SZAOG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court)|1949-08-12|Before: Emmett J, Beaumont J, Emmett JJ, North J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BEAUMONT J: 1 I have had the benefit of reading the reasons for judgment of Emmett J and I agree with those reasons and the proposed orders. I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beaumont.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

EMMETT J: 20 The appellants are father and daughter. They are citizens of Russia and arrived in Australia on 20 February 1998. On 23 March 1998, the father lodged applications for Protection (Class AZ) Visas for his daughter and himself. Only the father made specific claims and it is therefore convenient to refer to him as 'the appellant'. The daughter was accepted by the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the Tribunal') and the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia as a member of his family unit and no separate consideration was necessary in relation to her claims. 21 On 1 May 1998, a delegate of the respondent, the then Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs ('the Minister'), refused the applications. On 22 May 1998, the appellant and his daughter applied for review of that decision by the Tribunal. On 26 September 2000, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. Following an application to the Federal Court of Australia, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision on 27 February 2001. However, on 8 April 2004 the High Court of Australia apparently set aside the orders of the Federal Court and ordered that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. 22 On 11 April 2003, the Tribunal, differently constituted, published its decision, made on 20 March 2003, affirming the delegate's decision not to grant protection visas to the appellant and his daughter. On 8 May 2003, the appellant and his daughter filed an application to the Federal Magistrates Court for constitutional writ relief in respect of the second decision of the Tribunal. On 22 March 2004, the Federal Magistrates Court ordered that the application be dismissed. By Notice of Appeal filed on 24 March 2004, the appellant and his daughter appealed to the Federal Court from the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court. Since no contrary direction has been given by the Chief Justice, the appeal has been heard by a Full Court.

THE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS AND THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL 23 The original application for protection visas was accompanied by an undated declaration by the appellant. The reasons of the delegate summarised the claims made in that declaration as follows: 'The [appellant] claims that his life has been threatened in Russia by unknown persons who appear to be Chechen or connected in some way to the previous conflict between Russia and Chechnya. He claims they have threatened his life as a result of his supplying a testimony relating to events during the Chechen conflict to the Russian authorities. I find the applicant's claim to be non-Convention related. The applicant does not fear persecution as a result of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The [appellant] does not fear persecution for reasons of his membership of a particular social group. There is no recognisable or cognisable group that for reasons of his membership of that group the [appellant] is being targeted for persecutory treatment. I accept that the [appellant] may be the target of threats of a criminal nature related to his purported experiences in the military during the Chechen conflict and his subsequent testimony to the Russian authorities, however this does not bring the [appellant] within the ambit of the Convention. The [appellant] has become a target of violent criminal actions as the result of an act or an event he witnessed, and not for a Convention related reason.' It is significant that there was no reference to a claim based on conscientious objection to service in the army. 24 In his original declaration the appellant also said: 'Once I happened to be a witness as Russians wiped out a Chechen village killing all civilians. The officer who ordered to fire explained later that they (Chechens) started firing first… But I personally was at the helicopter and saw what was going on. No one was firing at us.' 25 In a written declaration in support of his application for review by the Tribunal, the appellant further stated: 'My numerous public protests against the policy and methods of the war between Russia and Chechnya, against meaningless and brutality of the slaughter of peaceful citizens by Russian troops, were considered by my commanders as a "political sabotage", and I was persecuted for that, and my life was put under fatal danger. In my complaints to the State Procurator and to the President I described the criminal activities of superiors, but the main point was the injustice of that war, and that, according to my deep belief, the Russian authorities had used that war for their political goals.' 26 On 31 October 2002, New Galaxy Consulting, migration agents, made a written submission to the Tribunal in support of the appellant's application for review ('the Submission'). In the Submission, the migration agents asserted that the appellant fears persecution 'on the basis of his actual and imputed political opinion'. The Submission referred to the question of whether the exposure of corruption in the army could be considered as political opinion within the meaning of the Convention. The Submission cited V v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 355 in support of the proposition that the exposure of corruption, while itself an act and not a belief, can be the outward manifestation of a belief. Thus, a person who is opposed to corruption may be prepared to expose it, even if so to do may bring consequences, although the act may be in disregard of those consequences. If the corruption is itself directed from the highest levels of society or endemic in the political fabric of society such that it either enjoys political protection, or the government of that society is unable to afford protection to those who campaign against it, the risk of persecution can be said to be for reasons of political opinion (supra at [32]). 27 The Submission also asserted that the appellant fears that he will be subject to physical violence and intimidation by the authorities in Russia if he is forced to return there. The Submission claimed that fear was the result of the appellant's decision to make public his opinion by sending letters to the military prosecutor and former President Yeltsin expressing belief that military crimes and corruption were part of the political system in Russia. The Submission asserted that there was abundant evidence to show persecution of political opponents in Russia. Again, it is significant that no claim was made in relation to conscientious objection to service in the army. 28 The Tribunal recorded the appellant's claim that he feared returning to Russia because he had exposed the entire structure of the Russian military, showed the Russian violations of Chechnya and had access to secret information. He claimed that he gave information to a journalist about the military although he made no claims that the journalist did anything with that information. 29 The Tribunal's reasons for its second decision referred to the contention by the appellant that his numerous public protests against the policy and methods of the war between Russia and Chechnya and against the brutality of the slaughter of peaceful citizens by Russian troops were considered by his commanders in the army as political sabotage. That was a reference to the assertions in his original declaration that, following his conscription in 1995 into the Russian military, he happened to be a witness to the Russians' wiping out a Chechen village, killing all civilians. The appellant asserted that, while most servicemen were against the inhuman war, not many people dared to struggle against it openly because their careers would have depended upon it. He claimed that he was independent and that, for that reason, during one regular meeting, he decided to talk about it. He claimed that, when he finished, he was accused of being alarmist and a liar. He claimed that the commander of his regiment then banned him from fighting and later ordered his arrest due to his refusal to obey orders. 30 The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was a witness of truth. It considered his claims were implausible and were not supported by the independent evidence. The Tribunal was of the view that the appellant had created his claims in order to enhance his claim to refugee status. While he claimed to have exposed the entire structure of the Russian military system, showing the violations and genocide that happened in Chechnya, he had only been in the military for some weeks as a reservist officer. The appellant also claimed that he was a marked man, unable to return to Russia because he had written to the military prosecutor and to former President Yeltsin exposing corruption. Nevertheless, after writing those letters, he was able to return to Russia after a trip to Finland. The Tribunal found that the appellant's claims, that a Russian threatened and harassed by Chechens could not obtain police protection, was not supported by independent information available. Rather, the information available to the Tribunal indicated that Russian authorities harass Chechens. 31 The Tribunal also referred to the appellant's claim that, in about November 1995, whilst serving in the Russian army, his section commander expelled him because he criticised the regiment command and expressed his political view about the war in Chechnya at a gathering where regimental officers were present. He claimed that, as a consequence, he spent ten days in the brig. The Tribunal considered that a military reservist officer of the Russian army would not be in a position to express an anti-government view to his military commander or to have any access to such a person. The Tribunal did not consider that it was plausible that an army reservist would have access to the upper echelons of the military in an army, particularly an army noted for its ability to deal severely with people and its record of human rights abuses. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the appellant's claims about criticising the commander or expressing his political views about the war, or obtaining any information about violations of human rights by the military, were plausible. 32 The appellant also claimed that he was on the KGB blacklist because he had access to secret information and was dangerous to the system. However, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the appellant was in a position to access secret information or that he had in any way come to the notice of the KGB. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the authorities in Russia censor and obstruct journalists reporting on Chechnya, the Tribunal observed that the appellant is not a journalist. It was not satisfied that the appellant had access to any sensitive information. 33 The Tribunal was also satisfied that the appellant could have applied for protection in Finland. The Tribunal placed weight on the appellant's failure to apply for protection in Finland as indicating a lack of subjective fear of persecution. It rejected his explanation as to why he did not do so. 34 The Tribunal summarised its conclusions in the following terms: 'Taking into account all of the evidence including findings as to the implausibility of the applicant's claims, the fact that the applicant did not engage in any political activities other than once criticising the military in 1995, speaking to a journalist, writing to the President and the Military Prosecutor, I am satisfied that the chance that harm, let alone harm amounting to persecution, will befall the applicant in the reasonably foreseeable future for reasons relating to his political affiliations is remote. The independent evidence does not state that citizens are unable to express their political views in Russia. The Constitution provides for freedom of association and freedom of speech. I accept that there are attempts to restrict freedom of the press especially in relation to the Chechen conflict but the applicant is not a journalist. I am satisfied that on his return to Russia he would be able to express his political views.' 35 Thus, the Tribunal rejected all of the appellant's claims as formulated in his original application for a protection visa and in the Submission. No complaint has been made in relation to the Tribunal's rejection of those claims. Rather, the appellant asserts that the Tribunal failed to deal adequately with claims that he would be at risk of persecution because of his conscientious objection to military service.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT 36 After the commencement of the hearing before the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Magistrate granted leave to the appellant to file an amended application, which confined his grounds for relief to the following: 'The Tribunal erred in its understanding of the law in relation to conscientious objection to military service, and such an error went to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.' That ground is based on observations made by the Tribunal in its reasons. 37 After dealing with the claims made by the appellant in his original declaration and made on his behalf in the Submission, and rejecting them, the Tribunal made the following further observations: 'The applicant claims he is still subject to call up and the war continues. Recognition of the right of a government to conscript its citizens is provided in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is not enough that an applicant's refusal to perform military service is motivated by reasons of being a pacifist, a conscientious objector or a partial conscientious objector. It is not enough to found a claim for refugee status based on punishment for refusal to perform military service, unless the sanctions that are imposed on an applicant are for Convention reasons. See: RAM v MIEA & Anor (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 568, Amanyar & Anor v MIEA (1995) 63 FCR 194 and Jahazi v MIEA (1996) 133 ALR 437. The applicant claims that he objects to the Chechen conflict and the Russian military methods of dealing with this conflict. Whilst I accept the applicant has these beliefs, I have found no independent evidence to suggest that persons who object to the conflict are treated any differently or any punishment imposed upon citizens for disobeying the draft is enforced in a discriminatory manner. I find that any reservist call up is the enforcement of a law of general application. In Applicant A & Anor v MIEA, McHugh J considered the possibility of a law, which is on its face legitimate and non discriminatory, being applied in a persecutory manner. His Honour stated at 354-355: Conduct will not constitute persecution,… if it is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country of the refugee. A legitimate object will ordinarily be an object whose pursuit is required in order to protect or promote the general welfare of the state and its citizens. The enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law does not ordinarily constitute persecution… However where a racial, religious, national group or the holder of a particular political opinion is the subject of sanctions that do not apply generally in the state, it is more likely than not that the application of the sanction is discriminatory and persecutory. It is therefore inherently suspect and requires close scrutiny. …Only in exceptional circumstances is it likely that a sanction aimed at persons for reasons of race, religion or nationality will be an appropriate means for achieving a legitimate government object and not amount to persecution. This reasoning clearly applies to the situation where the state conscripts persons of a particular racial, religious, or national group, the holders of a particular political opinion or members of a particular social group. I take the view that conscientious objection to military service or pacifist views or objection to call up as a reservist are not sufficient grounds to attract the protection of the Convention. If the applicant were to be called upon to serve as a reservist on his return to Russia, as a reservist this action would be a legal requirement in that country. The obligation to perform reservist military service is universal upon all males in the applicant's country, and hence it does not in itself amount to discrimination against him. I have found no suggestion in the independent evidence that such laws are enforced in a discriminatory manner.' 38 After referring to a number of authorities, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the Tribunal was not, in the passage cited above, focussing simply upon the requirement that the appellant undergo compulsory military service. Rather, the Tribunal was considering the core issue of whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. His Honour considered that the Tribunal had found that, whilst the appellant had a genuine objection to military service in Chechnya, there was no independent evidence to suggest that persons who objected to that particular conflict were treated any differently to any other objectors or that any punishment imposed upon such objectors was enforced in a discriminatory manner. His Honour concluded that, since those findings were open to the Tribunal, the Appellant could not succeed on the ground raised in his amended application.

THE APPEAL 39 In the Notice of Appeal to the Federal Court, the following ground is raised: 'The Court erred in holding that the Tribunal had not erred in law in its understanding of the law in relation to conscientious objection and what constitutes a refugee under the Convention, and consequently erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction, or exceed its jurisdiction.' Counsel for the appellant formulated the question before the Court as:

'…whether a finding that a law punishing those who refuse to fight when conscripted is a law of general application, applied without regard to the reasons for the objection, is enough to determine that an applicant falls outside the terms of the Refugee Convention.' 40 It is by no means clear in what circumstances, if at all, the appellant made any claim that he feared persecution by reason of being required to fight as a conscript in the Russian army against Chechnya. He made no such claim in his original application for a protection visa. Nor did his migration agents make any such claim on his behalf in the Submission. He may have made such a claim during the course of a hearing before the Tribunal but there was no evidence before the Federal Magistrate of the hearing before the Tribunal other than as appears from the Tribunal's reasons. It is therefore difficult to see why the Tribunal would be addressing the question of conscientious objection to service as a possible basis for entitlement to a protection visa, if indeed that is what the Tribunal was doing in the passage cited. 41 In Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs 201 CLR 293 (at [25] - [26]) the High Court held that not every form of discriminatory or persecutory behaviour is covered by the Convention definition of 'refugee'. It covers only conduct undertaken for reasons specified in the Convention. The question whether conduct is undertaken for a Convention reason cannot be entirely isolated from the question whether the conduct amounts to persecution. Moreover, the question whether particular discriminatory conduct is or is not persecution for one or other of the Convention reasons may necessitate different analysis, depending upon the particular reasons assigned for that conduct. If persons of a particular race, religion or nationality are treated differently from other members of society, that, of itself, may justify the conclusion that they are treated differently by reason of their race, religion or nationality. That is because, ordinarily, race, religion and nationality do not provide a reason for treating people differently. 42 In Chen Shi Hai the High Court held that the position is somewhat more complex when persecution is said to be for reasons of membership of a particular social group or political opinion. There may be groups that warrant different treatment to protect society. So, too, it may be necessary for the protection of society to treat persons who hold certain political views differently from other members of society. The question whether the different treatment of persons of a particular race, religion, nationality or political persuasion or who are members of a particular social group constitutes persecution for that reason ultimately depends on whether that treatment is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country concerned: see Chen Shi Hai (at [27] -[28]). 43 The appellant, through his counsel, placed considerable store on observations made by Gray J in Erduran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs ([2002] FCA 814, at [28]) to the effect that, where an issue of refusal to undergo compulsory military service arises, it may be necessary to look further than the question of whether the law relating to that military service is a law of general application. It is necessary to make a finding of fact as to whether the refusal to undergo military service arises from a conscientious objection to such service. If a person will be punished for refusing to undergo military service by reason of conscientious objection stemming from political opinion or a religious view, or if that of itself is political opinion, it may not be difficult to find that the person is liable to be persecuted for a Convention reason. 44 Counsel for the appellant contended, in effect, that a genuinely held conscientious objection to fighting in a war may constitute a political opinion. If one refuses to fight by reason of that objection and one is thereby at risk of punishment to a degree that could constitute persecution, the real or effective reason for the punishment could be seen to be persecution for a political opinion, notwithstanding that the punishment is by way of law of general application, applied without discrimination. 45 However, there was no finding that such a claim had been made by the appellant. A fortiori, there was no finding by the Tribunal that the appellant had a conscientious objection to fighting in the war against Chechnya that constituted a political opinion. The most that can be said is that the Tribunal accepted that the appellant held the belief that he objected to the Chechen conflict and the Russian military methods of dealing with that conflict. On the other hand, there was no finding as to what it was about the Chechen conflict that the appellant objected to. Nor was there any finding about the appellant's understanding as to the Russian military methods of dealing with that conflict. Indeed, the Tribunal's only conclusion about the appellant's evidence was that he was not a witness of truth and that his claims were implausible, as they were unsupported by independent evidence. 46 The Tribunal made no finding that any reluctance on the part of the appellant to serve in the Russian army was the result of any political opinion. While it may be possible for conscientious objection itself to be regarded as a form of political opinion, the question would still need to be asked whether the conscientious objection to military service had a political or religious basis or whether conscientious objectors, or some particular class of them, could constitute a particular social group. If a person would be punished for refusing to undergo military service by reason of conscientious objection stemming from political opinion or religious view, or the conscientious objection is itself political opinion, it may be possible to find that the person is liable to be persecuted for a Convention reason. There was no claim to that effect made by the appellant. Accordingly, the failure by the Tribunal to make a finding to that effect could not amount to jurisdictional error.

CONCLUSION 47 The appellant has not demonstrated that the Federal Magistrate erred in the conclusion that he reached. That is to say, there is no basis for concluding that the Tribunal made any error of a jurisdictional kind such that its decision was not a decision under the Act as provided in s 474(2) of the Act. It follows that the Tribunal's decision is not subject to certiorari or mandamus as claimed by the appellant. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.

Migration Act 1958(Cth)s 474(2)

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