Consideration
14 Section 476A of the Migration Act restricts the jurisdiction of this Court to grant constitutional writ relief or otherwise review decisions made by the Minister, his delegates or the Tribunal under the Act. Essentially, for present purposes, this Court can only exercise appellate jurisdiction in matters arising under the Act, being in the applicant's case the jurisdiction to grant leave to him to appeal out of time and, if an extension of time is granted, to consider whether to set aside the Federal Magistrates Court's decision. This Court has no jurisdiction to deal with any alleged deficiencies in the subsequent way in which the applicant's case has been progressed to the point of his imminent removal from Australia which he has been notified would have occurred today but for this hearing.
15 I have carefully read the decision of the Federal Magistrate to see whether there was any apparent error of law or other matter that might suggest a basis on which the applicant might be able to challenge his Honour's reasoning, conscious of the fact that the applicant is appearing for himself and is not familiar with the law or the intricacies of the Migration Act. I have not been able to detect any error that is apparent in his Honour's reasoning or the way in which his Honour dealt with the very detailed challenges that were made to the way in which the Tribunal had dealt with the application to review the delegate's decision to refuse him a protection visa in 2007.
16 In my opinion, none of the proposed grounds of appeal raises any basis on which it could be suggested that his Honour's decision is in error. The first ground raised issues to do with an international treaty obligations assessment. Such an assessment must be made with respect to the complementary protection ground provided in s 36(2)(aa). That ground came into force after amendments to the Migration Act on 24 March 2012, over four years after the Tribunal's decision. The failure to conduct an international treaty obligations assessment could not have provided any basis on which to challenge the decision made over four years before such an assessment became legally relevant under s 36(2)(aa). The complementary protection ground is now considered in addition to a claim under the Refugees Convention but was not applicable to the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court.
17 The second ground suggested that his Honour was in error in failing to set aside the Tribunal's decision on the basis that there was a threat to the applicant's life or liberty by reason of the fact that he might be detained were he to return to China on the basis of what North J had held in WZAPN [2014] FCA 947. The Tribunal made a specific finding that the applicant's treatment, were he returned to China and questioned by the authorities there in relation to what he had done in Australia, would not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. I am unable to see any arguable error in the way in which the Tribunal approached the matter or why it could be said that merely questioning the appellant on his return about his activities would amount to systematic and discriminatory conduct within the meaning of s 91R(1)(c) of the Act for the reasons I gave in SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1230 at [53]. Moreover, there was no finding by the Tribunal that the appellant would be detained in any way for the questioning.
18 The third ground asserts that the decision in SZGIZ 212 FCR 235 was in some way relevant. I am unable to see how it could be relevant for the purposes of considering an error by the Court below. His Honour was dealing with the Tribunal's consideration of the application for a protection visa on the basis that the Tribunal had dealt with that as a valid application, as, indeed, it was. To the extent that the ground seeks to challenge what the delegate decided on 24 April 2014, it too proceeds on an erroneous assumption. That is because the delegate acknowledged that the further application that the applicant made on 30 August 2013 was a valid application and required proper consideration in accordance with law which the delegate gave it, albeit in circumstances where the applicant was not present. Whether or not there was some error in the way in which the matter proceeded before the delegate could not affect the validity of the Tribunal's decision over six and a half years earlier, or the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court that reviewed the Tribunal's decision.
19 The fourth ground deals with the new application for a protection visa lodged earlier this week that could not possibly affect the correctness of the Federal Magistrates Court's decision in 2008 or the Tribunal's consideration of the claim for a protection visa in the previous year.
20 The principles on which the Court considers an extension of time under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) are well-known. The Court ordinarily considers, first, the nature of the explanation for the delay and, secondly, whether the case proposed to be brought is strong on its merits and one which ought to be heard in fairness to the parties, or whether it is a flimsy case and weak on the merits, in which case an extension may not be granted. In such applications, the Court does not go into detail on the merits: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 519-520 [3]-[4] per Brennan CJ and McHugh J, with whom Kirby J gave concurring reasons on this point at 540-541 [66(4)]; Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195 per Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ.
21 In my opinion, there is no prospect that any appeal, if an extension of time were granted and leave to appeal were also granted, could succeed on the grounds advanced, or on any other basis on my own review of his Honour's decision in which, as I have said, I have not been able to perceive any obvious errors in reasoning.