At paragraph 16 the Tribunal acknowledged that Dr Stark was proffering an opinion referrable to category 3 of the paragraph of chapter 2 of the AMA Guides which provided for the assessment of emotional disturbances resulting from brain injury. However, in paragraph 28, the Tribunal, presumably in accordance with its earlier determination as to the potential overlap between chapter 2 and chapter 12, excluded assessments for emotional disturbance when considering the correct impairment assessment for the plaintiff under chapter 2. That this is so is obvious not only from what the Tribunal said but also from the fact that the impairment assessment made by it under chapter 2 was 45 per cent. Unless it rejected Dr Stark's opinion outright, an acceptance of that opinion for the purpose of assessment under chapter 2 would have resulted in an impairment assessment of 50 per cent. The problem, says Mr Gorton, is that although the Tribunal impliedly puts Dr Stark's opinion aside for the purpose of assessment under chapter 2, it never took it up again when considering an impairment assessment under chapter 12. In fact, as far as I can see, Dr Stark's impairment assessment for emotional disturbances is never referred to again in the Tribunal's reasons despite discussion of the plaintiff's psychiatric impairment at paragraph 33 et seq, which portion of the reasons include a discussion of opinions from Drs Epstein and Klepfisz, both of whom, impliedly at least, offer opinions on the same subject. Indeed, the Tribunal found that Dr Klepfisz concluded that the plaintiff suffered a total psychiatric impairment of 25-30 per cent of which 18 per cent was the consequence of organic brain damage and Dr Epstein considered that the accident caused a 20% direct psychiatric impairment to the plaintiff.