Symond v McNeice

Issues on the Application to Set Aside the Default Judgement 6Rule 36.16 (2) of the UCPR affords a broad discretion to set aside a default judgment where the interests of justice require it and to permit the defendant to contest the plaintiff's claim. The proper approach to such an application was summarised by Hall J in Akari v Sole [2008] NSWSC 59 at [28]-[29]. The applicant bears the onus of showing an arguable case on the merits; not that a different result is likely, but that there is an arguable defence. The onus is on the applicant to advance any facts said to give rise to an arguable defence. The court is not concerned to determine disputed issues of fact and should take the applicant's evidence at it's highest. The court should also consider the extent of the delay in seeking to set aside the judgement, any explanation for the delay, and whether the respondent would suffer any special prejudice if the judgement was set aside. 7In this case, the respondent did not assert that it would suffer any special prejudice if the judgment was set aside. There was substantial delay in making the application: from mid June 2010 (when the applicant should have filed a defence) to 27 May 2011 (when the applicant filed the motion to set aside judgement). However, of itself, delay will rarely justify a refusal to set aside a default judgement.

The contentious issues (1) Was there an adequate explanation for the delay? (2) Was there an arguable defence?

Explanation for Delay 8The applicant gave evidence that he received the statement of claim on 20 May 2010. He noted and read the advice on the statement of claim that, if he intended to dispute the claim, he should file a defence and/or make a cross claim. He then telephoned the solicitor who was acting for him in the criminal proceedings. In a telephone call that lasted for two or three minutes, the solicitor advised the applicant that the civil claim was ill founded because the parallel civil and criminal proceedings constituted "double jeopardy". The solicitor told the applicant that he could ignore the statement of claim. 9It is difficult to believe that any solicitor would advise a client to disregard a statement of claim seeking $290,379.63 on the basis of a two or three minute telephone call, particularly when the solicitor had not seen the statement of claim. No competent solicitor would have suggested that "double jeopardy" rendered the civil claim groundless. In relation to a claim that he or she considered to be groundless, no competent solicitor would have suggested that it should be ignored. Nor would any reasonable businessperson (such as the applicant) act upon such superficial advice when faced with a claim for a large sum of money. I do not accept the applicant's evidence that a solicitor advised him in the terms asserted, nor do I accept his evidence that he acted upon such advice. The applicant has not advanced an adequate explanation for the delay. 10The adequacy of the explanation for delay is only one matter to be considered. Of greater importance is the issue of whether, if the applicant's evidence is taken at its highest, it supports an arguable defence.

Arguable Defence 11The applicant wishes to argue that, in late November 2004, the original loan agreement was varied through the agency of the respondent's nephew so that the requirement to pay $190,400 by 1 November 2004 became a requirement to pay $170,000 (or $190,400?) when the applicant acquired the capacity to pay. 12Taking the applicant's evidence at the highest, it is not capable of establishing that the respondent's nephew was acting as the respondent's agent. There is no evidence that the respondent appointed his nephew as his agent or held out that his nephew had authority to bind him in contractual relations. Rather, the respondent dealt directly with the applicant in relation to the personal loan when the loan was given and when repayment was discussed on 27 November 2004. 13There is no evidence that the applicant and the respondent (either himself or through his nephew) agreed in principle or otherwise, to vary the terms of the loan. In November 2004, the applicant sought the respondent's forbearance in relation to repayment, but the respondent's answer was to become angry and demand that the applicant leave his residence. It was for that very reason that the applicant petitioned the respondent's nephew to intervene on his behalf. 14For an agreement in principle to operate as a variation, there must be consideration. The mere forbearance by one party to a contract concerning performance of obligations by the other does not effect a variation of the contract unless it is supported by consideration or recorded in a deed under seal: Martech International Pty Ltd v Energy World Corporation Ltd [2006] FCA 1004 at [141] - [142], Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardener [2008] HCA 57 at [68], [84] and [96]. The applicant sought to rely upon Electronic Industries Ltd David Jones Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 288 as authority for the proposition that consideration was not necessary where the variation was a change in the date of performance of contractual obligations. However, in that case the High Court did not discuss whether consideration was necessary to support the variation of a contract. The facts in Electronic Industries were very different from those in the present case because, in Electronic Industries , neither party had performed its obligations under the contract. 15The applicant contended that the cheque for $170,000 constituted consideration. However, the cheque was not capable of constituting consideration because, as each party was aware at the time, the cheque was worthless. No funds were available to meet the cheque and there was no indication as to when funds might become available. In any event, as the sum of $190,400 had fallen due on 1 November 2004, the worthless cheque for $170,000 was not consideration because it was an offer to pay a lesser amount than that owed.

Frustration 16On the scenario advanced by the applicant, the issue of frustration is irrelevant. Frustration could only arise if the contract was varied in late November 2004. If the contract was varied so that the moneys did not become payable until the applicant was capable of paying them, then the time for payment had not arisen when the frustrating events occurred. The facts of arrest and incarceration merely provide evidence of incapacity to pay during the relevant period. Conversely, if the contract was not varied, then the time for compliance was 1 November 2004, four years before the alleged frustration. 17In any case, events such as those upon which the applicant relies cannot substantiate an argument of frustration. Hardship, inconvenience or material loss will not call the principles of frustration into play: per Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696 at [728]-[729], cited with approval by Hamilton J in Lindsay-Owen v Associated Dairies Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1095 at [11]. Prima facie, a promisor takes the risk of an event happening that prevents him or her from performing a promise: Scanlan's New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 169 per Latham CJ at [187]. 18The applicant has not advanced an arguable defence. The application is dismissed. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 11 August 2011