Ground 1 - denial of procedural fairness
31 The essence of TDS Biz's complaint as to a denial of procedural fairness may be summarised in some detail as follows, exposing the lack of content directed to the live issue of the need for an overseas finding for TDS Biz to be entitled to claim an R&D tax offset as detailed in relation to ground 2 considered above:
(a) TDS Biz filed a hearing certificate indicating it intended to call three witnesses, Mr Jamie Collins, Mr Anthony Elliott and Ms Amy Huang (as it transpired, Ms Huang was not available to be called as a witness);
(b) the application for review of the Commissioner's decision was set down by the Tribunal for a two-day hearing on 21 and 22 July 2022;
(c) the hearing commenced at approximately 10:04 am on the first day and, including a 15-minute break, and concluded at 12:03 pm without any witness being called or examined;
(d) TDS Biz did not have any legal representation;
(e) TDS Biz's external R&D consultant, Mr Collins, made submissions on its behalf, but was not sworn as a witness;
(f) Mr Elliott, TDS Biz's engineer and project developer, only spoke four words during the entire two-hour hearing;
(g) it was originally anticipated that Mr Elliott would be called as a witness, with the only issue being that he had been incorrectly identified as an expert witness in the hearing certificate;
(h) the issue of TDS Biz's witnesses providing evidence at the hearing went awry, referring to the hearing transcript where Mr Collins referred to Mr Elliott being an integral part of the business, that he undertook the R&D activities, and his evidence was to illuminate the activities that he undertook in Australia, being the primary purpose of him being there. (However, it should be noted that the Tribunal member had Mr Collins confirm that there was no intention that Mr Elliott would speak without being prompted, but he was available in case there were technical questions that needed to be addressed.);
(i) there were some additional exchanges between Mr Collins and the Tribunal member which are relied upon to infer that TDS Biz did not fully understand or appreciate the practice or procedure of the Tribunal, with no witness outlines ever being filed or served and Mr Collins reciting his prior professional experience despite not being sworn as a witness;
(j) Mr Collins also expressed concern that Mr Elliott's evidence would cause boredom, which is relied upon to support an inference that TDS Biz did not understand questions from the Tribunal about "formal evidence" or that Mr Collins' submissions were not evidence;
(k) the asserted denial of procedural fairness and the opportunity to present TDS Biz's case was exacerbated by the Commissioner objecting to any oral evidence from Mr Elliott or Mr Collins (noting that this objection by the Commissioner was evidently based upon the statutory construction questions addressed in relation to ground 2 above);
(l) while the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) provides that the Tribunal carry out its review quickly and informally, the basic procedure of a final hearing should not be abandoned, citing:
(i) Italiano v Carbone [2005] NSWCA 177 at [35]-[36]; and
(ii) Lee v Cha [2008] NSWCA 13 at [48]-[49] on the obligation for a trial judge in criminal proceedings to take appropriate steps to ensure that a party appearing unrepresented has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial with the application of the principle depending upon the circumstances of the case;
(m) s 39 of the AAT Act imposes an obligation on the Tribunal to ensure that every party to a proceeding before it is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case;
(n) while there was some preliminary discussion regarding TDS Biz's witnesses, the Tribunal appeared to abandon the ordinary procedure of the hearing and proceed with submissions from the parties;
(o) TDS Biz disagreed with the Commissioner's submission to the Tribunal that the evidence of Mr Elliott and Mr Collins would have been irrelevant and a waste of the Tribunal's time and resources;
(p) Mr Elliott's evidence would have been highly relevant in assisting the Tribunal regarding the details surrounding the component purchases from the Chinese companies, how the components were utilised for the R&D activities conducted in Australia, the details of the R&D conducted in Australia, and that no false or misleading statements were made, and the evidence existed that TDS Biz had a reasonably arguable position regarding the R&D tax offset;
(q) Mr Elliott was not invited to give this critical evidence under oath or affirmation, and be cross-examined upon it; and it was appropriate in the circumstances for the Tribunal to give TDS Biz assistance to fulfil its duty as that evidence would have been relevant to the principal issue surrounding the R&D activities, the purchase of the components from China, and the determination of any administrative penalty;
(r) while Mr Collins and Mr Elliott were highly qualified engineers, they were unaware of the Tribunal's practice and procedure and the "resulting miscarriage" that would result from not providing any evidence in the witness box on the relevant issues;
(s) while the Tribunal noted it did not have any other evidence beyond Mr Collins' limited and brief statement [in fact affidavit] from February 2022, the Tribunal should have informed TDS Biz that its submissions were not evidence, and without evidence, its appeal would necessarily fail;
(t) the Tribunal therefore did not ensure that TDS Biz had a reasonable opportunity to present its case, therefore failed to discharge the statutory obligation imposed by s 39 of the AAT Act.
32 TDS Biz relies upon a number of authorities dealing with unrepresented litigants, including SZUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; 216 FCR 445, a case dealing with an unrepresented litigant who did not speak English, who was not advised that the Court would not act on statements from the bar table made through an interpreter and that his allegations would fail in the absence of evidence. For reasons that will shortly become apparent, the reliance upon that and other like cases was misplaced given the very different circumstances in this case, turning as they do upon a state of affairs that could not be changed by any evidence that could have been given, or any submissions that could have been made.
33 TDS Biz also relies upon Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; 403 ALR 398, per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ at paragraphs 1, 2, 7-9, 12, 15, 33 and 39, and Gageler J at paragraphs 46-47, 51-53 and 56. That was a visa revocation case in which the appellant was not given an opportunity to give or adduce evidence or to make submissions on the way in which two domestic violence offences could affect the Tribunal's consideration of one of the primary considerations as to whether there was "another reason" (apart from the character ground for mandatory visa cancellation in the first place) why a visa cancellation should or should not be revoked, namely, in that case, the need for protection of the Australian community. The issue was whether or not the error in not having the appellant give evidence was material so as to constitute a jurisdictional error having regard to the terms of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
34 The practical test for materiality is substantially the same, at least in this context, as the familiar test of whether there was a reasonable possibility that the absent evidence, submissions or other information, deprived the party affected of the realistic possibility of a different outcome. Applying the reasoning in Nathanson to this case, the question is whether any submissions or evidence advanced by TDS Biz could realistically have produced any different outcome. For the following reasons, the answer to that question is a decisive and unambiguous "No", given the undisputed absence of an overseas finding which was indispensable for TDS Biz to be eligible to claim the R&D tax offset, and the statutory provisions dealing with the imposition of an administrative penalty for falsely claiming such an entitlement.
35 The vital springboard for TDS Biz's assertion of a denial of procedural fairness and a proper opportunity to be heard depends upon a misinterpretation of the legislative regime applicable to an entitlement to a tax offset for R&D expenditure. The claim of a denial of procedural fairness is incapable of being made out, because the evidence that was not called and not heard, and any related submissions that might have been made, essentially concerning R&D activities in Australia, and the use that would be made of the materials supplied from China, could not possibly have made any difference to the determination that the objection decision should be affirmed. That is because, after summarising key aspects of the documentary evidence from TDS Biz concerning the activities of the suppliers in China, the Tribunal correctly made the following determinative findings:
[25] As such, the [TDS Biz]'s supporting R&D activities are not covered by paragraphs 355- 210(1)(d) or 355-210(1)(e) as these activities are conducted overseas and the [TDS Biz] does not have an overseas finding.
[26] For these reasons, I find that notional deductions under section 355-205 of the ITAA 1997 do not arise from the [TDS Biz]'s $1,613,462 expenditure on the supporting R&D activities during the year ended 30 June 2018. The [TDS Biz] is not entitled to a tax offset in respect of this expenditure.
36 There was no evidence (or submissions) that could have been put before the Tribunal, and identified in the written or oral submissions for TDS Biz in this Court, that could possibly have changed the conclusion by the Tribunal that TDS Biz did not have the necessary finding under s 28C(1)(a) of the IRD Act, as required for any of the ITAA 1997 conditions in s 355-210 to be met, as clearly required by s 355-205(1)(a)(ii). In those circumstances, there was no injustice in the Tribunal not providing for irrelevant evidence to be adduced, or equally irrelevant submissions to be made, even if there was any obligation to do so, which is doubtful, at least in the circumstances of this case. The merits review application to the Tribunal in relation to the disallowance of the objection to the amended income taxation was at all times doomed to fail, as indeed were the objections to the amended notice of assessment, the penalty notice and this appeal.
37 The whole tenor of TDS Biz's case before the Tribunal was not that of apologising for, or otherwise explaining, making a false claim, but rather of doubling down on why it was not false at all. It was not for the Tribunal to give TDS Biz or its representatives legal advice. That is especially so when the reasons given for the Commissioner disallowing the objection, reproduced above at [14], made abundantly clear why that decision had been made in relation to the key and determinative issue of meeting one of the conditions in s 355-210 of the ITAA 1997.
38 In all the circumstances, it is clear that there was no denial of procedural fairness in relation to the Tribunal's review of the disallowance of the objection decision in relation to the notice of amended assessment.
39 On the question of the administrative penalty imposed, the Commissioner's reasons for disallowing the objection were thorough and detailed. TDS Biz faced a steep hurdle in showing that anything they could have said or done could realistically have made any difference to the Tribunal's decision to affirm the disallowance of the objection to the penalty notice. A generalised assertion of a denial of procedural fairness to vitiate the Tribunal's decision to affirm the disallowance of the objection as to the penalty imposed could not suffice.
40 No real attempt was made in this Court to explain how any evidence that could have been adduced on this topic before the Tribunal (or any submission could have been made) that could possibly have made a difference to the Tribunal's decision to affirm the disallowance of the objection to penalty. That is especially so when regard is had to the careful application by the Tribunal of apparently sound and well-established principles.
41 Nor could the evidence that was sought to be adduced on the question of eligibility to claim the tax offset conceivably have made any difference to the Tribunal's decision to affirm the disallowance of the objection to the penalty decision. To the contrary, the evidence which it is contended should have been facilitated being adduced by TDS Biz concerning the core R&D activities in Australia would have shown the extent of the failure to appreciate the correct meaning of the legislation and what was required to claim a tax offset for the supporting R&D activities in and from China. Adducing that evidence could not possibly have made the false statement by omission of failing to refer at all to the overseas nature of that work other than reckless, so as to warrant the 50% penalty, nor realistically could it have affected the decision of the Commissioner not to remit that penalty in whole or in part.
42 It follows that there was no denial of procedural fairness in the approach taken by the Tribunal. It follows that ground 1 must also fail.