Consideration
31 The Tribunal accepted all of the appellant's factual claims as to what happened to him in Sri Lanka. While accepting the claims, the Tribunal said that it was not able to satisfy itself that the essential and significant reason for these actions against the appellant was a Convention related reason. In that regard the Federal Magistrate found that the Tribunal fell into error in that it did not ask itself the relevant question, whether or not the incidents occurred because the appellant was a Tamil or alternatively whether these incidents would have occurred if the appellant had been Sinhalese.
32 That this constituted a jurisdictional error has not been challenged by the respondent. However, the respondent submits that this finding does not result in the matter being referred back to the Tribunal. It was submitted and accepted by the Federal Magistrate and by counsel for the appellant before the Federal Magistrate that the appellant had to succeed on each of the alleged errors claimed before the Federal Magistrate to succeed in his appeal.
33 I propose to proceed on the basis in favour of the appellant that the incidents that he described occurred because of a Convention reason.
34 The first question to be considered is whether the Federal Magistrate was in error in failing to find jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision that the appellant did not have a subjective well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal accepted the appellant's reasons for failing to seek to remain and seek protection in India in 1999. However, the Tribunal was satisfied that if the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, he would have applied for refugee status on or soon after his arrival in New Zealand in 2001. The appellant did not apply for refugee status at any time during his 10 months in New Zealand. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not leave the Wellington environs or seek to relocate to a warmer place anywhere else in New Zealand. The Tribunal found that he would have done this if he had a serious medical condition as he claimed which was exacerbated by the cold of Wellington. The Tribunal did not accept this explanation. The Tribunal was satisfied that:
'…If the appellant had a well founded fear of serious harm amounting to persecution in Sri Lanka, with all that that implies, then he would have applied for refugee status in spite of his claimed asthma and aversion to the cold.'
That factual finding by the Tribunal was sufficient to dispose of the appellant's claim.
35 Before the Federal Magistrate, it was accepted that the Tribunal's reference to a 'well-founded fear of serious harm' was a reference to subjective fear being a constituent of the total well-founded fear. The appellant argued before the Federal Magistrate and before me that the Tribunal did not give him an opportunity to explain why he could not relocate to a warmer part of New Zealand because, for example, he would have been unable to continue his studies there.
36 The Federal Magistrate was of the view that what the Tribunal had said did not constitute a finding that the appellant could have relocated. With respect to his Honour, I do not agree with that conclusion. Mr Potts did not seek to support that conclusion.
37 His Honour continued, however, to characterise the finding as a finding that the appellant did not seek to relocate and that he would have done this if he had a serious medical condition exacerbated by the cold of Wellington. The Federal Magistrate pointed out that that was part of the Tribunal's reasoning process but not a matter that had to be put to the appellant for the reasons his Honour set out at [12]:
'The Tribunal is charged with determining whether or not it reaches a state of satisfaction as to a claim that an applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In determining that actions which might have given him that fear were not motivated by Convention reasons the Tribunal is providing an explanation for why it does not reach the state of satisfaction. The Tribunal is not obliged to expose his or her reasoning process or subjective determinations for comment to the person affected Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte S154/2002 (2003) 210 ALR 437 at [54]; Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Limited (1993) 49 FCR 576 at [591]. Neither is the Tribunal required by the rules of procedural fairness to give the applicant a running commentary on his prospects of success so that there is a full warning of all possible reasons for failure Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at [31]. The issue which the Tribunal determined was quite clearly a matter in dispute because it was the essence of what the Tribunal had to decide. The Tribunal had already indicated in its pre-hearing letter that it was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom the Convention applied.'
38 The Federal Magistrate said that it is implicit in the Tribunal's reasoning process that it regarded a 10 month stay in a country which was clearly sympathetic to the situation of refugees, without making an application to remain for whatever reason, as indicative of a lack of genuine fear to return. The question of the appellant's failure to apply for a visa in New Zealand was put to the appellant. He was given the opportunity to address the issue. The Tribunal made its finding based upon the matters put to it by the appellant. It was not satisfied as to his explanation. The rejection of the explanation and the finding of lack of subjective fear were open to the Tribunal.
39 In WABY v Refugee Review Tribunal [2005] FCA 209 at [69] French J said:
'In my opinion, the Tribunal was not required to pre-test its conclusions on any of these matters with the applicant before finalising its reasons. Each were conclusions about and characterisations of the evidence put to the Tribunal by the applicant. They were conclusions and characterisations which the Tribunal was entitled to reach ... It is open to the Tribunal to reject or not be persuaded by an applicant's evidence without specifically putting to the applicant that the evidence has not convinced or persuaded it.'
40 Those words are apposite in the present case. The finding of a lack of a subjective fear of persecution was fatal to the appellant's claim.
41 The appellant has also submitted that the Tribunal erred in finding that he did not have a well-founded fear because of the then current cease-fire in Sri Lanka. The first alleged error was that the Tribunal should have speculated as to the possibility that the then current cease-fire and peace talks might fail and whether, in the circumstances, the appellant might be at risk of persecution. This argument fails because the Tribunal reached firm conclusions on the status of the cease-fire and peace talks and '[r]easonable speculation as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution does not require a possibility inconsistent with the RRT's own findings to be pursued'(per Sackville J in Rajalingam at [67]). The second alleged error in this regard was in relation to the failure to put certain country reports to the appellant for comment. The Federal Magistrate dealt with the same alleged errors in [15] to [17] of his Honour's reasons.
42 I refer to the above matters for a sense of completeness. No error on the part of the Federal Magistrate has been established. The lack of finding of subjective fear was fatal to the appellant's claim, as a matter of logic. The appellant has not established any appealable error by the Federal Magistrate. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.
43 The order of the court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Bennett.