consideration
19 On the assumption the reference to the "Tamil League" is intended to refer to the HINDRAF, the appellant's first ground of appeal appears to be similar to the first ground of review raised before the Federal Magistrate. This ground seeks to challenge the factual conclusions reached by the Tribunal as to the appellant's involvement with the HINDRAF organisation. This involvement was alleged to have caused his persecution. Even if there was some error in the Tribunal's conclusions about these matters, there is clear authority that such errors in the Tribunal's factual conclusions cannot, without more, amount to jurisdictional error: see Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 560; [1999] HCA 14 at [137].
20 Furthermore, it is not the role of this Court, nor is it the role of the Federal Magistrates Court, to second guess the Tribunal's fact-finding role, or to engage in a merits review of the Tribunal's decision. These are matters that fall squarely within the fact-finding jurisdiction of the Tribunal: see, eg NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9]. It follows that the appellant's first ground of appeal must be rejected.
21 The first part of the appellant's second ground of appeal also seeks to challenge the Tribunal's factual findings and, therefore, seeks a review of the merits of the Tribunal's decision. For the reasons outlined above (see [19] to [20]), these matters are not open to review, or to appeal in this Court. The second part of the appellant's second ground of appeal appears to allege that he was not provided with the opportunity to present a critical part of his case, ie the dire consequences if he were to remain in Malaysia. As the High Court observed in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 at [35]: " … the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision". The Tribunal's reasons show that the Tribunal did in fact give the appellant at least two opportunities to say what he wished to about this part of his case. First, the Tribunal records that it: "… put to [the appellant] that he would not have been willing to return to Malaysia if his claims were true". Secondly, at the end of the hearing, the Tribunal asked the appellant if there were any other claims or matters he wished to put before the Tribunal. According to the Tribunal's reasons, he responded at length about this aspect of his case on both these occasions. It follows that the appellant's second ground of appeal must also be rejected.
22 The first part of the appellant's third ground of appeal again seeks to challenge the Tribunal's factual findings and, therefore, seeks a review of the merits of the Tribunal's decision. For the reasons outlined above (see [19] to [20]), these matters are not open to review, or to appeal in this Court. In relation to the second part of the appellant's third ground of appeal, it is clear that the Tribunal wrote to the appellant on 28 October 2009, advising him that his application for review had been unsuccessful. Attached to that letter was a copy of the Tribunal's written reasons. It follows that the appellant's third ground of appeal must be rejected too.
23 Finally, it is not possible from the general and unparticularised nature of the appellant's fourth ground of appeal to begin to assess whether the Tribunal did in fact make any relevant error as alleged therein. No details are provided as to what "wrong issues" and "wrong questions" the Federal Magistrate and the Tribunal are said to have asked. If this ground is intended to allege bad faith or bias against both, first, I agree with the Federal Magistrate's reasons for rejecting the similar allegations in relation to the Tribunal's decision and, secondly, there is, in my view, not even the slightest evidence in the Federal Magistrate's reasons, or any other evidence, to support these allegations against the Federal Magistrate.
24 It follows that the appellant's fourth ground of appeal must be rejected.
25 The appellant's written submissions raise the contention that the Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness by requiring the appellant to provide proof of various matters: see above at [17]. As discussed by the Federal Magistrate ([2010] FMCA 236 at [34] to [36]), the Tribunal did not require proof of these matters as a condition precedent to finding that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution. Rather, the Tribunal noted that if the appellant suffered the horrendous treatment as he claimed, then he would have provided some evidence to support these claims. The Tribunal was quite entitled to take into account the appellant's failure to produce convincing corroborative evidence and the absence of such evidence was merely one factor relied upon by the Tribunal. I therefore reject this contention.