37 That, in turn, raises the question whether what has been pleaded in par 4 is sufficient to raise a case of knowing assistance in this respect. It seems to me that it is not. If the plea of request or authority fails, as it seems to me it must, the first respondents are left only with their plea that Mr Palassis acted in the interests of the appellant. That, in itself, cannot support a claim of knowing assistance on its part. I should mention, in this respect, that in Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 it was doubted by Handley and Cripps JJA (with whom Kirby P was relevantly in agreement) that allegations that one person permitted or allowed breaches of duty by another disclosed any basis for liability on Barnes v Addy principles. In the case of this pleading there is, if the plea of request by, or authority of, the appellant fails, not even any basis for suggesting that permission was given by the appellant to Mr Palassis to engage in the conduct relied upon, even if its permission be assumed to be relevant to that conduct. Moreover there is, in my opinion, simply no basis for contending that mere inactivity on the part of the appellant, at least in the circumstances of this case as pleaded, could amount to the lending of assistance for the purposes of the second limb of Barnes v Addy. Inactivity of that kind could not sensibly be said in any way to have facilitated the breaches of duty by Mr Palassis (see Jacobs, supra, par 1339). It follows that the pleading, as particularised, discloses no arguable cause of action against the appellant in respect of this claim.