consideration
23 The first ground of appeal seeks to challenge the findings of the Federal Magistrate about whether the Tribunal complied with the requirements in s 424A of the Act. The appellant contends, in very general terms, that: the Tribunal failed to give her clear particulars of the information it relied upon to make its decision; the Tribunal did not explain the relevance of the information it intended to rely upon; and that the Tribunal did not invite the appellant to comment or respond. Unlike with her grounds of review before the Federal Magistrate (see [12] above), the appellant has not identified which information she says should have been provided to her under s 424A of the Act. Assuming it is the same information that she identified in her grounds of review before the Federal Magistrate, I consider that the Federal Magistrate correctly determined that that "information" did not constitute information for the purposes of s 424A: see the reasoning summarised at [13] to [15] above.
24 Furthermore, I consider the Federal Magistrate was correct in concluding that the appellant was merely attempting to use these allegations to agitate for a merits review of the Tribunal's decision. It is not the role of this Court, nor is it the role of the Federal Magistrates Court, to second guess the Tribunal's fact-finding role, or to engage in a merits review of the Tribunal's decision. These are matters that fall squarely within the fact-finding jurisdiction of the Tribunal: see, eg NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9].
25 The appellant's first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
26 At this point it is appropriate to deal with ground 3 of the appellant's notice of appeal. It, too, can be rejected for the same reasons. In it, the appellant is clearly attempting to quibble with the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence relating to the death certificate the appellant provided to it. This assessment is one that falls within the fact-finding role of the Tribunal and it is, for the reasons stated above, not open to review by the Federal Magistrates Court nor, on appeal, to this Court. There is clear authority that errors in the Tribunal's factual conclusions cannot, without more, amount to jurisdictional error: see Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14 at [137].
27 Turning then to the appellant's second ground of appeal, in it she alleges that the Federal Magistrate erred by failing to find a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal. No particulars are provided and the appellant has not provided any evidence to support the allegation - she appears to rely solely upon the Tribunal's reasons for decision. There is clear authority that an allegation of bias such as this must be distinctly made and proven: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J. Furthermore, it has been held that it is only in rare and extreme circumstances that bias on the part of the Tribunal can be established simply by referring to the Tribunal's reasons for decision: see SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38] per von Doussa J, SBBF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 358 at [16] per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ.
28 In the absence of particulars, it is almost impossible to assess whether there is any merit in the appellant's allegations of bias. Nonetheless, from my reading of the Tribunal's reasons for decision, I do not consider this is one of those rare and extreme circumstances where bias is established by reference to those reasons. From its reasons, it is apparent that the Tribunal made a fair, balanced and comprehensive assessment of the appellant's claims. The appellant's second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.