SZSYI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

The Tribunal's decision 14 The first applicant claimed, in summary, to fear persecution for reason of his imputed anti-government political opinion. 15 The Tribunal accepted, at [44], that the first applicant was employed in the Herasat, which represented the Ministry of Intelligence and state security apparatuses, within Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). However, it doubted the plausibility of his claim that he was under scrutiny or considered himself to be under scrutiny, because of concerns about his loyalty to the regime. The Tribunal outlined its reasons for this doubt from [45]-[50]. 16 The Tribunal did not accept that at the time the first applicant left Iran there were outstanding charges against him, or any investigations into the first applicant for passing on weapons to anti-government protesters. The Tribunal did not accept that he was regarded with any suspicion by the Iranian authorities before he left Iran. The Tribunal did not accept that he was under scrutiny or considered himself to be under scrutiny because he was a person who was not loyal to the regime. 17 The Tribunal considered the first applicant's claim concerning his relatives' links with the Mojahedin e Khalg (MEK), his claim concerning being a failed asylum seeker, from [61], and further related claims from [64], including being put at risk of mistreatment because of his brother's attempt to seek asylum in Australia. 18 The Tribunal found that the first applicant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion at [73]. 19 The second applicant, the female adult applicant, claimed to fear harm for reason of her being a member of her husband's family and her parents' family. 20 The Tribunal accepted that the second applicant's parents were supporters or members of the MEK and were imprisoned 33 years ago for that reason. The Tribunal accepted that her father and her had lived normal lives free from harassment since her father's release from prison. The Tribunal noted that it was not claimed that her mother continued to be politically active in any way since the 1980s nor, until the recent claims of arrest, had she been subjected to any ongoing harassment or harm over many years. The Tribunal noted it was also not claimed that her sister (in Iran) had been harmed or harassed because of her mother's past. The Tribunal did not regard a particular article as a reliable source of evidence. 21 The Tribunal was satisfied the adult applicants had not been imputed with anti-government views because of their link with the second applicant's parents. The Tribunal found that the second applicant's chance of being arrested and interrogated for any reason arising from her parents' political histories or from her mother's current plight was remote. 22 The Tribunal considered remote the chance that the second applicant would be arrested and interrogated as claimed because of any problems associated with the first applicant's previous work for the MFA. It found the chance of the second applicant being perceived to be against the Iranian regime for any reason, including arising out of her legal departure from Iran, was remote. 23 The Tribunal found that the second applicant had made no complementary protection claims: at [107] of its reasons.

Proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court 24 The applicants commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court by application filed on 19 June 2013. The matter was listed for a directions hearing before his Honour Judge Raphael on 12 December 2013, at which procedural orders were made and the matter was set down for a final hearing on a date to be advised. The first applicant appeared in person on this occasion. 25 On 15 January 2014, the Minister and the applicants' then counsel were notified by email that the matter had been listed for hearing at 10.15am on 23 May 2014 before Judge Manousaridis. The Court convened a hearing on that date and time, at which the applicants were represented by counsel, who appeared with an instructing solicitor. At the hearing on 23 May 2014, the applicants were granted leave to amend their application. 26 The Court reserved its judgment, which it handed down on 30 January 2015. The applicants' counsel attended the judgment delivery. The Court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs. 27 The issue arising for determination was whether the Tribunal failed to consider the applicants' complementary protection claims under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). His Honour held that the Tribunal dealt with all claims relevant to whether there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicants' removal to Iran, there was a real risk of significant harm. In particular, it was held that the Tribunal had considered the matters the applicants' counsel said were not considered: at [25] of his Honour's reasons.

Application for extension of time 28 The application seeks an extension of time, pursuant to r 31.02(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), in which to appeal against the judgment of the learned primary judge. This rule is not apt to this appeal. This case is an appeal from a Federal Circuit Court decision and therefore the relevant rule is r 36.05. 29 Factors relevant to the grant of an extension of time include whether the applicants can successfully articulate an acceptable explanation for the delay, and the merits of the substantive application: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349. 30 The last day within which the applicants could have lodged any appeal within time was 20 February 2015: see r 36.03(a). This application was filed on 9 April 2015. The application is therefore moderately out of time. Counsel for the Minister, reasonably in my view, informed the Court that she was prepared to make submissions on the application confined to the question of the asserted merits of the putative appeal. I am satisfied that the applicants were not the cause of the delay. 31 The Minister submits that the ground of the draft notice of appeal lacks sufficient prospects of success, such that an extension of time should not be granted. This asserts that the primary judge erred at [24] of his reasons: [24] The Tribunal's statement that the second applicant made no claim for complementary protection may reflect a belief that the only harm the second applicant claimed she feared if she returned to Iran is harm that would flow from a Refugee Convention reason. Whatever the Tribunal may have meant by stating the second applicant made no claim for complementary protection, I am satisfied the Tribunal did consider whether the second applicant, as well as the first applicant, had a claim under complementary protection. In relation to both the first and second applicants, the Tribunal in terms considered whether there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of their being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real risk they will suffer significant harm. For both the first and second applicants, the Tribunal found there was no such risk. 32 The applicants referred to a number of passages from the transcript of the Tribunal hearing. First the Tribunal member stated the following: Tribunal Member: Okay, the other way in which you can get Australia's protection is through what's called complementary protection. So I'll just explain what refugee status is and what complementary protection is, briefly. I'm sure that your representative has already explained those things, but just briefly I'll remind everyone what they are. So a refugee is a person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in their own country for reasons of race or religion or nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and sometimes a combination of those reasons. Persecution involves some serious harm and when we say must have a well-founded fear of being persecuted; that means that there must be a real chance, a chance that isn't remote that you will be persecuted. Complementary protection involves significant harm. Slightly different wording - there must be substantial grounds for believing that is a necessary and foreseeable consequence of a person being removed to, in your case, Iran. There is a real risk that person will suffer significant harm, for any reason. So as you know, the immigration department decided that that did not apply to anyone on your application. So the Tribunal is not part of the Immigration department; it's independent. That means I'll be looking at all of the evidence anew. And the hearing today gives you a chance to add anything or explain anything that you think might not have been clear when you were interviewed previously. The hearing is completely confidential, so nothing that you say will be made public in any way that might identify you. [Emphasis added.] 33 The applicants submit that the statement by the Tribunal amounts to an express undertaking that the evidence before the Tribunal will be considered anew for the purposes of the applicants' claims for protection under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. 34 Subsequently, the following exchange occurred with the first applicant: Tribunal Member: All right, okay. So the final question is just the general question. Remember at the beginning I said that protection could come through refugee status or complementary protection? So apart from what you've already told me, or put in your written application, is there any reason why you think you might be, you might face significant harm if you go back to Iran - apart from what you've already said? First Applicant: No. 35 Then the following exchange occurred with the second applicant, who was also called to give evidence: Tribunal Member: Yes, okay. Okay, yes. Okay, so I mentioned at the beginning complementary protection, which requires that you would have to be facing some significant harm for any reason. I just want to make sure that you've told me all the reasons why you are concerned about being harmed if you go back to Iran. Second Applicant: That's all. Tribunal Member: That's all, okay. Second Applicant: What's the difference between these two? Tribunal Member: Well, basically - I'm going to summarize it very briefly. If you're a refugee, you have to face a real chance of being persecuted because of your race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. And with complementary protection, those reasons - race, religion and so on - are not required. You can fear significant harm for any reason. Second Applicant: Which one's better? What's the difference ultimately? I mean they're both ultimately protection visas. Tribunal Member: Yes, but you'll end up in the same place if you fit the criteria in either of them. It's just that complementary protection gives a further opportunity for protection that refugee status doesn't give. Now, is there anything we haven't discussed that you think is important? Second Applicant: I don't think so. 36 In dealing with the second applicant's claims under the complementary protection provision (s 36(2)(aa) of the Act), the Tribunal stated in its reasons at [107]: She has made no claims under the Complementary Protection criteria, which as noted above require that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of her being removed from Australia to Iran there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm. On this point I find that there is no such risk. 37 The applicants submit that a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons is that the Tribunal considered that the second applicant abandoned or did not make a claim for complementary protection. In oral submissions, counsel for the applicants outlined that if one accepts that that occurred with respect to the second applicant, one might infer therefore that it also happened with respect to the first. 38 The applicants submit that [24] of the reasons of the primary judge, set out fully at [31] of these reasons, amounted to a quasi-merits based analysis of the Tribunal's reasons and thus disclosed error: 24. The Tribunal's statement that the second applicant made no claim for complementary protection may reflect a belief that the only harm the second applicant claimed she feared if she returned to Iran is harm that would flow from a Refugee Convention reason. Whatever the Tribunal may have meant by stating the second applicant made no claim for complementary protection, I am satisfied the Tribunal did consider whether the second applicant, as well as the first applicant, had a claim under complementary protection. 39 The applicants submit that the passages from the transcript disclose that the second applicant did not understand and was not conversant with the nuances of the Refugee Convention and hence was not abandoning her claim or in any way limiting the ambit of her claim to the Refugee Convention. 40 It is then submitted that having misdirected himself about whether the applicants had narrowed their claim, his Honour then engaged in "merits' based" analysis, to the effect that even if the applicants had made a claim it would have been futile in any event. 41 This was, they contend, a flawed analysis in that the primary judge used a hypothetical result to justify a flawed process. 42 The applicants submit that this amounted to jurisdictional error by a failure to have regard to the actual nature of the legal inquiry required to be undertaken, citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82]. 43 The applicants accept that they did not, in express terms, raise claims under the complementary protection provisions with any specificity. Nonetheless they submit that: (a) a fair reading of the factual claims is demonstrative of the proposition that the claims were raised under both the Refugee Convention and the complementary protection criterion; (b) the factual claims were regarded by the Minister's delegate as having raised both a claim under the Refugee Convention and the complementary protection criterion; (c) a fair reading of the exchanges with the Tribunal do not admit the inference that the factual propositions put in regards to the generic claim were abandoned in regards to the complementary protection claim; (d) in light of the express undertakings made at the commencement of the hearing, the undertakings made by the then Minister in his second reading speech and the existing authority of this Court, this material should have been considered under the alternative criterion.

Consideration 44 As the applicants correctly submit a decision maker is required to correctly construe and consider claims, and component integers thereof, made by an applicant or apparent on the face of the material before him: Htun v Minster for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244 at [42] per Allsop J (with whom Spender and Merkel JJ agreed); Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321 at [22]-[24], [27] per Gummow and Callinan JJ; at [88]-[89] per Kirby J; at [95] per Hayne J. 45 I accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal in its reasons, including at [107], did not conclude that the applicants had abandoned any aspect of their factual claims as relevant to complementary protection. When the Tribunal said that no claims under the complementary protection criterion had been made, read in context, this meant no more than that, as was the fact, no express claims in this respect had been made. Certainly, as the Minister correctly observes, no separate or additional factual claims were asserted that were reliant specifically on the complementary protection criterion. In the final sentence of [107], the Tribunal made an express finding that the relevant risk, referrable to the complementary protection criterion and its findings of fact, did not exist. There would have been no reason to so find had the Tribunal thought the second applicant had abandoned any reliance on the complementary protection criterion. The Tribunal, I find, did engage with the complementary protection provisions. 46 The Tribunal's findings of fact with respect to the adult applicants' factual claims, were germane to its assessment of the adult applicants' claims to fear persecution under s 36(2)(a) of the Act as well as s 36(2)(aa), the complementary protection criterion. There was no need for any separate consideration of these same factual matters in relation to the complementary protection criterion. 47 Those adverse factual findings were sufficient warrant to dispose of any complementary protection claims adversely to the applicants. Such was the case too in SZSHF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 237, although the visa applicant there placed express reliance on the complementary protection criterion. 48 I reject the applicants' submission that they were denied procedural fairness. 49 I find that there is insufficient prospect of success on the merits. The application for an extension of time will be dismissed. The applicants should pay the Minister's costs. I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gilmour.