Consideration and determination
15 It is unnecessary to summarise the parties' submissions because they are sufficiently addressed in my reasons below for dismissing the appeal.
16 It is necessary, however, to restate the now reasonably well settled principles concerning legal unreasonableness because the appellant's case, as presented, is inconsistent with several of them.
17 The relevant principles are identified in cases such as Li; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1; Singh; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408; Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1; 364 ALR 446; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7; 365 ALR 202; Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; 366 ALR 665 and Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151. This list of authorities is by no means exhaustive.
18 In brief, the relevant principles may be summarised as follows:
(a) whether or not an administrative decision is legally unreasonable requires close attention to be given to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made (SZVFW at [54], [79] and [135]);
(b) legal unreasonableness is "invariably fact dependent", requires a "careful evaluation of the evidence" and involves an application of the relevant general legal principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case and not an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases (Singh at [42]);
(c) where reasons are provided, they are "the focal point for the assessment" (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]);
(d) where the reasons disclose a justification for the exercise of a statutory power, only rarely would a court find that the exercise of a discretionary power was legally unreasonable (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]);
(e) a court exercising judicial review jurisdiction is not entitled to replace a primary decision-maker's reasons which do not disclose an intelligible justification for the exercise of the power with reasons which were not relied upon by the decision-maker (Haq at [35]);
(f) the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and should not be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272);
(g) in assessing whether the standard of legal unreasonableness has been established, it is not relevant to take into account events which occurred after the challenged decision was made (see Li at [83] and Ellis at [174]-[177]);
(h) a statutory discretionary power contains an area of decisional freedom and the Courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion (Li at [28] and [66] and Haq at [37]); and
(i) in applying the standard of legal reasonableness, the Court should not substitute its view as to how a statutory discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker and, depending upon the terms of relevant discretionary power, the decision-maker will generally have "a degree of latitude in determining what is fair and just in a given case" (SZVFW at [13]). In other words, the standard of legal unreasonableness which is implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power is "a demanding standard" (Haq at [37]).
19 The starting point must be the key statutory provisions which provide the framework for the AAT's decision to grant an adjournment for a period less than that sought by the appellant. The AAT was conducting a review under Pt 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Where an application for review is properly made under s 412, the AAT had a statutory obligation under s 414 to review the decision the subject of the review application (subject to an exception in s 414(2) which is not relevant here). The purpose of the review was to determine whether the AAT should exercise any of the powers in s 415. In conducting the review, the AAT was bound to apply s 420, which described the way the AAT should operate in reviewing a Part 7-reviewable decision. Section 425 obliged the AAT to invite a review applicant to appear before it in the circumstances described therein. Under s 427(1)(b), the AAT had a discretion to adjourn the review from time to time.
20 It is unhelpful for the appellant's case of legal unreasonableness to be put on the basis that it is "on all fours" with Li. This effectively invites a "tick the box" approach which has been rejected in numerous cases, including Singh. That is not to say, however, that there is no need to pay close attention to the particular factual circumstances of a case as, plainly, that is required.
21 Where there are reasons for the challenged decision, as is the case here, they are the focal point of the analysis. The AAT's reasons are set out at [11] above. They are self-explanatory and, contrary to the appellant's submission, they provide a logical and intelligible justification for granting a shorter adjournment than that sought by the appellant. There is no reason to repeat those reasons as they speak for themselves.
22 It is particularly significant to note that the door was left open for the appellant to request a further adjournment if he was unwell on 6 November 2015 and guidance was provided to him as to the type of medical evidence he should obtain if he wished to make a further adjournment request. No such request was made.
23 Moreover, contrary to the appellant's submissions, it is evident that the AAT carefully monitored the appellant's capacity to participate in the hearing and, in response to its several requests, the appellant stated that he was well enough to proceed. To assist the appellant, the AAT took a brief adjournment during the course of the hearing on 6 November 2019 to reduce any stress being experienced by the appellant. It should be noted that the appellant did not contend, either below or on the appeal, that he was denied procedural fairness because he lacked capacity to present his case (see, for example, Karan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 139). His case was conducted on the sole basis of legal unreasonableness.
24 It was not illogical or legally unreasonable for the AAT to adjourn the matter for a period less than that sought by the appellant in circumstances where it was made clear to the appellant that he could make a further request for an adjournment based on medical evidence. It is to be recalled that the appellant himself is recorded as having told the AAT officer on 2 November 2015 that his medical problems "would come and go, a few days at a time".
25 It is also significant that at the end of the hearing on 6 November 2015, the appellant was given 18 days to provide any further evidence in support of his claim, including any medical evidence in relation to his memory and medical conditions. The material which the appellant then provided does not advance his claim of legal unreasonableness (assuming, without deciding, that such material is relevant to the issue of legal unreasonableness).
26 The primary judge was correct to conclude that the AAT's reasons provide a logical and intelligible justification for the actions it took which the appellant challenges. Having regard to SZVFW, I should state that I am not persuaded that the AAT's refusal to grant the appellant a longer adjournment than it did was legally unreasonable.