the decision of the federal magistrates court
30 The grounds of review relied on by the appellant before the Federal Magistrates Court may be summarised as follows:
1. The Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the appellant's claim that his father was arrested by the army in 1995. The Reviewer accepted that the appellant's father was arrested in 1995, but did not consider what the actual reason for the arrest was and found that there was insufficient evidence before him to satisfy him that the arrest was Refugee Convention related. In so finding, the Reviewer failed to consider the appellant's claim that the powers of arrest were exercised by the army and not local law enforcement.
2. The Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error by finding that the appellant contradicted himself about having mentioned his father's arrest at the RSA interview, in circumstances where there was no evidence upon which the Reviewer could have made such a finding. The Reviewer found that the appellant stated at the beginning of his interview that he had not revealed in his RSA interview that the army had arrested his father. The Reviewer failed to distinguish between the appellant's new evidence as to the circumstances, as opposed to the fact of, his father's arrest, which were separate matters. The finding of contradictory evidence was a critical step in the making of the credibility findings that formed the basis of the Reviewer's ultimate decision that the appellant did not satisfy the criterion for the grant of a protection visa, but there was no evidence upon which the Reviewer could make such a finding.
3. The Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error and failed to act judicially by making an adverse credit finding, in part because of a purported delay by the appellant, during the interview, in raising new evidence, when such delay was the result of the Reviewer's conduct at interview. The appellant sought to raise new evidence at the commencement of the interview. The Reviewer failed to distinguish between the appellant's new claim as to the factual circumstances giving rise to the arrest of his father, as opposed to the factual circumstances of the arrest itself. The Reviewer precluded the appellant from providing particulars of that new claim by changing the subject area of his questions before such evidence could be given. The fact that the appellant had allegedly not raised that new claim until the end of the interview was a critical step in the Reviewer's credibility findings and his key finding that the appellant's father was not arrested for reasons relating to the Refugee Convention.
7. The Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error by failing to take into account a material consideration in making an adverse credit finding on the basis of the inconsistency as between the appellant's entry interview and his statutory declaration, in that the Reviewer failed to have regard to an answer in the entry interview that was consistent with the claim made in the statutory declaration. The Reviewer was bound to take the whole entry interview into account before making an adverse credibility finding against the appellant, based on an inconsistency between the entry interview and the statutory declaration.
31 In dealing with ground 1, the primary judge observed that, in his reasons, the Reviewer recorded that the appellant said that he had new information to provide, namely, that he had recently been told by his aunt that the army had arrested his father. The claim that it had been the army that detained the appellant's father was made as early as the entry interview on 31 May 2010. His Honour considered that, in the circumstances, it was not necessary for the Reviewer to describe that it was the army that had detained the appellant's father. The Reviewer had already referred to the army's involvement in the detention when he summarised what the appellant had said at his entry interview. His Honour considered that there was nothing in the Reviewer's reasons to suggest that he had approached his consideration of the issue on any basis other than that it had been the army who detained the appellant's father. His Honour referred to a passage in the Reviewer's reasons where he expressly referred to the fact that he did not accept that the arrest of the appellant's father was because he had links with the LTTE or because he was perceived to have had such links. His Honour considered that the Reviewer plainly considered the claim and had rejected it as an invention.
32 The primary judge referred to the appellant's submission that, in that connection, the Reviewer should have considered the army's power of arrest, whether it was dependent on a person having LTTE connections and whether the claimed arrest of the appellant's father would have suggested that he had LTTE links. The primary judge did not accept the appellant's submission that, although such a claim had not been articulated at the review, it was nevertheless one that emerged sufficiently clearly from the material that was before the Reviewer that it should have been considered by him. His Honour said that the appellant did not point to any material before the Reviewer, such as country information, that supported any particular conclusion concerning what powers of detention the Sri Lankan army might have had at the relevant time and, thus, what detention by the army might have signified. His Honour considered that the evidence before the Reviewer did not suggest that, in a non-combat situation, the army had power to arrest or even a propensity to detain, lawfully or unlawfully, people in general or anyone in particular, such as persons with LTTE associations. His Honour concluded there was no claim concerning the significance of arrest by the Sri Lankan army, unarticulated but nevertheless tolerably obvious on the materials, that the Reviewer failed to consider.
33 In dealing with ground 2, the primary judge referred to the appellant's submission that his statement to the Reviewer, that he had mentioned in his RSA interview that his father had been arrested by the Sri Lankan army, was correct and that the Reviewer's finding that he had contradicted himself was a finding for which there was no evidence. The primary judge pointed out that, at no point prior to the interview with the Reviewer had the appellant described his father's disappearance as an arrest. Rather, he had always described it as an abduction, a distinction that the primary judge considered to be of some significance, on the basis that arrest implied the existence of a real or purported de jure power, while abduction meant a kidnapping. His Honour considered that it was significant to that distinction that the appellant's allegation, that his father had been abducted, was coupled with an assertion that his family did not know why that had happened. In both his entry interview and in his statutory declaration he said that he did not know why his father had been abducted.
34 The primary judge considered that the appellant's characterisation of his father's disappearance as an unlawful abduction, rather than a potentially lawful arrest, was borne out by his assertion in his statutory declaration that, when the police and army questioned his family at their home in Colombo, they wanted to know where his father was, implying that his father had been the subject of some action that lacked legal sanction and of which the army would have been formally unaware. His Honour observed that the RSA assessor's summary referred only to the appellant saying that his father had been abducted by the Sri Lankan army for unknown reasons and made no mention of the appellant having said that his father was arrested.
35 The primary judge observed that, in his interview with the Reviewer, the appellant was aware that his characterisation of the disappearance of his father as an arrest was new information. The appellant asserted that the Reviewer failed to recognise that his new evidence concerned the circumstances giving rise to his father's arrest, not the fact of the arrest. His Honour considered that that assertion misconceived the Reviewer's findings and reasons, and did not point to any relevant error on the Reviewer's part. The finding of contradictory evidence was concerned only with the nature of the detention of the appellant's father, not with the reasons for it. His Honour concluded that it was not true for the appellant to say that he had mentioned in his RSA interview that his father had been arrested by the army: he had not said that. Rather, he had said that his father had been abducted. His Honour considered that the evidence indicated that the appellant knew that those were different things. His Honour concluded that the Reviewer's finding that the appellant contradicted himself on that point was open on the evidence.
36 In relation to ground 3, the primary judge observed that the appellant relied on an exchange between the Reviewer and the appellant in the course of the interview. The appellant submitted that, on any view of that exchange, he would be understood to have been attempting to inform the Reviewer that his aunt had recently provided him with information concerning the circumstances of his father's arrest, rather than giving evidence about the fact that his father had been arrested. The appellant asserted that the Reviewer had failed to recognise that distinction. The passage referred to by the appellant is as follows:
A: You know, in my RSA interview I didn't reveal about my father's arrest. You know, army arrested my father that time I was small. I spoke to my auntie in recent months and she told me the details about his arrest.
R: Are you saying that at the time of the RSA interview, you were not aware of this fact?
A: Okay. During my RSA interview I didn't have full understanding about this incident and the second thing is I was scared. I was worried and upset whether I can reveal this or not. That's why I didn't give the man the idea about this arrest.
R: How do you mean you didn't have a full understanding of it?
A: Because I was small and at that time I was very small and my auntie only explained me about this arrest over the phone in recent months so I wanted to explain you about that.
R: And you said that during the RSA interview you were also scared to reveal this fact, but you've just said that you weren't fully aware of it at that time. Could you explain please.
A: Yes.
R: Let me explain my question in just a moment. You just said that during your RSA interview you were scared to reveal this information but you also said that you only found out a few months ago. I assume you mean after the interview, so I'm not quite clear of what you are saying.
A: Okay, you know when I had my RSA interview I knew that my father got arrested but I didn't know anything about it and I was a bit worried to mention that because I didn't know that I had to tell that or not. And then, I had a discussion with my auntie and she explained what happened.
R: You did say in your first interview and also in your written statement that your father had been abducted, so that was already on your file. I'm wondering why you were worried about mentioning it at the RSA interview. I'm just not quite clear on this could you clarify please.
A: I have mentioned in my RSA interview that my father got arrested by the army.
R: Why didn't your auntie mention this to you earlier, before you left Sri Lanka?
A: Because I didn't ask her anything about this I didn't have any thoughts about this when I left from Sri Lanka. I was very small that time and I didn't think about it.
37 The appellant pointed to his use of the word "about" in the above passage and submitted that that indicated that he was attempting to address the reasons for his father's arrest, and that he had been unable to expand on that issue because of the direction the Reviewer's questioning had taken, which effectively prevented him from discussing the issue. He submitted that it was only later in the interview that he had an opportunity to give evidence about why his father had been arrested. The primary judge considered that, when the passage in question is considered in the context of the transcript as a whole, that factual assertion is probably correct. His Honour had particular regard to the appellant's advisor's comments to the effect that, based on recent instructions, it was arguable that the appellant had a profile of someone who might be suspected of having a link with the LTTE, based on the possible activities of his father. His Honour accepted that the implication in the Reviewer's reasons, that the evidence concerning the reasons for the detention of the appellant's father was invented during the course of the interview, was incorrect. However, his Honour observed, it was based on the fact that the appellant did not articulate that aspect of his claim until towards the end of his interview with the Reviewer. Consequently, it was open to the Reviewer to conclude, albeit indirectly, that it was an invention devised during the interview. His Honour did not consider that an incorrect conclusion of that sort amounted to legal error.
38 The primary judge did not consider that the evidence supported a conclusion that the Reviewer was attempting to prevent the appellant from giving the evidence he wanted to give. Rather, it was a case of the interview going in a particular direction at a particular time and the appellant not saying all that he had to say until later. His Honour did not consider that that amounted to a denial of procedural fairness. In any event, his Honour said, the duty to act judicially was, in the circumstances, a duty to afford procedural fairness, which, in turn, involves a duty to act rationally and reasonably. The law is concerned to avoid practical injustice and the Reviewer's incorrect conclusion did not represent illogicality or unreasonableness in the relevant sense.
39 The primary judge accepted that an applicant who has established a want of procedural fairness on the part of an independent merits reviewer is entitled to succeed, unless the court is satisfied that it could have had no bearing on the outcome. His Honour considered that the Reviewer's factual error had no bearing on the outcome of the review. The Reviewer's rejection of the appellant's claim that his father was arrested because he had links with the LTTE, or because he was perceived to have had such links, had a number of bases. One of those bases was that the Reviewer considered that it was implausible that the appellant had not asked his aunt about the reasons for his father's arrest until the very last stage of his application for protection. His Honour considered, therefore, that the mistaken inference that the Reviewer drew about the point in the interview, when the appellant gave evidence about the claimed reason for his father's arrest, was mentioned only to give emphasis to the conclusion that the Reviewer had expressed in the immediately preceding sentences. It did not form part of the reasoning and did not render the reasoning legally erroneous. Accordingly, although the appellant had identified a finding that his Honour found was incorrect, his Honour did not consider that it was legally erroneous or a finding on which any conclusion that was material to the decision was based.
40 In relation to ground 7, the primary judge found it difficult to conclude that the Reviewer would have found the appellant's statutory declaration to be inconsistent with what had been said in his entry review questionnaire if the whole of that questionnaire had been taken into account. His Honour considered that a particular answer provided a factual bridge between the appellant's answer to an earlier question in his entry interview questionnaire and what he said in his statutory declaration. His Honour considered that, if regard had been had to the earlier question, the Reviewer would not have been able to find that the statutory declaration contradicted what had been said in the questionnaire. His Honour concluded that the answer to the earlier question had been overlooked by the Reviewer.
41 However, the primary judge considered that that oversight was of no real significance. His Honour considered that the Reviewer's comments concerned an issue that was entirely peripheral to the matter that he had to decide. Had he concluded that the appellant had not made inconsistent statements in relation to his stay in India, that would, in his Honour's opinion, have had no effect on the Reviewer's findings concerning whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, in so far as those findings depended on intermediate findings as to the appellant's credit. His Honour considered that the Reviewer's view of the appellant's credibility was determined by his evidence and claims concerning the events in Sri Lanka, not what he said about the terms on which he had been able to stay in India and when and why he had to leave. Accordingly, his Honour concluded that the Reviewer's failure to consider the information set out in the earlier question in the entry interview questionnaire could not possibly have deprived the appellant of a successful outcome, because the evidence was so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision.