ELABORATION
2 The consequence of not making such an order is brought out by Mr Fordyce in his comprehensive written submissions to which I express my indebtedness. Thus if a distribution were made under the DCA, the immediate effect would be that creditors covered by the Deed would be paid their dividend, whilst creditors whose debts were incurred after the DCA would be paid nothing. It also is inevitable that, with the company being hopelessly insolvent, some creditor will seek then to wind up the company.
3 At that point, it was said that an application would likely be made to retrieve the amount paid under the DCA on the basis that it was either an uncommercial transaction or an unfair preference, each within the meaning of Pt 5.7B of the Corporations Law. However, such an attack would be defeated by the fact that, in relation to such "insolvent transactions", avoidance only applies if they were entered into (or given effect to) on or before the winding-up began (s588FE(2)) and in the case of an administration that is taken to be the date the administration commenced (s513B and s513C). Nonetheless an attack might well be made on the basis that the distribution involved acting contrary to the interests of one group of creditors in a discriminatory fashion, not justified in the interests of creditors and the company as a whole, where the company is insolvent and not expected thereafter to survive. See generally Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, though otherwise it has been suggested that the duty may be one of imperfect obligation owed to creditors exigible merely by way of a qualification on the shareholders' power to ratify; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler (1994) 122 ALR 531 per Gummow J.
4 It will be appreciated that the validating effect of s451C(a) of the Corporations Law does not apply to transactions by a Deed Administrator but only by an ordinary administrator so that it would afford no protection in such a subsequent liquidation.
5 That squarely poses the question, does a Deed Administrator have a duty cognate with that of a liquidator to act impartially as between pre and post DCA creditors, being for that purpose at least in a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary position though concededly not as a trustee as I explain below. There appears to be no authority precisely on point though some helpful analogy as well as support for that proposition implicitly to be found in s447E(1) of the Corporations Law. This provides in relation to an administrator including one under a DCA:
"447E(1) [Power where management prejudicial to creditors] Where the Court is satisfied that the administrator of a company under administration, or of a deed of company arrangement:
(a) has managed, or is managing, the company's business, property or affairs in a way that is prejudicial to the interests of some or all of the company's creditors or members; or
(b) has done an act, or made an omission, or proposes to do an act, or to make an omission, that is or would be prejudicial to such interests;
the Court may make such order as it thinks just."
6 There is nothing in that subsection to suggest that the Court would only intervene where there is prejudice to pre DCA creditors and would not intervene where the prejudice is to post DCA creditors. To the contrary, if as appears "creditors" include both categories, it would be surprising indeed that the court has this statutory power to intervene by reason of prejudice (here) to post DCA creditors yet the administrator would have no duty of impartiality towards them but rather a duty owed exclusively to pre DCA creditors; a duty leading the DCA administrator to distribute only to them, leaving post DCA creditors lamenting.
7 Drawing on the analogy of a voluntary liquidator, which I consider is apposite also to a DCA Administrator, a voluntary liquidator has a duty to act impartially as between creditors. Thus Roxburgh J in Re Britton & Millard Ltd (1957) 107 LJO 601 at 601.
"… this was an unusual case for the voluntary liquidator had come here to take sides. It was most undesirable for a voluntary liquidator to interfere in proceedings such as these except to dispel any ground for attack which may be made on him. The mere fact that a voluntary liquidator opposed a winding-up by the Court was one reason why a compulsory winding up order should be made because liquidator must be impartial as between the creditors."
Such a voluntary liquidator is not a trustee but is in a fiduciary position. See for example Thomas Franklin & Sons Ltd v Cameron (1935) 36 SR(NSW) 286 at 296 where Davidson J in the full court reviewed the authorities concerning the position of a liquidator in a voluntary winding up and concluded that he was not a trustee but did have fiduciary duties:
"It appears to me then, on the whole, from all these authorities, that the liquidator is principally and really an agent for the company but occupies a position which is fiduciary in some respects and is bound by the statutory duties imposed upon him by the Act."