Those are the circumstances. There are some irresistible conclusions from the facts narrated in detail. First: the agreement to which Forster was a party was in reality a tripartite agreement, not confined in reality to the document called the "offer" and to some actual or implied assent of Forster, but constituted by all the circumstances. Stevens was the vendor, Forster the purchaser, and the Company a necessary party for the purpose of inducing, and assenting to, Stevens selling to Forster in derogation of Stevens' statutory obligation and of the Company's statutory rights, and for the purpose of carrying out the transaction in respect of delivery and payment, and particularly of carrying out the minute provisions incorporated in the offer from clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the award of 1918, for as to these it was, as already observed, the Company, and not Forster, that was capable of performing the acts therein referred to. The Company's part in the agreement was taken in the first instance by its sending the offer to Stevens to sign and forward to some one, either Forster or some one representing him in aiding Stevens and Forster to carry through their respective parts in it, and co-operating in the performance - one portion of its co-operation, namely, the details of the arrangement between it and Forster being disclosed only by the acts of the Company, showing that Forster was a mere intermediary. Though the Company's name does not appear in the offer or in any formal acceptance of it, the facts demonstrate the true tripartite nature of the arrangement. Indeed, Forster's undertaking to indemnify Stevens for breach of the statute, adopted as it was by the Company in including it in the offer, is indisputable proof that the Company's assent was a necessary element in the bargain; and indicates that it was the instigator of the scheme. Forster's role as a dramatis persona is strongly suggestive of that of Wall between Pyramus and Thisbe. The second conclusion is that Stevens delivered his cane to the Company on the terms of the Forster agreement. He delivered the cane in fact to the Company. He so delivered it in his actual capacity of "grower" of the cane, a character he never in fact lost. The Company received the cane in fact at its mill. To all outward appearance and in substance it so received the cane as the owner of the mill. Did it lose that quality by reason of the arrangement? Apart from the arrangement between the grower, the mill-owner and Forster, the award had in those circumstances to be complied with as to terms of analysis and price. If sec. 15 (1) nullifies the arrangement as between the Company and Stevens (a question to be presently considered), what was there to prevent the award taking effect? The question then comes to this: Is the bargain, entered into and carried out between mill-owner, cane-grower and a third party, who acted entirely through the Company as his agent, such a bargain as avoided the operation of the award of 1919? Did Stevens cease to have, in respect of the cane he delivered to the Company, the status of a "grower" under the award? Or did the mill-owner cease to have, in respect of the cane delivered, the status of mill-owner under the award? In other words, did the arrangement referred to effectually, in the eye of the law, interpose Forster as a barrier between cane-grower and mill-owner so as to prevent the award operating upon their actual relations. If, as the Supreme Court has held, these questions are to be answered in the affirmative, the Act is practically a dead letter. Before arriving at so drastic a conclusion, it is necessary to examine the statute carefully in order to discover from its express provisions or its necessary implications how the relations of mill-owners and cane-growers are regulated in the public interest.