Introduction
1 The applicant is the operator of a live music venue from premises at 57 Swan Street, Richmond, Victoria. It owns a number of registered trade marks in class 41 for live music performances and ticket booking services for such performances, including "THE CORNER HOTEL", "THE CORNER" and "CORNER".
2 The respondents are the operators of, relevantly, two businesses that are both conducted within the building located at 352 William Street, Melbourne, Victoria. The first business is a hotel called The Jazz Corner Hotel and has its street entrance at 352 William Street. The second business is a jazz music venue called Bird's Basement that has its street entrance at 11 Singers Lane, Melbourne, which is at the back of the building.
3 The applicant brought these proceedings against the respondents under s 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TMA) alleging that the respondents have infringed the applicant's trade marks by using as trade marks the names "The Jazz Corner Hotel", "Jazz Corner", "Jazz Corner of Melbourne" and "Jazz Corner of the World" in relation to live music services. The respondents deny infringement on multiple grounds, including whether the respondents have used the "Jazz"-related names as trade marks, whether they have used the names in relation to live music services and whether the names are deceptively similar to the applicant's trade marks.
4 The respondents have brought a cross-claim seeking rectification of the Register of Trade Marks by cancellation of the applicant's trade marks on the following grounds: ss 88(2)(a) and 41 of the TMA (the trade marks are not capable of distinguishing the applicant's services) and s 88(2)(c) of the TMA (use of the trade marks is likely to deceive or cause confusion).
5 The foregoing is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of the issues in dispute between the parties, but is a sufficient summary to explain the evidentiary rulings that follow.
6 The trial of this proceeding occurred on 16 and 17 March 2020 and was then adjourned for the parties to prepare written closing submissions. In the course of the trial, I made rulings on objections to the affidavit evidence of witnesses who were called for cross-examination. In respect of witnesses who were not required for cross-examination, the parties agreed to file written submissions addressing their objections and that I should rule on the objections "on the papers". On 19 August 2020, each of the parties filed a further written submission addressing the remaining evidentiary objections that were pressed.
7 One of the rulings I made during the trial is relevant to other evidence considered below, and it is convenient to explain the reasons for that ruling. The ruling concerned Mr Dadon's affidavit affirmed 17 February 2020 which exhibited:
(a) screenshots of webpages for various hotel businesses trading under names that included the word "corner", including The Corner Hotel Alexandra, Victoria; The Corner Pub in Liverpool, NSW; and the Corner Hotel in Ballarat, Victoria;
(b) an online search of the St Kilda Historical Society which showed that there was a "Corner Hotel" on the corner of Fitzroy and Barkly Streets in St Kilda which operated from 1864 until 1967; and
(c) an online search of the Victorian Heritage Database (an electronic database of Victoria's significant heritage places and objects published by the Heritage Council of Victoria) for hotels or pubs using the word "corner" in their name, which showed there was a "Corner Hotel" that was located on the corner of Barker and Lyttleton Streets in Castlemaine, Victoria and was built in June 1869.
8 The search results were sought to be adduced to prove the facts asserted in them. As such, they were inadmissible hearsay under s 59 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) unless they fell within an exception or I waived the hearsay rule pursuant to s 190.
9 In relation to the websites, I considered that the screenshots were not business records, for the reasons I expressed in Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd v Monster Energy Company [2019] FCA 923 at [178]. The screenshots were solely descriptive of the businesses concerned. In relation to the historical searches, the parties did not make submissions about the possible application of the provisions of Part 4.3 of the Evidence Act.
10 During the hearing, I accepted the respondent's submission that I should waive the hearsay rule pursuant to s 190 of the Evidence Act. Section 190(3) provides that the Court may order that the hearsay rule does not apply in relation to evidence if (a) the matter to which the evidence relates is not genuinely in dispute or the application of that rule would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay. Section 190(4) describes, without limitation, the following matters that the Court may take into account in deciding whether to exercise the power conferred by s 190(3):
(a) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding;
(b) the nature of the cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding;
(c) the probative value of the evidence; and
(d) the powers of the Court (if any) to adjourn the hearing, to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence.
11 The asserted facts sought to be relied on by the respondents were relatively confined. Those facts were of two kinds: first, that there have been a number of hotels or pubs in Australia that have traded under a name that included the word "corner", as in the "Corner Hotel"; second, a number of those hotels or pubs have offered live music performances at the premises. The respondents contended that the evidence is relevant to the defence of the applicant's infringement claim as well as to the respondents' cross-claim seeking cancellation of the applicant's trade marks.
12 In my view, neither fact was genuinely in dispute. The dispute concerns the nature of the live music performances conducted at such premises and the extent to which they might be regarded as comparable to the live music and booking services provided by the applicant's business. Further, I consider that the application of the hearsay rule to the evidence proposed to be adduced would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay. In the case of businesses that are currently operating, it would require the respondents to visit the premises in order to obtain direct evidence of their operations. The respondents have adduced evidence of that kind, but to replicate it across all possible venues would, in my view, involve unnecessary expense. In the case of businesses that have closed, it would require the respondents to obtain evidence from the authors of the historical records concerning such premises. Again, in my view, such a step would involve unnecessary expense. I have reached that conclusion in light of the facts that the evidence is relatively uncontroversial; the facts sought to be proved by the evidence are relatively confined, as set out above; and those facts are not determinative of the issues in dispute between the parties.
13 My rulings in respect of the remainder of the evidence follows.