By summons filed on 18 October 2021, the State of New South Wales (or plaintiff) makes an application for an Extended Supervision Order (ESO) pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act).
Following a preliminary hearing on 2 February 2022, Justice Ierace made orders on 9 February 2022 including an order for the appointment of experts and an Interim Supervision Order (ISO) commencing on 10 February 2022 for a period of 28 days. On 8 March 2022, Bellew J made a further ISO, extending the period of supervision by 28 days commencing on 10 March 2022. On 29 March 2022, Bellew J made another order extending the period of supervision by 28 days commencing on 7 April 2022.
The final hearing was conducted yesterday, that is Tuesday, 3 May 2022. On its face the ISO would expire on 6 May 2022. The parties agree that it may be possible to extend the ISO for a further several days (until 11 May 2022). Due to other commitments over the next week, it is necessary to resolve the controversy and deliver judgment today or, at the latest, on Friday 6 May 2022. As a result of these time imperatives, it is necessary to be exceedingly brief in providing the reasons for the orders that I propose to make. That task is made considerably easier by the efficient and cooperative conduct of counsel and their instructing solicitors on both sides. I express my appreciation, and that of the Court, for the conduct of the case by all of the lawyers involved.
The parties prepared a bundle of evidentiary and other material described as the Judge's Working Folder, which was marked as Ex A. That included "Volume 1" comprising two lever arch folders of affidavits, reports, submissions, case notes and other relevant documents. There was a third lever arch folder, described as "Volume 2", which was an exhibit to an affidavit by the State's solicitor, Ms Murty, affirmed 14 October 2021. That exhibit included further evidentiary material of significance, including, for example, the defendant's criminal history, the remarks on sentence of a number of sentencing Judges, the facts behind some of the relevant matters on the defendant's criminal record, and bundles of material from files maintained by Corrective Services NSW (Corrective Services). Over objection by the State, a few additional Corrective Services case note reports were admitted as Ex 1. Those notes were tendered to demonstrate that the ISO had been, or might be, administered in an inflexible way. The State's objection was that the relevant notes related to a period when the defendant was subject to a parole order, rather than an ISO, and that the State did not have the opportunity to call relevant officers to explain their conduct. However, no adjournment was sought, and I took the view the evidence was admissible and relevant because the same officer of Corrective Services was administering the defendant's parole, the ISO and (prospectively) any ESO that would be made on the State's present application. In admitting the evidence, and in making any findings based upon it, it must be acknowledged that the officers in question did not have the opportunity to answer any criticisms made by, or implicit in, the defendant's submissions.
Before turning to the matters in relation to which the parties do not agree, it is first necessary to state briefly that I accept the effective concession made on behalf of the defendant that I would exercise the Court's discretion to make an ESO.
The material in Volume 2 includes the defendant's criminal record, which commences in 1986 and includes a number of sexual offences, including offences against children. The first sexual offence was committed in December 2001 and resulted initially in a suspended sentence of two years. Presumably following a breach of the suspended sentence bond, the defendant was sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment for six months commencing on 3 September 2003.
In 2005 and 2019, the defendant was charged but found not guilty of offences of sexual intercourse without consent. These allegations, while not proved, are relevant to the present application but the Court should be extremely cautious in taking those matters into account. The existence of these charges is not irrelevant, particularly in circumstances where the protection of the community is the paramount consideration guiding the Court in determining what orders to make. However, I have exercised great care in not giving too much, if any, weight to those offences which the prosecution was unable to establish to the criminal standard.
In 2011, the defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years and one month, with a non-parole period of three years. At the same time there were other offences involving acts of indecency or indecent assault.
On 9 August 2019, the defendant was again sent to gaol, this time for an offence of sexual intercourse with a person aged between 14 and 16 years. He was sentenced to three years and three months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and five months. That sentence was imposed by Judge Flannery SC. Her Honour's remarks on sentence are included in Ex A.
Finally, on 1 May 2020, Acting Judge Marien SC sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for a period of 2 years and 4 months, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 9 months, for two counts of aggravated indecent assault on a person under the age of 16 years. The non-parole period expired on 10 July 2021 and the total sentence expired on 10 February 2022.
The defendant was on parole in relation to the last-mentioned offences at the time the current proceedings were instituted. Accordingly, he was a "supervised offender" pursuant to the provisions in ss 5B and 5I of the Act. The other formal requirements under s 5I have also been satisfied. There is no dispute, and I am satisfied, that the formal requirements for the making of an order are established.
Further, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an ESO. This finding is based on Mr Woods' criminal history, the facts of the cases detailed in that criminal history, Mr Woods' patchy record of compliance while on conditional liberty and the contents of various reports providing opinions as to his risk of re-offending based on statistical tools and the authors' experience and expertise. For example, a Risk Assessment Report dated 13 August 2021, described the defendant as being a "well above average risk" of committing further offences. It also described his "high density of criminogenic needs" relative to other male sexual offenders. A forensic psychologist, Dr Amanda White, provided a report setting out a number of matters relevant to an assessment of whether the defendant would commit further sexual offences if not closely supervised. Dr White provided the following opinions which are consistent with the assessment in the risk assessment report that the defendant poses a "well above average risk" of committing sexual offences:
"104. In my view, Mr Woods does pose a risk of committing a sex offence and, in my opinion, it is likely that future sex offences may meet the threshold for serious sex offence as defined in the Act.
105. The Results of the current assessment are consistent with previous evaluations identifying that Mr Woods presents with High level needs and intervention to reduce his risk. Key risk factors include: sexual violence history, psychological coercion, extreme minimization, attitudes that support his sexual offending, problems with self-awareness, managing stress and coping mechanisms, sexual deviance, problems with intimate and non-intimate relationships, and problems with supervision and treatment. All of these factors have been related to risk of sexual offending either directly or indirectly and considering his individual risk profile together with previous nature and severity of sexual offending, it is in my view likely any future offences may fall under the definition of a serious sex offence in accordance with the Act.
106. Risk factors remain despite prior intensive treatment, indicating that further high-level intervention is required. Currently, he presents with substantial responsivity issues that impact on the likely efficacy of further treatment which suggests that external supervision will be required to manage and reduce risk. It is expected that if he is truly able to immerse himself in treatment, some factors such as his ability to respond to stress and relationship issues may reduce, which may assist in reducing likelihood of reoffending.
…
108. … Assessment utilising static and dynamic factors is most effective for evaluating risk of sexual re-offending. Statistical analysis of Mr Woods' risk of sexual reoffending conducted in 2020 and 2021 consistently place him in the Well Above Average category. Combined with dynamic factors, Mr Woods' level of risk is still Well Above Average indicating high intensity intervention and support is required. Inherent limitations exist as with all assessment measures as described herein, however these measures have been shown to have utility in risk evaluations and adhere to current best practice."
It is unnecessary to go into further detail, however the forensic psychiatrist Dr Kerri Eagle provided a generally similar opinion to the experts already noted. She said the risk of further sexual offending was "well above average" based on both his clinical presentation and the administration of actuarial and structured professional judgment tools.
Having considered all of the material tendered by both parties, I am comfortably satisfied that the State has established that an ESO should be made based on the requirements of the Act. There is no reason that the discretion to make an ESO should not be exercised.
As I have said, or implied, the defendant and his legal advisers took a realistic approach to these matters and essentially conceded that the Court would be satisfied that an order should be made. However, the parties did not agree on the length or duration of the ESO, or the precise content of the conditions proposed by the State.
[2]
Conditions not in dispute
On the final hearing, counsel for the State filed an amended summons in which the conditions of the ISO had been amended to reflect the discussions and negotiations that have taken place between the parties between the time Ierace J made the ISO and the final hearing. There were approximately 55 proposed conditions in the schedule to the amended summons. The defendant agreed with the vast majority of them. Some had been amended or deleted as a result of the discussions between the parties. I have considered those conditions upon which the parties agree and accept the joint position of the parties that those conditions are necessary and appropriate to address the risk factors identified in the material and the triggers that may lead the defendant to re-offend.
[3]
Conditions in dispute
I come to consider those conditions upon which the parties do not agree.
[4]
Schedule of movements, accommodation, and curfew - conditions 5, 6, 7 and 9
The first three conditions in dispute, being 5, 6 and 7, concern a proposed "schedule of movements". The State's position is that the following conditions should be imposed:
"5. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
6. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO), he must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.
7. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency or to attend to urgent bodily functions."
Relatedly, the State proposes a curfew condition regarding the defendant's accommodation as follows:
"9. The defendant must be at his approved address between 9:00pm and 6:00am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO."
The defendant points to occasions in the past in which similar conditions have been administered in what is contended to be an inflexible and unduly onerous way. In order to avoid such inflexibility in the future, the defendant proposes that conditions 5 to 7 be amended by conditions in the following terms:
"5. If directed by his DSO, the defendant is to provide an honest summary of his anticipated movements each week (or over successive weeks), limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, and the dates of travel, but unconfined by any travel route or timetable. If so directed, such a summary is to be provided on, or before the Friday prior to each week (or as otherwise agreed between the defendant and his DSO).
6. The defendant must not deviate from his summary of anticipated movements except in an emergency or to attend to urgent bodily functions, or except as specified in paragraph 7 below.
7. It will not be a breach of condition 5 if the defendant departs from the summary but notifies his DSO of his change of plans before doing so, or as soon as is reasonably practicable afterwards."
The State opposes the conditions proposed by the defendant, and in particular complains that the last phrase of condition 7, that is "or as soon as is reasonably practicable afterwards", fails to provide the protection to the community required by the paramount objectives and purposes of the legislation. It also argues that the terms of conditions 5 - 7 as proposed by the defendant are too loose and non-specific to allow their enforcement.
The State submits that if conditions 5, 6 and 7 are imposed, it is unnecessary to impose the curfew condition stipulated in condition 9. The State also pointed to a number of occasions when the defendant applied for and was granted last-minute variations of his schedule of movements and submitted that the conditions had not been administered in an inflexible manner.
The defendant submitted that the conditions proposed by the State are too inflexible and have been administered, or could be administered, in an unduly harsh manner leading to the defendant's exposure to substantial custodial penalties for breaching the ESO. Reliance was placed on my observations in a case called Manna v State of New South Wales [2021] NSWSC 1220.
Having considered the competing arguments, and reviewing the departmental records, I am unable to conclude that, to this point, the conditions concerning the schedule of movements have been administered in an oppressive or inflexible way. However, I do accept that there have been occasions where that appears to have been the case. In saying that, I intend no criticism of the departmental personnel involved. But there is at least one example (fairly conceded by counsel for the State), and I believe some others when the defendant was on parole, where the position contended for by counsel for the defendant is established. However, the situation is very different from the circumstances that prevailed in Mr Manna's case: see, for example, Manna v State of New South Wales at [16].
I accept the State's submission that it is not appropriate, and against the public interest, to allow condition 7 as proposed by the defendant to be imposed without amendment. However, on balance, I am satisfied that the conditions proposed by the defendant are sufficient to fulfil the purpose of such conditions. It is to be noted that there are many other conditions controlling his movements and activities and that he accepts that electronic monitoring should be ordered as part of the ESO. It is also to be noted that the State can bring an application to vary the ESO if the condition as proposed causes difficulties or is unworkable.
Subject to the deletion of the words "or as soon as reasonably practicable afterwards" from condition 7, conditions 5, 6 and 7 as proposed by the defendant will be imposed. In my assessment, they are sufficient to fulfil the purposes of the Act and to manage the defendant's risk factors while also providing flexibility to allow him some limited freedom.
In view of the requirement for a schedule of movements, albeit one that is less rigid than that contended for by the State, I am of the view that the curfew in condition 9 is neither necessary nor desirable. Accordingly, I do not propose to make condition 9 part of the ESO.
[5]
Notification of visitors - condition 12
The next disputed condition is condition 12, which is in the following terms:
"12. The defendant must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at his approved address and must not permit any person to stay overnight, at his approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside at his approved address), without the prior approval of a DSO."
The evidence demonstrates that the defendant lives with his relatively elderly mother on a somewhat isolated rural property. In my assessment, condition 12 is neither necessary nor desirable to protect the public or address the defendant's risk factors. The concerns raised by the State are not sufficiently cogent to justify the making of an order which would, for example, require the defendant to notify the DSO immediately should his mother's friends and family decide to drop in on them unexpectedly. A balance must be struck between the protection of the community, the desirability that the defendant be encouraged to live an independent life and to rehabilitate within the community, and the rights and privacy of others, including his elderly mother: see State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855 at [89], [96] (Fullerton J).
I do not propose to impose condition 12 as proposed by the State.
[6]
Disclosure of financial information - condition 18
The next condition in dispute is condition 18, which is in the following terms:
"18. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO."
I accept the defendant's submission that this condition is neither necessary nor desirable to protect the safety of the community. True it is, as submitted by counsel for the State, that access to the financial details of the defendant may, in certain limited circumstances, provide evidence or provoke inquiries as to the defendant's expenditure and whether he is using his very modest income to acquire illegal substances or to "groom" potential victims. However, I can see no significant benefit in requiring the defendant to disclose information concerning his financial affairs to the DSO. Again, there is much to be said in allowing the defendant some freedoms in his life administration in order to promote his rehabilitation. That is a secondary objective of the legislation and should always be borne in mind when formulating the appropriate and necessary conditions to an ESO: see State of New South Wales v Bugmy at [89], [96] (Fullerton J).
I will not propose to impose condition 18 as proposed by the State.
[7]
Association with people consuming alcohol - condition 26(a)
The proposed condition 26(a) prohibits the defendant from associating "with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of alcohol without prior approval of a DSO."
The other conditions that will be imposed include a number of conditions which allow the defendant to drink alcohol, provided his DSO approves of the consumption. The conditions also allow for testing to enforce both the condition relating to alcohol use and other conditions prohibiting the use of illegal drugs. While condition 26(a) proposed by the State is not, on its terms, directly inconsistent with the other conditions proposed in the amended summons, I am satisfied that the other conditions provide sufficient protection against the risk factor identified in a number of the reports; that is, that the defendant's inhibitions are compromised by his use of alcohol. On the other hand, it is easy to envisage situations where the proposed condition could lead the defendant into breaches of the ESO, either unwittingly or with no malevolent design on his part.
Condition 26(a) is neither necessary nor desirable to address the relevant risk factors and I do not propose to make it a condition of the ESO.
[8]
The reasons of Ierace J concerning conditions 12, 18 and 26(a)
I note in passing that Ierace J declined to impose conditions 12, 18 or 26(a). His Honour's function in determining the terms and content of the ISO is different to that confronting the Court formulating a final order. However, where relevant, I also adopt his Honour's reasons for concluding that those conditions ought not to form part of the ISO.
[9]
Access to the internet and other electronic communication - conditions 37 and 41
Conditions 37 and 41 are also in contention between the parties. They are part of a raft of conditions restricting and limiting the defendant's access to the Internet and use of various forms of electronic communication.
Condition 37, which is opposed by the defendant, is in the following terms:
"37. The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service, without prior approval of the DSO."
Condition 41 is also opposed, and is in the following terms:
"41. The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO."
I am satisfied that the conditions along the lines of those proposed by the State are both in accordance with the paramount interest in protecting the public and are workable. I do not perceive that there is a realistic likelihood that they will operate oppressively. I can see no reason why the defendant would need to use encrypted or coded messaging applications. In saying that, I have considered the defendant's submissions on the issue and the concerns raised that he may unwittingly do so.
In deference to those submissions, I would propose to include the word "knowingly" in the proposed condition 37. This would mean that the defendant would not be in breach should he use a messaging, or other, application or service which is encrypted but not to his knowledge. Accordingly, I will include a condition along the lines of the proposed condition 37 (albeit now numbered as condition 32), however, in the following slightly amended terms:
32. The defendant must not knowingly use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service, without prior approval of the DSO.
The complaint made by the defendant in relation to condition 41 is that it may be oppressive for him to be required to obtain the consent of the DSO before deleting anything from his mobile device. Issues were raised as to the limited data available on plans he can afford. It was suggested his inability to delete past searches and so forth may cause his device to slow down or become unworkable.
However, the evidence generally satisfies me that the defendant will have access to a DSO on a weekly basis and can be supervised in the deletion of any history or the other kinds of information on his mobile device, falling within the terms of the proposed condition 41. I am unable to accept that the defendant's complaints in relation to condition 41 are matters of any real concern or that it involves any substantial infringement upon his rights.
I accept that it will not always be possible for him to contact his DSO on short notice, but I am firmly of the view that community protection requires that he not be permitted to delete items such as his internet browsing history, search history or communications made on his mobile device in the short term. The purpose of this raft of conditions is to address a clear risk factor in his case, namely the use of electronic communications to foster relationships with young persons (or their carers) and access content that might trigger him to commit the kinds of offences which have led to his incarceration in the past.
Accordingly, I will impose a condition in the terms of condition 41 as proposed by the State.
[10]
Duration of the ESO
The State sought an ESO of three years duration. The defendant submitted that it was only necessary to make an order for a period of two years.
I am unable to accept the defendant's submission. The defendant's history of offending goes back decades. The criminal history and various reports do not suggest that Mr Woods' chronic psychological issues are in remission or are likely to be resolved within the period of two years. While I do take the view that the Court should exercise parsimony in determining the length of such orders, given their potential to infringe on the liberty of people who have served the full term of the sentence imposed on them, there is nothing in the material to suggest that reducing the duration of the order would be in the interests of community safety, or even in the interests of the defendant himself. Further, if the order is administered properly and if the defendant performs well, the strictures of the supervision order will be ameliorated over time.
I have considered the submission that the length of the sentences imposed for the most recent offences may provide some guidance in determining the length of the ESO. The argument was that because the sentence for the index offence was relatively short, the ESO should also be short. The length of the ESO proposed by the State is longer than the total sentence imposed by the sentencing Judge. I consider this to be an ingenious and somewhat ambitious submission although I do not reject it out of hand. Even so, while I accept it may be a relevant consideration, it could not by any means be determinative of this Court's approach to the length of a supervision order under the Act. The length of any sentence, and any period of supervised parole, is dictated by the sentencing principle of proportionality. That is, the sentence must not exceed that which is appropriate to the seriousness of the particular offence. Both Flannery SC DCJ and Marien SC ADCJ applied that principle and structured the sentences to allow for a period of supervised parole as each considered by each sentencing Judge to be appropriate. The sentencing Judges were not permitted to extend the period of supervision beyond that which was appropriate as punishment for the particular offences based on any perceived need to protect the community. The judicial function being exercised in sentencing is quite different to that exercised in making decisions under the Act. Neither Judge made any comment in their remarks that would inform the decision concerning the length of the ESO.
I accept the State's submission that the ESO should be one of three years duration.
Before formally making the orders, I should state that the foregoing reasons do no justice whatsoever to the comprehensive submissions made in writing and orally by counsel for both sides. Nor have I attempted to make reference to the evidence upon which counsel relied in mounting their helpful submissions. However, I have taken into account the matters that each counsel has raised and the evidence to which they referred, particularly the evidence contained in the Corrective Services case notes, the expert reports, including those of Dr Eagles and Dr White, and the risk factors therein identified. I have also closely considered the contents of the Risk Assessment and Risk Management Reports which precipitated the current proceedings. However, because of the time constraints under which the Court is operating, and the silly workload of the Common Law Division, it is impossible to refer to those matters in any detail in this judgment.
For those reasons, brief and truncated as they are, I make the following orders:
1. Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to be subject to an extended supervision order (ESO) for a period of three years from today, 4 May 2022.
2. Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, the defendant is directed, for the period of the ESO, to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these orders.
[11]
SHAWN WOODS
SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO)
Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)
In these conditions:
"CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW.
"Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services
"Defendant" means Shawn Michael Woods, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.
"Electronic Identity" means each of the following:
1. an email address,
2. a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,
3. a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,
4. any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.
"DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.
"Material" includes:
1. any written or printed material;
2. any picture, painting or drawing;
3. any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;
4. any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;
5. any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and
6. any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.
"NSWPF" means NSW Police Force.
"Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).
"Search" includes:
1. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and
2. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched.
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.
Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.
Electronic Monitoring
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.
Schedule of Movements
If directed by his DSO, the defendant is to provide an honest summary of his anticipated movements each week (or over successive weeks), limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, and the dates of travel, but unconfined by any travel route or timetable. If so directed, such a summary is to be provided on, or before the Friday prior to each week (or as otherwise agreed between the defendant and his DSO).
The defendant must not deviate from his summary of anticipated movements except in an emergency or to attend to urgent bodily functions, or except as specified in condition 7 below.
It will not be a breach of condition 5 if the defendant departs from the summary but notifies his DSO of his change of plans before doing so.
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant's address or living arrangements.
The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.
The defendant must comply with any reasonable direction from a DSO not to go to a particular place or district.
The defendant must notify a DSO before attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment.
Part D: Employment, finance and education
The defendant must not start on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.
The defendant must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment if practicable before the change occurs or otherwise at his next interview with a DSO.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not:
(a) Possess or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.
(b) Possess or use prohibited drugs or drugs unlawfully obtained.
The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing.
The defendant must not enter any licensed premises including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants, without the prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.
Part F: Non-association
Association with Children
The defendant must not associate with any female who he knows or reasonably should know is under 18, other than incidental contact in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor; or with the written permission of a DSO and in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO, including that the contact takes place in the presence of an adult who has been approved in writing by a DSO. Association includes but is not limited to:
(a) Having a female under the age of 18 years at his home.
(b) Attending a residence where the defendant knows that females under the age of 18 years ordinarily reside or are present at the time.
(c) Communicating by any means (including social media platforms) with any female under the age of 18 years.
If the defendant starts a romantic, sexual, or friendship relationship with a woman, he must report the person's name to a DSO within 24 hours and truthfully any questions that a DSO asks regarding that relationship.
Associations with Others (not children)
The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.
Without limiting condition 22, the defendant must not:
(a) associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
(b) associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant must not contact any victims or complainants by any means, including by telephone, social media, or any other form of communication or via third party contacts.
The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers, without the prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. In cases involving a close social relationship, the DSO will first give the defendant an opportunity to inform the person himself.
The defendant must obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.
Part G: Weapons
The defendant must not possess or use any of the following:
(a) a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996,
(b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998,
(c) a knife, axe or hammer, other on his own residential property (including any property currently leased by his mother, Phyllis Woods) for the purpose of household tasks, farm work and property maintenance, and only to be used or on his person when CSNSW staff and/or Police are not present.
(d) anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.
Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information.
The defendant must not use any alias, electronic identity, log-in name, name other than "SHAWN WOODS" or any email address other than those known to a DSO or subsequently approved by a DSO. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications, internet sites and communication platforms of any kind he uses to communicate with or to access the internet and advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately. This includes:
(a) phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers:
(b) the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names;
(c) relevant passwords and codes; and
(d) the nature and details of any internet connection.
The defendant must only use an electronic device which has the ability to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.
The defendant must not knowingly use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service without prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication, as reasonably known to him, if discovered on the defendant's electronic devices or accounts as a result of a search or a remote inspection.
The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet-based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services.
The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.
The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO.
The defendant must provide consent for his telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.
Part I: Search and seizure
The defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is traveling or which is under his effective control, any computer, electronic and communication device, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order.
Part J: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from "Shawn Woods" or use any other name without notifying a DSO.
The defendant must not significantly change his appearance, other than to trim, shave or grow his beard or cut his hair, without the approval of a DSO.
The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.
Part K: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.
The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners only in the manner prescribed.
The defendant must notify a DSO as soon as practicable if he ceases to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.
The defendant must agree to his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on his progress and attendance, and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO.
The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.
The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. Disclosure under this condition is only reasonably necessary if the DSO believes on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is necessary to ameliorate the defendant's risk of further sexual offending.
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Decision last updated: 27 May 2022