Where should costs fall?
4 While the Court has broad discretion to make a costs order pursuant to s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), it is well-settled that, as a general proposition, costs follow the event (Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) 8 ATPR 40-748, De Rose v State of South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 137, Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72). So, where a respondent successfully raises a defence, as a general proposition the respondent is deemed successful so far as "the event" is concerned and the proper allocation of costs (GPT Management Ltd v Spa Heaven Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1043, Pondcil Pty Ltd v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd (unreported, Cooper J, 19 August 1994), Lend Lease GPT (Rouse Hill) Pty Ltd v Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 26, Ryding v Miles (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 312, cf Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Limited [2007] FCA 2058 at [10]).
5 In this case however Tamawood submits, in summary:
Tamawood was entitled to declarations that the Bloomer respondents infringed Tamawood's copyright, albeit innocently.
The Bloomer respondents chose to throw themselves into the fray. They could have accepted that Tamawood was the owner of the copyright in the relevant plans and not put in issue three-dimensional infringement or authorisation and thereby confined the issues between the parties to a defence under s 115(3) of the Copyright Act.
Instead, by their pleadings, until July 2011 the Bloomer respondents took an identical position to the Habitare respondents.
Tamawood was justified in prosecuting the proceedings as against the Bloomer respondents, particularly in light of the fact that, in the final iteration of their defence, they did not admit either the subsistence of copyright in Tamawood in respect of their drawings or that the building of houses by Bloomer constructions infringed Tamawood's copyright.
6 In my view Tamawood should pay the costs of the Bloomer respondents.
7 It was not in dispute at the recent hearing that Tamawood sought a declaration concerning the infringement of its copyright by the Bloomer respondents because there was commercial and practical utility in obtaining from the Court a public statement to that effect, particularly in the highly competitive environment in which Tamawood operates. While Tamawood was entitled to a declaration, it was appropriate that this declaration be heavily qualified not only by reference to the fact that the infringement concerned only one of the Tamawood designs, but by reference to the innocence of the Bloomer respondents. Further, this outcome must be considered in light of the facts that:
I found that the Bloomer respondents only innocently infringed Tamawood's copyright in relation to one of the designs, namely the Torrington, and did not infringe copyright in any other Tamawood designs. It was perfectly reasonable, in my view, for the Bloomer respondents to defend the breadth of Tamawood's case against them.
The Bloomer respondents consistently denied that they were at fault.
In a letter from their solicitors to Tamawood's legal representatives dated 13 October 2011 the Bloomer respondents informed Tamawood that they had made no profit from the projects involving the Habitare dwellings.
As Mr Bloomer deposed in his affidavits of 26 September 2011 and 22 November 2013, he had no notice of any issue of infringement of Tamawood's copyright until the Habitare projects upon which the Bloomer respondents worked were almost or totally completed.
As was clear from the manner in which the trial was conducted, the Bloomer respondents put Tamawood to proof. To that extent, it does not appear that the approach of the Bloomer respondents to the proceedings unnecessarily inflated costs incurred.
Prior to the trial, and in particular by communications of 2 September 2011 and 13 October 2011, the Bloomer respondents offered to settle the proceedings with Tamawood and bear their own costs, but this offer was rejected by Tamawood and the trial commenced on 18 October 2011.
8 In my view, Tamawood's pursuit of the Bloomer respondents, with little result - namely heavily qualified declarations which were limited to one of the Tamawood designs only and which exonerated the Bloomer respondents from any deliberate infringement - was reflective of Tamawood's wish to make an example of the Bloomer respondents as builders who had innocently become involved in the matter.
9 I see no reason why the Bloomer respondents should pay Tamawood's costs in such circumstances. I also see no reason why the Bloomer respondents should bear their own costs when they have successfully resisted Tamawood's claims - completely in relation to all designs but the Torrington design, and having raised a successful defence in relation to the Torrington design.