19 During the hearing the following exchange took place between the Tribunal member and the appellant:
'Member: For the record, the applicant was shown the Statutory Declaration at the end of Form B, whereby he agrees that is his signature appearing on that form.
So do you agree that all the information you have provided in those forms is true and correct?
Applicant: Yes.
Member: Now, in support of your application you also provided a Statutory Declaration which was declared on the 10th of February 2003.
Applicant: Yes.'
20 Immediately thereafter it became apparent that the appellant did not have a copy of the statutory declaration. However, the following exchange occurred:
'Member: Do you understand what a Statutory Declaration is Mr […]?
Applicant: Yes.
Member: What is it then?
Applicant: Statutory Declaration means whatever happens in my life, I'm compiling into one and I'm explaining everything clearly on that, and I declare that it is true and nothing but true.
Member: Alright, so I will confirm with you then. Is all the information contained in your Statutory Declaration true and correct?
Applicant: Yes.'
21 There is no evidence that the Tribunal provided any notification to the appellant, in advance of the hearing date, that the statutory declaration would be relied upon. Further, the Tribunal was not invited by the appellant by a written communication before or at the hearing to consider the information in his declaration which would have activated the exemption: see M55 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 131, SZDMJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1034 and SZHIB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 611, nor did the appellant bring the statutory declaration to the hearing. These facts suggest that the statutory declaration was not regarded by the appellant as being significant in his application before the Tribunal.
22 The appellant was questioned extensively in relation to the contents of his statutory declaration and in its findings the Tribunal relied on four specific events each of which were material to his claim for refugee status and which were found to be inconsistent with the evidence the appellant gave orally at the hearing. Such events included the appellant's arrest by the police and the charges laid against him; demonstrations which the appellant claimed to have organised; the number of times the appellant had been arrested; and the appellant's alleged imprisonment for a week in Kerala. The Tribunal also relied upon discrepancies between the appellant's statutory declaration and his oral evidence and failures of the appellant to recall exact dates and other details, in making adverse conclusions about the appellant's credibility. These discrepancies relate to an alleged strike in September 2001; allegations of torture by members of the AIADMK party; and an alleged arrest in November 2002.
23 The information contained in the statutory declaration formed part of the reasons for the Tribunal's decision. It was not uncontentious, foundational or basic, nor was it information which was given to the Tribunal by the appellant to enliven the exception under s 424A(3)(b). The fact that the appellant was asked to supplement the information in his statutory declaration orally in answer to the Tribunal's questions and the fact that the appellant referred to the statutory declaration in the course of these answers is not sufficient to constitute 'giving' the document to the Tribunal: see SZFXG; NAZY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744, which was approved by the Full Court in SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 at 225 [20] per Moore J, with whom Weinberg J (at 252 [157]) and Allsop J at 262 [219] agreed. Accordingly s 424A(1) of the Act applied to the information the appellant had provided to the Tribunal in answer to its questions.
24 The mere fact that the appellant understood the significance of a statutory declaration and answered the Tribunal's questions is not relevant to the question of republication envisaged by s 424A(3)(b) of the Act. The fact that the appellant did not have his statutory declaration with him at the hearing supports the inference that the appellant did not intend to adopt or republish the claims made therein
25 McHugh J in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162 at [63] referred to the rationale underlying the statutory requirements of s 424A(1) of the Act in relation to evidence adverse to an appellant provided by a third party. His Honour found that such provision was intended to ensure that an appellant is aware of the significance of such information to the Tribunal's determination. He said:
'So it is in the interests of fairness that the applicant should have the information in writing and should be given an opportunity to comment on it. For that reason s 424A should not be regarded as spent because the applicant is present at the hearing.'
26 In this instance his Honour's observations provide a guide for the interpretation of s 424A of the Act, namely, where the Tribunal intends to rely upon information which is more than historical fact or other basic detail, the appellant is entitled to be given notice that the Tribunal will rely upon such information.