(2) what she says are false entries in the first defendant's accounts purporting to show that she is indebted to the first defendant in the sum of $310,000.
24 The plaintiff did not address submissions to the submission recorded in para 19 above. In view of the conclusion to which I have come on that submission (see para [45] below), I did not prolong the time taken to give this judgment, and increase the costs, by requiring the plaintiff to put submissions on that issue.
The plaintiff is a member of the first defendant
25 By s 231(b) of the Corporations Act, "[a] person is a member of a company if they ... agree to become a member of the company after its registration and their name is entered on the register of members". Clause 2 of the first defendant's constitution reflects this, when it states that ""Shareholders" and "Members" respectively mean and include the holders for the time being of shares in the capital of the Company".
26 In the course of argument, Mr M D Broun QC, who appeared for the second and third defendants, the applicants for interlocutory relief, conceded that the plaintiff was a member of the first defendant because the register had not been rectified. In his written submissions, Mr Broun had said:
"It is common ground that the records show that the plaintiff ... is both the majority shareholder and a Director of the company as the result of events that occurred in 1995".
27 In my opinion, it follows inevitably that the plaintiff, as a member of the first defendant holding about 87% of its issued share capital, is in a position, unless restrained, to exercise the rights given by s 249D of the Corporations Act and, if the directors do not comply with her s 249D notice, to exercise the further rights given by s 249E.
The decision in Paringa
28 Mr J M White of Counsel, who appeared for the plaintiff, relied heavily on the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Paringa Mining and Exploration Co plc v North Flinders Mines Ltd & Ors (1988) 14 ACLR 587.
29 Paringa was the major shareholder in North Flinders, holding a little under 50% of the issued share capital. The Full Court found that it was in a position from a practical point of view to control decisions at any meeting of shareholders of North Flinders. Paringa sought to challenge decisions made by the Board of North Flinders (which board Paringa did not then control) relating to a proposed takeover and a proposed rights issue. Paringa requisitioned a general meeting to consider resolutions to reconstitute the Board of North Flinders in such a way as to give directors nominated by Paringa control of the Board. This was clearly done in an attempt to ensure that North Flinders did not continue with the takeover and rights issue decisions and (under the control of the proposed new directors) that it would do what could be done to revoke those decisions. An injunction was granted at first instance to restrain the holding of the requisitioned meeting. Paringa appealed to the Full Court from that decision.
30 King CJ, with whom White and O'Loughlin JJ agreed, considered that the first question to be addressed was "what constitutes the status quo in the circumstances". He said (14 ACLR at 590-1):
"It seems to me that his Honour's order, having the effect as it does of preventing the shareholders of Paringa [sic: clearly his Honour meant North Flinders] from exercising such rights as shareholders possess at General Meetings to control the affairs of North Flinders and, in particular, to alter the composition of the Board, does not protect or preserve the status quo but rather disturbs it in quite radical respects. The relevant status quo, as it seems to me, includes the right of the shareholders of North Flinders to vote at a lawfully convened General Meeting on any business which is lawfully before it and, in the present circumstances, includes the right of shareholders in North Flinders to vote at the Extraordinary General Meeting which has been requisitioned on the business for which that meeting has been requisitioned, namely the proposed changes in the composition of the Board. To deprive the shareholders of North Flinders and, in particular, the controlling shareholder, Paringa, of that right, seems to me to be not a preservation of the status quo but rather a disturbance of it".
31 In my respectful opinion, his Honour's reasoning is correct, and is directly applicable to the present case. The plaintiff is a shareholder in the first defendant. As a shareholder she has present rights, including, as I have already noted, those accruing to her under s 249D of the Corporations Act. That is the status quo. An order that would prevent her exercising those rights does not preserve the status quo. It would change it.
32 The decision in Paringa was considered by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Carr Boyd Minerals Limited v Ashton Mining Limited (1989) 15 ACLR 599. Malcolm CJ, with whom Brinsden and Walsh JJ agreed, considered that the decision in Paringa could be distinguished because, in Carr Boyd, "there is alleged as the basis of the cause of action an agreement whereby for consideration, Ashton contracted not to exercise its votes in a certain way, or not to exercise its powers as a 30% shareholder with a capacity to control in a certain way" (15 ACLR at 606). However, his Honour did not question the correctness of the reasoning in Paringa; indeed, immediately before the remarks that I have just referred to, he said that "[o]ne can accept everything which appears in the passages cited from King CJ at ACLR 588-592".
33 In the present case (for the reasons given in paras [40] to [44] below, there is nothing approaching an agreement by the plaintiff not to exercise her rights as a shareholder. If she is to be restrained, it can only be on the basis that her shareholding is, as the second and third defendants submit, a "sham".
No sham transaction
34 In my opinion, the evidence falls far short of establishing that the plaintiff's shareholding in the first defendant is a "sham", even if, which I assume but do not decide, that were a sufficient basis for depriving her of the incidents attaching to her shareholding.
35 Mr Broun did not define what it was that was a "sham". However, if the doctrine relating to sham transactions is to have any relevance, the case for the second and third defendants must be that the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant, whereby the plaintiff subscribed for and was allotted 200,000 shares in the capital of the first defendant, was a sham.
36 The concept of sham transactions has been discussed in a number of cases. Those cases establish that "[f]or an agreement to be found to be a sham it is necessary for both parties to intend to enter into an agreement of a different legal kind and with different incidents from the legal form which they in fact adopt": Esanda Limited v Burgess (1984) 2 NSWLR 139, 144 (Samuels JA); see also Hutley and Priestley JJA at 146 and 153 respectively; and see also Boydell v James (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 620, 627 (Jordan CJ); Perpetual Trustee Co [Ltd] v Bligh (1940) 41 SR (NSW) 33, 39 (Jordan CJ); Hawke v Edwards (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 21, 23 (Jordan CJ).
37 In the present case, it is clear that the parties intended that the plaintiff should subscribe for and be allotted shares in the capital of the first defendant. That is so whether the purpose was one of investment (as the plaintiff contends) or of facilitating her application for permanent residency (as the second and third defendants contend). There is no evidence to suggest that, at the time it was made and performed, the agreement was not intended to have legal effect according to its terms. Even on the case for the second and third defendants, it was not until some time after the plaintiff had subscribed for her shares that (as they say) she asked to take the money out. There is no evidence that this was even in contemplation, let alone agreed, at the time the agreement for subscription and allotment was made.
38 It might be otherwise if (for example) the parties never intended that the first defendant should have the benefit of the money subscribed by the plaintiff. However, there is no evidence to support such a conclusion.
39 In my opinion, therefore, there is no basis upon which it can be said that the agreement for the plaintiff to subscribe for and be allotted shares in the capital of the first defendant was a sham. It must follow, as the case for the second and third defendants was put at the hearing, that there is no basis made out for the grant of injunctive relief as sought.
Alleged agreement not to participate in management
40 As I have said, this submission by the second and third defendants was not put at the hearing but was raised, almost as an afterthought, in supplementary written submissions dealing with s 1322(4)(d). It may have been inspired by consideration of the decision in Carr Boyd.
41 If the substance of the submission were made out as a matter of fact, it might afford a ground for relief. However, as a matter of fact, it must fail. There is no evidence, in either of the affidavits of the second defendant that were read before me, of any agreement to which the plaintiff was a party that she would not attempt to participate in the management of the first defendant, or that she would leave the second and third defendants in charge. The highest that the evidence goes is that, according to the second defendant, the plaintiff on one occasion said words to the effect that she would not be involved in the daily operation of the first defendant and would not want any share of the profits. According to the second defendant, this was said on the occasion when, after the plaintiff had paid her money and had received the allocation of shares, she asked for the money back. As I have noted, the plaintiff denies that she asked for the money back and denies that she said at any time that she would not be involved in the daily operation of the first defendant and that she would not want any share of profits.
42 I am not in a position to reconcile this dispute in the evidence. However, for present purposes, it does not seem to me to be possible to construct the remark alleged by the second defendant to have been uttered into an agreement of the kind now, belatedly, referred to by the second and third defendants in their submissions.
43 On their face, the words attributed by the second defendant to the plaintiff do not seem to be promissory in nature, nor (on the second defendant's account of the conversation) do they seem to have been regarded as promissory. They seem to me to be too vague and general to be regarded as possessing promissory effect, so as to be capable, upon acceptance, of leading to a binding contract. At most, they might be regarded as some statement of present intention.
44 Even if the words be regarded as promissory, it would not be thought that the plaintiff was binding herself never to seek to intervene in the management of the company. The same would apply, to the extent that it is relevant, if the words were treated as representations of intention rather than as being promissory. In other words, whether the words are to be regarded as promissory or whether they are to be regarded as a representation of present intention, they do not seem to me to amount to a commitment on the part of the plaintiff never to seek to intervene in the management of the first defendant.
45 I therefore conclude that there is no basis made out on this ground for the grant of injunctive relief as sought.