Consideration
17 A significant feature of the psychologist's report is its meagre description of a possible diagnosis of two psychological conditions (post traumatic stress disorder and dysthymic disorder) coupled with its observation that these were consistent with the symptoms described by the appellant. The only statement of the history taken from the appellant was that he "briefly described experiences of religious persecution he experienced in Bangladesh". The appellant here did not rely on that as being corroborative of his claim as such, but rather, on the fact that he had the symptoms and that they were consistent with the psychological conditions. The appellant did not argue that this necessarily required a finding of a diagnosis that those conditions were post-traumatic stress or dysthymic disorder, but merely said that his symptoms were corroborative of his having suffered from the events he claimed which had led to the development of the symptoms and conditions.
18 The psychologist's report did not express a connection between the meagre history she had described as taken from the appellant and his symptoms or the two psychological conditions.
19 The use of medical and psychological evidence, as well as suggestions in evidence before the tribunal that applicants for review suffer or may suffer from medical or psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, has been considered in a number of authorities. Indeed, Applicant S20/2002 198 ALR 59 was itself a case with similar features. There the applicant for review had complained of an actual medical condition, being a form of hernia that he claimed was occasioned by reason of his treatment by persecutors in Sri Lanka. There, the tribunal had said it could not give weight to a doctor's report that such a condition was unusual in a 27 year old because the doctor was relying on the applicant for review's assertions as to how the hernia had been sustained. It had found that he was not a credible witness and could not be satisfied he had ever been detained or physically mistreated by the Sri Lankan authorities. Gleeson CJ said there was no error in the way in which the information from the doctor was treated. As McHugh and Gummow JJ, with whom Callinan J concurred, said, the critical passage in the reasons of the tribunal in that case should be read as reasoning that because the applicant for review could not be believed, the tribunal could not be satisfied with the alleged corroboration given by the doctor and that the tribunal was then unwilling to give that evidence weight: Applicant S20/2002 189 ALR at 64 [17] and [70] 49, 71 [51]-[52]. McHugh and Gummow JJ said:
"The tribunal discounted the medical report for its reliance upon assertions by the appellant as to the circumstances in which the hernia had been sustained."
20 Shortly afterwards, in Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12, the Court dealt with a situation in which the tribunal found that the applicant for review had been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The tribunal had accepted that that condition could explain inconsistencies in earlier information he had provided and did not hold those against him. As Gleeson CJ observed, there was no argument there that further assessment of the applicant for review might have provided evidence that he had been, in fact, seriously harmed before he came to Australia: SGLB 207 ALR at 16-17 [19]. In their judgment, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that in preparing its written statement under s 430 of the Act, the tribunal was obliged to determine which of conflicting accounts it accepted. They noted that after accepting that the applicant for review's ability to give evidence may have been impaired by the condition, the tribunal went on to determine whether his current condition was a consequence of Convention-related events in Iran rather than occurring during his detention in Australia. It was for the tribunal to make findings on the events which the applicant for review claimed had led to his decision to leave Iran. Their Honours said:
"That is to say, while the tribunal was prepared to take the respondent's claims at their highest, namely, as last described in the oral evidence (at hearing) and written evidence (by affidavit after the hearing) where there was a conflict the tribunal was nevertheless bound to decide between those inconsistent accounts."
21 They held that the tribunal was still at the end of the day required to make a factual finding about those matters. It is of course the case that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are intended to inform and they are not to be read with an eye finely attuned to error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1995) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
22 In my opinion, the critical passage in [92] of the tribunal's reasons does not reveal a jurisdictional error. Rather, the tribunal had to make a factual finding. The appellant claimed a connection could exist between his symptoms as accepted by the tribunal and the claimed persecution. But, the tribunal was not satisfied such persecution existed, and found that there was no corroboration available from the symptoms.
23 I see no error in the way in which the tribunal expressed itself in discounting any probative effect of the existence of the symptoms as supporting the appellant's claims. In order to assess whether or not the aetiology of his symptoms was the persecutory conduct, or that there was a real chance that they had resulted from that conduct, the tribunal necessarily had to assess all of the evidence. It did so throughout mindful of the fact that the appellant was in fact experiencing and suffering from those symptoms. On a fair reading of the whole of the tribunal's reasons, it was conscious that he suffered from those symptoms, but considered that his substantive claim of persecutory treatment was simply, as it said, "untruthful" and had been "fabricated."
24 The tribunal's lack of satisfaction about the substantive factual events that the appellant said had occurred in Bangladesh was arrived at in a way that does not appear to be illogical or irrational or such as no reasonable person could have reasoned. The inconsistencies and implausibilities which the tribunal exposed in its reasoning concerning the factual claims entitled it to find that, even if it were to treat the symptoms the appellant was exhibiting as corroborative of his claims, those symptoms would have taken his claim no further. On the basis that the tribunal assessed the matter, the symptoms could hardly explain why, for example, the appellant had returned to Bangladesh for 22 days when allegedly in fear of his life and he was unable to explain to the tribunal's satisfaction why he was there. Similarly, the tribunal has not been shown to have been unable to treat, as it did in [92], the symptoms that the appellant was exhibiting as not satisfying it that they were probative of persecution where his account had the significant inconsistencies or untruthfulness which the tribunal identified.
25 I am not satisfied that his Honour erred in the conclusion that he arrived at below or that any jurisdictional error asserted has been established.
26 In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rares.