SZIZO & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1339
[2007] FMCA 1339
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
Decision date
2007-09-05
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
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[2007] FMCA 1339
Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
2007-09-05
Original judgment source is linked above.
MIGRATION - Affidavit by applicant of translation of Tribunal proceedings not accepted as evidence - not accredited interpreter - grounds struck out because no particulars - no basis for understanding the reasons for challenging the decision - weight a matter for the Tribunal - bias not established.
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 144 ALR 567
Yao-Jing Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 289; (1997) 74 FCR 275
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155
Luu & Anor v Renevier [1989] FCA 518; (1989) 91 ALR 39
Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner [1993] FCA 412; (1993) 44 FCR 361
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
SZHPD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 157
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; ex parte H & Anor [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
1. This is an application filed on 30 June 2006 for an order to show cause why a remedy should not be granted in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") dated 16 May 2006 which affirmed the decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs not to grant the applicants protection visas. The applicants have not filed an amended application.
2. The first named applicant was born on 10 July 1952; his wife and their four children (third applicant, born 1 January 1985, 22 years old; fourth applicant, born 1 January 1992, 15 years old; fifth applicant, born
11 October 1992, 14 years old; sixth applicant, born 15 March 1996,
11 years old) are the remaining applicants in these proceedings. All applicants claim to be from, and of, Lebanese ethnicity and Maronite Christian faith.
3. The applicants arrived in Australia on 21 March 2001. The first named applicant lodged a protection visa application with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 14 November 2005. The applicant wife and children did not submit their own claims to refugee status, but rely on the application of the applicant husband/father (hereinafter "the applicant"). They lodged their protection visa applications with the Department on 6 December 2005. The first named applicant claimed in his application that Christian villages (including his own) were attacked by a group of terrorists in 2001. The applicant claimed that "on one of their night attack[s], they walked past my house...I informed the Lebanese army about their whereabouts and what I saw" (Court Book "CB" 19). The applicant claimed that the terrorists discovered what he had done and now he feared that they would "do everything in order to harm me or one of my family member as a payback" (CB 21).
4. On 9 February 2006 the applicant filed an application for review of the decision of the Minister's delegate with the Refugee Review Tribunal (CB 93). The applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on
23 March 2006 and was supported by a number of witnesses (CB 103).
5. By decision signed on 16 May 2006, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister's delegate refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. In considering the applicant's claims, the Tribunal found (CB 169-173) (highlighting added):
I accept that the applicant is a citizen of Lebanon.
The applicant claims to fear persecution from members of an extremist Islamic group who were involved in a conflict in the Dinnieh area of Lebanon in January 2000. He claims that he informed upon the activities of some members of this group one evening and as a result the Lebanese Army detained members of the group. He claims that members of the group and his Muslim neighbours are aware that he was the informer and will seek to harm him if he returns to Lebanon now or in the foreseeable future. He claims that he cannot relocate from the area near Dinnieh because he does not have the financial means to fund other accommodation for his family.
I have considered the applicant's claims in his protection visa application and review application, his and his witnesses oral evidence, written submissions made on his behalf and the documents given to the Department and referred to by the applicant in his submissions to the Tribunal.
I am required to determine whether the applicant has a well founded fear and if so whether what he fears amounts to persecution for a Convention related reason. My task is to consider all the evidence, make findings on material questions of fact and then to give reasons for my decision.
I accept that the applicant and his family are Maronite Christians and that they lived in a house in the village of Alma before the Dinnieh incident in January 2000. I accept that the house was owned by the applicant's brother in law and after the Dinnieh conflict that the applicant and his family went to live with the applicant's his sister in law in another area of northern Lebanon.
I accept that on or about the 31 January 1999 the applicant and his wife were visiting a relative in hospital in Zgharta when they saw ambulances arriving at the hospital and were informed of the conflict which was taking place in the villages located near the village of Alma. They were understandably anxious about the safety of their children who were at home at this time and I accept that they telephoned the children to ensure they were safe and that the applicant and his wife returned home immediately.
I accept that on or about the evening of 31 December 1999 the family slept in the family home taking some precautions to make sure that family members were together. I also accept that the applicant's wife and the applicant observed lights in the distance early in the morning and that they telephoned the local police to report this activity. I accept that the applicant and his wife were so disturbed and frightened by the activity going on around them that night that they left the home in Alma the next morning and moved in with the applicant's sister in law who was living in another village some distance way from the Dinnieh area.
It may be that the applicant and his wife returned to the home from time to time to collect belongings however I do not accept that they returned for any lengthy period of time or resided in the village of Alma before their departure from Lebanon.
The applicant and his wife presented as highly anxious and agitated individuals who became quite distressed at times when discussing the application. The applicant's evidence was confused and contradictory however the wife's evidence was clear and concise and she had a good recall of the incident. The evidence is that the applicant did engage in paid work before he left Lebanon and that he and his wife removed their daughter from her school in Tripoli. I formed the view that the family of the applicant had previously lived a stable life in a small village and were highly distressed and frightened by the incident in which the group known as Takfir al Hijra engaged in a serious and violent conflict with the Lebanese Army for a period of about 4 days in January 2000. There were reports of the mutilation of a female civilian in the attack on the village of Kfar Harbou and the evident distress shown by the applicant, his wife and daughter when talking about this aspect demonstrates the fear that resulted from the circumstances of the incident. I accept that the applicant and his wife feared for their safety and the safety of their children and it may be that the failure of the applicant to obtain further paid work in Lebanon resulted from the almost paralysing effects of this fear.
However I do not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution from members of Takfir al Hijra or any extremist Islamic group if he returns to Lebanon now or in the immediate future. The applicant claims he is at risk because he telephoned a local police officer and told him about lights in the distance on or about the night of 31 December 2000. He claims that members of the group know that he is the person who informed upon them and will take revenge. The country information indicates that the Lebanese Army and the Takfir group were engaged in hostilities well before the 31 December and the attack on the village of Kfar Harbou. The Army deployed over 3000 troops in the area against 300 members of the group. By the evening of the 31 January 2000 the Lebanese Army was engaged in a serious armed conflict with members of the group and the applicant's phone call would have only confirmed the known facts that the group was dispersing into the mountains following the engagement.
The country information also indicates that there were numerous complaints from villagers in the Dinnieh area that members of Takfir were openly walking the streets with their weapons before the Army became involved in December 1999. There are no reports of any revenge attacks on villagers in the local area who made those complaints.
The Takfir group is described as an extremist Islamic group with a small number of members who fled the area after the Dinnieh incident. Members of the group were either killed or arrested and others fled the area. The group is isolated and does not have widespread support in the community. The Army crackdown resulted in the relocation and reduction in size of the group and whilst there are reports and rumours of sporadic activity I accept the country information that they have little or no influence or support in the Lebanese community.
I do not accept that the applicant has been targeted by members of the Takfir group or his Muslim neighbours. I do not accept his evidence or that of his witnesses that members of Takfir have been asking about his whereabouts since he left Alma. The evidence is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. There is no indication of how the applicant or his witnesses know the identity or purpose of people asking about his whereabouts. There is no logical reason why unidentified persons would continue to make enquiries about his whereabouts for a period of almost six years when it is clear that he and his family left their family home in January 2000 and have never returned. There is nothing to suggest threats have been made against the applicant and he has not suffered any harm following the Dinnieh incident and before he left Lebanon in March 2001. The evidence of his witnesses is vague and is said to come from other sources. I consider that the evidence that members of Takfir are seeking his whereabouts is not truthful. I find that his witnesses have given this evidence out of family loyalty or friendship. Whilst I accept that the applicant has a general fear of members of extremist Islamic groups as a result of his experience of the events involved in the Dinnieh incident I do not consider that there is any objective basis for a fear of targeted harm against himself or his family.
I accept the evidence of Brother Fernando that he has been counselling the family since 2003 however this evidence does not take the applicant's claims any further as I have accepted that the applicant has a real and genuine fear of Muslim extremist activity in Lebanon and that this has caused him and his family significant distress. Further since his temporary residence visa was not renewed I accept he has been under stress and worried about his and his family's future.
I have considered the situation for the applicant if he returns to Lebanon now or in the foreseeable future. I accept that he will suffer financial and emotional stress as he and his family have lived in Australia for 5 years and have ties to persons in the Australian community. However the country information indicates that Lebanon has a functioning political and justice system which has improved significantly in recent years. I find that all members of the Lebanese community are able to access reasonable state protection against threats of harm from members of extremist groups such as Takfir on a non discriminatory basis. In fact, the Lebanese government has been criticised by Amnesty for its heavy handed treatment of and denial of human rights to, members and suspected members of the Takfir group. The amnesty recently offered to detainees accused of criminal activity at Dinnieh has been generally well received by most of the Lebanese community as a step towards sectarian reconciliation.
With respect to the information contained in the two anonymous letters I have disregarded that information in determining this application. It is clear that the applicant and his family have been involved in a dispute with other members of the Lebanese community over work, financial debts and obligations in the period since their arrival in Australia. The purpose of the anonymous letters appears to be to denigrate the family and is mainly concerned with matters which have taken place in Australia and generally does not relate to the refugee claims made by the applicant. The only reference to the applicant's refugee claims is an allegation that the applicant lived in a Christian village and could not have given information about extremist activity. I consider that this is an allegation based on speculation and I do not give it any weight. Further the allegation that the person who has made submissions does not know the family very well is irrelevant. The applicant has obviously asked the author of the submissions to assist him in putting his case to the Tribunal in a clear and concise manner and that person has performed that service on the instructions of the applicant. Accordingly I do not accept that the information in those letters is credible, relevant or significant and I have not put the information to the applicant for comment.
I find that the applicant does not face a real chance of persecution for reasons of his Christian religion or because he is perceived to he is opposed to extremist Islamic groups or for any other Convention based reason should he return to Lebanon now or in the foreseeable future. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for any Convention based reason.
Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the first named applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Therefore the first named applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act for a protection visa.
No specific Convention claims were made by or on behalf of the applicant wife and dependent children. The fate of their application therefore depends on the outcome of the first named applicant's application. As the first named applicant cannot be granted a protection visa, it follows that the applicant wife and children cannot satisfy the alternative criterion set out in s.36(2)(b) of the Act and cannot be granted a protection visa.
6. The applicant then filed the application in this Court, seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act").
7. In his application, the applicant set out three grounds as follows:
(1) The Tribunal erred in law in construing the Refugee Review Convention which error resulted in the Tribunal failing to exercise its jurisdiction under the Migration Act 1958.
(2) The Refugee Review Tribunal erred in law in finding that there was no real chance that the applicant faced serious harm from Takfir wal Hijrah, a Sunni extremist group.
(3) The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to investigate important information as probative evidence supporting the applicant's claim and in ignoring important information raised in a submission dated 3 March 2006 the Tribunal erred in law by ignoring the personal particulars of the applicant and the motivation of the Muslim extremists to take revenge as well as three important documents from competent authorities i.e. Parish Priest, Mayor of Zgharta, and applicant's brother.
8. The applicant has not filed an amended application.
Findings of the Court as to the grounds in the application
9. Ground one alleges an error in construing the Refugee Review Convention. The ground has not been supported by any particulars.
The Court accepts the submission for the first respondent that as "no particulars are provided in relation to the ground, it is not a proper ground and should be struck out."
10. In Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 per Heerey, Moore and Goldberg JJ at [14], their Honours concluded that the grounds in that application were not grounds at all as "they provide no basis for understanding what are the reasons for challenging the Tribunal's decision". The Court recognises that in Iyer the relevant issue was whether the appellant needed leave to argue grounds not raised before this Court, when conducting an appeal before the Federal Court of Australia. However, the Court accepts the relevance to this case of the ruling that where grounds provide no basis for understanding what are the reasons for challenging the Tribunal's reasons, they are not grounds at all. The Court is not required to search to see if it can find any possible breach of the Migration Act. The Court however will consider if a breach of s.424A or 425 has been established.
11. The applicant was invited to the hearing before the Tribunal (CB 99-100) and had the opportunity to present his case. He gave oral evidence at the hearing on 23 March 2006 (CB 154). There was no breach of s.425. No breach of s.424A has been alleged or is evident. Ground one is rejected.
12. Ground two complains about the findings of fact by the Tribunal that there was no real chance that the applicant faced serious harm from a Sunni extremist group (CB 170). That was a finding of fact by the Tribunal that was properly open to it on the material before it. The Tribunal set out its reasons for making that finding at CB 170.8 - 171.9. The applicant complains that the Tribunal should have called witnesses (Transcript 10, line 10) presumably to support the applicant's case.
13. The Court accepts the following statement by the Tribunal in N05/51049:
_It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements for the grant of protection are made out [_MIEA v Guo & Anor _(1997) 144 ALR 567 at 596]; and although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision making [_Yao-Jing Li v MIMA _[1997] FCA 289; (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288], the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant himself or herself, in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for him or her: [_Prasad v MIEA [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70; Luu & Anor v Renevier [1989] FCA 518; (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45.]
No error of law or reviewable error of fact has been established. Court Book 160-161 shows that the applicant was able to call the witnesses he wanted. Ground two is rejected.
14. Ground three alleges that the Tribunal failed to investigate important information which supported the applicant's claim and ignored information raised in a submission dated 3 March 2006. It is claimed that important information raised in that submission (CB 120-124) was ignored and that "three important documents" were ignored from:
• the Parish Priest;
• the Mayor of Zgharta; and
• the applicant's brother.
15. The Court rejects the contention that these "important documents" were ignored by the Tribunal. The Tribunal referred to each of those documents in its decision (CB 153, 156.9, 162.1 and 171.5).
16. The Tribunal found that "the witnesses have given this evidence out of family loyalty or friendship" (CB 171.7). The question of how much weight the Tribunal gave to the letters is a matter for it. The Court applies the following statement from the decision in Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commission [1993] FCA 412; (1993) 44 FCR 361 at [54]:
_It amounts to no more than a complaint as to the weight which was given to the retrospective nature of the regulation. The weight which is to be given to a relevant factor is a matter for the Tribunal unless it can be said that the Tribunal's decision is manifestly unreasonable. (_Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors [1986] HCA 40; (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41; Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; (1948) 1 KB 223 at 230, 233-234).
To set aside the decision as to weight it "must be so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it": Wednesbury.
17. The Court refers also to the decision in Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]:
In this case, the applicant was represented by a migration agent. The Tribunal is entitled to accept or reject or give such weight to the evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate in all the circumstances. Of course, if there is a positive finding of dishonesty or concoction or forgery that the Tribunal makes, of which no prior notice has been given to an applicant in the course of the hearing or otherwise, then a question of procedural fairness can arise, as did in the cases to which I have made reference earlier.
18. The applicant claims that there was a breach of s.424A as the Tribunal failed to put the letters of 10 April and 11 May 2006 to the applicant for comment (CB 162.5). At CB 172.4 the Tribunal said
With respect to the information contained in the two anonymous letters I have disregarded that information in determining this application.
There is something fishy and biased as it appears in the decision of the RRT, especially referring to Court Book page 162 and page 50 of the RRT decision. I strongly believe that the information given by anonymous sources are so important that the applicant should obtain a copy because it refers to the author of the submission of 7 April 2006 and 7 April 2006 is a date which indicates that the submission was received at the Tribunal as it appears on page 128 of the Court Book. So where did this information come from? The non-disclosure of a non-invitation to comment on these letters is an error of law. Your Honour, our future is in your hands.
The allegation refers to the anonymous letters that the Tribunal said it disregarded in determining the application. Ignoring those letters (which were against the interests of the applicant) does not show bias by the Tribunal.
20. An allegation of bias must be "distinctly made and clearly proven": SZHPD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 157 at [22], citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507. The Court accepts also that it "will be a rare and exceptional case where actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons for decision": SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38].
21. To establish bias the applicant would have to show that the Tribunal "acted dishonestly or arbitrarily or capriciously": SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ at [56-59]. There is nothing to show that the Tribunal acted dishonestly, arbitrarily or capriciously.
22. "The test for apprehended bias in relation to curial proceedings is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided": Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; ex parte H & Anor [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27].
There is nothing to show that a "fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided": Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; ex parte H & Anor [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27], citing Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337; (2000) 176 ALR 644 at 647 [6] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Bias has not been established. This complaint is rejected.
23. The applicant complains that the Tribunal found that the applicant father was confused and contradicted himself (Transcript 14, line 36). However, the Tribunal stated "I have not taken an adverse view of the contradictions in his evidence" (CB 156.2). This complaint is rejected.
24. The applicant alleges a breach of s.91R (Transcript 16, line 37). The Tribunal found at CB 171.8 that "I do not consider that there is any objective basis for a fear of targeted harm against himself or his family" for the reasons set out in the preceding sentences of that paragraph. Those findings of fact were properly open to the Tribunal on the material before it and are not subject to review.
25. The Tribunal found also at CB 172.10 that the applicant did not face a real chance of persecution for a Convention based reason. No breach of s.91R has been established.
26. The third applicant (SZIZQ) sought an adjournment to obtain a translation by a duly accredited interpreter of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The third applicant then identified from the transcript in her possession the alleged errors in interpretation. Those alleged errors were not of significance to the resolution of the matter. An adjournment was therefore not needed or granted.
I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Turner FM
# SZIZO & Ors
Minister for Immigration & Anor \[2007\] FMCA 1339
(1985) 6 FCR 155
(1997) 144 ALR 567
(1997) 74 FCR 275
(1989) 91 ALR 39
(1993) 44 FCR 361
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2001) 205 CLR 507
(2002) 194 ALR 749
(2001) 179 ALR 425
(2000) 205 CLR 337
(2000) 176 ALR 644