Notice of Appeal
17 The Court now refers to the ground of appeal referred to in the Notice of Appeal. At the outset the Court observes that the first ground in the notice of appeal which is numbered 2 is a proforma document often used in appeals in this Court since the decision of Raphael FM in SZNAV and Others v Minister for Immigration and Another (2009) 110 ALD 604. In that decision his Honour found that the 'acknowledgement letter' sent by the Tribunal was an invitation for additional information pursuant to s 424(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). Such decision however was reversed by the Full Court on appeal: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNAV [2009] FCAFC 109.
18 Further, the Court observes that ground 2 and ground 3 were not raised before Raphael FM. Accordingly, leave is required to rely upon such grounds: see VAAC.
19 Ground 2 claims that the Tribunal asked questions of the appellant during the hearing which invited him to give additional information but that the Tribunal failed to comply with ss 424(3)(a) and 424B of the Act. The Court notes that the reference to 'information addition' [sic] in the ground numbered 2(a) appears to be based upon the provisions of s 424 of the Act prior to its amendment. Such amendment was contained in items 9-15 of Schedule 1 of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2009 (Cth) which came into effect on 15 March 2009. As a result of the amendments, the current and relevant version of s 424 only refers to 'information'. No distinction is drawn between 'information' and 'additional information'. Section 424(1) empowers the Tribunal to 'get any information that it considers relevant' and s 424(2) now provides that the Tribunal may 'invite either orally (including by telephone) or in writing a person to give information'. The distinction which previously existed and referred to by Gleeson CJ in SAAP and Another v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 299 [4] is no longer relevant in view of the legislative change. Since the Tribunal heard the application for review on 8 April 2009 and had handed down its reasons on 8 August 2009, the Act, as amended, has application.
20 Under the amended s 424(3)(a) of the Act, a written invitation issued under s 424(2) must be given to the person in accordance with s 441A. The factual circumstance referred to in s 424(3)(b) is not relevant. However, it should be observed that under the amended s 424(3) there is no requirement, where an oral invitation is given, to comply with any further statutory requirement for notice. Since the appellant claims that questions were asked of him at the hearing, in accordance with the amended s 424(2) there is no basis for the submission that the invitation did not specify the way in which the 'additional information' was to be given nor the period in which it was to be given since these requirements do not exist under the amended legislation. It follows that ground 2 has no merit.
21 The second ground of appeal as contained in the Notice of Appeal is numbered 3. It alleges that the Tribunal failed to comply 'with the mandatory procedure prescribes [sic] by the Act in failing to comply with s 424AA(b)(iv) of the Act'. As to particular (a) to such claim, it is alleged that his Honour failed to establish that 'the Tribunal and the Federal Magistrates Court made error in law and jurisdictional error in relation to relief under s 424A of the migration Act' [sic]. This ground is misconceived. There is no evidence (in the absence of a transcript) that the Tribunal in fact exercised its discretion to adopt the procedures set out in s 424AA of the Act.
22 Secondly, even if it can be said that the Tribunal did exercise its discretion to adopt the procedures set out in s 424AA, a breach of s 424AA does not, of itself, constitute jurisdictional error: SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2009) 174 FCR 415 at [74-75]. The provisions of ss 424A and 424AA operate in a complementary fashion (by reason of s 424A(2A)), and the decision to engage the provisions of s 424AA is discretionary in the sense that the Tribunal is not obliged to take a course which engages those provisions but may do so if it considers such a course of action to be appropriate: see SZMCD at [86]. It is s 424A(1) that prescribes what must be done: see SZMCD at [90].
23 Further the appellant provides no details of the information which he alleges could have been the subject of s 424 A of the Act. In this circumstance particular (a) to the ground of the appeal is meaningless.
24 As to particular (b) it is alleged that the Federal Magistrate 'failed to find that the tribunal [sic] did not consider UNHCR section 4, 5, 9, 10 and did not consider at all cruelty against the humanity and therefore made error of law and jurisdictional error'.
25 It is well settled that whilst there is no onus of proof in administrative inquiries and decision making (see Yao-Jingi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275), it is for an applicant to provide their evidence and arguments in sufficient detail to enable the decision maker to establish the relevant facts: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214. The decision maker is not required to make the applicant's case for him or her: seePrasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155. Moreover, the choice and assessment of independent information used by the Tribunal is a factual matter for it: see NAHI at [11]-[14]; NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Another (2006) 156 FCR 419 at [81].
26 The appellants' claims appear to constitute a complaint in respect of the Tribunal's decision. The Court is not able to review the merits of the findings of the Tribunal: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang and Others (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. In these circumstances there is no error which the Court could review.
27 In view of the above, the Court considers that the grounds of appeal could not succeed and accordingly the Court refuses leave to rely upon them. The Court also observes that it has reached such conclusion having considered the merits, as if leave had been granted. Since the claims of the second appellant are dependant upon the result of the first appellant's claims, her claim must also fail. It follows that the appeal is dismissed.