21 The appellant was assisted at the hearing by Mr Toufic Laba Sarkis. Mr Laba Sarkis is not legally qualified and is acting as a friend to the applicant, with no objection from the first respondent and with the leave of the Court. Despite Mr Sarkis' efforts, which I note were provided on a voluntary basis, his assistance was not equivalent to the assistance of a legal practitioner. Accordingly, I consider it appropriate to examine the judgment of Smith FM and of the Tribunal to ensure that there is no jurisdictional error which has escaped the attention of the appellant.
22 As to the first ground of appeal, the appellant claimed that the interpreter in the Tribunal hearing was inadequate, resulting in several errors revealed by the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. The appellant accepts that the transcript was not tendered before the Federal Magistrate, but says that he believed the transcript was being obtained by his solicitor as part of the preparation for the hearing before Smith FM, as he paid his solicitor to obtain it.
23 In support of his claim, the appellant sought to tender a copy of the costs agreement made with his former solicitor. He also sought to tender a version of the transcript, although not an official version. The respondent objected to the tender of both of these documents on the basis that new evidence could not be filed on an appeal of this nature, and, in the case of the transcript, because it had not been authenticated and, on the face of it, contained obvious errors. However, I allowed the tender of these documents, as I considered them necessary for me to understand the appellant's arguments.
24 The appellant's agent took the Court to several examples when the interpreter had difficulty in translating the appellant's evidence. The appellant claims that he was prejudiced because of the difficulties in translation. He submitted that had a more competent interpreter been present, he may have been able to establish to the Tribunal's satisfaction that he had a well-founded fear of persecution.
25 The transcript was not in evidence before Smith FM, although directions had been made in the Federal Magistrates Court for it to be filed. Whilst the appellant claimed that the omission resulted from the default of his former solicitor, I do not consider the costs agreement alone provides sufficient evidence to establish this fact. It is evident that the agreement between the appellant and his solicitor was, for some reason, terminated, which led to the filing of a notice of ceasing to act in these proceedings. The reasons for that termination have not been given. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there are any grounds for allowing the transcript to be tendered as new evidence in this appeal.
26 Even if I were to consider the transcript, the grounds of error alleged by the appellant could not succeed. The primary error relied upon by the appellant was the inability of the interpreter to interpret properly the correct military ranks. This subject matter has no bearing upon the ultimate decision of the Tribunal. Further, it is clear from the transcript which has been provided that the interpreter alerted the Tribunal to this problem. The Tribunal itself observed that it would be of no significance in its decision.
27 As a second ground, the appellant says the Federal Magistrates Court erred in rejecting the ground of appeal which alleged errors in the translation of the appellant's original statement. However, I consider the Federal Magistrate was correct to reject this ground. As Smith FM noted, there was nothing before the Tribunal which might have caused it to doubt that the appellant's statement had been incorrectly translated. The Tribunal was entitled to rely upon the documents which were before it. Further, Smith FM said that even if the correct translation was that subsequently tendered by the appellant, there was no significant difference between the two statements and it would not have been capable of materially affecting the conclusions of the Tribunal. I agree. I would add that the transcript tendered by the appellant in these proceedings indicates that he told the Tribunal that he had actually been imprisoned for 60 days, which is, in any event, inconsistent with the newly translated statement provided by the appellant.
28 The appellant further submits that the Tribunal misapplied the definition of 'persecution' by not finding that the appellant's experiences, namely being required to serve in dangerous areas, being denied promotion, fines, loss of pay and leave entitlements, removal of religious symbols from his motorcar and imprisonment, constituted persecution.
29 I accept that, if they had occurred for a Convention reason, the experiences described above might constitute persecution. However, the Tribunal in this case found that the experiences of the appellant were not suffered as a result of his religion. Nor was it satisfied that the authorities may have imputed to the appellant an affiliation with the LF. Accordingly the appellant could not be said to have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
30 A further issue considered by Smith FM was whether the Tribunal had breached s 424A of the Migration Act by relying upon the discrepancy between his original statement attached to his protection visa and his statements to the Tribunal concerning his imprisonment on return to Lebanon in 2000. I agree with Smith FM that the Tribunal did breach s 424A(1) in this respect.
31 The question, therefore, is whether, as Smith FM suggests, the decision of the Tribunal can be sustained because there is a separate and independent line of reasoning which is not affected by the breach of s 424A(1): see SZECD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 53.
32 The finding of the Tribunal relied upon by Smith FM states as follows:
'In any event, even if I am wrong in relation to these findings, I am satisfied that given that the applicant has now been discharged from the LAF, there is no prospect that this mistreatment would continue if he were to return to Lebanon. I do not accept the applicant's evidence that his relative the colonel advised him to leave Lebanon once he was demobilised. There is no sensible reason arising from the evidence before me to suggest that the applicant would be at risk of any continuing harm or human rights violations arising from his military service once that service had ended. Whatever ill treatment he may have encountered during that period, I am satisfied that there is no real chance that it would continue in the future.'
33 I accept that this is a separate and independent line of reasoning as discussed in SZECD and that, if this finding is unaffected by jurisdictional error, the decision of the Tribunal can be sustained. Accordingly, the question is whether this finding is free from jurisdictional error.
34 I consider that it was open to the Tribunal to find that there was no real chance that the appellant would be subject to mistreatment if he were to return to Lebanon because he had been discharged from the military, even given the possibility that the appellant might be called up for reservist duty. The Tribunal was clearly aware of this possibility. It recorded in its reasons the fact that the appellant is a reservist, noting:
'The applicant submitted copies and translations of his military service exemption card, issued in January 2003, stating that the applicant had completed more than two years service in the armed forces and was free to travel overseas, among other things; his army reservist card, indicating that he is eligible for reservist duty at first level until 2007, and at second level until 2017 …'
35 The Tribunal's reasons also record that the appellant specifically raised the matter of his reservist status, noting that the appellant claimed:
'Also, because he is a reservist, if a war breaks out he will have to fight; he does not want to fight because he does not want to hurt anyone, and they will put Christians in the front line.'
36 In view of this, and mindful of the principle in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1986) 162 CLR 24, I do not consider that the words 'no prospect' in the reasons given by the Tribunal indicate that the Tribunal did not take into account his reservist status in making this finding. The finding that there was no real chance of future persecution was open on the evidence. I can see no jurisdictional error in the finding. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.