4 This purported notice of appeal is identical in form to those reproduced in numerous earlier appeals that I heard in 2004: SZAIL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 266; SZAXN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 275; SZAQW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 635; SZAKU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 892; SZALF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1065; and SZAUV & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1745.
5 The appellant did not provide the Court with an outline of submissions, despite my direction made on 14 December 2004. Furthermore, the appellant's name was called outside the courtroom on the day of the hearing and it was apparent that the appellant was not present in the courtroom or the precincts of the court. In those circumstances, I heard the appeal in the appellant's absence pursuant to O 52 r 38A of the Federal Court Rules 1976 (Cth) and dismissed the appeal with a view to publishing reasons for judgment in due course. Those reasons now appear below.
6 As I have stated on many earlier occasions in relation to what may be described as a standard form of notice of appeal for instance adopted by the appellant in this matter, it is readily apparent that paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of that purported notice of appeal do not specify any viable grounds of review, but merely re-state the decision appealed from, and refer to case law in general terms, without in any way purporting to relate or apply the same to the circumstances and matters set out in the reasons for judgment of Mowbray FM below, or the reasons for decision of the Tribunal, or otherwise to explain the relevance of the same to any alleged circumstances of the appellants. None of that material satisfies the requirements of Order 52 rule 13(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 1976 (Cth), which require an appellant to state 'briefly, but specifically the grounds relied upon in support of the appeal'. Moreover the general assertions the subject of grounds 4, 5 and 6 do not establish any viable basis for impugning the reasons for judgment below.
The Tribunal's decision
7 The Tribunal wrote to the appellant on 29 April 2004 pursuant to s 424 of the Act requesting further information from the appellant in relation to his purported claims about religious and political persecution in India. It summarised its country information in relation to India which indicated (inter alia) that India was a "longstanding parliamentary democracy, with an independent judiciary, a broad range of democratic institutions and a comprehensive constitutional framework for the protection of human rights including the National Human Rights Commission". The appellant was asked whether he disagreed with this assessment of India and if so, whether he could provide any information to demonstrate the basis for belief to the contrary. There was no response from the appellant to that request for additional information. The request was followed up with an invitation dated 30 April 2004 to attend an oral hearing and give evidence, however the appellant indicated that he did not wish to give oral evidence and consented to the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision on the review based on the information then before it.
8 The Tribunal found that the information provided by the appellant in his application for review was stated in the most general terms and was not of sufficient detail to substantiate the appellant's claim that he feared persecution upon return to India. It concluded that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations, stating that:
'The information that the applicant provided does not give adequate details of the applicant's involvement in the BJP or of the threats made by members of the Congress Party. He has not explained why the threats from members of the Congress Party continued after the applicant relocated to Andhra Pradesh. The Applicant does not explain the inconsistency between the statement in his protection visa application that he lived at the same address in Ahmedabad from 1969 to 2003 with his statement that he worked in Ahmedabad between 1993 to 2001 and then in Andhra Pradesh from 2001 to 2003.