But each of these matters was in fact addressed and considered by the Tribunal. There has been no failure to consider that "information" which the Appellant claims was not considered.
13 Even if the ground can be construed as anything other than an impermissible attempt to revisit the merits of the Tribunal's decision, it is without substance. The findings as made by the Tribunal were findings of fact entrusted by the legislature to the Tribunal to make. Moreover, those findings were based upon a consideration of all the evidence, including that "information" which it erroneously was said was not considered.
14 The first Ground of Appeal is thus rejected.
15 The second Ground of Appeal is equally difficult to understand. The oral submissions as advanced by the Appellant at the hearing of the appeal, as translated, explained that this ground was intended to focus attention again upon the discrepancies as between the information set forth in her business visa application and her protection visa application. Rather than there being "no evidence" to support the findings as made by the Tribunal, the reasons of the Tribunal set forth the basis upon which it proceeded. In part the Tribunal found as follows:
The Tribunal considers that this would be too complicated a matter for a travel agent to just create letters that are forgeries in order to get a visa. There may be repercussions against the above-named organizations and reputations would be at stake. The Tribunal considers that the relevant China Chamber of Commerce, the organizer of the Trade Expo, with Government Departments would have carefully selected the participating companies and the companies would have carefully selected their candidates for the Expo.
The Tribunal does not consider that the evidence provided by the applicant shows that the Department's file documents are not genuine. It further considers that the applicant's claims are implausible: the Tribunal does not accept that a person who was not actually the person described in the business visa application could obtain a business visa in this way. The Tribunal considers that it is more plausible that a business person who has a previously unblemished police record could obtain a passport and an Australian visa and attend a Trade Expo and then seek asylum without any knowledge of the relevant China Chamber of Commerce or the person's employers.
The Tribunal therefore does not accept that the documents on the Department's file are fabrications used to create a new business identity for the applicant for the purposes of seeking asylum. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the Department's file documents are genuine. Thus, the implausibility of the applicant's claim and the weight of the documentary evidence on the business visa file suggests to the Tribunal that what is stated on the Department's business visa file about the applicant is indeed her true identity.
That finding is, again, one entrusted to the Tribunal and it is not considered that it is possible to sustain a contention that the conclusion of the Tribunal was without evidential support.
16 The second ground is also rejected.
17 The final ground is also misconceived. The task of the Tribunal was to review the decision of the delegate in accordance with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 15 May 2007 the Tribunal wrote to the now Appellant pursuant to s 424A of the Migration Act and specifically identified those matters in respect to which her comments were invited. That letter in part referred to evidence which had been given as to the work carried out by the now Appellant and evidence as to her true identity. The letter continued:
Such a conclusion may lead the Tribunal to find that parts of your evidence to it as to your identity was untruthful. This in turn may cause the Tribunal to doubt your truthfulness in relation to other parts of your evidence, such as your Falun Gong practice both here and in China, and it may also lead the Tribunal to find that you deliberately set out to contrive a claim for refugee status through your attendance at Falun Gong activities and related protests and demonstrations here in Australia.
Further time was sought by the now Appellant to respond to that letter and further time was in fact granted by a Tribunal officer. The now Appellant attended before the Tribunal at a hearing conducted on 16 April 2007 and ultimately replied to the May 2007 letter in July 2007.
18 The Tribunal, it is considered, thereafter proceeded carefully and fairly and properly set forth in some detail the "grounds" upon which it based its decision.
19 The final Ground of Appeal, it should finally be noted, refers separately to the Tribunal proceeding without "any proper grounds" and to proceeding without "any proper investigation". The reference to "proper grounds", it is considered, adds nothing to the first two Grounds of Appeal. What further "investigation" should have been undertaken, but was not undertaken, was again not set forth in the Notice of Appeal but was developed during the Appellant's oral submissions, as translated. The contention was that the Tribunal failed to call as a witness - or failed to make inquiries of - a fellow Falun Gong practitioner.
20 That more specific contention must also be rejected. On 21 March 2007 the Appellant signed a "Response to Hearing Invitation" as forwarded to her by the Tribunal. That document asked a limited number of questions of the now Appellant. One of those questions was:
"Do you want the Tribunal to take oral evidence from any witnesses?"
That question was left unanswered. There is no further evidence to support a contention that the now Appellant asked the Tribunal to call the fellow practitioner as a witness or that the Tribunal denied a request to call that witness. Reference was made in the Tribunal's reasons to the prospect of another person providing evidence, but the Tribunal noted that the now Appellant said of this person that she "had stated a few months ago that she was not writing letters for anyone any more to help in refugee applications".
21 In such circumstances it cannot be concluded that there was any failure on the part of the Tribunal to make a "proper investigation". Nor was such a contention advanced before the Federal Magistrates Court. It should further be noted that even had the Appellant requested that a witness be called before the Tribunal, the Tribunal was under no duty to allow such evidence to be given: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 426(3). As was the like conclusion in VJAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178, there is not considered in the present proceedings to be any reason to find that an obligation was imposed upon the Tribunal to call or to hear further evidence from the fellow Falun Gong practitioner referred to by the now Appellant.
22 The final ground is thus also rejected.
23 An Affidavit was filed in Court on the day of hearing seeking a fixed costs order in the event that the appeal was dismissed. That Affidavit sought a fixed costs order in the sum of $2,200. There is no reason to question that quantification.