectures in taxation) that would not be appropriate to the registration of another person without those particular qualifications.
28 It follows, as the submissions made by counsel for the Board made clear, that it was open for the Tribunal itself to consider on the facts before it whether the particular course undertaken by Mr Aqabani was an "acceptable" course for the purposes of Regulation 156(1)(a)(iii) so as to entitle him to registration as a tax agent, or strictly, whether his failure to undertake another course meant he was disentitled to registration because he had not undertaken a course involving a written examination which course was "acceptable" to the Tribunal acting in the stead of the Board.
29 There is, I think, a real question about the status of the Guidelines in the present case. While I can accept that a statutory authority may promulgate guidelines notwithstanding that the statute under which it operates may make no provision for such guidelines (so long as the guidelines promulgated are relevant to the exercise of power or discretion with which they are concerned) there is a problem here, where the legislation (the Act), provides for the establishment of separate Tax Agents' Boards, albeit that the Act is expressed in language which, at the least, can be said to contemplate that the boards will speak with one voice. As will be seen, this is not a matter which need be considered in the present case. However, there is a hypothetical difficulty if guidelines, promulgated by one board differed from guidelines promulgated by another. Would a Tribunal be required to take one set of guidelines into account when reviewing the decision of one board and another and potentially inconsistent set of guidelines when reviewing the decision of another board? There is a similar difficulty in the present case in that the annexure documents in question were not guidelines in force in all boards because it is known that at least one other board had no guidelines at all. Would it mean that the Tribunal would, if the "Annexure E" document was treated as a guideline of policy, be required to take it into account in reviewing a decision made by, say, the New South Wales board but would not be required to take it into account in reviewing a decision made by, say, the Victorian board? In the result, it would be possible that different conclusions might be reached by the Tribunal depending upon whether it was reviewing a decision of the New South Wales board or of the Victorian board. This may well lead to the conclusion that "Annexure E" should not be given the status of a guideline in the same sense as the guidelines of national policy were given in Drake or Nikac and that failure to take the Guidelines into account might not constitute error of law.
30 As to the second question, it is not entirely clear why the learned tribunal member thought there was an internal inconsistency. However, there appear from her reasons to be two possible explanations. The first is that there was an internal inconsistency between "Appendix C" and "Appendix E" relating to the requirements for the study of commercial law and accountancy. This was a matter considered earlier in the Tribunal's reasons. As the Tribunal pointed out, "Appendix C", when dealing with applicants with overseas qualifications, omitted reference to commercial law requirements. "Appendix E", in what was said to be an introductory statement, took a particular view about the accountancy and commercial law subject required to be undertaken. I think this is the matter to which the Tribunal adverted. The other possibility is that "Annexure E" appeared to regard the CPA or Institute of Chartered Accountants tax module as requiring face to face attendance when this was, according to the evidence before the Tribunal, not the case. I think it is possible to regard there to be some internal inconsistency as suggested by the Tribunal.
31 The other matter discussed by the Tribunal, namely that the Guidelines purported to impose requirements absent from the Regulations, would seem to be wrong. This comment appears to arise from the letter to Mr Aqabani to which reference has already been made, where it is said that a course of four months income tax study would not comply with the Regulations. No doubt, it is strictly correct that the Regulations do not require the course of tax study to have a particular time limit. To that extent, the Tribunal is correct. However, while the Secretary to the Board was wrong in suggesting that the Regulations did require the taxation course to have a particular time limit, that is not what "Annexure E" says at all. "Annexure E" is consistent with the fact that the Regulations leave the question of the acceptability of a particular course to the Board. The only requirement of the Regulations is that the applicant successfully complete a course of study in Australian income tax law which is "acceptable" to the Board. No doubt in an appropriate case the Board could decide that a course of 12 months and no less was, in the case of the particular applicant, appropriate so that a four month course was not, in respect of that applicant, "acceptable". In fact, the examples given in "Appendix E" are all examples of courses requiring 12 months study, although in some cases, the 12 months takes into account other courses, for example, the modules prescribed by the accounting bodies. I therefore agree with counsel for the Board that the Tribunal to this extent fell into error so that if the error was material to the decision, the result would be that the decision would be set aside.
32 However, I do not think that the Tribunal reached its decision by ignoring the so-called "Guidelines" in this case and doing so because of the error which I have identified in the last paragraph.
33 As I have noted, the Tribunal, in reviewing the decision of the Board, was empowered itself to consider whether in the case of this applicant, the course which he undertook in Queensland and at postgraduate level, was acceptable after taking into account all the relevant facts, including the experience of the applicant including the fact that he taught taxation at TAFE. The Tribunal was not bound to apply the Guidelines and require Mr Aqabani to undertake a course of 12 months study, which the Guidelines might suggest. Indeed, had the Tribunal done so it would have been an error of law involving a failure to take into account the personal circumstances of Mr Aqabani in deciding whether the course he undertook was "acceptable".
34 Certainly, the reasons of the Tribunal are not as clear as might be desired. However, it seems to me to be the case that the Tribunal understood, as illustrated by the citation of Al Mughrabi that any unique circumstances of this applicant were required to be considered and that "Appendix E" did not control the decision, albeit, if a guideline, that it was necessary to take it into account. The unique circumstances of Mr Aqabani's case were set out. The reference to the Guidelines purporting to impose requirements absent from the Regulations, while an error, appears clearly to be a reference to the Board's reasons for refusing Mr Aqabani registration as communicated through the Secretary, where it is clear that the Board was (assuming the letter reflected the Board's actual reasons - it may not have done so) purporting to apply a requirement which the Regulations did not apply. The reference to "internal inconsistency" is probably not erroneous, although it is difficult to see that "Appendix E" itself is internally inconsistent.
35 In my view the Tribunal was applying the question of acceptability of the Queensland course in the unique circumstances of Mr Aqabani's case against the background that the normal case involving an application to be a tax agent would require a longer course of study in Australian income tax law. I do not think that in the circumstances of the present case the Tribunal's decision was affected by such error of law, if there were any, as flowed from the comments about internal inconsistency and imposition of a requirement inconsistent with the regulation. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs as Mr Aqabani was self-represented.
36 I would like to make the following comments for consideration in due course by those responsible for administering the Tax Agents' Boards. It is undoubtedly useful for there to be national guidelines to assist in the determination whether, in a particular case, a particular course is acceptable before registration is granted. It would be far from helpful for there to be inconsistent guidelines and desirable that all boards adopt guidelines if any are to. Secondly it would be desirable, if guidelines are to be adopted, that they be published as guidelines, so that their status is clear on their face. Thirdly, it would be desirable, if there are to be national guidelines, that they make clear that they apply only to the ordinary case and that the determination will need to take into consideration the particular educational and/or professional qualifications or experience in Australian income taxation which the applicant for registration has. It is fair to say that "Appendix E" generally sets out an appropriate prescription of the type of course that would in the ordinary case be thought to be a minimum requirement for a person who was to be given the right to charge for the preparation of income tax returns and advice. Some attention might, however, be given to the wording of the appendix, at least so far as it makes reference to contact hours, having regard to the evidence in the present case that the modules required by the accounting bodies do not have contact hours.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Hill.