Schmidt J, Street CJ, Lusher JJ, Fullerton J, Beech Jones J
Catchwords
[1989] HCA 46
Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636
[2016] NSWCA 57
R v Wilde (District Court (NSW), Mathews DCJ, 27 March 1985, unrep)
Regina v John Allan Wilde (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
Street CJ, Lee and Lusher JJ
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
[1989] HCA 46
Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636[2016] NSWCA 57
R v Wilde (District Court (NSW), Mathews DCJ, 27 March 1985, unrep)
Regina v John Allan Wilde (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)Street CJ, Lee and Lusher JJ
Judgment (14 paragraphs)
[1]
Judgment
By its amended summons the State sought a further three year extended supervision order against Mr Wilde under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). The conditions sought were later amended after expert evidence was received, but Mr Wilde opposed the application and in the event that it succeeds, the term and conditions of the order pressed.
Campbell J made interim supervision orders on 10 August 2017, also over Mr Wilde's objection: State of New South Wales v Wilde [2017] NSWSC 1056. Those orders were later extended by Campbell J on 29 August 2017. Beech-Jones J further extended those orders on 4 October 2017, also over Mr Wilde's objection: State of New South Wales v Wilde (Supreme Court (NSW), 4 October 2017, Beech Jones J, unrep).
Orders for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or psychologists to examine Mr Wilde and furnish reports to the Court were made by Campbell J on 29 August. Attached to those orders were the terms in which the experts were to be instructed, his Honour having heard the parties over their dispute about those terms.
[2]
Mr Wilde's stay applications
Mr Wilde has appeared unrepresented throughout the proceedings, for reasons ventilated before Campbell J, Beech-Jones J and myself.
At the commencement of the final hearing, by way of a motion which he was given leave to file in court, Mr Wilde, who is on a disability support pension, made an application to have these proceedings permanently stayed. That application was supported by an affidavit which he swore on 16 October 2017, as well as by written and oral submissions.
Even though the State accepted that Mr Wilde would be placed in a difficult position if he had to continue representing himself, given what was in issue and the potential consequences for his liberty, if the application succeeded, the stay was opposed.
I refused Mr Wilde's application, indicating that I would later give reasons for that decision. In final submissions the application was renewed. These are the reasons for the rejection of those applications.
Mr Wilde appeared unrepresented, on his case, despite having repeatedly sought legal aid and having sought to pursue a review of the refusal of his applications, to which he had received no response from Legal Aid. Mr Wilde said that he understood from a conversation that he had had with a Legal Aid officer, that the refusal was because of the view taken that he had the financial means to obtain legal representation.
Mr Wilde did not, however, tender the documents by which he had made any applications for legal aid; which established that his applications had been refused; or which disclosed the reasons for such refusal. Nor did he tender documents by which he had pursued either a review or appeal from such refusals.
Earlier, before Campbell J on 10 August, Mr Wilde told his Honour that he was unrepresented, but not through choice; that Legal Aid had not concluded its consideration of the merits of his application for assistance in these and what he considered to be related civil proceedings; and that the Law Society would not assist, until that decision had been made. He also said:
"HIS HONOUR: The reason why I am asking you these questions Mr Wilde is that it sounds like what you are telling me today anyway is that you would want legal aid to represent you?
WILDE: No I don't.
HIS HONOUR: That's what I thought. From reading your papers I thought you didn't want legal aid.
WILDE: No, what I do want is legal representation, just not through legal aid because they won't do their job. All I am after is an instructing solicitor that can do a pro bono who I haven't been able to get and if I can do that then I can get a barrister on pro bono who I am aware of who will take my case up, but not without an instructing solicitor.
HIS HONOUR: Who is that?
WILDE: Nicholas Kirby.
HIS HONOUR: I've come across Mr Kirby.
WILDE: He will take my case up if I have an instructing solicitor."
In his judgment Campbell J observed at [39] - [41]:
"39 I have just dealt with a matter under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act (NSW) and made some interim orders. Mr Wilde, who is the defendant, tells me that he has been refused Legal Aid for this matter, a most unusual circumstance, but there may be reasons for it having to do with his relationship with them. But he has been told by Mr Nicolas Kirby of counsel that he would be prepared to appear for him on a pro bono basis if only an instructing solicitor was prepared to accept reference on the same basis. I am empowered under r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW), if I am satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice, to refer a litigant to the Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on a pro bono panel for legal assistance.
40 Mr Wilde is on a disability support pension. Given what I have said about Legal Aid, he does not have the capacity to find other legal assistance outside the scheme and he tells me that the Law Society cannot do anything unless they get something in writing from Legal Aid.
41 These proceedings must come on quickly. They are complex and important. They are complex because Mr Wilde has been under an ESO for about eight years. There is a long history to be considered. They are important because of the type of restrictions that the State is seeking to impose upon his liberty so long after he has served his sentence.
42 Given that Mr Kirby apparently is prepared to assist, I think it appropriate that under r 7.36 I refer Mr Wilde to the Registrar for referral to Mr Kirby of counsel, if he confirms he is prepared to accept the referral, and to a solicitor to instruct him solely for the purpose of defending the State's summons under the Act."
This legal representation was not forthcoming, nor was any other, despite his Honour referring Mr Wilde for pro bono assistance.
Before Beech Jones J Mr Wilde remained unrepresented. His Honour noted in his ex-tempore judgment of 4 October 2017 that:
"One matter that has been raised concerns the continuing efforts to obtain legal representation for Mr Wilde. Campbell J put into place various steps designed to progress an application for legal aid on Mr Wilde's behalf. It appears to have resulted in something of a stand-off. The Crown Solicitors' Office has written to Legal Aid requesting that they provide him with legal assistance. The Legal Aid Commission has responded, pointing to the privacy provisions in the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 which prevent it disclosing information concerning any possible application made by Mr Wilde. The Legal Aid Commission also noted that subs 25(4)(l) of the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 allows a disclosure of certain limited information to a court including information about whether an application has been made, the basis for its refusal and whether an appeal has been made. The Legal Aid Commission stated that there had been no request by the court for that information.
From the bar table Mr Wilde stated that he, in fact, had been refused Legal Aid because of an application of an assets test which had led to a concern that he did have the assets to pay for legal representation, specifically a motor bike. He said that he posted an appeal from that decision but had received no acknowledgement from Legal Aid that the appeal had been received.
The difficulty with the Court making any order or direction or even request of Legal Aid for information of the kind referred to in subs 25(4)(l) is that there is actually no substantive application currently before the court for which that information is required.
There has not been and I do not suggest there could be any application to stay these proceedings pending the obtaining of any legal representation. The courts simply do not make requests of the kind envisaged by subs 25(4)(l) because it might be a good idea for someone to be represented.
All it can simply do is urge Legal Aid to assist Mr Wilde to actually lodge his appeal and determine that application with expedition.
I would add that, if the ultimate outcome of the application of an assets test by Legal Aid was that Mr Wilde was to be unable to obtain legal representation, then that will undoubtedly lead to further expense and delay for the State in the conduct of its case. If that circumstance arises, it will be for the State to reflect on how that circumstance has arisen and whether in the future it needs to take its own steps to ensure that people are legally represented."
The State relied on an affidavit sworn by Mr Vasiliou, a solicitor, on 22 September 2017, which revealed that the State had made representations to Legal Aid about Mr Wilde being provided with legal assistance in these proceedings.
In its correspondence the State had sought to confirm that Mr Wilde had been declined legal aid and if he had been, to enquire whether the decision could be reviewed, given the "prospect of Mr Wilde being subjected to further restrictions on his liberty long after the conclusion of the sentences which he has served", which made it "desirable that he be represented". The State was advised that the confidentiality provisions of s 25 and s 26 of the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW), precluded Legal Aid from divulging or discussing its dealings with Mr Wilde. He did not waive that confidentiality.
To support his application for a stay, Mr Wilde relied on Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292; [1992] HCA 57, where it was concluded that a criminal trial had miscarried, because the trial judge had not stayed or adjourned the trial until arrangements were made for counsel to appear at public expense with the result that, in the circumstances of that case, Mr Dietrich had been deprived of his right to a fair trial and of a real chance of acquittal.
While these are not criminal proceedings, if successful, they will undoubtedly have onerous consequences for Mr Wilde and his right to unfettered liberty, he having already served the sentences imposed upon him for his past serious sexual offending and having already twice been made the subject of extended supervision orders. If the State's application succeeds, the result will be the imposition of a further extended supervision order, subjecting him to onerous conditions, years after he finished serving the sentences imposed for his offending.
Mr Wilde also relied on Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23; [1989] HCA 46, where in issue were questions as to the right to a speedy trial and undue delay amounting to an abuse of process. These were not questions of immediate relevance to these proceedings, given the requirements of the statutory scheme under which the State's application was made.
Nevertheless, I accepted that it would have been in not only Mr Wilde's best interests, but desirable for the administration of justice and of real assistance to the Court, if he had had legal representation in these proceedings.
That was what undoubtedly moved Campbell J to refer Mr Wilde for pro bono legal assistance; Beech-Jones J to make the observations I have referred to; and the State to make representations to Legal Aid, urging that Mr Wilde be provided with assistance. The failure of all of these endeavours resulted in the proceedings being more difficult and taking longer than they otherwise would have.
While these were relevant considerations, Mr Wilde's undesirable position had to be weighed in the balance with the fact that the State's application raised serious questions going to the public interest, given the risk which on its case, Mr Wilde still poses. That is the risk of committing further serious sexual offences, when he is no longer subject to the ongoing supervision for which the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act provides.
These matters all had to be considered in the context that s 3 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act specifies that the primary object of this Act is to ensure the safety and protection of the community and another is to encourage high risk sex offenders such as Mr Wilde, to undertake rehabilitation.
It was also necessary to take into account that s 6 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act specifies the time at which an application for an extended supervision order must made, in the case of a supervised sex offender such as Mr Wilde, not until the last six months of his current supervision. Note also had to be taken of s 10A, which permits the Court to make the interim orders Campbell J earlier made, only in circumstances where:
"(a) .. the offender's current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and
(b) .. the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of a high risk sex offender extended supervision order."
Campbell J had earlier formed the statutory opinion, for the reasons his Honour explained: see State of New South Wales v Wilde [2017] NSWSC 1056 at [28].
It was also relevant to consider that such orders may be made only for a period of 28 days and that they may be renewed for no longer than periods totalling three months: s 10C. In Mr Wilde's case, that period expires on 5 November 2017.
I concluded that weighing all of the relevant considerations, which included the nature of the potential outcome of the proceedings; the desirability of Mr Wilde being legally represented; the efforts which had been made to achieve such representation; Mr Wilde not having led evidence to reveal the circumstances in which his applications were refused; Mr Wilde's stated attitude to legal aid; the views which Campbell J formed as to the existence of circumstances which could justify the making of a third extended supervision order in Mr Wilde's circumstances, to which I will return; and the protection of the community which such orders are intended to achieve - the stay had to be refused.
Even on his further application I was satisfied that in Mr Wilde's circumstances, considerations of the public interest in community protection outweighed the desirability of him being legally represented on the hearing of the State's application, as a matter of procedural fairness.
In his written submissions Mr Wilde renewed his application for a stay. He contended, amongst other things, that these proceedings were vexatious, as that term is defined in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), they involving an abuse of process. That was explained to be because he had been denied legal representation, through no fault of his own, in proceedings pursued to harass and annoy him, on the excuse of a trumped up knife charge. Further, that charge had been instituted without reasonable grounds, given that it had resulted from his possession of a butter knife and had been conducted so as to cause him detriment, because it has not been listed for hearing until January 2018.
While it will be necessary to refer further to various of these matters, Mr Wilde's case that these proceedings are vexatious and accordingly, had to be stayed, could not be accepted, given the orders earlier made by Campbell and Beech-Jones JJ.
Mr Wilde also argued that he was an innocent person, who had been wrongly charged with a minor offence, in order to severely detriment him, by putting him at risk of a further extended supervision order being made. In those circumstances, he argued that the earlier refusal of the stay was inconsistent with the requirements of s 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), given what the interests of fairness, justice and the community required, the refusal of his application involving as it did a high degree of injustice.
This was also not a basis upon which the stay Mr Wilde sought could be granted. Section 58 provides:
"58 Court to follow dictates of justice
(1) In deciding:
(a) whether to make any order or direction for the management of proceedings, including:
(i) any order for the amendment of a document, and
(ii) any order granting an adjournment or stay of proceedings, and
(iii) any other order of a procedural nature, and
(iv) any direction under Division 2, and
(b) the terms in which any such order or direction is to be made,
the court must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice.
(2) For the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case, the court:
(a) must have regard to the provisions of sections 56 and 57, and
(b) may have regard to the following matters to the extent to which it considers them relevant:
(i) the degree of difficulty or complexity to which the issues in the proceedings give rise,
(ii) the degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings, including the degree to which they have been timely in their interlocutory activities,
(iii) the degree to which any lack of expedition in approaching the proceedings has arisen from circumstances beyond the control of the respective parties,
(iv) the degree to which the respective parties have fulfilled their duties under section 56 (3),
(v) the use that any party has made, or could have made, of any opportunity that has been available to the party in the course of the proceedings, whether under rules of court, the practice of the court or any direction of a procedural nature given in the proceedings,
(vi) the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction,
(vii) such other matters as the court considers relevant in the circumstances of the case."
Section 56 establishes the overriding purpose which binds both the Court and the parties, namely, the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. Section 57 is concerned with case management.
In the circumstances, I was well satisfied that none of these considerations provided a proper basis for the grant of the stay which Mr Wilde pressed.
[3]
Mr Wilde falls within the statutory requirements
Section 5B(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act stipulates that orders of the kind sought by the State can only be made by this Court, when an offender falls within s 5B(2), which provides:
"An offender is a high risk sex offender if the offender is a sex offender and the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision."
While it is Mr Wilde's view that the extended supervision orders which have earlier been made against him are invalid and unjust and that the further orders sought should be refused, he did not contend that he did not fall within the statutory provisions which empower the Court to make the orders sought by the State.
This reflects that a "sex offender" is defined in s 4 to mean a person over the age of 18 years who has at any time been sentenced to imprisonment following his or her conviction of a serious sex offence. A "serious sex offence" is defined in s 5(1) in terms which encompass the sexual offences of which Mr Wilde has been convicted, including as the definition does, offences punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more: s 5(1)(a)(i). His offending also brings him within the definition of an "offence of a sexual nature" in s 5(2).
An application for a high risk sex offender extended supervision order may be made only in respect of a "supervised sex offender", defined in s 5I(b) to mean "a sex offender who, when the application for the order is made, is in custody or under supervision … pursuant to an existing extended supervision order or continuing detention order". Being subject to an interim extended supervision order, Mr Wilde also satisfies this definition.
There was also no issue that the requirements for pursuit of an extended supervision order under s 6 have been fulfilled by the State and that the term finally pressed, of three years, does not exceed the five year permissible term under s 10(1A).
The term "a high degree of probability" used in s 5B is not defined in the Act. In Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 its meaning (in predecessor legislation) was held to be:
"21 … something "beyond more probably than not"; so that the existence of the risk, that is the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the risk or likelihood itself does not have to be a probability to the civil standard of proof, but rather a sufficiently substantial probability to satisfy the criterion "likely" as explained in TSL."
The term "unacceptable risk" is also not defined. Consideration of the risk which Mr Wilde poses thus involves an evaluative judgment, which must be undertaken in light of all of the evidence, in the way discussed in Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 at [50] - [51] and [55]:
"50 …. by reference to dictionary definitions, the word "unacceptable" requires context in which, or parameters against which, the "unacceptable" risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is "so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed". The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym "acceptable". Something is "acceptable" if it is "tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters".
51 What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the "risk" that the offender poses "of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision". The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made.
…
55 This Act provides, as stated in its Long Title, for the extended supervision or continued detention of high risk offenders. The purpose of the legislation, as the primary object of the legislation states, is to "ensure the safety and protection of the community". The evaluation of whether an offender is a "high risk violent offender" has to be undertaken in that context. The further context in which that evaluation is undertaken is provided by s 5E(2) itself, namely, whether the offender poses an "unacceptable risk" of committing a serious violence offence, when regard is had to the safety and protection of the community, unless the person is kept under supervision, either by way of making an extended supervision order or an extended detention order. As this Court pointed out in State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24], a finding that a person poses an "unacceptable risk" within the meaning of s 5E(2):
"… is the gateway to the power to make an order under s 5F or s 5G … and applies to an assessment of likelihood ('unacceptable risk') in the absence of any supervision."
On the evidence I will discuss, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that Mr Wilde does pose such an "unacceptable risk", this assessment involving as it does an evaluative task, with this Court not being "required to determine that the risk of a person committing a serious sex offence is more likely than not in order to determine that the person poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence": Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act, s 5B(3).
[4]
Should a further extension order be made?
In determining the State's application, regard must be had to the requirements of s 9(3) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act which provides:
"(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant:
(a) the safety of the community,
(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender's participation in any such examination,
(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further relevant offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender's participation in any such assessment,
(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further relevant offence,
(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,
(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender's participation in any such programs,
(f) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,
(g) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,
(h) the offender's criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,
(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,
(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will in future commit offences of a sexual nature (in the case of an application for a high risk sex offender extended supervision order) or serious violence offences (in the case of an application for a high risk violent offender extended supervision order)."
The State's application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Ms Senanayake, a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's Office, annexing various relevant documents, as well as other documents and evidence called from various witnesses.
The incident reports relating to Mr Wilde were received over his objections. Mr Wilde disputed their accuracy, given that he had not been consulted about their preparation. Nevertheless I was satisfied that they were relevant and admissible, being business records falling within the s 69 hearsay exemption in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
Mr Wilde cross-examined, at length, Ms Dewson and Dr Eagle (the two experts who produced reports to the Court in response to Campbell J's orders); Mr Ardasinski (the psychologist who he had earlier cross-examined before Campbell J); Ms Thomson (Mr Wilde's Corrective Services Department supervising officer); and Ms Farroway (the Department's High Risk Offender Applications and Operational Governance Officer).
Mr Wilde also gave evidence and was cross-examined. He led no expert evidence himself, for reasons explained in his submissions to include his lack of legal representation and his financial means.
[5]
Mr Wilde's criminal record
Given the nature of what is in issue on this third application for an order for Mr Wilde's extended supervision, some eight years after he completed his sentence for his most recent sexual offending, it is necessary to give close attention to his criminal record, which commenced in his childhood.
Mr Wilde is now aged 55. His extensive record includes convictions of serious sexual offending, as well as offences involving violence, offences committed while he was in custody, as well as breaches of his earlier supervision orders.
In 1981, when Mr Wilde was aged 19, he pleaded guilty to one count of rape and another of common assault, offences which he had committed in the home of one of the victims, only a few days after he had been given a bond for offences of breaking, entering and stealing. For this offending he was sentenced by Nagle CJ to 5 years of penal servitude for the rape and 12 months for the common assault. The non-parole period expired in March 1981 and the sentence in March 1983.
In Nagle CJ's sentencing remarks his Honour noted that no great physical harm had been done to either of Mr Wilde's victims. One young girl had suffered cuts to her hand, when she attempted to seize the knife with which Mr Wilde was threatening her and the other victim, who he raped, having not received physical injury of consequence. Nevertheless, his Honour concluded that his actions had been terrifying and the rape victim had been horrified by his acts.
His Honour noted evidence that Mr Wilde had a personality disorder, his environment having prevented him growing up as a normal young man. He had also suffered a variety of illnesses, but had had the devotion of his mother and grandmother. His Honour also referred to evidence that 12 years previously, while a relatively young child, Mr Wilde had been identified by a psychiatrist, Dr Wright-Short, of being at risk of developing a disturbance.
Nagle CJ also noted the bizarre explanations Mr Wilde had advanced for his offending, the details of which do not appear in the sentence remarks. His Honour concluded that the feelings of the public and the necessity to make it obvious that offences of this kind could not be committed with impunity, had to be taken into account on sentencing. His Honour recommended that Mr Wilde be given the benefit of psychiatric checks during his sentence.
In his evidence, while Mr Wilde contended that he is innocent of the sexual offences of which he was convicted in 1983 and 1991, he acknowledged his guilt for the 1981 offending. Despite that evidence, this application must be decided in light of Mr Wilde's record of convictions.
In 1985, only three months after he had been released on parole, Mr Wilde was charged with eight further offences. A jury found him guilty of offences committed on 28 and 29 September 1983 of:
"a. Threaten to inflict actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse;
b. Two counts of indecent assault;
c. Stealing;
d. Break, enter and steal; and
e. Larceny of a motor vehicle."
The sexual offences involving two victims were committed on different days, but the trials were conducted together. There was a substantial issue at trial as to identity. The Crown case relied on the unexplained presence of Mr Wilde's fingerprint on the flyscreen at one victim's house, which had been removed from the window by which the attacker had gained access. It also relied on a silver ingot found in the victim's bedroom, which evidence established Mr Wilde had earlier admitted was his, on that his mother having given it to him. At trial he denied in his unsworn statement that the ingot belonged to him, or that he knew anything about it. He also called supportive evidence from his mother.
The Crown also relied on the presence outside a neighbour's house, of a blue Sigma sedan similar to that which had been stolen on 28 September and which Mr Wilde was driving on his arrest. There were also two rings then found in his possession, both of which the victim identified as belonging to her. The Crown also relied on that the victim's clear and detailed description of her attacker, which fitted Mr Wilde. She had also identified him in court.
In evidence was also an admission made by Mr Wilde in a handwritten statement, which was consistent with aspects of the account which the victim gave. It said:
"I went to a house at Nth Rocks on Thursday. There was a window open & I got in. Prior to this I was seen by 2 men who I've seen only once before, they bashed me after I refused to help them and they said that they wanted the house at Nth Rocks ripped off and if anyone caught me in there they were to be hurt bad. I was told if I didn't do it either myself or a friend or family would be hurt or killed if I didn't do it. So I went there and proceeded to rip the place when the owner came home. I grabbed her tied her up and gagged her. I ejaculated all over her then left without taking any-thing. I was up to the time of being arrested trying to find the 2 men so that all this could be stopped. So that no one else would be hurt and that I wouldn't have to do anything more illegal. I took the woman's child from her car into the house so the child Wouldn't be hurt from the heat or anything else I took the child in the house and didn't & I wouldn't hurt him."
In Mr Wilde's unsworn statement he said:
"Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury, I am absolutely not guilty of any of these charges. All I remember of these events is what I remember on Monday of the long weekend of the 3rd October. I remember waking up in the cell and feeling sore and in a lot of pain. I remember feeling my face and my body and finding that I was bruised and sore, namely, my eyes, my nose, my cheeks and my ribs. I had a great difficulty in breathing because of my ribs we're being so sore. My left wrist and left leg were also very sore and stiff. As I came to in the cell I could not make out what I was doing in there and it was only later that I found out that I was in Parramatta Police Station. I can at one stage remember being tied or handcuffed to a piece of furniture and being asked a lot of questions and being belted by the people who were asking those questions and I believe that to be the police although I can't say who it was or where the assault took place. I have no memory at all of ringing my mother or seeing her at the police station and I have no memory of writing any statements or anything, any way of confessions. I believe that if I did write those, that I would have been severely bashed by the police into doing so and they were not made of my own free will. I have no memory of hurting anybody or being in anybody's house at all and I don't believe that I done any of those things and I believe that the women in question are mistaken when they say it was me. If in their astute observations of the intruder they pointed out quite a lot of things regarding the description of that person. Now if that was me, why did they not identify a tattoo of a dragon that is on my left thigh which covers nearly the whole of the thigh. In regards to the rings and ingots, I can definitely say that those are not mine and I can't say as to where they were found. In regards to any of these matters I have no memory and I don't believe that I've done these things and I believe that I'm not guilty. Thank you"
Mathews DCJ, as her Honour then was, directed Mr Wilde's acquittal of one offence with which he was charged and the jury acquitted him of another. On the charges of which he was convicted, her Honour sentenced Mr Wilde to 10 years penal servitude for the threat offence and 3 years for the other offences, with a non-parole period of 6 years: R v Wilde (District Court (NSW), Mathews DCJ, 27 March 1985, unrep).
In her Honour's sentencing remarks she observed that Mr Wilde had invaded his victim's home when she returned there with her two baby sons. He had threatened her with a knife, gagged her, bound her hands and then treated her "with the greatest degradation and depravity". Her Honour found that the victim must have been terrified and terrorised by what he had done. It was, her Honour said, with grave misgivings, that she gave Mr Wilde the benefit of a non-parole period, his offending falling within the worst category, although not the worst conceivable offending of this type.
Mr Wilde's appealed his conviction on grounds that there should have been separate trials; that the judge had erred in directing that the sexual attack on the second victim could be used as similar facts, for the purpose of establishing the identity of the attacker of the second victim; and that the judge had erred in declining to discharge the jury at the end of the Crown case, on all charges.
Mr Wilde's appeal failed, despite it being accepted that the trial judge had erred in admitting the similar fact evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeal concluding that the Crown's case on the charges had been overwhelming: Regina v John Allan Wilde (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW); Street CJ, Lee and Lusher JJ; 10 April 1986). In the result, there had not been a substantial miscarriage of justice, the error not having been fundamental and Mr Wilde not having lost a chance of acquittal.
In its judgment the Court of Criminal Appeal described the offending on 28 September 1983 as having involved Mr Wilde, who the victim identified, having seized her from behind, while armed with a kitchen knife. She was pushed to the floor, her hands tied behind her back with a pantyhose pulled from his jacket and gagged with a wad of tissues and a scarf, which he took from a cupboard, before he sexually assaulted her. Mr Wilde then sat on a chair and told this victim that he had been coerced by others into attacking her, before removing the gag and bonds and leaving through the front door.
The Court of Criminal Appeal described the offending on 29 September as involving some similar elements and some which differed from the attack the previous day. This victim had noticed the blue Sigma sedan parked outside a neighbour's house when she returned from shopping with her six month old twins. That car had been stolen from the first victim's house, the previous day.
The second victim carried one child into the house, where she was confronted by Mr Wilde, who she identified. He was armed with a penknife and threatened to kill her, if she made any noise. He took the child, pushed her to the floor, slapped her and threatened to kill her and her kids, a threat which he repeated during his assault. He took her upstairs to her ransacked bedroom, where he placed her child onto the bed, pushed her onto the bed, tied her hands behind her back with a leather belt which he took from the floor and stuffed a white petticoat which was also on the floor into her mouth. He then tied a pair of stockings around her mouth and left her, while he went and got the other child.
Mr Wilde took the children out of the room, then sexually assaulted the victim. He then brought the children back and sexually assaulted her again, as well as subjecting her to demeaning acts, which it is unnecessary to describe. After threatening her again, he left.
Mr Wilde's appeal to the High Court was also dismissed: Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365; [1988] HCA 6. There the strength of the Crown case against Mr Wilde was not in issue. Mr Wilde appealed on the basis that the admission of the evidence relating to the attack on 28 September, as to the identification of Mr Wilde as the attacker on 29 September, was an irregularity of such gravity that no proper trial had taken place: at [12]. The charges were there explained to have been, at [2] - [3]:
"2 The next two counts in the indictment related to events which occurred at premises in Warrawee, on 28 September 1983. The third count charged that the applicant broke and entered the premises and stole a car key and the fourth count charged that he there stole a Sigma sedan. The applicant was convicted on these counts.
3 The remaining four counts related to events which occurred on 29 September 1983 in a house at North Rocks. The fifth, sixth and seventh counts charged that the applicant committed a series of sexual offences against a woman, and the eighth count charged that he stole two rings and $80 in money from her. The applicant was convicted on all of these counts. The complainant on this occasion was a mother with twin babies, who arrived home during the morning and observed a blue Sigma sedan parked outside her neighbour's house. (The Sigma sedan which was stolen on 28 September was a blue Sigma sedan.) She entered her house with one of her children, leaving the other in her car. In the hallway she was confronted by a man with a knife in his hand who forced her upstairs to the main bedroom. The contents of her dressing-table drawers had been emptied on the floor and her jewellery box had been emptied on the bed and on the floor. The intruder pushed the complainant towards the bed, tied her up and gagged her. He then went downstairs and recovered the other child. He placed both the children in another room and returned to the bedroom where he forced the complainant to engage in various acts of a sexual nature, including an act of oral intercourse. The man then took from the complainant's bag a sum of money amounting to about $80 and, following a visit to the kitchen, left. Subsequently, the complainant observed that the flyscreen on a downstairs window had been removed and that the window had been opened further than she had left it. She also found in the bedroom lying upon a bedside table a silver ingot which did not belong to her or any member of her family and which she had not seen before. Some weeks later the complainant missed a sapphire ring which had been in her bedroom."
It was concluded that the wrongly admitted evidence could not have carried significant additional weight on the 29 September counts, given the other evidence about those offences. Given the strength of the prosecution case upon those counts and the weakness of Mr Wilde's defence, it was concluded that the trial judge's error was not of a fundamental kind and that a reasonable jury would inevitably have convicted Mr Wilde, even if the error not been made: at [13].
In June 1993 a jury found Mr Wilde guilty of various further offences, all committed on 6 November 1991, while he was at liberty on parole. Ducker DCJ sentenced him in November 1991 to:
"a. Nine years of penal servitude commencing on 6 November 1991 and expiring on 5 November 200 in respect of the offence of break and enter with intent to commit a felony;
b. 10 years of penal servitude commencing on 6 November 1991 and expiring on 5 November 2011 in respect of one count of aggravated sexual assault;
c. 10 years of penal servitude commencing on 6 November 1991 and expiring on 5 November 2011 in respect of a second count of aggravated sexual assault;
d. 12 years of penal servitude commencing on 6 November 1991 and expiring on 5 November 2003 with an additional term of four years expiring on 5 November 2007, in respect of a third count of aggravated sexual assault; and
e. Two years of penal servitude commencing on 6 November 1991 and expiring on 5 November 1993 in respect of the offence of malicious wounding."
Ducker DCJ described that offending as having involved Mr Wilde knocking on the door of the victim's home at 11.30am. After refusing him entry, Mr Wilde pushed his way in, while the victim screamed. He pulled out a large hunting knife and said ""Be quiet and I won't hurt you". After looking around the unit, he took her to a bedroom, closed the door, threatened to kill her and sexually assaulted her, after telling her that her boyfriend owed someone a lot of money. Mr Wilde then sexually assaulted her again. It was during this assault that she bit him on the penis, causing him to scream. There was a struggle during which the victim was cut on the fingers. The victim's evidence was that survival was at that point her primary concern, but his Honour found that although his acts were despicable, Mr Wilde had not formed an intention to kill.
Mr Wilde then told the victim to remove her clothing, before punching her in the face, tying her hands with football socks and asking when her boyfriend was returning and threatening to kill her, if she lied. He then sexually assaulted her again in various ways, before untying her. He also told her that her boyfriend and brother, with whom she lived, owed other people a lot of money and that someone was making him "do this".
It was at this point that police, who had been alerted by a neighbour and friend of the victim who had heard her screams, arrived at the unit. They knocked, but Mr Wilde would not let the victim answer the door. When they entered police found Mr Wilde still in possession of the knife, together with the victim in the bedroom. After police drew a pistol, they were able to take possession of the knife and the victim made immediate complaint of having been raped. On later interview Mr Wilde gave a bizarre story, which he later denied having given. His defence at trial was that he had had consensual sex with the victim.
In his sentencing remarks Ducker DCJ found that the offences were premeditated and utterly despicable, with Mr Wilde's version of events wildly improbable, full of extraordinary coincidence and fantastic happenings, which the jury had rejected. His Honour concluded:
"The present prisoner has shown, at no stage, the slightest sign of remorse or contrition. His attitude throughout has been one of truculent self concern and apparent total indifference to the suffering of his victim. He exudes a sense of latent, only barely concealed violence, which does not bode well for his future, nor that of the community when he is released.
Neither of this prisoner's terms of imprisonment, neither of them, apparently, has had any deterrent effect whatever. Certainly, it has not stopped him from committing the present, highly premeditated offences.
As I have said, the present offences were premeditated, cold blooded, humiliating, and terrifying to the victim. And the prisoner emerged, by his commission of these acts, as a dangerous sexual predator who, so long as he was at large within the community, represented a considerable threat to women."
Ducker DCJ also referred to the alarming similarities between these offences and the acts involved in his earlier sexual offending, as well as his concern about Mr Wilde's dangerous mental state, given expert psychiatric reports in evidence. On that evidence his Honour concluded that Mr Wilde's chances of reform were not only below average, but remote, and that he would be a considerable risk to society, particularly women, if at large.
[6]
Earlier orders under the High Risk Offenders Act
In January 2008 Price J made a continuing detention order against Mr Wilde: Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Wilde [2008] NSWSC 14. In September 2008 McClellan CJ at CL made an interim supervision order: State of New South Wales v Wilde [2008] NSWSC 1148. In December 2008 Kirby J made an extended supervision order for three years, expiring on 11 December 2011: State of NSW v Wilde [2008] NSWSC 1211.
Mr Wilde breached this first extended supervision order on four separate occasions and served sentences of imprisonment for each of those breaches as follows:
"(a) On 18 March 2009, he was sentenced to 2 months imprisonment for possession of a knife in a public place;
(b) On 21 October 2009, he was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for threatening staff;
(c) On 21 May 2010, he was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for attempting to contact a female through "WIRES" (an Australian Wildlife Rescue Organisation) contrary to a direction;
(d) On 16 November 2011, he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment (8 months non-parole) for failing to inform his supervisor of his movements in advance, during which time, he attended the home of a female. This defendant had provided a schedule which deliberately excluded seeking approval to attend this female's home. The defendant stated his reason was to see how the house had changed."
In February 2014 Fullerton J made another interim supervision order: State of New South Wales v Wilde (Supreme Court (NSW), Fullerton J, 8 January 2014, unrep). In April 2014 Hall J made a second, three-year extended supervision order against Mr Wilde: State of New South Wales v Wilde [2014] NSWSC 305. That order expired on 12 August 2017, because of further time Mr Wilde spent in custody on other charges.
Mr Wilde did not appeal the making of Hall J's orders, but in Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28, Mr Wilde's appeal against various of the conditions imposed upon him was dismissed. Those conditions related to place and travel restrictions; non association; access to pornographic, violent and classified material; alcohol and drugs; search and computer searches.
On 31 March 2015, Mr Wilde was arrested and charged with three counts of failing to comply with the second extended supervision order and one of driving a motor vehicle while disqualified. He was released from custody in August 2015, after receiving a suspended sentence of 12 months imprisonment, upon entering a bond for one of the breach charges. His conviction of the driving offence was later quashed on appeal.
On 11 April 2017 the High Risk Offender Assessment Committee decided not to seek a further order for Mr Wilde's extended supervision. In June 2017, some five weeks after the electronic monitoring condition to which he had been subject was relaxed, Mr Wilde was charged with having custody of a knife in a public place. That charge concerned a knife found by police in Mr Wilde's possession while he was riding a motorbike. Duct tape and rope were also then found.
At the final hearing the State did not accept Mr Wilde's descriptions of the knife the subject of this charge. Initially he described it to be a butter knife and later, a butter knife which had a serrated edge. In his evidence he said that he had often carried such a knife, which he used to prepare food. This charge is due to be heard in January 2018 at a time, on Mr Wilde's case, which the State had contrived, in order to disadvantage him on this application, by allowing a police officer to take long service leave. Mr Wilde believes that he will be acquitted of that charge, his case being that he was carrying the knife to use to prepare sandwiches, for which he was also carrying bread and butter, although the State did not accept that bread and butter were also found in Mr Wilde's possession.
It should be noted that when I raised with Mr Wilde the possibility of adjourning the hearing, so that the outcome of the knife charge could be taken into account on the State's application, he objected, given that would have required the interim order to be continued, until the determination of that charge.
In any event, on the State's case, given the applicable provisions of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act, the Court had no power to continue the interim order, even by consent, to that time. That was not put in issue and in the result, the hearing of the application proceeded.
In August 2017, in coming to the conclusion that the interim order sought should be made, Campbell J took the view that the knife charge and the circumstances in which it came to be laid were significant: at [33]. His Honour also considered that it was relevant to take into account that in his previous offending, Mr Wilde had threatened each of his victims with a knife and had also bound and gagged them, observing at [31] that "it is obvious that the knife could be used for that purpose; the duct tape could be an effective gag; and the rope could be used to bind."
These remain relevant considerations on this application.
[7]
Mr Wilde's supervision
The application was supported by risk assessment reports prepared by Ms Thomson and Mr Ardasinski, who were both cross examined, Mr Ardasinski also having been cross-examined before Campbell J. Mr Wilde also cross-examined Dr Eagle, Ms Dewson and Ms Farroway.
Ms Thomson authored the risk management report of 17 July 2017 on which the State relied before Campbell J. She had also been involved in Mr Wilde's supervision, including of his internet usage and requests for approval of employment. On her evidence, she had not refused such requests.
In cross-examination Ms Thomson confirmed that Mr Wilde had become a member of the God Squad motorcycle organisation and that he had been given approval to participate in events such as Christmas charity runs and had maintained stable relationships with his sponsors from that organisation, and for a time, with others. She did not agree with the cause of the breakdown of other of Mr Wilde's relationships, or the number of times he had sought approval for things like trips to Mudgee to visit family members.
Ms Thomson explained the Departmental system of case review every three months, to monitor progress, confirming that supervised persons such as Mr Wilde do not have the opportunity to attend such reviews. There were also two monthly reviews conducted with the supervised individual. She also explained how requests such as to change accommodation were dealt with, the checks undertaken and how decisions were made.
From the tenor of Mr Wilde's cross-examination and the way in which Ms Thomson responded, not all of which is captured by the transcript, it became apparent that there was tension between them. When asked whether she knew of any occurrences where he had been outwardly hostile to women, by which Mr Wilde explained he meant aggressive, threatening behaviours, seeking harm, Ms Thomson said that he had been aggressive in tone to her, while she had supervised him. When pressed she referred to him being verbally aggressive, shouting and name calling and then finishing with "oh look its not about you". Ms Thomson also said, however, that she had never felt the need to protect herself, or to have Mr Wilde charged with any wrongdoing. While she considered his behaviour to be highly inappropriate, she had not felt threatened or in danger.
Ms Thomson said that Mr Wilde's requests to associate with outlaw motorcycle gangs had not been approved, because of the associated element of criminality involved in such gangs and the view taken that his participation would not involve him in pro-social activities.
Ms Thomson also explained how the electrical monitoring system operated and agreed that on more than one occasion Mr Wilde had brought to her attention that he had been directed by the monitoring team to cease an activity for which he been given prior approval. She had discussed those issues with the head of the monitoring team. She also explained how activities and changes in activities could be approved, in some cases immediately and how contact was made with Mr Wilde, when it appeared that he had deviated from his schedule.
In her evidence Ms Farroway also explained how conditions of supervision were implemented, monitored and reviewed. She agreed that those subject to the Court's orders could not attend strategic review meetings, or have formal input into these reviews, but that they could raise concerns with their supervising officer and the unit leader, who could raise matters at the meeting. If a decision was made with which the supervised person was aggrieved, a request for a review to the supervisor or unit leader.
Ms Farroway also explained that the aim was for the supervisor and the supervised person to develop a good working relationship and in cases where that had not been achieved, supervisors had been changed. Ms Farroway agreed that Mr Wilde's case notes reflected occasions when he had raised matters he was concerned about and when he was concerned that matters he had raised, were not properly dealt with. The case notes in evidence supported this evidence.
Ms Farroway was asked about a condition which required Mr Wilde to follow all reasonable directions given by his supervisor and whether a refusal of a request to go to a cafe at 2am, when he was not subject to a curfew, would be reasonable. She explained the considerations which would arise, and the associated risks which would have to be assessed, including the location of the café and how he would be travelling. Ms Faraway said that such a decision was not made simplistically and that she could foresee situations in which it would be reasonable to refuse such a request.
[8]
The expert evidence
The experts all assessed Mr Wilde to pose a high risk of further offending, notwithstanding his age and the time which has passed since his last sexual offending. In his report Mr Ardasinski concluded:
"[65] Mr Wilde is a 55-year old Australian man whose risk of sexual reoffending is estimated to be in the High risk category relative to other men who have offended sexually, when taking into account actuarial measures of risk, but who has not reoffended sexually since his release in 2008 and whose last sexual offence was committed over 20 years ago. It is likely that, by virtue of his personality factors alone, Mr Wilde would continue to fall in the high risk range regardless of how long he remained under supervision on an ESO. If the Court deems that Mr Wilde's risk remains unacceptability high, it may need to be considered that he will require lifelong supervision with repeated applications for ESOs under the HRO Act.
[66] In the event that Mr Wilde is considered suitable for a further ESO, he will be subject to ongoing intensive supervision and case management by CSNSW (the Metro ESO Team, based on Blacktown). Under such supervision, it has been noted that Mr Wilde's compliance was linked with reductions in his level of monitoring - he became more compliant and less belligerent as he progressed to Stages 3 and 4 of his electronic monitoring regimen, which entailed his not being subject to weekly schedules (but still being subject to electronic monitoring - Stage 3) and then not being subject to electronic monitoring at all (Stage 4) but still being subject to all of his other ESO conditions. Mr Wilde suggested in interview that he would not tolerate a further ESO - he said he would be a "ticking time-bomb" and that he had sustained himself thus far with the knowledge that his ESO had an end date (which he disputed, but he was willing to wait for the "court ordered" freedom at the expiry of his ESO). It is noted that Mr Wilde's behaviour deteriorated after he was made subject to his second ESO in 2014, but he then gradually improved again over the subsequent three years. Further ESOs would need to give careful consideration? to a lessening of the conditions which would be required to manage any latent risk - for instance, the routine carrying of any cutting weapon could be targeted through a specific condition, but conditions relating to work or associations may be less relevant to Mr Wilde's risk.
[67] In the event that no order is imposed, after his current ESO expires Mr Wilde will return to a community existence with no supervision. He would not be eligible for further formal support from the Department if he is not subject to any form of community-based supervision Since his victims were all adults he would not be subject to any of the restrictions of child sex offenders who remain subject to registration requirements under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. In interview, Mr Wilde suggested that he would seek to get a passport and make his way overseas to live with his 'partner' who I understand lives in the United States and whom Mr Wilde apparently met through playing an online game in 2015 or 2016. Mr Wilde maintains this view, despite the USA having strict border control policies which could potentially limit Mr Wilde's options to gain entry into the USA by virtue of his having a history of sexual offending in NSW.
[68] It may be that Mr Wilde could independently remain offence free following the expiry of his current ESO. He appears to have learned how to live a relatively prosocial, or in the least asocial, existence under his ESOs since 2008. Prior to this, a prosocial existence would have been quite alien to him, but he has managed to find housing, maintain social connections despite evident interpersonal skills deficits, and remain offence-free (outside of his Fail to Comply offences).
[69] Mr Wilde has not committed any serious sexual offence for over 20 years. However, he remains in the high risk category when considering actuarial risk assessment measures. These risk factors largely correspond to elements of Mr Wilde's "intractable" personality which have been described as 'chronic' and unlikely to remit. Either Mr Wilde is living as prosocial an existence as he is able to, and he has progressed as far along that trajectory as is possible, or he presents a latent risk of serious sexual offending which has been moderated sufficiently by the onerous terms and conditions of his ESOs since 2008 to prevent a new offence being committed to date. Either option is possible, although I consider the former more likely. Whether this would be considered "unacceptable" in the context of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 is a matter to be determined by the Court."
In his oral evidence Mr Ardasinski said the years Mr Wilde had been sexual offence free was taken into account in assessing his risk of reoffending, but that someone who fell into the high risk category would remain in that category, or close to it, even after 5-10 years without committing another offence and living in the community .
In cross-examination, Mr Ardasinski agreed that Mr Wilde had been subject to onerous conditions of supervision. He did not agree that the accuracy of some of the earlier assessments made of Mr Wilde had been jeopardised because of the shortness of the interviews on which they were based. Mr Ardasinski explained that Mr Wilde's interest in knives and possession of them, increased his risk of using them, but he agreed that there was a distinction necessarily drawn between cutlery, such as a butter knife and large knives used in the commission of violent rapes. Given how long Mr Wilde had lived in the community, where he could have had access to such knives, Mr Ardasinski considered that if there was a sufficient drive to reoffend, he would have done so by now.
Mr Ardasinski also explained the nature of personality disorders, of the kind Mr Wilde has been diagnosed to have, suggested functional impairment and if of a high order, could lead a person to pose a risk to themselves or others. Such disorders are intractable and do not remit until old age. The clinical opinions were that Mr Wilde's disorders were entrenched.
Mr Ardasinski considered that someone with an entrenched antisocial personality disorder would find it difficult, even with the constraints of a supervision order, to avoid more serious offending than fail to comply offences. The range of such behaviours could extend from low level assaults to homicides. Mr Ardasinski had, however, had experience of persons who had committed offences of sexual violence while supervised and others who had refrained until the supervision order ceased and then offended again. It was also often the case that fail to comply offences occurred instead of, or preceded serious sexual or violence offences. In Mr Wilde's case, given his three convictions for sexual offending, any possession of a knife was a dangerous situation, this, Mr Ardasinski explained, involving offence paralleling.
Mr Ardasinski also explained that personality disorders of the kind Mr Wilde has been diagnosed with were enduring and that his lack of acceptance of societal norms and rules was consistent with someone suffering such disorders. He also considered that Mr Wilde's sense of grievance was preventing him from moving forward in a pro-social way.
In her report Dr Eagle noted that Mr Wilde had told her that he had been wrongfully convicted, two out of three times, he having been guilty only of his first sexual offences and that 90% of what had been contained in previous psychiatric reports about him "was garbage". Mr Wilde refused to discuss his second and third offences, claiming that he had been wrongfully imprisoned for 17 years. He said that while he had appealed his second conviction to the High Court, he had been denied an appeal on his third and that he had been denied legal aid because he was a political prisoner. He also said that on his current charge, he had been crucified for having "a picnic basket".
Mr Wilde explained to Dr Eagle that he had not satisfactorily completed sex offenders courses in custody, because he cannot discuss the second and third offences, of which he was not guilty. He also claimed to have been barred from working in the community by the State. Mr Wilde said that he practiced witchcraft as a religion, but he was not allowed to associate with witches or pagans. Mr Wilde also told Dr Eagle that he was not a danger, in a sexual manner, to anyone in society, but he was a danger to authorities, whom he would hold to account. Dr Eagle also noted that:
"He said that if he was pushed "all hell will break loose" I asked him what he meant and he said "extreme violence" He said "I try my hardest to avoid it If my temper goes, it's not going to be good I don't want that I never have wanted that The State sees it differently". He said that he would cause major damage He said he was qualified as an arms expert and an explosives expert. He said "I don't want that All I want is to live free and happy like anyone else". He said that if he was pushed he was going to snap. He said "I'm trying to stop that at all possible costs because I've got too much to lose"."
Mr Wilde provided Dr Eagle a history of having been diagnosed with PTSD, that being the result of him having been persecuted, since he was aged 8 years, but that he had never had any psychiatric treatment, because he had been controlling his symptoms since 1979.
Mr Wilde reported no drug or alcohol abuse, but having tried "nearly everything" between the ages of 13 and 18. He had been prescribed valium at age 8, to control his anger, but had ceased using it at age 14. His account was that none of his offending had involved substance use.
Mr Wilde said that the 2017 knife charge concerned a butter knife which he had been carrying lawfully and that he had the duct tape to assist anyone who needed it and the rope to hold down gear on his bike.
Mr Wilde admitted having raped the victim of his first offence, believing that she had been involved in the rape and near killing of his then girlfriend. He had pleaded guilty and apologised to that victim, who he believed had forgiven him, but he had not forgiven himself. He said that since then, he had never believed in "an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth". Mr Wilde also claimed that his last offence had involved consensual sex; that there was a witness who could clear him of wrongdoing; and that he was trying to get those matters re-opened.
Dr Eagle also noted that Mr Wilde was aged 19 at the time of his first violent offence and on his account, that he had been in trouble with police since he was aged 8 years, when he saw a 10 year old friend murdered. He said, however, that he had never been ultra-violent, or beaten people up.
Mr Wilde gave Dr Wilde a history of getting along with his parents, who had separated when he was a child. He despised his paternal grandparents, who put him into a cupboard for four to six hours as punishment, for which they had never been held to account and that his anger had developed as a result of this punishment, and had led to problems at school when he was 8, but they had ceased at age 10. Now, however, he was extremely dangerous when he lost his temper, but he had not suffered either sexual abuse, or any domestic violence.
Mr Wilde said that he had undertaken a number of courses after school, but had worked for only three weeks in the last eight years and had not had stable employment since 1980. In custody he had worked as a computer teacher, for up to two years.
Mr Wilde also reported never having been in a marriage like relationship and having had only three serious relationships in his life, the first of between 6 to 12 months when he was aged 17; the second before his first offence; and now a two year relationship with a woman living in the US, where he hoped to travel to live. He also said that he had many friendships, but no contact with family.
Mr Wilde denied any sexual preoccupations or rape fantasies, but Dr Eagle noted that he appeared angry and acknowledged the stress he felt about these proceedings. Mr Wilde was logical and coherent, but at times loud and explosive, displaying hostility towards authority, which dominated the interview. He did not accept responsibility for his conduct, with the exception of qualified responsibility for his first sexual offences. Dr Eagle also noted:
"73 Mr Wilde persisted throughout the interview to state that he would ultimately be pushed too far and that this would result in substantial harm to others given his knowledge of weapons and explosives He maintained that this was not a "threat" and said "I don't threaten" However, the repetition of the statements in this regard and the emotional force behind them was clearly intended to either implicitly or overtly control the situation by intimidation This may not be a conscious process.
74. Mr Wilde clearly displayed a number of significant cognitive distortions including an attributional bias (errors in the evaluation of one's own behaviour) in that he persistently blamed others or external factors for all the incidents giving rise to his charges and other adverse events in his life He minimised his behaviour in relation to his offending, not just by denying the second and third offences, but by for instance dismissing his behaviour in relation to the third offences as acceptable on the basis that it was consensual (despite the victim being physically harmed and degraded) This revealed cognitive distortions regarding his views of women and what would be considered appropriate or socially acceptable behaviours He also revealed similar cognitive distortions regarding the breaches of his ESO and his most recent charge."
Dr Eagle also noted:
Dr Baron's 2004 assessment of Mr Wilde, "as falling within the high risk groups for general and violent (including sexually violent) reoffending";
Dr O'Dea's 2008 assessment of Mr Wilde's ongoing problems with anger and aggression, which would satisfy a diagnosis of personality disorder with anti-social and narcissistic traits and why he met the criteria for psychopathy;
A psychologist's report of Mr Rendell of 2007, which noted that Mr Wilde's three offences had escalated and that it appeared unlikely that his risk of reoffending had reduced significantly, given his high level of risk and needs;
Dr Allnutt's view in 2008, that there was no clear evidence that Mr Wilde's internal capacity to manage his risk had improved and the 2011 view of the psychologist Ms Bel, that his management under supervision had to be optimised;
The report of the psychologist Ms Howell, who had undertaken 59 counselling sessions with Mr Wilde following his release in 2008, who found that he had been respectful and engaged in difficult discussions of offending issues;
In 2013 Mr Wilde had refused to participate in a clinical interview with the forensic psychologist Mr Sheehan, who considered that while his risks were intensely managed, he still posed a high risk of reoffending. He also noted that after the second offences in 1983, Mr Wilde had produced a signed document acknowledging that he had broken into the property, bound and gagged the victim and ejaculated on her, but had claimed to have previously been bashed and threatened by two other men, who had directed him to undertake a robbery at that address, otherwise they would hurt or kill him, his family or friends. While there had been some complaints about Mr Wilde's behaviour towards certain women in 2013, Dr Sheehan concluded that his supervision had reduced the risk which he posed, he not having sexually offended in the three years he had lived in the community;
In 2014 Dr Samuels considered that Mr Wilde was then at moderate to high risk of reoffending. Concerns were raised by Mr Wilde's attempts to evade monitoring, having been caught with a knife, having changed his name, having used aliases, having attempted to access the home of a female and having never fully participated in a sex offender treatment, or used anti-libidinal medication;
In 2014 Professor Greenberg concluded that Mr Wilde posed a high risk of further sexual offending over the long term and that he fell at the high end of that risk, even though he had since July 2012 been living in the community without further offending and had participated in therapy;
In Departmental reports in December 2009, March 2011, August 2013 and March 2015, residence, non-compliance and challenges to supervision persisted;
Mr Ardasinski's July 2017 and Ms Thomson's July 2017 reports;
NSW Department of Corrective Service case note reports, between March 2014 and June 2017, which noted Mr Wilde's pro social activities, as well as breaches of supervision conditions; and
Dr Eagle found that Mr Wilde had not displayed signs or symptoms of a major mental illness or mood disturbance in interview. Dr Eagle could not determine whether his offending, involving as it had humiliating and degrading his victims, significant levels of violence and intended physical and psychological harm, evidenced a sexual sadism disorder, or sexual pleasure or arousal in response others suffering.
Dr Eagle noted that Mr Wilde's history of childhood mistreatment and exposure to violence could have given rise to disturbances in his personality structure, resulting in pervasive patterns of disregard for and violation of the rights of others from age 15, leading to rapid arrest and conviction which was indicative of conduct disorder, even prior to age 15. Dr Eagle considered that he satisfied the criteria of anti-social personality disorder. Mr Wilde's pattern of grandiosity and lack of empathy since early childhood and his sense of entitlement and arrogant haughty behaviour, satisfied the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder. His personality structure was on a spectrum with psychopathy at the extreme end. Dr Eagle also considered that his history was consistent with a psychopathic personality structure.
Dr Eagle also discussed the limitations of risk assessment and the tools which she had used to assess the risks Mr Wilde posed, both the Stable 2007 and Static 99 R tools. The results of these assessment tools, which Dr Eagle explained, together placed Mr Wilde in the very high category of risk. His risk of violent offending was also considered by Dr Eagle, using the HCR 20 Version 3 tool, which considers historical, clinical and risk management factors.
Dr Eagle identified Mr Wilde's historical and clinical factors as including problems with violence, anti-social behaviours, identified disorders, traumatic experiences and attitudes to treatment and supervision, problems with insight and recent problems while under supervision. Mr Wilde's risk management factors were identified to include that he was unlikely to voluntarily access professional services; his expressed intention to reconnect with associates from outlaw motorcycle clubs; intention to resume possession of knives; and his demonstrated lack of coping skills, especially in response to anger and frustration.
Dr Eagle concluded:
"132. Clinical factors that have been found to be associated with violent offending include recent problems with insight, instability, violent ideation, symptoms of major mental disorder and treatment or supervision response. Clinical factors are potentially changeable or modifiable by intervention. These factors are associated with an increased risk of violent reoffending in the short to medium term.
133. Mr Wilde has had recent problems (over the last six months) with insight, instability (affective and cognitive), violent ideation and treatment or supervision response."
In the result, while Dr Eagle did not diagnose Mr Wilde as suffering a major mental illness, she concluded that he did have personality traits and characteristics that suggested a malignant, narcissistic personality structure, a number of psychopathic traits and perhaps, a sexual sadism disorder. Dr Eagle concluded that Mr Wilde falls into the highest risk of reoffending, given his combination of static and dynamic risk factors. While his static risk would not alter over time, his dynamic risk could.
[9]
Mr Wilde's evidence
Mr Wilde's evidence and submissions were to similar effect.
In chief, Mr Wilde gave evidence that he had two serious previous female relationships prior to his offending. The first was between 1978 and 1980, with a woman whom he had known for several years prior to commencing this relationship. He explained that:
"… she ended up being raped by four police officers at Roma Street cop shop in the presence of another woman that was a friend of hers and ours and in the presence of myself and the other woman's partner. We were present in an adjoining cell and watched the other girls being raped for four days nearly. My friend's girl ended up having a suicidal attack and killing herself afterwards. My lady went to try and have the police charged and was found several weeks later dead."
Mr Wilde then gave evidence that he moved to Sydney and had commenced a second relationship. He explained that his then girlfriend was also raped by a bi-sexual female and another male, and "beaten that badly that she lost the ability to bear children". He said that this had sent him "over the edge", and that at the time he "had the belief, an eye for an eye a tooth for a tooth", although he had not had such an attitude for the best part of the last 30 years. Mr Wilde claimed that it was these events which had "caused" him to commit his first sexual offences.
In relation to his later convictions of sexual offending Mr Wilde claimed that he had done no wrong and that:
"I had a very, very hard time dealing with the fact that I was incarcerated for something I didn't do and more often than not I was having a lot of problems with Corrective Services. I got out, I was trying to rebuild my life again. I went over to another person's place with somebody I'd only known for a week or so looking for someone else and was told that person might know where I could find them. In the course of that, I've ended up having a short term sexual liaison with this person. The person who took me over there left just prior to the police arriving. When the police arrived, they arrived because of an argument me and the occupant of the place had that a neighbour had occurred and that's why the police came. When they came, this person screamed rape and I subsequently did 16 years on that even though I was not guilty of rape. I was guilty of common assault, I don't deny that and I have never denied that. But that was in self defence from being attacked by her first. I've always denied any malicious wounding, but I was also convicted of that."
Mr Wilde then gave evidence that he was "blackmailed" into the first supervision order, being forced to either agree to it or be kept in custody. In relation to the second order, on Mr Wilde's evidence it had eventuated because of only "minor technical breaches".
Mr Wilde also gave evidence of the various breaches of the supervision orders with which he had been charged, which he considered to have been "minor", "technical" or "unjustified". In relation to the knife charge, Mr Wilde said:
"I'm going fine, no problems, starting to reintegrate back into society, slowly starting to get confidence to rebuild my life up again in a meaningful prosocial manner. In the whole of the last eight years, off and on, I've had bread, butter, knife, jam, bananas, apples, pears, all of that kind of thing on my bike when I've had saddle bags or a backpack simply to use for food like anybody would take in a picnic basket in a car somewhere for a picnic. That's the exact same thing that I had on the day where the police say I had a knife in a public place."
Mr Wilde explained his deep resentment at the way he perceived he had been treated by the State, while being on extended supervision orders. He explained that the electronic monitoring room had repeatedly threatened to have him charged for breaching conditions of his order. Further, that:
"… since I've been on this ESO from 2008 to now, instead of the State trying to help me either reintegrate or rehabilitate in any meaningful manner, they've done every single thing they possibly could to provoke me or to push me into a situation where they've got justification to either put me back behind bars, as in technical breaches, or put me into a situation where I end up losing my temper and violence ensues, so that I can either go in for a longer period of time or get a bullet in me.
…
I am extremely good at controlling my temper these days and have been for many, many years, but at the same time I also know that when I do lose my temper all hell breaks loose and my temper actually does scare me, that's why I've got such a very, very good control and a tight rein on it but people in my situation or people in general that are affected by things like these orders can only take so much before they end up snapping, and that's my opinion that that's what the State's been trying to do right from day one when I got out, is keep pushing and pushing until I end up snapping.
… I know I can survive out in the community without being on an ESO with no chance of any kind of sexually reoffending in my life. I know that for a fact. 100% for a fact. I don't say that I may not be involved in a bar room brawl or something, that's always a possibility, especially in the biker community. You know, that's not something I'd be looking for, it's not something I would like, I've seen way to much violence in my life both inside the prison system and outside. Contrary to what the State believe, I don't look to violence to sort things out as a first resort. It's always the last resort and if I can do anything to avoid that, I will."
Mr Wilde explained the relationship he had formed with a woman who lives in the US, who experiences numerous medical conditions which are causing extreme stress for each of them. He desires to live with her in the US and perceives that continued supervision will prevent him achieving that aim
Mr Wilde explained how his numerous attempts to obtain permission to reside at Mudgee and Katoomba had failed and how his attempts to enrol in various training courses run by "WIRES" at Katoomba and to establish a wildlife conservation business, had been frustrated. He also referred to having been denied access to Facebook sites and having lost his family and friends because of the conditions to which he was subject, including because of limited permission received to visit Mudgee.
Mr Wilde also complained about conditions relating to alcohol use, which had prevented him from going out to any licensed premises, even though he had no alcohol abuse history.
Mr Wilde explained his interaction with members of motorcycle clubs such as the "God Squad", including a period of employment. He claimed that through members of outlaw motorcycle clubs that he knew, he would be able to find various types of legitimate employment, but had been refused approval for such associations.
Mr Wilde also gave evidence about his personality. He explained that he had a "problem with authority" and that:
"I don't threaten your Honour, I'm a person who either does something or I don't do something, I don't threaten to do it. If I do say something that some people can misconstrue as being a threat, it's either making a statement of fact about what I could or can be capable of or giving a warning. It's not meant to be done as an intimidation, it's not meant to be done as a threat because I don't believe in that kind of thing.
…
Now I am not somebody who is wanting to do crime, I am not somebody who needs to do crime, I am not somebody who's got an alcohol history or a drug history that might require crime to be able to pay for some kind of habit. I don't have a gambling habit. What I do have is as positive an outlook given my situation as I possibly can in rehabilitating and reintegrating back into society. What I do have is eight years free of no sexual violence of any kind and no violence of any kind, and that's not because of any ESOs I've been put on."
Finally, Mr Wilde explained that when no longer subject to a supervision order, he intends to move overseas, initially as a tourist and then to seek to permanently live there with his partner.
In cross-examination, Mr Wilde agreed that the various conditions to which he has been subject had upset him, but said that he has been able to deal with them. Mr Wilde admitted to some breaches of such conditions, but could not recall the circumstances surrounding most of those breaches. Mr Wilde also denied the correctness of what was recorded in case notes, about various breaches.
Mr Wilde accepted that he approached a primary school in November 2016, he said in order to inquire about having his dog go there as a companion dog and to talk to the children about how to train a dog. Mr Wilde also accepted that he had attended a knife shop in January 2017 to look at knives, swords and armour and accepted that he had possessed rope, duct tape and a knife in the saddlebags of his motorbike on 17 May 2017. When pressed, Mr Wilde strongly denied the suggestion that he did not also have bread and butter in his saddlebags.
Mr Wilde agreed that if he was not subject to supervision orders, in the future he would return to associating with members of both social and outlaw motorcycle gangs and to collecting knives, saws, armour and archery.
Mr Wilde denied being offered treatment while subject to any of the ESOs and denied that he would need any future treatment, beyond treatment to deal better with, and control, his disrespect for "authoritarians".
In reply, Mr Wilde said that he did not have any kind of abnormality or disorder and had never been clinically diagnosed with any serious or non‑serious disorder, outside those with which he had been diagnosed by professionals during his incarceration and while being subject to supervision orders. He explained that all he wanted to do was to move overseas to live with his current partner and rebuild his life. Finally, he considered himself to be the victim, denying that he had committed the crime which had resulted in him being subject to supervision orders. He also said that he does not intend to commit any further significant offences.
[10]
A further extended supervision order must be made
I am satisfied that the evidence I have discussed establishes that the State has met the onus imposed upon it, to demonstrate that Mr Wilde not only poses a high risk of further sexual offending, but that he continues to pose unacceptable risks of such offending.
In cross-examination Mr Ardasinski explained his experience of offenders who, like Mr Wilde, were able to comply with conditions of extended supervision which had been imposed upon them, but that once that supervision ceased, the risks they posed materialised and they were returned to custody, having been charged with further sexual offending. The evidence establishes that there is a real possibility that Mr Wilde falls into that category.
This requires particular consideration, given Mr Wilde's continuing interest in knives, his intention to resume pursuing that interest and the increased risk which that exposes him to. Recently, soon after electronic monitoring ceased, he was found in public, not only carrying a knife, but also duct tape and rope.
Mr Wilde has told those who have assessed him that it has not been the conditions of his supervision, but his ability to control himself, when opportunities for further sexual offending have arisen, which has resulted in him not having been charged with further such offending over the past 8 years. His evidence was to similar effect. He also said that he does not intend to commit further such offences, but has threatened considerable violence, if a further order is made, notwithstanding that he does not characterise what he has said as involving threats.
Dr Eagle and Ms Dewson had a different view, considering that Mr Wilde posed a more significant risk than that which he identified. When their views are considered in light of Mr Wilde's repeated, serious threats against all those who he considers responsible for the imposition of past and any future supervision orders upon him, which I consider are relevant to the question of the exercise of the Court's discretion, I am unable to conclude that there is a basis upon which I could justly refrain from imposing a further supervision order on Mr Wilde.
Mr Wilde's views have to be considered in light of the conclusions which the experts have reached, conclusions which I am satisfied must be accepted. Their views as to the considerable risk which he continues to pose were influenced by the occasions when Mr Wilde has pursued behaviour which parallels that involved in his earlier sexual offending, or which might be pursued in preparation for such offending. That includes the occasions on which he has carried knives, and when he has taken steps by which he could have gained access to the homes of women not known to him, even though he did not actually gain that access.
On the knife charge, Mr Wilde finally described the knife to have been a "serrated" butter knife, which he claims to have carried for an innocent purpose, as he had carried similar knives on other past occasions. He insists that he will be acquitted of that charge.
I accept that it is a possibility. His description of the knife which is the subject of that charge as a serrated butter knife, was not, however, accepted. That raises obvious questions as to the type of knife the subject of the charge and whether it was a knife which Mr Wilde carried for the purpose he explained.
Whatever might be the outcome of that charge, on this application, that the circumstances in which Mr Wilde was found in possession of that knife while out riding his bike, soon after his electronic surveillance was lifted, he was also carrying duct tape and rope in his saddlebags, must be taken into account. While Mr Wilde also advanced an innocent explanation for possessing those items, his explanations must be considered in light of the type of sexual offending he has committed; what those items could be used for; and the high risk of further sexual offending which he continues to pose.
Mr Wilde's past offending involved him gaining entry, during the day, to the homes of women who did not know him, who he then repeatedly threatened to kill and sexually assaulted, after he bound and gagged them, while armed with a knife. Despite Mr Wilde's submissions, the evidence established that he continues to make threats of serious violence, in a variety of situations, as well as being found in public in possession of a knife as well as items which can readily be used to bind and gag a victim.
Mr Wilde's case that it is entirely the result of decisions he has made, to control his actions, rather than the effect which the conditions of his supervision have had upon him, that he has not committed further serious offences cannot be accepted, given the experts' opinions. On their evidence, I am satisfied that Mr Wilde's conditions of supervision have either assisted him to exercise such control, or they have deterred him from further offending, or perhaps both.
In the result, despite Mr Wilde's evidence as to his views and the fact that he has not committed further sexual offences while subject to the earlier supervision orders, which reflects that while under supervision, he has been able to live, in the main, as a law abiding member of the community, I am persuaded that he does pose an unacceptable risk of further serious sexual offending. That conclusion flows from the opinions of the experts about the high risk of further sexual offending which Mr Wilde poses, which I am satisfied must be accepted, as well as from evidence Mr Wilde himself gave about his views, interests and capacity for violence.
In the result, I have concluded that a further extended supervision order must be made, given the unacceptably high risk of further serious sexual offending which Mr Wilde continues to pose and the need, for the present, for that risk to be managed by the imposition of a further supervision order, for the safety and protection of the community.
[11]
The term of the order
Initially the State sought an order for supervision for a term of one year. Finally a term of three years was pressed. In cross-examination Dr Eagle said that she thought twelve months could be adequate, but that there was no hard and fast timetable. In re-examination she said that she expected that problems with Mr Wilde's compliance with any order would emerge within 6 months and that a 12 to 18 month timeframe would give ample opportunity to manage Mr Wilde's risk and give him the opportunity to show that he could address the behaviours which were of concern. Ms Dewson considered a three year term appropriate.
I consider that the absence of sexual offending in the past 8 years and that while Mr Wilde has threatened violence, he has not acted on those threats, must be reflected in the term of the order which is imposed upon him, as well as in the conditions imposed.
Given all that I have discussed, I am satisfied that a further term of two years is appropriate.
This reflects the expert evidence that Mr Wilde's compliance with his conditions of supervision had earlier improved significantly, to the point where he was no longer subject to even electronic monitoring, prior to the laying of the knife charge. A further period of two years will permit consideration to be given to the outcome of the knife charge and whether he can sustain that improvement, or whether, as he has repeatedly stated he intends, this outcome will result in him committing serious offences of violence.
Should Mr Wilde choose to act on what he has said were not threats of violence, but statements of fact, the result will of course be that he will be returned to custody and convicted of further offences. Thereby his opportunity to live his life as he said he wishes to live it, in the community, pro-socially, peacefully and without violence, will be brought to an end, as the result of his own actions.
[12]
Conditions
The conditions which may be imposed under an extended supervision order include, but are not limited to, those specified in s 11. Those finally pressed by the State are annexed.
Mr Wilde opposed the proposed conditions. In his written submissions he explained why it was that he considered he had been wrongly convicted of various breaches of conditions of his supervision. He considered the expert evidence relied on by the State to be nothing more than a series of outrageous, malicious, irrelevant and incorrect opinions, because he did not have and never had the personality traits they considered him to have.
Mr Wilde also relied on his defence of the knife charge; his record of not having acted violently for many years, despite provocation of various kinds; what he considered to be his record of compliance with the conditions of his supervision, despite the conduct of those who had supervised him, who had in practice, contrary to the statutory aims of reintegration into society and rehabilitation, set out to make his life unnecessarily difficult. He also explained how his onerous conditions had been implemented in punitive ways, with the result unnecessarily impinging on his freedom and that of others, as well as disruption to his relationships and opportunities for study and work.
While Mr Wilde acknowledged that he had the capacity to be violent, he considered violence to be a last resort and preferred to live his life peacefully, in order to be able to pursue redress for his wrongful convictions. He also considered that these proceedings had been conducted in a deliberately unfair way by the State, knowing that he had no legal representation and that the minor charge which he now faced, should not be used as the basis for further orders and onerous conditions being made imposed upon him.
I accept that if the knife charge had been heard before this application had to be determined, the outcome would have been relevant to the conclusions reached. Given the statutory scheme, as I have explained, the application must be determined on the evidence led, even though undoubtedly, if Mr Wilde's defence of the charge succeeds, that will be a material consideration in how the conditions imposed upon him are implemented and eventually, whether any further supervision order will be sought by the State, before the order I will make, expires.
The conditions sought by the State were modified after the expert evidence was received, I having raised questions as to the purpose of some quite onerous conditions originally sought, given the risks Mr Wilde posed and his submissions having been put.
What is now in issue as to the conditions, has to be resolved in light of all of the evidence I have discussed, including Mr Wilde's conviction of various breaches of the conditions of his earlier orders. Like his criminal record, in these proceedings those convictions cannot be ignored, despite Mr Wilde's views about them.
Nor can the expert evidence be approached on the basis for which Mr Wilde contended. To do so would be to ignore that the opinions which the Court appointed experts reached, were not only consistent with those of Mr Ardasinski, but also with those reached by many other experts who have examined Mr Wilde over the course of many years.
It may also not be overlooked, as I earlier explained, that some of the views expressed by the experts were favourable to Mr Wilde. Further, Dr Eagle had reservations about the appropriateness of some proposed conditions, as did Mr Ardasinski, although Ms Dewson did not share those views. Ms Dewson's opinion was that the proposed conditions were designed to permit external management of Mr Wilde, so that there could be intervention when it appeared that the community was at risk.
Dr Eagle's view was that the conditions imposed on Mr Wilde should be clear and transparent, so that he was given the opportunity to comply with them as fully as possible. She took the view that he would benefit from a further period of electronic monitoring, which could be reduced over time, but that otherwise there should be the least restrictive amount of conditions possible, consistent with managing the risks which Mr Wilde posed. In part that depended on available resources and the practical considerations involved, which she did not have expertise in.
Dr Eagle also considered it to be important that Mr Wilde be permitted to live in stable accommodation, where he could access support, where supervision could be provided and where he was not going to be involved with others pursuing antisocial conduct, or offending behaviours, for example at Kings Cross. In her view conditions regulating Mr Wilde's phone and internet use were appropriate to the risks which he posed, even though they had not been involved in his earlier offending, given that the internet was not available as it is now, when he offended in the 1980's and 1990's. It is now extensively used by offenders identifying and grooming victims.
Dr Eagle also considered that while conditions which applied to Mr Wilde's social interactions with others involved an invasion of his privacy, given his risks, they were necessary. Over time, however, she envisaged that the conditions could be relaxed again, when it was shown that he was managing his disappointment and his approach reflected some diminution in his dynamic risk factors.
These views have to be considered in light of Mr Wilde's evidence as to how conditions have been implemented. This included, for example, that in addition to not being able to drink alcohol, the subject of an express condition, he has also not been allowed to enter premises where it is sold, even for a meal. It is difficult to see that a condition imposed as to alcohol consumption, provides a basis for reasonably refusing Mr Wilde the opportunity to have a meal, or even work at any place where alcohol is sold.
Consideration thus has to be given to the evidence as to how the conditions have been implemented by the Department to this point and the desirability of a relationship of trust being established between Mr Wilde and those who supervise him, about which the State's witnesses spoke.
Order 3 sought by the State provides that:
"The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO or any other person supervising him."
On his evidence Mr Wilde has in the past been given directions which he considered were unreasonable and he has also been refused various applications for approvals, he considers unreasonably, as to residence, travel and work, for instance. He said, for example, that he had been denied the opportunity to live outside Sydney; the route by which he drove to Mudgee has been unreasonably directed; and he has also been denied the opportunity to visit family in Mudgee, as often as he wished. On Mr Ardasinski's evidence, however, a desire to live outside Sydney is accommodated for those the subject of these supervision orders. Why that was not possible in Mr Wilde's case, has not been revealed.
In formulating the conditions to be imposed on Mr Wilde, account must be taken of these concerns, which I accept Mr Wilde sincerely holds. That accords with the statutory object of his rehabilitation, by pursuit of his reintegration into society, which would be supported by him having, as far as possible, unregulated access to friends and family, while managing the risks which he poses.
I have thus concluded that in addition to the requirement imposed on Mr Wilde, that he must follow reasonable directions given by his DSO or any other person supervising him, reference must be made to approvals which he seeks under various conditions. Implicit in this condition, consistent with the evidence I have discussed, is that such approval will not be unreasonably withheld.
There is a review mechanism in place, which permits Mr Wilde to raise his concerns for review. I consider that these complimentary requirements will not only facilitate the operation of that review process and help address concerns Mr Wilde explained in his evidence and pursued in cross-examination of various of the witnesses, but will also be consistent with the object specified in s 3, as to Mr Wilde's rehabilitation.
While Mr Wilde objected to various of the proposed conditions as involving gross invasions of his privacy, the need to provide a schedule of his movements and electric monitoring for example, I accept Mr Ardasinski's view that these are necessary conditions, if Mr Wilde is to be effectively supervised, as the order intends he be.
I also consider that account should be taken of Mr Ardasinski's view that Mr Wilde had proven to be easier to manage, when he came off schedule and electric monitoring ceased and Dr Eagle's views about the imposition of less restrictive conditions. That has, in part, been reflected by the State no longer pressing some conditions.
I also consider that given the length of time that Mr Wilde has already been supervised and all of the expert evidence I have discussed, that the timing of the relaxation of the conditions of his supervision should be left to those actually supervising Mr Wilde. Accordingly, I have amended condition 6 to permit the possibility that electronic monitoring could cease, prior to the 12 months there specified.
Mr Ardasinski also expressed reservations about condition 14 being related to Mr Wilde's risk assessment and about condition 15, which led to amendment of the conditions the State pressed. I consider that the amendment I have made to condition 3, will address these concerns.
In relation to other conditions, the views reached by the Court of Appeal in Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 may not be overlooked. There it was concluded, amongst other things, that it may be appropriate to impose particular conditions envisaged by s 11, having regard to the scope, purpose, and objects of the Act, notwithstanding that past offences did not involve conduct of the type constrained by such conditions: at [54]. That in Mr Wilde's circumstances, conditions restricting his access to alcohol were an appropriate means of controlling a possible risk factor for reoffending: [62] -[68]. That in his case, the imposition of conditions restricting him from associating with outlaw motorcycle gangs was appropriate, given the Act's rehabilitative purpose and the link between reintegration into the community and reduced rates of recidivism: at [69] - [70]. Further, that supervision of Mr Wilde's computer devices was not in error, in his circumstances: at [71] - [75].
On the evidence led on this application, there is no basis upon which different conclusions can be reached as to any of those matters, notwithstanding Mr Ardasinski's view that there was no link between Mr Wilde's offending and alcohol. That is reflected in the conditions imposed. Finally, in the items listed in Condition 35, I have added "duct tape", given the concerns which both Campbell J and I have reached about that item.
[13]
Orders
For these reasons I order that:
1. Pursuant to s 5C and s 9(l)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) the defendant is subject to a high risk sex offender extended supervision order ("the extended supervision order") for a period of 2 years from the date of the order; and
2. Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, the defendant is directed, for the period of the extended supervision order, to comply with the following conditions:
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) until the end of the Order.
The defendant must report to the Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) or any other person supervising him as directed by the DSO.
The defendant must follow all reasonable directions given by his DSO or any other person supervising him, including in relation to approvals sought under the following conditions.
The defendant must attend the police station nearest to his approved accommodation within 3 days of the date of this order and provide a copy of this order.
Electronic Monitoring
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the DSO or any other person supervising him.
If the defendant is not charged with any offence of breaching the ESO, or with any other criminal offence, for a period of 12 continuous months from the date of the commencement of the ESO, the defendant will no longer be required to wear the electronic monitoring equipment and condition 5 will cease to apply, unless beforehand those supervising the defendant have determined that he should no longer be required to wear electronic monitoring equipment.
If electronic monitoring is removed because of condition 6 and the defendant is then charged with any offence of breaching the ESO, or with any other criminal offence, the DSO or any other person supervising the defendant may reapply condition 5.
Schedule of Movements
If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.
The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing.
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO.
The defendant must allow his DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not permit any female person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW.
The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner for Corrective Services.
The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or areas specified by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not attend any premises that he knows to be frequented by any person who he knows to be a member and/or associate of any Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, Organised Criminal Network, or Criminal Organisation (as declared under the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012).
The defendant must not hitchhike or pick up anyone who is hitchhiking.
Part D: Employment, finance and education
If the defendant is unemployed, the defendant must enter available employment if and as directed by the DSO or make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by the DSO.
The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must agree that, if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate to do so, the Departmental supervising officer may contact any supervisor, employer or prospective employer of the defendant, for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the defendant's employment activities or educational courses.
NOTE: The defendant accepts that if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate for the defendant to disclose to any prospective employer or supervisor information relating to the defendant's criminal history and / or that the defendant is subject to this order and the terms of the order, and the defendant refuses to make such a disclosure, then it is a basis upon which the employment or educational activity may not be approved.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not possess or consume any illicit drugs.
The defendant must not possess or consume any alcohol (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits), without prior approval of the Departmental supervising office.
The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental supervising officer or any officer of Corrective Services NSW who from time to time supervises the defendant.
Part F: Non-association
Non-associations generally
The defendant must not associate, contact or communicate with any persons specified by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, or attempt to contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, the victims of the sexual offences for which the defendant was sentenced on 18 November 1981, 1 March 1985 and 11 June 1993.
The defendant must not knowingly associate with any person convicted of a "serious sex offence" or an "offence of a sexual nature" as defined by the Act without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer and except in the course of living in an approved address, undertaking any educational programs, employment activities, maintenance, treatment or rehabilitation programs that have been approved by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not associate with any person he knows to be a member and/or associate of any Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, Organised Criminal Network, or Criminal Organisation (as declared under the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012), without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
Relationship
The defendant must notify the Departmental supervising officer as soon as possible of any relationship with another person ("the other person") involving sexual or intimate contact.
The defendant must allow the Departmental supervising officer to disclose the defendant's offence history and that the defendant is on this order (and details of the order) to the other person if the Departmental supervising officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the other person.
Club affiliations
The defendant must obtain written permission from the Departmental supervising officer prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.
Part G: Weapons
The defendant must not possess or use any firearm within the meaning of s. 4 of the Firearms Act 1996 or prohibited weapon as defined in s. 4 and Schedule 1 of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.
The defendant must not carry on his person, at any time he has left his residence, any knife, syringe or other cutting instrument or any rope, cord, cable ties, duct tape or other instrument of restraint.
Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet or which are in his possession. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This also includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed. The defendant must advise the DSO of any change to this inventory immediately.
The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.
The defendant must comply with any direction given by the Departmental Supervising Officer regarding access to the internet by the defendant on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer), including but not limited to:
a) the use of parental lock or other device or software that may restrict access to or permit access only to certain web sites;
b) the times and places that the defendant is permitted to access the internet;
c) accepting the presence of an appropriate person, being a person previously approved in writing by the Departmental supervising officer for the purpose of this condition;
d) restricting the use of the internet for specified purposes; and
e) the use of Skype or any Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) or other similar services without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with details of the type of any internet connection used, or intended to be used, by the defendant, including whether the connection is a wireless, broadband, ADSL or dial-up connection.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with details of any email addresses, internet user names, instant messaging user names, chat room user names or any other user name or identity used, or intended to be used, by the defendant through the internet.
The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.
Social networking services
The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any internet based social networking service, including web-based, e-mail, instant messaging services and on-line community services ("internet based social networking services"), without the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer.
In circumstances where the defendant is approved under condition 42 to access, join and/or connect to any internet based social networking service, the defendant must:
inform the Departmental Supervising Officer of any login identification name and password for any internet based social networking service the defendant joins and / or connects to; and
comply with the rules and conditions of that service.
Part I: Search and seizure
If the DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to f below) is necessary:
a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address;
b. to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or
c. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;
then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to, a:
d. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address;
e. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;
f. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or
g. search and examination of his person.
For the purposes of the above condition:
a. a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.
b. to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO.
NOTE:
"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.
"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.
During a search carried out pursuant to conditions 44 and 45 above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found in the defendant's approved address, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant, or on the defendant's person, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise:
the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address;
the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or
the defendant's compliance with this order;
or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.
The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 44 to 47 above.
Part J: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification and X18, or any other material as directed by the DSO.
Part K: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from "John Alan Wilde" or use any name other than John Alan Wilde without the prior approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "John Alan Wilde" or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 33 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.
The defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental supervising officer, change his or her appearance to the extent that the defendant cannot be easily recognised.
The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide the DSO with such details.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with information regarding any tattoos or permanent distinguishing marks that the defendant has (including details of any tattoo or mark that has been removed).
Part L: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any psychologist, psychiatrist or counselling service that he consults.
The defendant agrees to the persons referred to in condition 56 above sharing information, including reports on his progress and information he has told them, with each other, with his DSO, and with any other persons involved in his supervision.
The defendant must undergo any assessment as recommended by the persons referred to in condition 56 above, or by his DSO, or by any other person involved in his supervision to determine what is required for treatment in respect of the defendant's potential risk for reoffending.
If those persons referred to in condition 56 above or those persons who have assessed the defendant in accordance with condition 58 above consider it necessary or appropriate that the defendant attend psychological or psychiatric treatment or counselling to address his risk of reoffending, the defendant must attend that treatment, as directed by the DSO.
[14]
AMENDED SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
JOHN ALAN WILDE
Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO)
Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) until the end of the Order.
The defendant must report to the Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) or any other person supervising him as directed by the DSO.
The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO or any other person supervising him.
The defendant must attend the police station nearest to his approved accommodation within 3 days of the date of this order and provide a copy of this order.
Electronic Monitoring
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the DSO or any other person supervising him.
If the defendant is not charged with any offence of breaching the ESO, or with any other criminal offence, for a period of 12 continuous months from the date of the commencement of the ESO, the defendant will no longer be required to wear the electronic monitoring equipment and condition 5 will cease to apply.
If electronic monitoring is removed because of condition 6 and the defendant is then charged with any offence of breaching the ESO, or with any other criminal offence, the DSO or any other person supervising the defendant may reapply condition 5.
Schedule of Movements
If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.
The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing.
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO.
The defendant must allow his DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not permit any female person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW.
The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner for Corrective Services.
The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or areas specified by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not attend any premises that he knows to be frequented by any person who he knows to be a member and/or associate of any Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, Organised Criminal Network, or Criminal Organisation (as declared under the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012).
The defendant must not hitchhike or pick up anyone who is hitchhiking.
Part D: Employment, finance and education
If the defendant is unemployed, the defendant must enter available employment if and as directed by the DSO or make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by the DSO.
The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must agree that, if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate to do so, the Departmental supervising officer may contact any supervisor, employer or prospective employer of the defendant, for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the defendant's employment activities or educational courses.
NOTE: The defendant accepts that if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate for the defendant to disclose to any prospective employer or supervisor information relating to the defendant's criminal history and / or that the defendant is subject to this order and the terms of the order, and the defendant refuses to make such a disclosure, then it is a basis upon which the employment or educational activity may not be approved.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not possess or consume any illicit drugs.
The defendant must not possess or consume any alcohol (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits), without prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental supervising officer or any officer of Corrective Services NSW who from time to time supervises the defendant.
Part F: Non-association
Non-associations generally
The defendant must not associate, contact or communicate with any persons specified by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, or attempt to contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, the victims of the sexual offences for which the defendant was sentenced on 18 November 1981, 1 March 1985 and 11 June 1993.
The defendant must not knowingly associate with any person convicted of a "serious sex offence" or an "offence of a sexual nature" as defined by the Act without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer and except in the course of living in an approved address, undertaking any educational programs, employment activities, maintenance, treatment or rehabilitation programs that have been approved by the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must not associate with any person he knows to be a member and/or associate of any Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, Organised Criminal Network, or Criminal Organisation (as declared under the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012), without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
Relationship
The defendant must notify the Departmental supervising officer as soon as possible of any relationship with another person ("the other person") involving sexual or intimate contact.
The defendant must allow the Departmental supervising officer to disclose the defendant's offence history and that the defendant is on this order (and details of the order) to the other person if the Departmental supervising officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the other person.
Club affiliations
The defendant must obtain written permission from the Departmental supervising officer prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.
Part G: Weapons
The defendant must not possess or use any firearm within the meaning of s. 4 of the Firearms Act 1996 or prohibited weapon as defined in s. 4 and Schedule 1 of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.
The defendant must not carry on his person, at any time he has left his residence, any knife, syringe or other cutting instrument or any rope, cord, cable ties, or other instrument of restraint.
Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet or which are in his possession. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This also includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed. The defendant must advise the DSO of any change to this inventory immediately.
The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.
The defendant must comply with any direction given by the Departmental Supervising Officer regarding access to the internet by the defendant on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer), including but not limited to:
the use of parental lock or other device or software that may restrict access to or permit access only to certain web sites;
the times and places that the defendant is permitted to access the internet;
accepting the presence of an appropriate person, being a person previously approved in writing by the Departmental supervising officer for the purpose of this condition;
restricting the use of the internet for specified purposes; and
the use of Skype or any Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) or other similar services without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with details of the type of any internet connection used, or intended to be used, by the defendant, including whether the connection is a wireless, broadband, ADSL or dial-up connection.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with details of any email addresses, internet user names, instant messaging user names, chat room user names or any other user name or identity used, or intended to be used, by the defendant through the internet.
The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.
Social networking services
The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any internet based social networking service, including web-based, e-mail, instant messaging services and on-line community services ("internet based social networking services"), without the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer.
In circumstances where the defendant is approved under condition 42 to access, join and/or connect to any internet based social networking service, the defendant must:
inform the Departmental Supervising Officer of any login identification name and password for any internet based social networking service the defendant joins and / or connects to; and
comply with the rules and conditions of that service.
Part I: Search and seizure
If the DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub- paragraphs d to f below) is necessary:
for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address;
to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or
because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;
then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to, a:
search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address;
search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;
search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or
search and examination of his person.
For the purposes of the above condition:
a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.
to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO.
NOTE:
"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.
"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.
During a search carried out pursuant to conditions 44 and 45 above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found in the defendant's approved address, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant, or on the defendant's person, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise:
the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address;
the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or
the defendant's compliance with this order;
or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.
The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 44 to 47 above.
Part J: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification and X18, or any other material as directed by the DSO.
Part K: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from "John Alan Wilde" or use any name other than John Alan Wilde without the prior approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "John Alan Wilde" or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 33 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.
The defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental supervising officer, change his or her appearance to the extent that the defendant cannot be easily recognised.
The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide the DSO with such details.
The defendant must provide the Departmental supervising officer with information regarding any tattoos or permanent distinguishing marks that the defendant has (including details of any tattoo or mark that has been removed).
Part L: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any psychologist, psychiatrist or counselling service that he consults.
The defendant agrees to the persons referred to in condition 56 above sharing information, including reports on his progress and information he has told them, with each other, with his DSO, and with any other persons involved in his supervision.
The defendant must undergo any assessment as recommended by the persons referred to in condition 56 above, or by his DSO, or by any other person involved in his supervision to determine what is required for treatment in respect of the defendant's potential risk for reoffending.
If those persons referred to in condition 56 above or those persons who have assessed the defendant in accordance with condition 58 above consider it necessary or appropriate that the defendant attend psychological or psychiatric treatment or counselling to address his risk of reoffending, the defendant must attend that treatment, as directed by the DSO.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 03 November 2017
In January 2017 Mr Wilde had expressed an intention of looking at collecting knives and swords again, at the conclusion of the supervision order.
Dr Eagle considered that Mr Wilde's increasing age could be a protective factor, but a complicating factor was that it was difficult to know whether ongoing supervision, including by exclusion zones and electronic monitoring, has prevented him from reoffending, given that thereby his access to victims has been reduced and early intervention increased. Dr Eagle also noted that identified research had established that GPS monitoring may be effective in deterring high risk offenders from reoffending and encouraging their reintegration into society;
Dr Eagle also considered that regardless of the pending charge, Mr Wilde would have fallen into the highest risk of reoffending, but the facts giving rise to that charge could be interpreted as being part of a plan to prepare to offend again, developed within weeks of cessation of GPS monitoring and his supervision restrictions being lessened.
Dr Eagle also noted that while antilibinal medication might be of benefit to Mr Wilde, his position was that he would not under any circumstances accept such treatment, which he had taken in custody and felt had not been beneficial and led to adverse side effects.
Dr Eagle was extensively cross-examined by Mr Wilde. She confirmed that she had not concluded that he suffered a major mental illness. She made relevant concessions, especially in relation to proposed conditions of custody to which I will return, but she did not agree that the time since Mr Wilde had last committed sexual offences and his current age, reduced his risk below that which she had assessed him as posing. She confirmed that conclusions which she reached were similar to those reached by Ms Dewson. Dr Eagle also explained the reasons for reaching particular conclusions in relation to identified risk factors that Mr Wilde asked her about. She explained that the final conclusions reached depended on the presence or absence of factors relevant to the assessment of risk, by the tools which she and Ms Dewson had used.
Dr Eagle agreed that on his past pattern of offending, Mr Wilde's risk of reoffending would be high within a short time of restrictions imposed by the supervision order being removed. She observed that to date, they had not been removed for any significant degree, except for a period of five weeks. That Mr Wilde had not committed further offences while under supervision over the past eight years, she considered to be commendable, but that did not cause her to believe that in the future, he was unlikely to reoffend, regardless of whether or not he was on restrictions, because of his dynamic risk factors.
Further, while Dr Eagle agreed that Mr Wilde had demonstrated some self-awareness of his emotional state, she considered that he did not necessarily have good emotional control. Dr Eagle explained her conclusions about Mr Wilde's emotional stability by reference to distorted views which led him to blame external factors, other people and events for his predicament, rather than considering how he had contributed to his situation, by his behaviours, including by his violent ideation, his implicit and explicit threats against others and his failure to take responsibility for his own actions. Dr Eagle considered, however, that there had been improvement in recent years in Mr Wilde's compliance with his supervision conditions, although some problems with timetable and activities persisted.
Dr Eagle also agreed that the risk assessments she had conducted could not accurately determine whether Mr Wilde would offend again, if left unsupervised in the community, although there was evidence that electronic monitoring does deter offenders. Dr Eagle accepted that it was to Mr Wilde's credit that he had not reoffended, but she could not say that it was the restrictions imposed upon him which had resulted in him having lived in a more pro-social way in the community. Nor could she predict how successful he would be in managing his risks of reoffending, if he was left unsupervised in the community, noting his feeling that he was being persecuted and his inability to accept that the system applied equally to everybody, within a certain framework, which had been applied to him.
Ms Eagle also explained how her diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and narcissism was arrived at, including by reference to Mr Wild's history of failing to conform to social norms, legal restrictions and laws and his pervasive disregard for the rights of others, a diagnosis which he shared with many other offenders. She also referred to his inability to identify with others and what impact his conduct might have upon them. Dr Eagle accepted that Mr Wilde perceived that he had been treated unfairly during his supervision, but explained why she considered that his expectations of others were unreasonable, in the context of that supervision.
Dr Eagle did consider that in the last year of his supervision Mr Wilde had demonstrated some very positive signs, including in relation to increased compliance with his conditions and interaction with supervisory staff. When asked how he could achieve reductions in the risks he posed, she explained that would involve him reducing his dynamic risk factors, including by demonstrating an understanding of the problems which his offending history posed, improving his problem solving skills by reacting less negatively and taking responsibility for the results of his behaviour towards others.
Dr Eagle rejected Mr Wilde's suggestion that his dynamic risk factors had been reduced because he had not reoffended, despite being pushed by the State and charged with wrongful breaches, which he alleged had been technical in nature and brought about by those who had enforced the conditions of his supervision. She did not consider that the State could be held responsible for Mr Wilde's offending, but accepted that his perception of being provoked and antagonised might create a situation in which he would reoffend. That, she explained, was one of the reasons why risk assessments were undertaken. In his case, if he perceived that he had been antagonised, his risk of reoffending increased. Given his vulnerability, Dr Eagle considered it was positive that he had not reoffended, while subject to a very restrictive regime of supervision. She agreed with Mr Wilde, however, that if he did not care about the consequences of reoffending, strict supervision would not be an effective deterrent.
Ms Dewson reported that Mr Wilde had been difficult to interview, given his manner, and that despite repeated assurances that he was not being aggressive, he did appear at times to be hostile. He also expressed hostility towards police, CSNSW employees and people in authority generally, when he became agitated and animated.
Nevertheless, Ms Dewson found Mr Wilde to have been logical, even though not always coherent; orientated in time, person and place; without evidence of florid psychosis or thought disorder; and with an understanding of his legal circumstances; and without indication of any cognitive deficits.
Ms Dewson also referred in her report to Mr Wilde's criminal record, the circumstances of his past offending, his past clinical assessments by various psychiatrists and psychologists and the mental health issues he had been diagnosed to be suffering, including severe, entrenched and chronic antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic features and/or narcissistic personality disorder, at the upper end of severity. Ms Dewson also noted Mr Ardasinski's assessment in 2017, that he demonstrated a high number of psychopathic traits.
Ms Dewson noted that Mr Wilde's account of his sexual offending began after release from a Queensland prison, when his then girlfriend had rejected a sexual advance from another couple, who had later raped and beaten her almost to death, after which he went looking for revenge, he believing in "an eye for an eye". He said that he had mistakenly identified the victim he had raped and while he felt shame and guilt about this, if he had targeted the right person, he would not have regretted his behaviour.
Mr Wilde denied having committed the sexual offence he had been convicted of in 1983, although he accepted that his fingerprints had been found at one of the scenes. He did not consider this to have provided sufficient evidence and he claimed to have been abused by police for four days after his arrest. Mr Wilde also claimed that the 1993 offences had involved consensual sex, after the victim had made sexual advances to him, during which she had bitten him and he had smacked her in the mouth instinctively, in response to the pain.
Mr Wilde accounted for his poor relationship with police as being the result of having witnessed the murder of his 10 year old friend, in a drive by shooting. The victim had died in his arms and he had not been able to provide police with a witness account, due to his shock. They had initially thought that he had been complicit in the murder. At age 14 he had been thrown down stairs by police and had been extensively injured, which had left him in a coma for three days. He had also suffered a depressed skull and an enzyme imbalance in the brain.
Mr Wilde also gave an account of having been abused between the ages of 6 and 14 by his paternal grandparents, who lived with he and his father, after his parents separated. He denied having been financially disadvantaged or neglected and said that he was not exposed to alcohol or drugs. His father had tried to discipline him, but that had no impact on his behaviour. At age 14 he was stabbed by another kid.
Mr Wilde left school at 16, having participated in cadets from age 12, intending to enlist in the military, but came to appreciate that he despised discipline. He worked casually as a labourer and supplemented his income with government support. At 18 he was arrested and incarcerated and has since spent most of his adulthood in custody. His longest period of employment was for three to six months. He said he had refused to work in custody, perceiving the pay and conditions to be unjust. He lives on a disability support pension for chronic headaches and back pain, but aspires to work in wildlife conservation.
Mr Wilde said that his maternal great grandmother had been involved in witchcraft and he described himself as being an "eclectic witch", who was frustrated at being denied the ability to pursue his religious observance, because of his wrongful incarceration. He could not, however, provide a clear explanation of the concept of living by witchcraft principles.
Mr Wilde refused to participate in testing which Ms Dewson sought to administer on interview. On the basis of his history, she diagnosed him to have an anti-social personality disorder with narcissistic tendencies. He later completed a questionnaire for PTSD. Based on his responses, Ms Dewson considered that he met he the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, having reported experiencing trauma symptoms congruent with PTSD, but that they were only present at the subclinical level.
Ms Dewson observed:
"77 Supervision and Release Plans Throughout the interview, Mr Wilde provided copious information regarding his negative perception of supervision, specifically the ESO He described being "very dirty" about what he considers "wrongful conviction' that has resulted in him being incarcerated for breaches of his supervision order He became aggressive when talking about his perception of supervision and commented that 'the State has plenty to fear, but the community doesn't' He referred to the State as "maggots" and when questioned specifically, he identified his dislike for 'CSNSW politicians and police". If subject to further supervision order, Mr Wilde reported that he would "snap" and that he would become "extremely violent" because he would "not tolerate it". He perceives himself to be "existing but not living" and by being subject to future supervision, he is concerned that he will "lose everything" including his "girl, happiness and life". To reinforce his objections, Mr Wilde stated that he is "aware of what (he) is capable of, and that scares (him)". Although he did not provide any direct threat to any individual, he stated that he will "access arms (weapons) from the Military" and that when he is faced with police he will "likely get a bullet because (he) will be fully armed". He continued to say that he did not want to use violence, but that he felt he was being pushed in that direction by 'the State'."
Ms Dewson explained the limitations of risk assessment of sexual offenders. Using the former Static-99R risk category system, which has moderate accuracy in ranking offenders according to their relative risk of sexual recidivism, Mr Wilde received a score which placed him at a level well above average risk, with a score higher than 99.1% of sexual offending. The limitations and caution with which this assessment must be used was also explained. Ms Dewson explained that recidivism estimates provided are based on groups of individuals. Mr Wilde was assessed as having a recidivism rate of 35.1%, with a 30-40% margin for error. This means that out of 100 offenders with that score, between 30 and 40 will be charged with new sexual offending after five years in the community and 60 to 70 will not.
The dynamic risk assessment conducted used the RSVP protocol, which examines 22 items, not all of which are given equal weight and which allows for consideration of risk management issues. Mr Wilde was considered to be at risk of further forced sexual offending against adult females not known to him, at home and with use of a knife to subdue the victim. It was also noted that he had been known to reoffend rapidly upon release, when unsupervised.
Ms Dewson concluded that Mr Wilde's incapacity to take responsibility for his acts served as a deterrent to his ability to address his criminogenic needs and his threats at interview indicated his poor insight and lack of self-regulation. Ms Dewson concluded that he posed a high risk of further serious sexual offending and that his breaches of supervision were indicative of him engaging either in offence paralleling behaviour, or in his offence cycle, which would mean that it was fortunate that he had been detected before he had caused harm. She considered that recent allegations indicated that he had evolved his offence planning, by becoming more organised prior to offending.
While his supervision had not moderated his behaviour, it had permitted external management and early intervention when he engaged in risky behaviour.
Ms Dewson also concluded that there was a risk that further supervision could trigger the violent behaviour Mr Wilde had threatened, but a further supervision order was supported, because he continued to encounter barriers to contributing and functioning as a law abiding member of the community.
Ms Dewson noted the threats Mr Wilde made against the State, not her and that his risks might reduce with age and by him taking active steps to address his issues, but that there was no indication that he planned to implement any additional risk management strategies, which required ongoing and concerted effort on his part. While he had participated in therapeutic treatment, he appeared to have made little progress and whether he would benefit from further treatment was questionable, given his motivations.
Ms Dewson also considered that Mr Wilde's behavioural change could be motivated by periodic reassessment of the terms of his supervision and progressive withdrawal of restrictive conditions, if socially appropriate behaviour was pursued. If he continued to engage in problematic behaviour such as carrying weapons, threatening others and attempting to access the houses of strangers, however, he might require more than a further three years of supervision.
In cross-examination Ms Dewson explained that antisocial personality disorder stemmed from experiences in childhood, evidenced by conduct, although it was not diagnosed until adulthood. She explained it to involve rule violation behaviour, including violent sexual offending and personality traits which endured. Other factors were being deceptive, irresponsible, irritable and aggressive.
Ms Dewson also explained that being acquitted of particular offending did not necessarily result in a different outcome under the risk assessment tools she had used and explained why she considered that various conduct Mr Wilde had pursued while under supervision involved offence paralleling behaviour. She also explained that it was not until there had been seven years in total at liberty without offending, that risk would begin to decline, but that there was no way that offending by particular individuals could be predicted, by use of these tools.
Ms Dewson explained the risk she considered alcohol consumption posed, because of its disinhibiting effect on people. She explained the views she had reached as to Mr Wilde's problems with self-regulation, managing his emotions, insight into his behaviour and capacity to regulate himself, evidenced by threats which he had made about using violence in future. She explained that his excuses for using violence indicated poor coping, also evidenced by failures to comply with conditions of supervision orders.