consideration
17 None of the grounds raised in the appellant's notice of appeal was raised before the Federal Magistrate. The authorities clearly establish that leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: see O'Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310 at 319 and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees [No 2] Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [38]. Nonetheless, since the appellant is unrepresented, I will consider the grounds raised in the notice of appeal.
18 At the outset of that examination, it is appropriate to observe that the appellant's grounds of appeal are quite formulaic in their terms and they are similar, if not identical to, the grounds of appeal that have been used before in other migration appeals, including a number of appeals before me in this sittings: see SZKNA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1806 at [10]; SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775 and SZNDJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 778. Nonetheless, I have attempted to identify whether any of the grounds raises any apparent error on the part of the Federal Magistrate.
19 Turning to the first ground, because of the unparticularised and general nature of it, it is not possible for me to even begin to assess whether the Federal Magistrate did in fact make any such errors. The appellant's first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
20 In relation to the second ground of appeal, it is clear from the Tribunal's reasons that it carefully considered each of the appellant's claims, including his claim that he and his wife's lives would be in danger if they were to return to Pakistan, and gave comprehensive reasons for deciding that the appellant did not face such a risk. To succeed on this type of ground, the appellant must identify a specific claim he made to the Tribunal and then demonstrate that the Tribunal did not address that claim. Here, it is not possible from the general and unparticularised nature of this ground of appeal, to begin to assess whether the Tribunal did in fact overlook any part of the appellant's claims. The appellant's second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
21 The appellant's third ground of appeal asserts that the Federal Magistrate dismissed his application without considering the legal and factual errors contained in the decision of the Tribunal. This ground of appeal is also general and unparticularised. The appellant has not pointed to any error in the Federal Magistrate's reasons, nor any specific legal error in the Tribunal's decision. Furthermore, I consider it is clear from the reasons for decision of the Federal Magistrate that each of the grounds of review raised by the appellant was dealt with in a clear and comprehensive manner. As to the assertion there were factual errors in the Tribunal's decisions, there is clear authority that such errors cannot, without more, amount to jurisdictional error: see Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 560; [1999] HCA 14 at [137]. The appellant's third ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
22 As to the appellant's fourth ground of appeal it, too, is unparticularised and in the most general of terms. Moreover, whether the Tribunal's decision was "unjust" and "made without taking into account … of [his] circumstances …" is redolent of a merits review, which of course, is not open in an appeal to this Court. Furthermore, these are matters that fall squarely within the exclusive fact-finding role of the Tribunal: see, eg NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9]. The appellant's fourth ground of appeal must also be rejected.
23 Finally, in case there may be some error in the Federal Magistrate's decision that falls within these general and unparticularised grounds of appeal, I have examined the Federal Magistrate's reasons (summarised at [10] to [12] above) and I cannot detect any such error in them.