(3) Trade Practices Act misleading and deceptive conduct
121The executrices say that the Wikramanayakes were knowingly involved in Wagga Road's misleading and deceptive conduct. The executrices say that Wagga Road's agreement with Plus 55 was such that Wagga Road and the Wikramanayakes must have expected that when the Donoghues entered their Resident Agreements on 18 March that the Donoghues' accommodation bond would be transferred to Wagga Road and used by Wagga Road to service its NAB facility.
122The executrices say that with this knowledge or expectation, that the Wikramanayakes refrained either from disclosing to the Donoghues or refrained from causing Wagga Road to disclose to the Donoghues that they were in a vulnerable position and may not have their bonds refunded to them in a timely manner in the future. The executrices contend that by failing to disclose to residents of Lavington Lodge the Wagga Road-Plus 55 accommodation bond or transfer arrangement, that Wagga Road contravened Trade Practices Act s 52, and that the Wikramanayakes were well aware of that contravention.
123The executrices' misleading and deceptive conduct case depends on two main circumstances: one, based on Plus 55's conduct up to March 2005; and the other based on what Wagga Road would soon have to do. First, by the time the Donoghues entered into the Resident Agreement on 18 March 2005, that the Wikramanayakes were aware that Plus 55, controlled as it was by Messrs Smith and James, had failed to account to Wagga Road for $500,000 of accommodation bonds. And so, Wagga Road and the Wikramanayakes were said to be conscious that present and future residents of Lavington Lodge were vulnerable to the loss of their accommodation bonds. After all, so the argument goes, if Wagga Road was having trouble getting an explanation from Plus 55 for what had happened to the accommodation bonds, it could be expected without more that present and future residents of Lavington Lodge would have similar problems.
124Secondly, because of Mr Smith's and Mr James' failure to account, the Wikramanayakes were very conscious, as their 9 February 2005 correspondence shows, that Wagga Road must soon act to enforce its rights against Plus 55 to have all accommodation bonds Plus 55 had received, paid over to it, in accordance with the Plus 55-Wagga Road agreement, so that the accommodation bonds could then be used to pay down Wagga Road's loan facility with the NAB. From this demand it is said that the Wikramanayakes must have been very well aware that the accommodation bonds would not be readily available in the future for the residents to call for them.
125These two circumstances are said to give rise to a reasonable expectation that before the Donoghues entered their Resident Agreement on 18 March 2005, the Wikramanayakes should have disclosed to the Donoghues that Wagga Road was asserting a right to have the accommodation bonds transferred from Plus 55, where the residents such as the Donoghues had lodged or were lodging them, over to Wagga Road. The executrices say that this disclosure should have been given to all the residents soon after the Wikramanayakes' 9 February 2005 letter and certainly before 18 March 2005.
126The authorities make clear, and the executrices accepted in argument, that it is inappropriate to speak in terms of a duty of disclosure. Rather the question is "whether having regard to all the relevant circumstances, there had been conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive: Demagogue v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 ("Demagogue") at 32 per Black CJ, and see Commonwealth Bank v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84. The requirement to avoid misleading and deceptive conduct by speaking is expressed in terms of a reasonable expectation that the information in question would be disclosed rather than in terms of a duty of disclosure. In Demagogue, at 41, per Gummow J, expressed the applicable principle when agreeing with a statement of French J (as his Honour then was) in Kimberley NZI Finance Ltd v Torero Pty Limited (1989) ATPR (Digest) 46-054 at 53,195:
If in a particular case silence would, as a matter of fact, constitute misleading or deceptive conduct, s 52 by virtue of its prohibition of such conduct imposes its own statutory duty to make disclosure. The cases in which silence may be so characterised are no doubt many and various and it would be dangerous to essay any principle by which they might be exhaustively defined. However, unless the circumstances are such as to give rise to the reasonable expectation that if some relevant fact exists it would be disclosed, it is difficult to see how mere silence could support the interference that the fact does not exist.
127The Wikramanayake's liability for misleading and deceptive conduct is said to be accessorial: that both, as directors of Wagga Road, were knowingly involved in Wagga Road's misleading and deceptive conduct in failing to provide further information to residents and specifically to the Donoghues. Although it is in dispute that accessorial liability is sufficiently pleaded, the Further Amended Statement of Claim is sufficient to make the nature of the Wikramanayakes' liability clear.
128What should have been disclosed? Reflecting the two elements above identified the executrices' case is that Wagga Road (and the Wikramanayakes) should have disclosed to residents that: Wagga Road was having problems in recovering accommodation bonds from Plus 55 and that Wagga Road's intention was to have all bonds transferred from Plus 55 and then used to satisfy Wagga Road's liabilities.
129The Wikramanayakes' have several persuasive answers to the misleading and deceptive conduct argument. First, the relationship between Wagga Road and the residents of Lavington Lodge and Plus 55 is not obviously one which calls for the disclosure which the plaintiffs have identified. Wagga Road is acting in the role of the lessor to Plus 55 and a financier of Plus 55's operations at Lavington Lodge. Wagga Road had no direct contractual relationship with any of the residents of Lavington Lodge. The evidence does not show that Wagga Road made any commitment directly to any resident about what would happen to accommodation bonds. Even if it be assumed that Wagga Road was aware that Plus 55 was not performing Plus 55's obligations to Wagga Road, that would not of itself raise in Wagga Road any obligation to correct misapprehensions that the residents might have about the way that Plus 55 was conducting its affairs. The residents of Lavington Lodge are Plus 55's customers. A financier or a lessor does not ordinarily have an obligation to tell the customers of the lessee/borrower's financial difficulties. Such a duty to disclose was put to Mr Wikramanayake, who colourfully expressed this idea in his answer, "exactly, your Honour. I mean, my understanding, if two parties are in a commercial arrangement you can't use that knowledge to go out and bag somebody else's visit. Maybe I am looking at it too simplistically." Thus, leaving aside the position of the Wikramanayakes, which is even more remote from the residents of Lavington Lodge than was Wagga Road, I do not see that the relationship of Wagga Road with the residents is one that in itself calls for action to correct a misleading impression being given by Plus 55.
130Secondly, the suggested disclosure was unlikely to assist the residents of Lavington Lodge, if that is its objective. If what was to be disclosed was that Wagga Road was having trouble in ensuring Plus 55 accounted to it for accommodation bonds received, and was now seeking to ensure that bonds were paid over to it, it is certainly not obvious that all residents would want this information disclosed widely, so as to put Plus 55 and Lavington Lodge in a bad public light. It was probably in the financial interest of existing residents for Plus 55 to continue attracting future residents to the facility, so that existing residents could share the benefits of the increased economies of scale and reduced financial risk associated with the receipt of further accommodation bonds. If disclosure to new residents was perceived as "bad news" deterring future residents coming into Lavington Lodge, what should Wagga Road do? Should it risk potential financial harm to existing residents by disclosing this information? Should it risk potential financial harm to prospective residents by not disclosing?
131Thirdly, part of the Wagga Road-Plus 55 arrangements had already been disclosed through the Resident Agreement Clause D7.01, which disclosure had made clear that existing residents would have their accommodation bonds reimbursed to them when bonds were received from future incoming residents. That clause itself signalled a degree of risk to persons becoming residents that should they wish to exit the facility in the future they may not get their accommodation bonds back either quickly or at all. Whilst this clause does not convey the full terms agreed between Wagga Road and Plus 55, it certainly conveys the risk of non-return of the bonds. Given this disclosure of a negative risk, it is questionable how much more disclosure was required.
132Fourthly, the plaintiffs say that Messrs Smith and James may have misapplied the accommodation bonds that Wagga Road was entitled to receive. This is said to be information that should have been disclosed. But there are difficulties with the content of such a disclosure. So far as the Donoghues' bonds are concerned, they were in fact paid to Wagga Road, and were not misapplied, albeit misrepresented on receipt as the funds of an investor. In respect of accommodation bonds paid before the Donoghues came into Lavington Lodge, it is difficult to see why Wagga Road should risk Messrs Smith and James bringing an action for defamation against it on account of its public statements that they had misapplied funds.
133And the case for the other part of what the executrices say should have been disclosed - that the accommodation bonds were soon going to Wagga Road - has even less force. Assuming in the plaintiffs' favour, that it could be clearly established that Messrs Smith and James had misapplied some accommodation bonds to purposes unrelated to Lavington Lodge, then Wagga Road may actually have been a safer destination for the accommodation bonds than was Plus 55. It is difficult to see in those circumstances, why Wagga Road should disclose it was receiving the bonds. Wagga Road by then had substantial assets - it owned Lavington Lodge. And it was proposed to use any accommodation bonds it received to reduce its mortgage liabilities (as it did indeed with the Donoghues' accommodation bonds).
134Fifthly, establishing a misleading and deceptive case against the Wikramanayakes is even more difficult than it is against Wagga Road. Wagga Road is not now sued in these proceedings. The Wikramanayakes are sued under Trade Practices Act 1974 s 75B, as the provision then stood, as accessories to Wagga Road's alleged misleading and deceptive conduct. Liability under the Fair Trading Act 1987 was not pleaded against them. A person will only be regarded as involved in a contravention sufficiently to attract s 75B if the person intentionally participated in the contravention, which requires actual rather than constructive knowledge of the essential matters that make up the contravention, together with a level of involvement, that may lead to a conclusion that a person had sufficient knowledge to be implicated in the contravention sufficiently to attract s 75B: Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65 (1985) 158 CLR 661 and Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry, Payes, Bunnett, Sharp, Bassat, Kras, Horman & Thomson (1998) 157 ALR 1. For the Wikramanayakes to know whether or not Wagga Road has engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by reason of Wagga Road's failure to provide information to residents, the Wikramanayakes would need to know a great deal about what Plus 55 had or had not said to the residents. The evidence did not clearly establish that Mr and Mrs Wikramanayake had sufficient knowledge of the communication between Plus 55 and the residents of Lavington Lodge for the Wikramanayakes to know or even strongly suspect that a misleading impression had been left with residents. In my view the plaintiffs' case fell well short of establishing the necessary degree of knowledge on the Wikramanayakes' part, to make out a Yorke v Lucas case.
135Sixthly, reliance is a major difficulty for the plaintiffs' case. The plaintiffs must prove that Mr and Mrs Donoghue relied upon misleading and deceptive conduct in order to succeed. The two executrices were not the decision-makers who committed themselves to the Resident Agreement. Their parents would have been the natural sources of such evidence. The proceedings were commenced in 2010, some two years before Mrs Donoghues' death. No explanation is given as to why there is no evidence from her to support the inference of reliance on misleading and deceptive conduct. Mrs Donoghue could be expected to have been a decisive person: Mrs Briggs explained that her mother had business experience, had managed a hotel, and chose where she wanted to live in 2005. The absence of any evidence from the person who is said to have acted on the misleading conduct, at least to explain their decision-making processes, makes the Court cautious about inferring reliance.
136And the inference of reliance in this case is a subtle one. The plaintiffs have to prove that Mr and Mrs Donoghue would not have proceeded had they known that Plus 55 had not accounted to Wagga Road for $500,000 and that Wagga Road wanted to enforce its rights to take the accommodation bonds. Yet, Mr Geddes had pressed advice upon Mr and Mrs Donoghue, recorded in his March 2005 letter of advice, that shows that the Donoghues were warned (paragraph 8) about there being risk that the accommodation bonds may not be repaid unless a new resident could be found to replace them. In the absence of any evidence from either Mrs Donoghue or Mr Geddes that the Donoghues were interested in the subject matter of what is now said not to have been disclosed to them. Mrs Ryan's evidence was that Mr Geddes' advice to her parents did not cover whether Plus 55 could dispose of or deal with the bonds and Mrs Ryan could not say to the best of her recollection that was a matter that concerned her mother. In these circumstances, I decline to draw the inference that either Mr or Mrs Donoghue relied upon misleading and deceptive conduct of the kind alleged.
137Seventhly, looked at objectively with the knowledge that the Wikramanayakes had at the time, the urgency of the need to disclose information to the residents is not as obvious the plaintiffs now contend. In closing submissions Mr Van Aalst tended to suggest that Mr James and Smith had misappropriated $500,000 that had been received in accommodation bonds prior to the Donoghues' money being received. But the evidence does not go so far as to enable the Court to make any such finding. All that can be said is that Mr Smith and Mr James had failed to account to Wagga Road for accommodation bonds received. They had not admitted any misappropriation. Nor were they refusing ever to give an account. And it was certainly not clear to the Wikramanayakes that Messrs Smith and James had caused Plus 55 to pay the accommodation bonds away out of reach. One would have expected the Wikramanayakes' 9 February letter to have been even stronger if they had known such things. The Wikramanayakes were entitled to assume that the monies were still either with or within easy call of Plus 55. In a real sense the Wikramanayakes were therefore entitled to believe that the funds were closer to Plus 55 than they would have been had they actually been paid to Wagga Road. These circumstances somewhat reduce the urgency of Wagga Road or the Wikramanayakes coming to the rescue of the residents by disclosing more information to them.
138Eighthly, it was suggested on behalf of the plaintiffs in final submissions that the Wikramanayakes should have disclosed to Mr and Mrs Donoghue that Plus 55 was in breach of the Aged Care Act by insisting in the proviso to clause D7.01 of the Resident Agreement that accommodation bonds would not be repaid until a new resident came into the facility. But there are two problems with the case so put. One, a breach of the Aged Care Act was not pleaded as part of the alleged non-disclosure. And, in any event, I do not infer that Mr and Mrs Wikramanayake were aware that clause D7.01 of the Resident Agreements was a breach of the Aged Care Act, even assuming that it was such a breach. Mr and Mrs Wikramanayake did not seem to the Court to be the kind of people who would have deliberately left themselves in breach of legislation, if they were aware of the breach. They were both practising accountants and struck the Court as both being fairly conservative and anxious not to jeopardise the value of the licence to conduct an aged care facility.
139Thus the plaintiffs' misleading and deceptive conduct case also fails.
Conclusion and Orders
140In the result each of the plaintiffs' causes of action fails. They have not been able to establish against the Wikramanayakes their constructive trust, interference with contractual relations, or misleading and deceptive conduct cases. The result therefore is that the plaintiffs' Further Amended Statement of Claim will be dismissed.
141Ordinarily costs would follow the event under Uniform Civil Procedure Rule r 42.1 "unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made". It may be that one or other party will seek a special costs order. But unless such an application is notified to my Associate by 2.00pm on Friday 23 August 2013, then the orders that the Court will make that day are:
(1)Dismiss the Further Amended Statement of Claim;
(2)Direct the parties to provide any submission that they are advised in relation to costs to the Court by 12 noon on Friday 23 August 2013; and
(3)I note that the Court will make its costs decision in chambers without the need for any further appearance.
I certify that this and the preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Justice Slattery delivered on
Associate..................................