ment of claims. The primary proportion of premiums ceded to the
reinsurer by the reinsured is the same as that of the risk, viz. two- ;
thirds. From this the allowances are to be deducted. We listened
to an elaborate discussion of the basis and true inwardness of the
calculation of the deductions, the object of which was to show that
the reinsurance treaty resulted in " pooling" or profit-sharing.
I do not quite see what virtue there is in these expressions one way
or the other. It is quite clear that under the treaty the payments
to the reinsurer, whether they are called premiums or by whatever
name they are described, are calculated upon a proportion to the
original premiums, and it does not seem to me to matter whether
it is a simple proportion or a more complicated one based upon a
number of variables. The material facts of the case are simply that
a company carrying on business in London and not in Victoria makes
a reinsurance treaty with a company carrying on business in Victoria
in the insurance of risks more or less identified with Victoria, that -
the London company's remuneration is equivalent to a portion of
the premiums and that the payment of the remuneration, less the
London company's proportion of losses, is to be made to a bank
account in Melbourne. I do not think that any amount of discussion
of the facts will make more of them than this. On these facts we
have to decide whether the London company derives its profit in
or from Victoria. We are frequently told, on the authority of judg-
ments of this court, that such a question is "a hard, practical matter
of fact." This means, I suppose, that every case must be decided
on its own circumstances, and that screens, pretexts, devices and
other unrealities, however fair may be the legal appearance which
on first sight they bear, are not to stand in the way of the court
charged with the duty of deciding these questions. But it does not
mean that the question is one for a jury or that it is one for econo-_
mists set free to disregard every legal relation and penetrate into
the recesses of the causation of financial results, nor does it mean
that the court is to treat contracts, agreements and other acts,
matters and things existing in the law as having no significance.
In the present case it seems to me that the London company is