REASONS
22 I have considered the first respondent's submissions which I have drawn upon in framing these reasons.
23 The Tribunal's decision here is a privative clause decision, as defined by s 474(2) of the Act. Section 474 validly operates to prevent the judicial review of all decisions under the Act, except those vitiated by jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia(2003) 211 CLR 476.
24 By Order 52 rule 15(1) of the Federal Court Rules, the time limit for filing a notice of appeal is 21 days from the date of the judgment, which was given on 18 April 2007. Taking into account Order 3 rule 2(2), the notice of appeal was required to have been filed on or before 9 May 2007. The application for an extension of time was filed on 22 May 2007. This is a delay of 13 days.
25 By Order 52 rule 15(2), the time limit may be extended 'for special reasons'. To justify an extension of time, there must be 'a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry date of 21 days:' Joss v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195. In that case the expression 'special reasons' was characterised as 'an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served'.
26 The discretion of the Court to extend time is given for the purpose of enabling the court to do justice between the parties: WAAD v MIMIA [2002] FCAFC 399 at [7], Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 at 262; Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 at 480. However, an extension of time within which to file an appeal will not be granted without a consideration of the putative appellant's prospects of successfully prosecuting his appeal: WAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs at [9], Hughes at 264.
27 Accordingly, before granting the extension sought, the Court is required to be satisfied that the reasons put forward in the applicant's affidavit in support of the application constitute sufficient grounds for a departure from this general rule.
28 The applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the application, contained in the affidavit attached to his application for an extension of time, is that he did not know how to lodge the application. He also claims that he was denied procedural fairness in connection with the making of the decision.
29 I am not satisfied that these reasons constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of an extension of time. The applicant clearly had no difficulties in filing the application for review before the Tribunal and within the specified time limit, nor any difficulties filing the application for judicial review before the Federal Magistrates Court, again, within the required time. Furthermore, the reason given by the applicant today, namely that he forgot to file his appeal within time, was a different reason, although I suspect the correct one, to that contained in his affidavit. I do not accept his earlier explanation.
30 The applicant has not in any meaningful way particularised its first ground of proposed appeal relating to a denial of procedural fairness. The reasoning and conclusion of the Federal Magistrate in this respect were in my opinion correct.
31 The applicant's second proposed ground of appeal amounts to no more than an impermissible request for a review of the merits of the Tribunal's decision.
32 The applicant's two grounds of appeal noted above, are, in effect, reiterations of the applicant's grounds for judicial review before the Federal Magistrates Court. The proposed grounds of appeal do not point to any jurisdictional error by the Court below.