(iv) the relevance of the return to the Tribunal of the notification of hearing addressed to the appellant
25 The appellant did not attend the hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the required statutory steps were taken to notify the appellant. As set out above, the Tribunal had written to advise him that it had examined all the information relating to his application but was not prepared to make a favourable decision on that information alone. A copy of this letter was sent to his adviser. No response was received. As recorded in the decision of the Federal Magistrate, the appellant informed his Honour that, to his knowledge, the adviser received the invitation and wrote to him about it. That is not challenged.
26 The appellant submits that, by s 426A of the Act, the Tribunal is given discretion to delay its decision and to reschedule the hearing. He contends that, in exercising that discretion, the Tribunal must take into account relevant considerations, in this case that the letter sent by the Tribunal to the appellant had been returned to the Tribunal unclaimed. It is submitted that this was not taken into account and that this amounted to jurisdictional error. In particular, the appellant relies upon the statement of the Tribunal in its reasons that 'if the appellant had attended the hearing, it would have been possible to investigate his claims more thoroughly' and submits that the Tribunal was obliged to take account of the return of the notification before deciding that it was appropriate to make the decision in the absence of consideration of that relevant consideration.
27 There is no dispute that the Tribunal complied with the requirements of s 425 and s 425A of the Act. By s 426A, the Tribunal was entitled to make a decision without taking any further action to allow or enable the appellant to appear before it.
28 Ms Wong who appears for the Minister submits that, as the Tribunal is not obliged to satisfy itself that the appellant received the notification or that his nominated agent had informed him of the hearing details, it follows that the return to the Tribunal of the notification to the appellant is not a relevant consideration. In any event, she submits, it is not clear that the Tribunal failed to consider that the notification was returned.
29 In its decision, the Tribunal said that no response had been received. Strictly, this was not the case, as the letter addressed to the appellant had been returned. Ms Wong submits that the Tribunal can be said to have taken account of the returned letter. I do not accept that.
30 However, in NADK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 184, the Full Court considered the failure on the part of a migration agent to notify an appellant of the Tribunal hearing and concluded at [16] that 'the asserted fact that the applicant was unaware of the Tribunal's hearing was of no legal relevance'. In VNAA at [15-16] Sundberg and Hely JJ said that the Tribunal was not required in each case to be affirmatively satisfied that the invitation under s 425 had actually come to the notice of the applicant. Further, their Honours observed that the Tribunal is authorised to proceed to decide the review in the applicant's absence notwithstanding that the applicant's absence involved no fault on his or her part. VNAA was followed in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VSAF [2005] FCAFC 73.
31 If the Tribunal has complied with its statutory obligations and is entitled to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the applicant (VNAA; VSAF), is the Tribunal obliged to consider the reason for the non-attendance? In WAEE V Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47] the Court found that it was unnecessary for the Tribunal specifically to advert to the return of the notification to the appellant as it was subsumed in the consideration that the Tribunal gave to the fact that the appellant had not appeared.
32 It is the case that the Tribunal has discretion to defer the hearing but it is only if the Tribunal is obliged to do so that there is jurisdictional error. 'The factors which the decision-maker is bound to take into account are determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If they are not stated, they are to be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act' (citing Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40; in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 211 ALR 126 at [71] per Kiefel and Bennett JJ). As was found in NADK and is apparent from the statutory scheme, the fact that the appellant was unaware of the hearing and that the Tribunal may have had notice of this, was of no legal relevance. The Tribunal was not required to take into account the fact that the invitation to hearing sent to the appellant's home address had been "returned to sender".