Resolution of the appeal
22 The resolution of the appeal does not, subject to one matter, require any examination of principle as to the construction of commercial contracts. The primary judge, in his recital of principle at [16] of his reasons, appeared to adopt a principle that background or extrinsic material can only be examined once some textual ambiguity in the contract is revealed. This is not so: Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2005] FCA 1812; 223 ALR 560 at 573-574 [78] (Finn J), approved in Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65; Aust. Contract Reports 90-254 at 89,868 [107] (per Tobias JA, with whom Mason P and Campbell JA agreed at 89,851 [1] and 89,892 [257] respectively); see also K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd [1985] HCA 48; 157 CLR 309 at 315 (per Mason J); and Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35; 218 CLR 451 at 461-426 [22] (per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); and, with respect, the succinct but comprehensive identification of relevant authority by the Chief Justice in Gardiner v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 235 at [7]-[13].
23 Like the primary judge, I think the resolution of the problem at hand is to be found in the text and structure of the written agreements. The background material permits one to conclude that at different times certain services were provided by other security providers which could be seen to be services falling within the purview of the annexure to the contract and thus the terms of the engagement of Synergy. The state of affairs in respect of such matters varied between the times of entry into the various contracts. Taking the two final contracts, they are to be understood as taking effect against a background of operations taking place in October and November 2004. These matters were set out by the primary judge at [28] of his reasons, see [4] above.
24 One aspect of background, which was not given any prominence by the primary judge in his reasons, was the statutory background against which security services of the kind provided by Synergy were provided. Under the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) (the "SI Act") licences are required in accordance with Part 2. A master licence is required by anyone employing or providing persons to carry on security activities: s 7(1). A person is not to carry on a "security activity" (widely defined in s 4(1)) unless he or she has a relevant licence: s 7(2). The various licence classifications are set out in the SI Act, Part 2, Division 2. It can be accepted that the ability of Synergy to organise its affairs in order to comply with the contracts required it to have at its ready disposal suitably qualified and licensed persons in sufficient numbers to be able to fulfil its contractual obligations to Norths.
25 Norths also referred in its submissions on appeal to the Registered Clubs Act 1976 (NSW) (the "RC Act"), the Liquor Act 1982 (NSW), the Liquor Act 2007 (NSW) and the Gaming Machines Act 2001 (NSW) (the "GM Act"). Provisions of these Acts which placed responsibility on Norths not to sell liquor to minors and not to permit gaming machines to be used by minors (the RC Act, ss 30(2)(g) and (h) and 50(1), the Liquor Act 2007, ss 117(2) and 124 and the GM Act, ss 50-52), and not to permit intoxication or indecent, violent or quarrelsome conduct on club premises (the RC Act, s 44A(1) and the Liquor Act 2007, s 73) were relied upon by Norths to support a submission that Synergy could not be seen as entitled to supply all Norths' requirements since to do so might place Norths in breach of the law if Synergy was unable to meet those requirements. I will deal with this submission in due course.
26 Recognising this background, it is necessary to examine the text and structure of the contracts and to ascertain (to paraphrase Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas at 462 [22]) what a reasonable person in the position of Norths and Synergy would have understood the agreements to mean.
27 The first matter to note in relation to the structure of the agreement is that it was a formal document and apparently intended to govern the affairs of the parties for three years. It was submitted that the text was proffered by Synergy; but there was no suggestion that its negotiation was in any way inhibited or that the contract can be viewed as one of adhesion. Nor was there any argument that the contract should be read against Synergy, contra proferentem, as its propounder.
28 The essential task is the ascertainment of the content of the engagement in cl 2 and the annexure. The "Club's requirements on a weekly basis" is a phrase apt to connote the objective needs of the Club: what they will require, as a matter of fact. Clause 2 and the annexure do not say that Synergy will supply whatever is required of it by the Club; rather it will provide the requirements of the Club.
29 The task is not one of implying a term as to exclusivity in the contract, as submitted by Norths; rather the task is to give content to the terms of the engagement.
30 By cl 3.2 Synergy is required to "inform itself of the requirements" of the Club. Such an obligation tends to indicate that the "requirements" are, in substance, objectively ascertainable. The obligation tends to be inconsistent with the notion that the "requirements" are simply what Synergy is told week by week. There would be little need to inform oneself of the requirements of X, if those requirements were simply what X wanted and communicated from time to time. The consultative process envisaged by the second clause in cl 3.2 reflects the necessary degree of co-operation between the parties in the operation and performance of the contract. The "requirements" of the Club will be affected by decisions of Norths as to how it wishes to conduct its business which might affect its needs or requirements in any given week. That, however, does not negate the essentially objective character of the notion of "requirements of the Club".
31 Whilst not determinative on their own, cll 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 conform more conveniently to circumstances where Synergy is obliged to provided the objectively ascertained needs of the Club.
32 Clause 4 is important. Under this clause Norths is to provide, as soon as practicable, the information there identified "relating to [the Club's] requirements in connection with this Agreement." This is less than apt language for a contract merely to provide operatives when, or if, they are required.
33 Clause 5, read with item 4 of the Schedule, requires weekly payment claims. This is more consistent with a continuous, rather than an ad hoc engagement.
34 Clause 6.1 permits Norths to vary the service, as long as the variation is within the general scope of the service. If the agreement operated as a standing order or supply contract little work would remain for the clause. Norths submitted that the clause was not directed to its "requirements", but to varying the service descriptions. I do not think that the clause is so limited. In any event, the point is that it is curious to have an entitlement to insist on a change to a standing order; it makes more sense for Norths to have a power of variation within the scope of mutual obligations.
35 Most telling is cl 10 dealing with termination. Norths and Synergy were given rights to terminate the contract in certain circumstances. The clause is appropriate for a contractual relationship of a continuing nature of a more substantial character than a standing offer. In particular, the 14 day period under paragraph (b) (where it second appears in cl 10.1) is inconsistent with a simple standing order called on for seven day periods. Also, it is difficult to see what a substantial breach of the agreement would be for cl 10.2(c) if this were merely a standing order.
36 Norths, on the other hand, submitted that cl 10.1 revealed a commercial difficulty, if the contract were to be seen as other than as a standing offer. If Synergy did not produce staff when requested, leaving the clubs without security staff, Norths' only remedy, it was submitted, was to demand the remedying of the default within 14 days, thereby potentially putting it in breach of provisions of its regulatory regime unless it closed the clubs in question. I do not agree with this submission. Clause 10 deals with termination of the agreement. The obligation of Synergy in cl 2 was to provide the service, that is to provide security operatives in accordance with the Club's weekly requirements. It was not an obligation confined to best endeavours. If Synergy could not, on any occasion, provide the services due, say, to a lack of qualified personnel, it would be in no position to complain if Norths, mitigating its loss, provided substitute staff. Any such steps by Norths, consequent on such a failure of Synergy to perform, would be a legitimate protection of its own position brought about by Synergy's breach. Clause 10 deals with termination of the contract under its terms, it does not foreclose steps in mitigation. It is unnecessary to discuss how the agreement would or might operate in the light of cl 10.1(d) and 10.2(c) in the context of repudiatory conduct or a sufficiently serious breach as would otherwise give rise at common law to a right to terminate: cf Wallace-Smith v Thiess Infraco (Swanston) Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 49; 218 ALR 1 at 15-19 [52]-[68] and 62-69 [289]-[315].
37 Taken as a whole, and the above clauses considered in particular, the engagement of Synergy in cl 2 and the annexure was for the objective requirements of the respective club for security operatives performing duties of the character in the annexure. That objective requirement is to be understood against the background at the time of the entry into the relevant contracts. If the context is that some services were supplied by others at the time of entry into the contract in question and the circumstances did not point to any intended change in those circumstances by entry into the contract, the contract can be seen not to apply to such services. Further, the objective requirements of Norths in respect of either club might be affected by bona fide commercial decisions as to how the clubs are to operate. Such decisions may have an effect on the overall requirements for security operatives. Whether any such decision had the aim or the effect of denying Synergy the contractual benefits to which it was entitled would be a matter for analysis based on a specific factual circumstance.