Strano v Jovcevski [2008] NSWSC 380 | Case summary

4867 of 2005 ALMA STRANO -v- STEVEN JOVCEVSKI JUDGMENT 1 HIS HONOUR: These are proceedings under the Family Provision Act 1982. 2 The proceedings were instituted by summons filed by the Plaintiff on 7 September 2005. Subsequently an amended summons was filed on 1 November 2007 (upon the commencement of the trial of the proceedings). By that amended summons the Plaintiff claims an order for provision for her maintenance and advancement in life out of the estate and/or notional estate of her late husband, Kenneth Kire Jovcevski (to whom I shall refer as "the Deceased"). 3 The Deceased died on 14 August 2005, aged 55 years. He left a will dated 17 November 2004, probate whereof was on 3 August 2007 granted to Steven Jovcevski, the executor named in such will (who is the Defendant to the present proceedings). 4 The Plaintiff and the Deceased met in 1995, and commenced to reside together in the Deceased's residence at 157 Derribong Road, Cordeaux Heights ("the Cordeaux Heights property") on 30 January 1996. (That property had been acquired by the Deceased in 1990.) They married on 3 June 1997. Each of the Plaintiff (who was born on 6 April 1967, and who is now aged 41) and the Deceased (who was born on 21 May 1950) had previously been married. No children were born to the union of the Plaintiff and the Deceased, although each had children of their respective previous marriages. The Deceased by his first marriage had two children, Steven, the present Defendant (who was born on 18 August 1975, and who is now aged 31) and Vicki (who was born in 1982, and is presently aged about 26). The Plaintiff by her previous marriage had a daughter, Bianka (who was born on 7 September 1989 and who is presently aged 18). The Plaintiff's first husband died in September 1991. (It should for completeness here be recorded that the Plaintiff when aged in her late teens had entered into what she described as an "arranged marriage", which shortly afterwards was annulled.) 5 The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased was volatile and was characterised by separations and reconciliations. There were instances of physical violence suffered by the Plaintiff at the hands of the Deceased, as well as instances of mental violence and oppression. 6 Probate in solemn form (pursuant to an order in that regard, made on 31 July 2007) of the will of the Deceased dated 17 November 2004 was on 3 August 2007 granted to Steven Jovcevski, the executor appointed under that will. 7 The Deceased made no provision for the Plaintiff in that will, but, in the events which have happened, gave the entirety of his estate (after payment of debts, taxes, funeral and testamentary expenses) to the Defendant and the Deceased's daughter Vicki, in equal shares. 8 The inventory of property discloses the following assets, and the respective values ascribed thereto, 1999 BMW 323 coupé motor vehicle $30,000 Commonwealth Bank savings account $300 Household furniture $30,000 Superannuation $10,000 Jewellery $1,000 Total $71,300 9 The Deceased at the time of his death had liabilities of $40,000, in respect to loans made to him by his parents and for costs in Family Court proceedings which were on foot between the Plaintiff and the Deceased at the time of the Deceased's death. 10 On 31 July 2007 (that being after the commencement of the present proceedings) the Plaintiff consented to an order that she pay the costs of the Defendant of the probate proceedings. The Defendant estimates that those costs will be in the vicinity of $66,000, although he has not attempted to have them assessed. The Defendant in his affidavit of 18 October 2007, filed in the present proceedings, queried whether the Plaintiff had any assets of substance which would enable those costs to be recoverable. 11 At the time of the death of the Deceased he was embroiled in proceedings with the Plaintiff in the Family Court of Australia. They were not the only proceedings in which the Plaintiff and the Deceased had been involved against each other. There had also been proceedings in the Local Court at Sutherland, and proceedings (either instituted or at least threatened by the Plaintiff) in the District Court of New South Wales at Sydney. 12 About fourteen months before his death the Deceased on 18 June 2004 transferred the Cordeaux Heights property to the Defendant. The present value of that property was agreed by the parties to be $620,000. 13 On 7 October 2004, the Defendant, who had an authority from the Deceased to operate his account with the Commonwealth Bank withdrew from that account the sum of $78,005.40. 14 In his affidavit of 18 October 2007, the Defendant identified assets which might be the subject of a prescribed transaction as being the Cordeaux Heights property and the foregoing amount of $78,005.40. The Defendant said that he had expended that latter sum towards the payment of various legal costs incurred by the Deceased in the Family Court proceedings, and also towards the costs of the contested probate proceedings. The Defendant said that he had been prepared to accept responsibility for his father's legal costs because the Deceased had transferred the house property to him and be expected that in due course, after his father's death, he could reimburse himself from the proceeds of sale of that house property. 15 The Defendant provided details of various liabilities of the estate, in a total amount of almost $52,000, in addition, the Defendant estimated that his costs of the present proceedings would total $45,490. 16 The Plaintiff estimated that her costs of the present proceedings to date total about $140,000, and that there will be further costs in respect to barrister's fees. 17 It is obvious that, unless there be an order designating the foregoing withdrawal from the Deceased's bank account and part or all of the Cordeaux Heights property as notional estate of the Deceased, there is no property which may be the subject of an order for provision in favour of the Plaintiff. 18 At the time when she met the Deceased the Plaintiff, who has worked as a hairdresser throughout her working life, was residing in a townhouse which she owned at Albion Park. She had purchased that townhouse from the sale proceeds of her former matrimonial home in Kiama after the death of her previous husband in September 1991. 19 The Plaintiff (and her daughter Bianka) and the Deceased lived together in the Cordeaux Heights property, from January 1996 to April 1996, when the Plaintiff returned to her Albion Park residence. At the behest of the Deceased, the Plaintiff (and Bianka) returned to the Cordeaux Heights residence in about November 1996. They remained together until November 1997. 20 In early 1997 the Plaintiff had purchased a hair salon at Sutherland (financing that purchase by way of borrowings). The parties again separated in 1997, the Plaintiff returning to her townhouse at Albion Park. At the instance of the Plaintiff the Deceased was charged with common assault. On 6 January 1998 he pleaded guilty to that charge, was fined $300 and was required to enter into a good behaviour bond for twelve months. Again at the behest of the Deceased, the Plaintiff returned to the Cordeaux Heights property in January 1998, remaining there until August of that year. 21 After departing the Cordeaux Heights property in August 1998 and residing with her mother for some weeks the Plaintiff rented a unit at 26/28-34 Leonay Street, Sutherland from 14 November 1998. That separation from the Deceased obtained from August 1998 until March 2000. According to the Plaintiff, during that period the Deceased constantly communicated with her by telephone, or attempted to do so. On occasion the Deceased visited the Plaintiff's hair salon at Sutherland. 22 Again, in May 1999 the at the instance of the Plaintiff, apprehended violence proceedings were brought against the Deceased, but those proceedings were withdrawn at the request of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sought a further apprehended violence order in November 1999, which resulted in the Deceased giving undertakings to the Court on 20 December 1999. 23 The Plaintiff returned to reside with the Deceased at the Cordeaux Heights property in about March 2000. (On each of her periods of cohabitation with the Deceased the Plaintiff was accompanied by her daughter Bianka.) 24 Throughout the period of their relationship the Deceased was suffering from kidney ailments, which required dialysis. According to the Plaintiff, she was in the habit of taking the Deceased to various medical appointments; and during the periods of cohabitation the Plaintiff did most of the cooking for the household as well as attending to washing, ironing, and work in the garden at the Cordeaux Heights residence. 25 In July 2000 the Plaintiff and Bianka again removed from the Cordeaux Heights residence, to rental accommodation at Jannali. That fourth period of separation lasted from July 2000 to June 2002. During that period the Plaintiff changed her rental accommodation on two further occasions. 26 Again, at the instance of the Deceased, the Plaintiff resumed cohabitation with him (that being the fifth such period) in June 2002. By that time the Plaintiff had, on 27 August 2001, instituted proceedings against the Deceased in the Family Court of Australia. She said that as a result of the requests and offers by the Deceased in that regard, the Plaintiff on 16 April 2002 signed a deed of release in relation to a possible District Court claim, and agreed to orders in the Federal Magistrates Court at Wollongong. The Deceased paid the Plaintiff's legal costs of $30,000 in respect to those proceedings. In June 2002 the Deceased took the Plaintiff and Bianka on a holiday to Thailand, which was paid for by the Deceased. After returning from that holiday the Plaintiff again resumed cohabitation with the Deceased at the Cordeaux Heights property. 27 Throughout the periods of their cohabitation the Plaintiff and the Deceased maintained separate bank accounts. They shared household expenses, although not necessarily in equal proportions. 28 It was the Plaintiff's evidence that from the time of their final reconciliation in June 2002 until the Deceased was admitted into full-time care in the Wollongong Hospital in September 2004, they had an excellent marital relationship. In about July 2002, the Deceased gave the Plaintiff an antique silver and diamond ring, and also a gold chain. 29 At much the same time the Deceased purchased a block of land at Port Kembla for $100,000, which he sold in December 2003 for $269,000. 30 The Deceased was admitted into the Wollongong Hospital on or about 17 September 2004, and remained there until his death on 14 August 2005. The Plaintiff said that she attended upon him every day until late November 2004 when, allegedly at the request of other members of his family, the Plaintiff was denied access to him by the hospital staff. 31 The Deceased, who apparently had an interest in a family tobacco business, gave up work in that business in about 2000. The Plaintiff sold her hair salon in 2002 for $17,000. That amount went to pay the Plaintiff's debts. In about November 2002, the Plaintiff and the Deceased conjointly acquired another hair salon, at Bulli, for about $33,000 (that purchase price being provided by the Deceased). The Plaintiff conducted that business for about nine months. However, she said that the Deceased's frequent visits to the salon were disruptive, and also that the Deceased's health condition required her to leave the salon from time to time. The Bulli salon was sold in 2003, for about $21,000. After payment of outstanding bills relating to that business, the balance of the proceeds of sale were retained by the Deceased. 32 On 7 September 2004, the Deceased executed a will by which he gave legacies of $100,000 to each of his children Steven and Vicki and his stepdaughter Bianka, and gave the residue of his estate to the Plaintiff. 33 Only eight days later, on 15 September 2004, the Deceased executed another will, by which he appointed the Plaintiff to be his sole executor and sole beneficiary. 34 As has already been recorded, the Deceased's final will (that which has been admitted to probate) was made on 17 November 2004. 35 During the course of their relationship the Deceased purchased a block of land at 10 Highfields Road, Cordeaux Heights, in an estate known as The Farm, for $140,000. He had financed that purchase by a mortgage loan from the ANZ Bank in an amount of $280,000, with the intention of constructing a house on that vacant land. In about February 2001, the Deceased sold the property at The Farm for $359,990. 36 On 18 June 2004 the Deceased transferred his interest in the Cordeaux Heights property to the Defendant for a stated price of $470,000. It would appear that the Defendant did not pay that purchase price (or any purchase price) to the Deceased. It was not until October 2004 that the Plaintiff became aware of the transfer of the Cordeaux Heights property to the Defendant. According to the Plaintiff, the Deceased when questioned by her about that transfer said that he had sold the house "to protect myself from you", and that a few days later the Deceased concerning that transfer to the Defendant said, "Don't worry; you have been provided for… I did it for business reasons." 37 At the time of the institution of the proceedings the Plaintiff was employed in a hair salon known as Just Cuts at Corrimal, where she was earning about $600-$650 net a week, such income varying according to the hours which she worked. The Plaintiff had no other income. On 4 October 2007, shortly before the hearing of the present proceedings, the Plaintiff purchased that hair salon for $75,000. Settlement took place on 8 October 2007. That purchase was funded by a loan of $40,000 from the Plaintiff's parents and vendor finance in respect to the balance of $35,000. The vendor finance was repayable at the rate of $170 a week from the date of settlement, with full repayment to be made on or before 1 March 2008. At the time of the purchase of the business the Plaintiff also took over the liability for staff entitlements. 38 The Plaintiff provided details of her weekly expenses and outgoings, in a total amount of about $531. 39 The Plaintiff has the following assets, Furniture and chattels $5000 Jewellery $2500 Superannuation $1,100 Total $8,600 40 The Plaintiff provided details of her liabilities, as follows, Sydney Water (unpaid water rates), Cordeaux Height Property $1,924 Debts to parents $100,000 Holy Spirit College, Bellambi (Bianka's unpaid school fees) $9,909 Legal costs due to Graham Chegwidden, Solicitor & Barrister $262,344 Total liabilities $374,177 41 The Plaintiff's costs for the probate proceedings and the present proceedings presently total almost $140,000. In the Family Court her costs total almost $116,000. The Plaintiff expects to incur further costs for her representation at the hearing of the present proceedings. The Plaintiff's present and expected debts total no less than $400,000 (possibly considerably more than that figure). 42 During the course of the hearing it was noted that the following facts had been agreed upon by the parties. · The Defendant's solicitor's costs are $11,000 (inclusive of GST). · The Defendant has no knowledge of any alleged consent to transfer the Deceased's car to the Plaintiff. · The value of the reality at Cordeaux Heights is $620,000. · The Deceased's former spouse, being the mother of the Defendant and his sister Vicki, is aware of these proceedings and does not wish to participate in them. 43 It has already been recorded that the Plaintiff instituted proceedings against the Deceased in the Family Court on 27 August 2001. Pursuant to an order made by the Family Court on 9 December 2004 the Plaintiff has been enabled to continue to reside in the Cordeux Heights property. She is required to pay all council rates, water rates and other statutory charges. 44 It is in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances that the Court should proceed to a consideration of the claim of the Plaintiff. 45 I have had the benefit of receiving various chronologies and summaries of evidence from Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff, and I have received written outlines of submissions and a chronology from Senior Counsel for the Defendant. Those documents will be retained in the Court file. 46 The Plaintiff, as the widow of the Deceased, is an eligible person within paragraph (a) of the definition of that phrase contained in section 6 (1) of the Family Provision Act. As such she has the standing to bring the present proceedings. 47 The only other eligible persons in relation to the Deceased are the two children of the Deceased, being the Defendant and his sister Vicki, each of whom is an eligible person within paragraph (b) of the foregoing definition; and their mother, the former spouse of the Deceased, who is an eligible person within paragraph (c) of the foregoing definition (and who, although aware of these proceedings, does not wish to participate in them). 48 The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased was a volatile one, characterised by separations and reconciliations (at least five of each) in a period of less than nine years, as well as by various court proceedings. It will be appreciated, however, that in the present proceedings the Court has heard only one side of that relationship, being the evidence of the Plaintiff. The Deceased is not available to give his version of the events which are set forth in the Plaintiff's affidavits. Nevertheless, it was the Plaintiff's evidence that during the periods while she and the Deceased were living together there was, at times, a close and affectionate relationship between them. It is not for the Court to attribute blame for the various separations or for the instigation of the various court proceedings (both criminal and civil) between the parties. 49 In carrying out the first stage in the two-stage process identified by the High Court of Australia in Singer v Berghouse [1994] HCA 40; (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 208-210 (the correctness of which test was affirmed by the High Court in Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11; (2005) 221 CLR 191), the Court must determine whether in consequence of the provisions of the will of a testator the applicant has been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance. 50 The High Court in Singer v Berghouse (at 209-210) said that the determination of the first stage calls for an assessment of whether the provision (if any) made was inadequate for what, in all the circumstances, was the proper level of maintenance etc appropriate for the applicant having regard, amongst other things, to the applicant's financial position, the size and nature of the deceased's estate, the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty. 51 In the instant case the Deceased left the entirety of his estate equally between his two children. Neither the Defendant nor the Deceased's daughter Vicki has chosen to place before the Court any information regarding their respective material and financial circumstances. 52 It is obvious that the Plaintiff is in poor financial circumstances. However, the Court, in carrying out the foregoing first stage, must bear in mind that the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased commenced in early 1996 and for all practical purposes terminated in late November 2004, when the Plaintiff made a further application in the Family Court of Australia. That is, the relationship obtained for no more than nine years, and was subject to separations totalling three years and four months. In summary, the parties lived together during the course of their relationship and marriage for a period of no more than about five and a half years. It cannot be said that during those years of cohabitation the relationship between the parties was consistently either harmonious or tranquil. 53 The Family Court proceedings were instituted by the Plaintiff on 27 August 2001, when she made application for final orders. On 16 April 2002, the Family Court made orders by consent, by which the Deceased was to pay the Plaintiff $30,000. That payment was made ten days later, on 26 April 2002. Subsequently, further consent orders were made on 12 June 2002, by which the Deceased was to pay the Plaintiff a further sum of $15,000. 54 By an amended application filed by the Plaintiff on 26 November 2004 the Plaintiff sought to set aside the orders made on 12 June 2002. In place thereof she sought an order that she have the exclusive occupation of the Cordeaux Heights property, and that the Deceased pay to her the sum of $25,000. It will be appreciated that at that time the Cordeaux Heights property had already, five months earlier, been transferred by the Deceased to the Defendant, although the Plaintiff said that she did not become aware of that fact until October 2004. 55 On 9 December 2004, the Family Court made interim orders by consent, that the Plaintiff have exclusive right to occupy the Cordeaux Heights property, provided that she keep the property in a reasonable state of repair and attend to the payment of all council rates and levies, water rates, and all other statutory rates and levies. 56 The Plaintiff has remained in occupation of the Cordeaux Heights property until the present time. However, she presently owes $997 in respect to unpaid waters rates. 57 In the instant case, the fact that the Plaintiff is in poor financial circumstances is not determinative of, first, the question whether the Plaintiff had been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance; or, if so, of the nature of any provision which should be made for her. 58 Since the commencement of the fifth period of cohabitation in June 2002, the Plaintiff has resided in the Cordeaux Heights property. From the time when the Deceased was admitted to the Wollongong Hospital in September 2004, the Plaintiff has had exclusive occupation of that property, despite the fact that, for all practical purposes her relationship with the Deceased terminated in late November 2004. That is, for the past three and a half years, the Plaintiff has had accommodation, without the payment of any rent, and subject only to the payment of outgoings. (As has already been recorded, the Plaintiff has failed to fulfil that latter obligation, in respect to water rates.) 59 It should not be overlooked that the Plaintiff made no financial contribution towards the estate of the Deceased or towards the assets which are now sought to be designated as notional estate. The Deceased had acquired the Cordeaux Heights property in 1990, at least five years before he met the Plaintiff. 60 In the light of the nature of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased, the benefits which the Plaintiff received both during the periods of cohabitation and during the relationship and marriage, and, more importantly, which she has received over the past three and a half years, by way of exclusive accommodation for herself and her daughter in the Cordeaux Heights property, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance. 61 That conclusion is determinative of the present claim. 62 However, in the event that I am wrong in my foregoing conclusion, and it be established that the Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance, then for completeness, I should refer to the Plaintiff's claim for an order for provision out of the notional estate of the Deceased. 63 The Deceased's estate is of little actual value, and its liabilities far exceed its assets. Those liabilities have been funded by the Defendant, who had the expectation of being able to reimburse himself from the proceeds of sale of the Cordeaux Heights property. In the event that the Court were to conclude, first, that the Plaintiff had been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance, and, further, that she was entitled to an order for such provisions, then it would be necessary for her to invoke the provisions relating to notional estate, contained in Part II, Division 2 of the Family Provision Act, in particular, sections 22 and 23, relating to prescribed transactions. 64 However, unless the Plaintiff were to receive from the notional estate of the Deceased an amount well exceeding about $400,000, the entirety of any such provision would go to her creditors, and would not be received for the benefit of the Plaintiff herself. 65 In Thomas v Jackson [2002] NSWSC 660 (26 July 2002), Master Macready (as he then was) said, at [31] that the amount which might otherwise be given to the applicant in that case should not be given to him, since any order for that amount will not be for the benefit of the Plaintiff, as it will pass to his creditors, the amount of whose claims are likely to exceed the amount of any appropriate award. 66 I am in agreement that the Courts do not order provision if it is merely to go to the applicant's creditors in respect of unrelated matters. Such a payment would not operate as provision for the Plaintiff's maintenance or advancement in life (see Caska v Caska [1999] NSWSC 289, 1 April 1999; Diver v Neal [2008] NSWSC 304, 7 April 2008). 67 As has already been recorded, the agreed value of the Cordeux Heights property is $620,000. If there be added to that figure of $620,000 the amount of $78,000 (in respect to the transfer from the Deceased's bank account to the Defendant), the maximum amount which might be available to be designated notional estate of the Deceased would be a little under $700,000. In the event that the Cordeaux Heights property were to be sold, that amount would be diminished somewhat by agent's commission and legal costs associated with the sale. 68 From that amount of, say, $680,000 the estate liabilities of $40,000 must be paid, as well as the costs and expenses relating to the Deceased's Family Court proceedings and to the probate proceedings, in a total amount of about $210,000. In addition, the Defendant provided details of further liabilities of the estate of the Deceased, totalling almost $52,000, as well as funeral expenses of $11,000. That is, the debts and liabilities of the Deceased and the subsequent debts incurred by the estate totalled about $313,000. Of that amount the Defendant has expended the amount of $78,005 which was transferred to him from the Deceased's bank account, thus leaving an outstanding amount of about $235,000, which must be paid by the Defendant on behalf of the estate. Further, the Defendant estimated that additional costs of about $45,000 would be incurred in the conduct of the present proceedings, and that the total of all costs, expenses, outstanding debts, and expected future costs, would be in the order of $280,000. If that figure be deducted from a total potential figure of $680,000 (which would be the maximum amount available if the Cordeaux Heights property and the bank account proceeds be designated notional estate of the Deceased), there would remain, at most, an amount of about $400,000 which could be designated notional estate available to meet any order for provision which might be made in favour of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's debts are in the order of $400,000. 69 Even if I were to consider that the Plaintiff had been left without adequate provision for her proper maintenance, I am not persuaded that, in the circumstances of the instant case, it would be appropriate that an order for provision be made where the maximum amount available to satisfy such an order would benefit not the Plaintiff herself but her creditors. 70 I consider that it would not be appropriate for me to make an order the only practical effect whereof would be to benefit the Plaintiff's creditors and not the Plaintiff herself. Unless the potential assets which might be available to be designated notional estate of the Deceased were significantly greater than the totality of the agreed value of the Cordeaux Heights property and the amount transferred from the Deceased's bank account, then, after meeting the Deceased's liabilities and the Defendant's costs, the maximum amount available to be the subject of an order for provision for the Plaintiff would be about $400,000, and that amount in its entirety would go to the benefit of the Plaintiff's creditors. The Plaintiff herself would receive no benefit from such an order. 71 In summary, therefore, I would not, in any event, be disposed to make an order designating part or all of the foregoing assets as notional estate of the Deceased in such circumstances where no practical benefit would accrue to the Plaintiff from such a designation and such an order. However, for completeness, I consider it appropriate that I should express my views as to whether, in the circumstances of the instant case, the transfer from the Deceased's bank account and the transfer of the Cordeaux Heights property to the Defendant, each constituted a prescribed transaction of the nature described in section 22 of the Act. 72 The withdrawal of the amount of $78,005 from the Deceased's bank account by the Defendant took place within one year of the death of the Deceased. The only evidence placed before the Court concerning the circumstances in which the Defendant entered into that transaction was the Defendant's statement that he told the Deceased when alive that he would pay his Family Court legal costs, the major part of which he has in fact paid. The Defendant said that he was prepared to accept responsibility for his father's legal costs because the Deceased had transferred the house to him and he expected that after the Deceased's death he could sell the house to reimburse himself. The Defendant further said that the amount of $78,005 which he received from the Deceased on or about 7 October 2004 was used by him to pay the foregoing costs of the Deceased and the expenses subsequently incurred by the estate, totalling almost $52,000. I am satisfied that the foregoing withdrawal constituted a prescribed transaction of the nature described in section 23 (b) (ii) of the Act. 73 The transfer of the Cordeaux Heights property by the Deceased to the Defendant took place more than one year before the death of the Deceased, but within the period of three years before his death. It is apparent from the statements made by the Deceased to the Plaintiff, that the intention of that transfer was to deny provision for the maintenance or advancement in life of the Plaintiff out of the estate of the Deceased. I am satisfied, therefore, that that transfer also constituted a prescribed transaction, within section 23 (b) (i) of the Act. 74 However, it must be recognised that the discretionary power of the Court to make an order designating property as notional estate of the Deceased is subject to the provisions of, inter alia, section 27 of the Act. Subsection (1) of that section precludes the Court from making such an order designating property as notional estate of the Deceased unless it has considered - (a) the importance of not interfering with reasonable expectations in relation to property;

Strano v Jovcevski

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Judgment (16 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (8)

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