CONSIDERATION
17 I have set out the appellant's notice of appeal in full because it serves to demonstrate at least two things. First, the only attempt he has made to point to any error on the part of the Federal Magistrate is the statement in the first line: "That the appellant's case was not considered by the learned FMC". Secondly, its main thrust is to quibble with the Tribunal's fact finding exercise.
18 As to the first of these matters, I have examined the Federal Magistrate's reasons for decision and it is clear from them that his Honour did consider the matters put to him by the appellant. The appellant's difficulty, however, is that all of those matters involve various factual aspects of his claims. For example, the Federal Magistrate records in his decision (at [27]) that:
The Applicant told the Court that there was still violence against Sikhs in India. He said that a friend of his had also lodged an application for a protection visa. His father was arrested in relation to a bomb blast in India. He had been tortured by the police. There were other cases similar to those.
19 This leads me to the second thing demonstrated by the appellant's notice of appeal. That is, that his quibbling with the fact finding exercise of the Tribunal clearly amounts to an attempt to seek a merits review of the Tribunal's decision. It is well-established that neither the Federal Magistrates Court, nor this Court, can review the merits of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 and 291 and NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10]. The Court is not concerned with whether the decision was unjust, only with whether it was lawfully made: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-6.
20 These observations apply equally to the affidavit the appellant has filed in support of his notice of appeal in this Court. This affidavit is identical to his written submissions. It is also very similar, if not identical, to the three page written statement the appellant submitted in support of his original application. In other words, this affidavit simply restates the appellant's factual claims.
21 The appellant's fundamental problem in this appeal is that he passed up his opportunity for a full merits review by the Tribunal by electing not to accept its invitation for him to attend before it and elaborate on his claims. As the Full Court said in NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 (at [8]), once he did that: "the inevitable consequence was the rejection of his application".
22 There can be no doubt the Tribunal clearly had the power to proceed under s 426A(1) in the appellant's absence. While that power must be exercised reasonably and cannot be exercised capriciously, the election to proceed to a decision on the review in the absence of the appellant cannot, by itself, be treated as the expression of an unreasonable exercise of the power: NBBL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 152 FCR 592; [2006] FCA 1045 per Greenwood J at [20]-[21]. Nor is there any obligation on the Tribunal to make any inquiry as to the failure on the part of an applicant to appear: see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73 at [39].
23 The Federal Magistrate was satisfied that the Tribunal had not exceeded its powers by proceeding pursuant to s 426A of the Act and, in the circumstances, I am unable to detect any relevant error in that conclusion.
24 For these reasons, the appellant's appeal must be dismissed. I will so order and also order that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of this appeal fixed in the sum of $2,930.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Reeves.