The applicant does not suggest that this is a case in which the Governor was or ought to have been involved in deliberations as to whether consent to the taking order should be given. The applicant acknowledges the effect of s 60 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), that where there is a reference to the Governor doing some act, matter or thing, it will be taken to mean that such act, matter or thing shall be done by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Executive Council.
In relation to the general workings of the Governor in Council, I have been guided by the observations of Wilson J in FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke:[6] It is unnecessary to repeat those observations in these reasons.
The applicant submits the inclusion in s 191(1) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) of a requirement for the Governor's consent to the taking order to be obtained, is a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive, and that being so, if it is to operate as an effective safeguard, it implies an obligation to accord procedural fairness to the land owner.
The respondents' answer to that submission is to say that as a matter of statutory interpretation, no such obligation of procedural fairness arises. They contend that the stage of the process at which procedural fairness was required to be given was the reservation of the intersection land under the Metropolitan Regional Scheme in 1994 and that there is nothing in the statutory framework that suggests that the land owner should be afforded an opportunity to make submissions before recommending and seeking the Governor's consent.
The question of discovery arises on the hypothesis that the applicant succeeds in its primary argument, that is, it establishes there is an obligation on the respondents to accord the applicant procedural fairness. The question will then be whether the applicant has made out its argument that there has been a lack of procedural fairness. It is to this question that the documents sought by the discovery application are relevant.
On this question the respondents say that the applicant's case rises no higher than an assertion that there has been a failure to accord procedural fairness and that there is no substance or support for that case in any of the materials that are presently relied upon by the applicant.
I do not accept that is so. I consider there is at least an inference that can be drawn from the circumstances of the decision-making process in this case that the decision-maker failed to give proper, genuine, and independent consideration to the issue of whether the Governor's consent should be sought or whether a recommendation that it be given should be made.
That inference arises from two matters. First, the question of whether such consideration was given is closely related to the question of whether the decision-maker was under an obligation to accept and consider submissions from the applicant. If the decision-maker failed to accept and consider submissions from the applicant, then it is a short step to infer that proper, genuine, and independent consideration was not given to recommending and seeking the Governor's consent. Secondly, (perhaps this is of slightly less significance) the overall position adopted by the respondents in this matter is consistent with there being no obligation to accord procedural fairness of any kind to the applicant in the decision-making process under review. That being so, I think it is open to infer that no such consideration was given and that the recommending and seeking of the Governor's consent were steps regarded as formalities to be observed to carry the taking order into effect and distinct from the deliberative process.
The analysis just undertaken proceeds on the basis most favourable to the respondents, that is, I have, in effect, searched for an evidentiary foundation to support the application for discovery but on the basis of the statements of applicable principle derived from Hill J's judgment in Canwest such an exercise is unnecessary. All that is required is for the allegation to be pleaded in a cogent, bona fide way in the substantive application, thereby giving rise to an issue to which the discovery is said to be relevant. That has been done in this case.
Thus, in my view, the respondents should provide discovery of the documents relating to the procedural fairness ground.
It might be said, perhaps with some justification, that the applicants have cast the net wider than may be required in sub-pars 3(a) to 3(e) of their minute. There is a degree of overlap between the categories of documents that are sought, but any criticism of the applicant's approach must be tempered by an appreciation that the applicant does not know precisely what documents exist. In other circumstances, there might be a justification requiring the documents to be specified with a greater degree of precision, but in the circumstances of this case it is appropriate to order that the respondents provide a list of documents verified by affidavit in relation to the categories of documents identified in sub-pars 3(a) to 3(e).
[2]
Respondent's claim for public interest immunity privilege
[3]
Notwithstanding that each side made detailed and helpful written submissions, it is both proper and preferable to determine any claims for public interest immunity after a list of the relevant documents has been produced and the claims for public interest immunity are articulated in the conventional way in an affidavit. I will make orders to that effect.
[4]
Respondents' claim for legal professional privilege
[5]
I propose to take a pragmatic approach to dealing with the claims for legal professional privilege. The documents should be made available to me, and after I have inspected them, I will make rulings in relation to the claims.
[6]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
After referring to and discussing the decision of a Full Court of the Federal Court in WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman [1980] FCA 79; (1980) 41 FLR 175, his Honour said, at 412: