State of New South Wales v Slater

The issues

1. The defendant does not dispute that an ESO should be made, implicitly accepting that the evidence proves, to the requisite high degree of probability, the condition set out in s 5B(d) of the Act that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision. The real issues tried before me were the duration of the order, and the conditions to be imposed.
2. Notwithstanding the attitude of the defendant, it is appropriate for me to explain why I am of the view that the defendant's concession was rightly made, given the very serious constraints on the liberty of the person, who has fully served the sentence imposed for serious offending, inherent in the operation of an ESO.

Applicable law

1. Notwithstanding the commencement of these proceedings on 10 November 2017, the Act as amended by the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Amendment Act 2017 (NSW) applies to my determination by dint of the transitional provision made by Clause 19(2) of Part 10 of Schedule 2 of the Act. This provision was enacted by the 2017 Amending Act, which commenced on 6 December 2017. That provision is in the following terms: "The amendments made by the Amending Act apply to and in respect of proceedings in relation to an application made under Part 2 or 3 of this Act but not determined before the commencement of the amendments." The application for the ESO is made under Division 1 of Part 2 of the Act, and my determination will be made under Division 2 of Part 2. The Act as amended applies.
2. The Court's power to determine the application for the ESO is conferred by s 9 of the Act. By s 9(2) (as amended) "in determining whether or not to make an ESO, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration" of the Court. It is important to bear this requirement firmly in mind, not only as a matter of principle, but also because emphasis was to some extent laid on considerations relevant to the rehabilitation of the defendant by Mr Carroll of Counsel who appeared for the defendant. While these considerations are not entirely irrelevant, s 9(2) gives effect to the primary object of the Act as expressed in s 3(1). The encouragement of rehabilitation is but "[a]nother", and I would read lesser, "object" of the Act. The enactment of s 9(2) gives operative statutory force to the prevailing interpretation arising out of the objects provision in s 3 afforded the Act before the commencement of the 2017 amendments: Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 ("Lynn"). Its enactment overcomes difficulties which may have arisen from the rule of construction that an objects provision cannot control the clear meaning of language used in operative provisions: Lynn at [54], Beazley P.
3. The mandatory considerations governing the exercise of the Court's power to make a determination are set out in s 9(3). I will return to these below.
4. The statutory conditions for making an ESO are set out in s 5B. In the case at hand there is no question that: the defendant is an offender who has served a sentence of imprisonment for a serious sex offence; he is a supervised offender in as much as when the summons was filed he was in custody serving a sentence for imprisonment for a serious sex offence, or alternatively when the application was heard he was under the existing interim supervision order (s 5I); and the application was made in accordance with s 5I. Nor is it seriously in dispute, as I have said, that the evidence ought to be taken as satisfying me to the requisite "high degree of probability that the [defendant] poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision" under an ESO: s 5B(d). The satisfaction of the standard of "a high degree of probability" does not require a determination that the risk of the defendant "committing a serious offence is more likely than not": s5D.

The nature of the defendant's serious offending

1. With respect, the offences, related offences taken into account, and the circumstances of the offending were admirably, comprehensively, but succinctly set out by Wilson J at [10] - [37] of her Honour's judgment. The evidence put before her Honour on this aspect of the case was identical to the evidence led before me. There was no dispute about the circumstances of the offending. The only matter in question is whether the defendant's assertion of a complete lack of recall of these circumstances should be accepted on the basis of an alcoholic blackout on each occasion, a question to which I will return. I gratefully adopt her Honour's statement of the circumstances of the offending which I set out below: "[10] The "serious sex offence" of which the defendant was convicted is an offence of aggravated sexual intercourse contrary to s 61J of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). [11] The defendant was convicted of that and a number of other serious sex and violence offences on 1 July 2004, by his Honour Judge Sides QC in the District Court at Campbelltown. The defendant had previously, on 26 September 2003, entered pleas of guilty to the following offences, including the index offence: Count 1: Attempt to choke with intent to commit an indictable offence, namely, sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 37(2) of the Crimes Act; Counts 2 and 3: Sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act; Count 4: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 61J of the Crimes Act; Count 5: Attempt to choke with intent to commit an indictable offence, namely, sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 37(2) of the Crimes Act; and Count 6: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 61J of the Crimes Act. This last count is the index offence. [12] His Honour sentenced the defendant to an overall term of imprisonment of 15 years and 6 months with an effective non-parole period ("NPP") of 11 years, which expired on 30 June 2013. The individual sentences were as follows: Count 1, and taking into account two offences of indecent assault contrary to s 61L of the Crimes Act: imprisonment for 8 years and 6 months, with a NPP of 6 years; Counts 2 and 3: concurrent terms of imprisonment for 8 years and 6 months, with a NPP of 3 years; Count 4: imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months, with a NPP of 4 years and 6 months; Count 5: imprisonment for 7 years, with a NPP of 3 years; Count 6: imprisonment for 8 years, with a NPP of 5 years and 6 months. [13] The sentence for count 6 commenced on 14 December 2009 and expires on 13 December 2017. The NPP expired on 13 June 2013, but the defendant was not granted parole. He continues to serve this sentence. [14] As the sentences imposed upon the defendant suggest, these were very serious offences. [15] Counts 1 to 4 all relate to offences committed against a 24 year old woman in April 2001. After a night out with friends in Sydney, the victim boarded a train at Central Station to travel to Ingleburn. The defendant approached her during the journey, and spoke to her for a time. She then fell asleep. [16] Shortly after the train left Macquarie Fields, the defendant woke the victim. They both got off the train when it drew into the platform at Ingleburn Station. Telling the victim he had to go back, the defendant stopped on the platform. The victim thanked him and continued walking. Closed circuit television footage recorded at the station showed that, after a short pause, the defendant followed the victim as she left the station and walked along Oxford Street. [17] The victim detoured briefly into a park, and then returned to the roadway. As she did the defendant took hold of her with an arm around her neck and dragged her back, away from the road. She was dragged into a public toilet block, where the defendant pushed her against a wall, holding her tightly by the throat. The victim tried to pull the defendant's arm away but was unable to do so. When he asked her if she was going to fight, she was unable to answer due to the pressure on her throat. [18] Taking the victim by the hair, the defendant forced her down to her knees and then, exposing his penis, told her "Put it in your mouth". This offence was the first of the two counts of indecent assault taken into account against count 1. [19] Instead of complying the victim punched the defendant in the groin. He then let go of her hair and again grabbed her by the throat, lifting her to her feet and holding her against the wall. He told her not to bother screaming as no-one would hear, and threatened her "I could snap your fucking neck". The defendant again asked the victim if she was going to fight, but his hold on her throat was such that she could neither speak nor breathe. This act was charged as count 1. [20] The victim was faint and, when the defendant released his hold on her throat, she collapsed to her hands and knees on the ground. The defendant, who was masturbating, demanded that the victim "suck it", and put his penis into her mouth. This act was reflected by count 2. [21] The defendant next pushed the victim over and removed her jeans and underpants. Directing her to get on her knees he had penile-vaginal intercourse with her from behind. This was count 3. [22] Removing his penis from the victim's vagina the defendant pushed it against her anus (this being the second incident of indecent assault taken into account on sentence against count 1). The victim immediately rolled away from the defendant, telling him no He pushed her down and again inserted his penis into her vagina (count 4). He held the victim by the throat during this assault, although not as tightly as previously. [23] The defendant withdrew his penis and dressed. The victim begged for her life, and the defendant left the toilet block. When he had gone the victim ran to a nearby Fire Station and sought help from firefighters stationed there. She was sobbing and distressed. [24] Having just returned from attending a fire incident, the firemen recalled having seen a man sprinting towards Ingleburn Railway Station. They went to the Station to look for the man but, being unable to see him, made inquiries of taxi drivers at a rank near the Station. A taxi driver was located who had taken a man, whom the driver had seen running from Oxford Street, in the direction of the Holsworthy Army Barracks. The man had asked to be dropped off near Holsworthy Railway Station. [25] The victim was taken to hospital where a Dr examined her. She was found to have several areas of bruising to her neck, with an area of broken skin and petechial bruising to the right side of her throat. There was bruising, swelling, and reddening all around the right side of the throat and thorax. Further areas of reddening were observed on the victim's buttocks. The lower left side of her hymen had been transected. Forensic swabs were taken on which semen was later detected. DNA was extracted from the semen, but no DNA match was found at that time. [26] Counts 5 and 6 relate to the defendant's assault upon another young woman on 17 November 2001. The victim, who was 18 years old, went out with friends on the evening of 16 November 2001, arriving at a nightclub in Sutherland in the early hours of the following morning. The defendant was also at the nightclub. [27] He struck up a conversation with the young woman, telling her that he was a soldier stationed at Holsworthy, and that he had served in East Timor. They shared drinks and the victim introduced the defendant to some of the friends she had attended the club with. The defendant and victim kissed a number of times. The defendant pushed his hand under the victim's skirt and inserted his fingers into her vagina, but she pushed his hand away. He asked her to come back to Holsworthy with him, but she refused. [28] When the club closed at 5am the victim and defendant left together. They went into the grounds of a nearby public building where they had consensual oral and vaginal sexual intercourse. When the defendant tried to push his fingers into the victim's anus, she pushed his hand away and told him "No, don't do this". When he next tried to push his penis into her anus the victim pushed his penis away and said "no". The defendant then took hold of the victim by the throat with both his hands and began to choke her, telling her "I want you to die slowly". He continued to squeeze her throat for more than a minute. She could not breathe. This act is reflected by count 5. [29] The defendant released his hold on the victim's throat, leaving her gasping for air and crying. He forced her onto her hands and knees and pushed his penis into her anus (count 6). When she said "it hurts", the defendant responded "No it doesn't, you like it". He then grasped her again by her throat and began to choke her, telling her "I just want you to pass out, just for a little bit". [30] With his penis still in the victim's anus, the defendant released his hold on her throat and took hold of her hair, pushing her head into a wall. He told her she was a "dirty little slut" and, when she did not agree with that, became even more aggressive. He then pushed her head repeatedly into the ground. [31] When the defendant finally withdrew his penis from her anus the victim asked him why he "was doing this". The defendant answered, "You don't know me, you don't know who I am". He told her she "like[d] being strangled" and, taking her clothing, walked away. [32] The victim rang her brother and told him she had been raped; she asked him to come and get her. She was crying. Police were contacted. [33] The victim was found crouched in a corner of a verandah dressed only in underwear. She was distressed and crying. She was able to tell the police that the defendant was to board a plane for Victoria that morning. [34] The victim was taken to hospital. On examination she was found to have bruising to her head, neck, an arm and knee. Both sides of her vulva were swollen and she had a "v" shaped fissure to the bottom of the anal margin, and deep purple bruising to the whole area. Forensic swabs were taken, and semen was recovered from a vaginal swab. [35] The defendant was arrested for the November 2001 offences in January 2002. He denied the crimes, claiming to have no memory of the nightclub or the victim. A buccal swab was obtained from him, and DNA extracted. That DNA was consistent with that recovered from the semen samples obtained from both the April 2001 offences, and the November 2001 offences. [36] The victim identified the defendant from a photographic lineup later in January 2002, and he was arrested on 8 February 2002. [37] On 14 June 2002 the defendant was arrested in relation to the offences of April 2001. When interviewed by police, the defendant denied having been responsible for the crimes, stating that he had been on overseas military service between April and November 2001. He could not explain the presence of DNA in semen recovered from the victim. The victim later identified the defendant from a photographic lineup." Notwithstanding the defendant's claims of total lack of recall, these facts were contained in an Agreed Statement of Fact for the purpose of sentencing by his Honour Judge Sides QC on 1 July 2004. The defendant has not himself questioned their accuracy.

The mandatory considerations - s 9(3) (h1) - the views of the sentencing judge

1. After a careful review of all the evidence, Judge Sides rejected the defendant's assertion of alcoholic amnesia. In coming to this conclusion his Honour fully reviewed the available lay evidence and expert psychiatric evidence. Dr Jennifer Thompson, psychiatrist, had expressed this opinion: "Memory loss is common in chronic alcoholics but [it] takes many years to develop in conjunction with vitamin deficiency due to alcohol replacing food as a diet. It is unlikely that a fit young man with a good diet would suffer from memory loss due to alcoholism. However, drinking alcohol to the extent of paralytic drunkenness may result in memory loss". It should be borne in mind that at the time of both sets of offences the defendant was aged 19 and 20 respectively. He was a soldier serving in the Australian army. It may be taken that he was fit and well-nourished with a good diet. Dr Olav Neilson, psychiatrist, said: "Mr Slater reported regular amnesic episodes after heavy drinking and reported consumption of amounts of alcohol at a level that is frequently associated with amnesic episodes. However, complete amnesia for such dramatic events is a little surprising and may be due in part to the shame associated with the charges both on himself as an individual, on his unit and on the service as a whole"(sic).
2. It was also apparent that the defendant had complete recall up until the time of the commencement of the offending and thereafter. Judge Sides did not regard the defendant's words, actions and conduct during each episode of offending, the details of which the defendant did not dispute, as consistent with him being "paralytic". His Honour found (ROS 20): "There is no evidence to establish that, at the time of either of the events, the subject of these charges, the offender was so affected by liquor to support his claim of amnesia of these events. I am satisfied on the evidence that whatever the level of his intoxication, if any, at the time of both incidents, he had an appreciation of what he was doing and that it was wrong".
3. Between 18 April 2001 and 2 November 2001, other than during a week's leave from 10 August to 17 August 2001, the defendant served with the Australian Defence Forces in their peace keeping role in East Timor. According to his own account, accepted for this purpose by the psychiatrists who assessed him, he was exposed to the trauma of active combat and other very traumatic events. Drs Thompson and Neilson accepted that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") due to this deployment. However, the learned sentencing judge was not persuaded that there was a link between the PTSD and the offending given that the PTSD wholly post-dated the 18 April offending. His Honour was prepared to accept that this condition made the defendant more pre-disposed to violence when affected by liquor and drugs. But he did not give it much weight.
4. The State submits the following matters are relevant for present purposes and I agree. His Honour found: 1. The April 2001 offences were premeditated (at least to a degree) and that choking the victim was done with the intent of inflicting maximum suffering and exercising power over her; 2. Both victims were vulnerable, first by intoxication and, secondly because they were alone with the defendant. The defendant's actions in throttling them and the words he spoke to them were intended to cause them to fear for their lives; 3. Although the November 2001 offending was a spontaneous response to the victim's rejection of the defendant's overtures for anal sex, requiring her to hit her own head on the wall and floor "was done to maximise her suffering and humiliation and thereby maximise his pleasure. It was a sadistic crime" ROS [31]; and 4. His Honour assessed the defendant variously in respect of individual counts as at the top, or close to the top, of the range for similar offending. Count 5 came close to the worst category.
5. Notwithstanding his Honour's rejection of the alcoholic amnesia argument, because of the defendant's youth and his, generally speaking, compliant, and good, behaviour in gaol his Honour accepted that with engagement with appropriate programs to address the criminogenic factors evident in the offending, the defendant had reasonable, perhaps good, prospects of rehabilitation. (ROS [26]).
6. It should be noted his Honour appeared to accept that there were relevant aspects of deprivation in the defendant's background including exposure to domestic violence and incidents of child sex abuse.
7. The actual sentences imposed are as follows:

April 2001 offences 1. Count 1 (taking into account offenses on the Form 1), a term of imprisonment of 8 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 6 years; 2. Counts 1 and 2, a term of imprisonment of 4 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 3 years; 3. Count 4, a term of imprisonment of 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

November 2001 offences 1. Count 5, a term of imprisonment of 7 years with a non-parole period of 3 years; 2. Count 6, a term of imprisonment of 8 years with a non-parole period of 3 and ½ years. His Honour structured the total effective sentence so as to incorporate a degree of concurrency and partial accumulation, as I have said, to produce a total term of 15 years and 6 months with a total effective non-parole period of 11 years.

Reports from psychiatrists appointed under s 7(4) - s 9(3)(b)

1. Pursuant to the orders made by Wilson J on 10 November 2017, Dr Richard Furst and Dr Jonathon Adams, both Consultant Forensic Psychiatrists were appointed to, separately, examine and report to the Court on the results of their examination.
2. Dr Furst examined the defendant on 18 December 2017 providing a report dated 15 February 2018. Like Judge Sides (and other assessors), Dr Furst, in his report, did not accept the defendant's claims of amnesia. In his evidence-in-chief (6.10T), Dr Furst explained that the defendant had been able to give a clear account of all events leading up to and after the sexual offending. He was sceptical about the "reported memory loss for what happened at the very moment of the actual offending". He considered that "almost everyone would remember such events". Dr Furst received no history of "true alcohol-related amnesia or blackouts". He considered the "reported amnesia" as "very convenient" but not reliable. This was relevant because it spoke to the defendant's level of contrition and remorse which was relevant to risk.
3. In cross-examination, Dr Furst accepted that the defendant had in fact recounted a history of suffering alcoholic blackouts in the period prior to his arrest to other examiners, especially Dr Nielson (10.50T). He accepted that if the history was accurate then notwithstanding the claimed amnesia it could be said he had accepted responsibility for his offending. That would be less "problematic … from a therapeutic perspective (than) if amnesia is coupled with a denial of responsibility for the offending behaviour" (11.20T). However, I was left with impression while acknowledging the existence of different histories, Dr Furst did not accept the claims of amnesia. He said: "… in terms of raping women and inflicting violence that's the kind of thing that most people would remember" (12.20T) Dr Furst was prepared to accept the possibility that the defendant "had amnesia for those events" (12.35T).
4. Dr Furst was also of the view that the offence characteristics raised "the very real possibility that (the defendant) meets criteria for the diagnosis of sexual sadism, a paraphilia characterised by ongoing sexual deviant interest in which an individual experiences sexual arousal in response to the extreme pain, suffering and humiliation of others" (Report page 13). In his own opinion, the defendant posed a moderate to high risk of committing a further serious sex offence and a moderate risk of committing a serious offence of a non-sexual nature. The main factors were social isolation, emotional dysregulation, intoxication, lack of adequate supervision and the possible re-emergence of sexual sadism. Dr Furst administered the STATIC-99R statistical model for assessing risk and recorded that the defendant scored 7 which put him in the High risk category. He also administered the Risk of Sexual Violence Protocol ("RSVP") involving the consideration of more dynamic variables assessing the defendant again at the Moderate/High risk of reoffending in a sexual manner.
5. Dr Furst was of the view that the appropriate duration of the order was 5 years. He did not accept in cross-examination that the defendant undertaking the CUBIT program in the last period of his long incarceration and applying himself to compliance with the conditions of the interim supervision order were such as to change his opinion about this matter. He said that the biggest risk factor actually relates to the defendant's offending in 2001 and "not about his behaviour in 2018" (17.45T).
6. I think it can be said, however, that Dr Furst notwithstanding the contents of his report questioned the appropriateness of some of the proposed conditions, at least from the therapeutic standpoint.
7. Dr Adams commenced his examination of the defendant on 24 January 2018, completing it on 5 February 2018. His report to the Court is dated 16 February 2018. The history he received was different from others. The defendant claimed to have had symptoms of PTSD arising from physical and sexual abuse as a child. As he did not give evidence it is difficult to assess this. In respect of the April 2001 offending he claimed to have had amnesia from the time he was drinking in a registered club. I interpolate this seems a curious history given what others observed of his behaviour on the train and his interactions with his victim on the train before they both alighted from it.
8. Dr Adams assessed the defendant by reference to the RSVP. He identified as pertinent the history of sexual violence giving rise to a risk factor in the future; psychological maladjustment resulting from childhood abuse; mental disorders including PTSD, and a substance abuse disorder (in remission); and like Dr Furst, the possibility of a diagnosis of paraphilia involving sexual sadism. Unlike Dr Furst, Dr Adams considered, generally, the defendant not to have problems in social relationships. Dr Adams was of the view that the possibility of sexual sadism needed to be addressed to manage the sexual violence risk factors. Monitoring will need to be ongoing because the risk of further serious offending is likely to fluctuate and his management plan will need to be adjusted accordingly. Management of the risk requires the appropriate plan and the positive engagement of the defendant with it. At the time of his assessment he regarded the conditions imposed with the interim supervision order as appropriate.
9. In his evidence-in-chief, Dr Adams, having averted to and identified the relevant risk factors, expressed the opinion, "It is certainly reasonable to suggest that (the defendant) will require assertive follow-up in the longer term" (9.15T). He put the longer term as "a number of years"; five years "would not be inappropriate". Dr Adams also said whereas the defendant's current close engagement with the program "is a positive prognostic indicator … his recent management needs will be far longer than that" (18.10T). He remained of the view that five years was appropriate. When asked in cross-examination about "a three-year supervision" and whether that "would encourage commitment to treatment in a quicker or more rapid pace", Dr Adams said, "No is the short answer" (18.45T). He explained that would send the wrong message to the defendant; and would in fact be misleading "because actually his risk management terms are very long-term" (19.5T).
10. When asked about the possibility of less restrictive conditions than those he is subject to under the ESO being appropriate (25.10T), Dr Adams offered the following opinion: "I think what would be necessary is that the concerning behaviour will be thoroughly assessed and appropriately managed with the least restrictive management plan possible. Having the possibility of re-implementing the electronic monitoring, if indeed it were a positive risk management strategy in the first place in Mr Slater's case, then yes having that as a possibility from my perspective would be a positive thing". When asked (by me) whether the least restrictive available regime is always the most appropriate from a public safety point of view (25.45T), Dr Adams said: "Not necessarily so, but certainly I would hope when your ‑ if we come back to the scenario of whatever problematic behaviour it is, my take on the least restrictive management would be both his risk management … and the needs of the community. And it's balancing the two, to come up with one management plan which addresses both. I certainly wouldn't see the two in isolation."

Other psychiatric assessments - s 9(3)(c)

1. I have had regard to the report of Dr Scott Clark, psychiatrist, who assessed the defendant for the State Parole Authority on 31 August 2015. Dr Clark's report mainly engaged with the defendant's reluctance to enter the CUBIT program in a timely way. Dr Clark thought his concerns "genuine" but considered, as I understand him, that this was clouded by the possibility that he may have wished to avoid participation for other purposes. I should say that I formed the impression from the material as a whole that the applicant's reluctance to engage in CUBIT was for no good reason, even though his recalcitrance cost him in terms of rendering him ineligible for parole. Too late he finally realised this, undertaking the course only during the last year of his sentence.
2. Dr Thompson in her report of 25 November 2013 did not express any opinion about the risk of recidivism but opined that the defendant required involvement in appropriate programs while in custody including seeing a psychologist. Neither did Dr Neilson, in his report of 17 November 2003, offer an opinion about the risk of recidivism. He did express the view that the defendant would benefit from involvement in a sex offender treatment program and alcohol and drug counselling.

The results of other assessments of risk of re-offending s 9(3)(d)

1. I have referred to the assessments of Drs Furst and Adams which they obtained by administering objective or statistical tests. The defendant was also assessed while in custody by Mr Samuel Ardasinkski, forensic psychologist, whose affidavit sworn on 13 February 2018 was read without objection. The affidavit annexes his risk assessment report of 5 April 2017. Mr Ardasinkski points out that it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict whether or not an individual offender will actually reoffend. However, the psychological literature provided a variety of actuarial tools for combining static (or historical) and dynamic risk factors to assess the risk of re-offending rather than providing any indication about whether a particular individual will actually re-offend. As the imposition of an order is not resisted, it is not necessary for me to detail the results of Mr Ardasinkski's application of the assessment tools. Suffice it to say that he administered the LSI-R, STATIC-99R, the STABLE-2007 and also the RSVP. His overall assessment was that the defendant fell into the High risk category of sexual offending relevant to other adult male sex offenders (Report page 22). Because of the defendant's recalcitrance in refusing entry to the CUBIT program 7 times during his incarceration, he was of the view that, as at the time of his assessment, the defendant's needs had not been adequately addressed. He proffered the view that if an ESO was to be made upon the defendant's release from custody he would require "strict monitoring, intensive supervision and case management".
2. In a supplementary risk assessment report of 19 July 2017 he corrected a scoring error in his STATIC-99R assessment arising out of a further interview with the defendant on 3 July 2017. Having reworked the actuarial tools he adhered to his previously expressed opinion that the defendant fell into the High risk category. He also expressed the view that the defendant's "repeated denial that he can recall the offences themselves" made him less amenable to treatment (Report page 6[15]). Mr Ardasinkski also reviewed the case notes from the Offender Integrated Management System ("OIMS") from 19 July 2017 to 13 February 2018. Nothing in the case notes led him to alter his opinion or conclusions, I interpolate notwithstanding the defendant's high degree of compliance with the conditions of his interim order so far.

Management of the defendant in the community - s 9(3)(d)(1)

1. I have had the benefit of affidavits from a number of officers of Corrective Services New South Wales including Ms Angela Ryback sworn on 9 February 2018, Ms Fiona Savage sworn 11 February 2018 and oral evidence from Ms Janelle Farroway who is the High Risk Offender Applications and Operational Governance Officer. Additionally there was a Risk Management Report of Ilona Koro, the unit leader of the Extended Supervision Order Team dated 17 April 2017 setting out inter alia a risk management plan. It is necessarily implicit in all of this evidence that the responsible officers of Corrective Services were of the view that the defendant can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community by a rigorous, but flexible suite of conditions such as those under which he currently operates. This same body of evidence describes that there are options available if the defendant is in the community, provided that he remains under supervision, that are capable of reducing the likelihood of the defendant reoffending over time (s 9 (3)(e1)).

The defendant's compliance - s 9(3)(e2) and (f)

1. As I have already emphasised, I am concerned about what I have described as the defendant's recalcitrance in relation to undertaking the CUBIT program to which he refused entry to on 7 occasions. On reviewing the whole of the evidence, I am not satisfied that any of his reasons for declining those opportunities were credible. Rather, they were simply excuses. This recalcitrance as I have already pointed out cost him any opportunity of release to parole after he first became eligible in 2013. The inference is clearly open, and I regard it as more likely than not, that he finally undertook the course at the very last opportunity in 2017 due to the realisation that he may have been subject to an application by the State for the imposition of a continuing detention order at the expiration of his term of imprisonment. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that his refusal to undertake the CUBIT program is related in part to his claims that he has no recollection of the offending. I am not satisfied that these claims are genuine, notwithstanding his apparent acceptance of responsibility for the offending. He may have accepted legal responsibility and its consequences, but it's far from clear that he has accepted personal responsibility.
2. Having made those criticisms, and with my reservation about his claimed lack of recall firmly in mind, I acknowledge that since the realisation of the necessity for him to engage in appropriate programs has dawned, he has applied himself diligently to compliance with the requirements, not only of the CUBIT program, but also with the interim supervision order while it has been in force. In relation to the latter, I have very carefully read the OIMS Case Notes attached to the affidavit of Paul Armstrong, the solicitor in the Crown Solicitor's Office with carriage of this matter, sworn on 13 February 2018. I have two firm impressions from a consideration of that contemporaneous record. The first is that the defendant has in fact been very diligent in compliance in all respects with the requirements of the order. He has shown creditable determination to re-integrate with the community in a pro-social manner. My second impression is that the stringent conditions imposed have been very flexibly applied by the corrective services officers responsible. This is consistent with the evidence given before me in affidavit and oral form. This second consideration has some significance for the determination of the issues surrounding the conditions to which the defendant should continue to be subject.

Criminal history s 9(3)(h)

1. As I have said, the defendant was only 19 and 20 respectively at the time of the commission of the offences. It is of some concern that there were allegations against him of sexual offending, not as serious as the offending with which I am concerned, in Victoria and South Australia around the same time. Neither of these allegations resulted in a prosecution; probably because of events here in New South Wales. For that reason, I will put the other allegations to one side.

Other available information s 9(3)(i)

1. It should be recorded that by and large, the defendant complied with the requirements of prison discipline. At the time of his release there had been no breaches of discipline for some years and he had risen to a position where he was a trusted inmate undertaking work in the printing shop which has equipped him for employment since his release. Of concern, however, is that from 2014 the defendant had a security alert placed on his custodial record to the effect that he was not to be left alone with female staff of any discipline. This seems to relate to complaints made about the defendant's behaviour by a Justice Health Nurse in 2004 and a female custodial officer in 2013, including of him making inappropriate sexualised remarks (Mr Ardasinkski Report page 18 [34]). In the case of the nurse he wrote to her, setting out his feelings towards her.
2. I have not addressed s 9(3)(g) as it is not applicable in the present case.

Assessment of risk

1. Having considered this material for myself, I am satisfied that the concession on behalf of the defendant is properly made. I am actually satisfied to the high degree of probability necessary that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence, and in particular a serious sex offence, if not kept under an ESO. I turn then to the remaining issues.

Duration of the order

1. The current interim supervision order expires on 12 March 2018 and the order I will pronounce will commence at its expiration. As I have indicated Mr Carroll of Counsel submitted on behalf of the defendant that an order of no more than 3 years duration should be made. Mr Hammond of Counsel for the State contended the appropriate duration was the maximum duration of 5 years provided for in s 10(1)(AA).
2. Mr Carroll reminded me that the question of duration is one for the evaluative judgment of the Court which should not be delegated to the court-appointed experts for their opinion. Of course, I accept this legal argument. He contended that a period of 3 years was more appropriate to provide encouragement to the defendant to continue to keenly comply with the order over a shorter timeframe. This would promote the therapeutic benefit of the continued supervision, promoting his rehabilitation, which in the end was the best way of promoting the protection of the community. There was a kind of "light at the end of the tunnel" aspect to the argument which is not entirely inappropriate.
3. Although Dr Adams, in particular, may be understood as promoting a balance between community protection and the therapeutic benefits of supervision, even he, with great respect, did not accept that a shorter period than 5 years was appropriate. Indeed, as the passage from his evidence I have quoted above makes clear, he was of the view that imposing a shorter order would be counterproductive from the therapeutic point of view because it would send a false message to the defendant that his time under supervision was likely to be short or at least medium term.
4. I can accept that on one basis rehabilitation is the best means of protecting the community, however, one cannot ignore either the bifurcation of statutory objects set out in s 3 or the recent re-emphasis of protection of the community by the enactment in the 2017 amending Act of s 9(2). The statutory requirement that the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration, in my view, while primarily governing the decision whether or not to make the order, must also influence the judgment about its necessary duration.
5. Given my reservations about whether the defendant has accepted personal responsibility of his offending, bound up as it is with my doubts about the genuineness of his claims of alcoholic amnesia, and having regard to the firm opinions of Drs Furst and Adams, I am satisfied that the order ought to be imposed for 5 years.

Appropriate conditions

1. Section 11 of the Act empowers the Court to "direct [the defendant] to comply with such conditions as [it] considers appropriate".
2. I am dealing with this question last because of the order in which issues were addressed before me by Counsel. I am conscious however that in Lynn, Basten JA at [129] - [130] and Gleeson JA at [149] regarded the consideration of what conditions may be appropriate as "an intermediate stage" before finally determining whether an ESO should be made.
3. I also bear in mind that the interest of the defendant in liberty and privacy are matters to be taken into account, not in the assessment of the "unacceptable risk" test, but at the intermediate stage of assessing conditions and at the final stage of exercising power. In this regard I have borne in mind that the defendant has served the whole of a relatively, especially by the standards of the time when it was imposed, stern total effective term of imprisonment. Even so my finding in relation to unacceptable risk and my reservations about the areas of concern I have identified persuade me that comprehensive and stringent conditions are appropriate, especially given the view I have formed that they are being, and will be, flexibly applied when good cause in that regard is shown.
4. The debate about conditions before me did not deny that they should be comprehensive; rather the detail of some was contested.

Electronic monitoring

1. The first area of dispute concerns proposed Condition 5 requiring the defendant to wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by his departmental supervising officer. Mr Carroll accepts there should be a period of electronic monitoring, but contends for a condition like that imposed by Bellew J in State of New South Wales v Weribone [2016] NSWSC 1747. Without setting it out verbatim, the substance of the order was to require its removal after a period of 18 months of good behaviour with a power to reimpose it if the defendant commits any breach of the conditions of the order or any criminal offence.
2. I am not persuaded the original condition should be changed. In coming to this conclusion I have had regard to the annexure to Ms Koro's report. It explains that there are four stages of the management plan relating to electronic monitoring "which vary with regard to the intensity of monitoring applied". The fourth stage involves the removal of the electronic monitoring. Progress is reviewed every two months and there is a review by a committee every quarter. It also should be borne in mind that electronic monitoring generally speaking works in concert with scheduling of activities and movements. By achievement of the second stage, the requirement for scheduling is reduced. By the third stage no scheduling is required, and if the defendant progresses to the fourth stage, no electronic monitoring is required. In my judgment this seems a beneficial approach and superior to the prescriptive approach contended for by the defendant. I will leave Condition 5 as it is.

Curfew

1. Condition 11 imposes a curfew between the hours of 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. The defendant submits that this is inappropriate. Mr Carroll points out there is considerable supervision of the defendant's movements in other conditions and the curfew may inhibit his employment. He currently resides at Malabar and works at Silverwater. From time to time he is required to come in early or finish late.
2. The curfew operates in conjunction with electronic monitoring and scheduling of movements, it is subject to the same four stages so that if the defendant achieves stage 3 (and 4) the curfew is dispensed with. It's also been the case from my consideration of the OIMS Case Notes that the curfew has been relaxed and indeed lifted on given occasions by the Department Supervising Officer ("DSO") at the request of the defendant when good reason is shown. Generally, I have of the view that the curfew is an important part of the Department's management plan and I would not remove it. However, there is no magic to the hours fixed. It should be borne in mind that the April 2001 offending occurred in broad daylight at about 7 a.m. on a Saturday morning albeit after the defendant had been out all night. Given his employment situation and in recognition of his strict compliance so far I would vary the hours of the curfew from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.
3. I acknowledge that Dr Furst was not impressed by the requirement of a curfew. He regarded it as akin to a "bail condition". So it may be, however, for reasons I have given I regard it as a legitimate measure in accordance with the Department's management plan.

Conditions 19 and 21

1. Condition 19 is currently proposed in the following term: "The defendant must make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by his DSO". Condition 21 is as follows: "The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by his DSO." Mr Carroll referred to the observations of Rothman J in State of New South Wales v Banks [2016] NSWSC 926 at [68 (d)]. His Honour's concerns there expressed related to questions about the power of government to force a person into compulsory labour, or civil conscription as it is sometimes put. With respect, these are legitimate concerns affecting proposed Condition 19, but not obviously Condition 21.
2. On the other hand, it's clear that the DSO has a role in encouraging the defendant to make good use of his time at liberty; this is, in my judgment, an important part of managing the risk of further offending posed by the defendant: "Idle hands are the devil's workshop" (Proverbs 16:27).
3. I acknowledge that even Mr Ardasinkski praised the defendant for his work ethic shown while in custody. In my review of the OIMS Case Notes shows that despite setbacks, the applicant has assiduously sought work since his release and has been successful, making use of the skills he acquired in the prison print shop. Bearing these things in mind, I would amend proposed Condition 19 to read as follows: "If the defendant is unemployed, he must make himself available for suitable employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by his DSO."
4. Turning to Condition 21, as I have said the defendant is in employment deriving income. He is also in receipt of a part Service Pension. Still, given his substance abuse disorder, albeit in remission, it may be if he relapses the DSO may legitimately need to enforce compliance with this condition as a check on activities. Without encouraging unnecessary applications, should enquiries into his financial affairs prove unduly frequent or intrusive, an application can be made for a variation.

Condition 24

1. The defendant objects to proposed Condition 24 which is now in the following terms: "The defendant must not knowingly enter any licenced premises without the prior approval of his DSO". Mr Carroll makes the point that liquor licences are prevalent. Many small cafes and the like are "licenced premises". I acknowledge the force of this submission. On the other hand, approval has already been provided to the defendant to attend licenced premises in accordance with his schedule of movements to share a meal with family or friends. Normally, at this early stage of the order, he is required to undergo alcohol testing when he returns to his accommodation. On each occasion he has returned a nil reading. I think there has been flexibility in the application of this condition and, I repeat, given his previous drug and alcohol substance abuse and bearing in mind the association of drugs and alcohol consumption with his past serious offending, I regard the condition as appropriate.

Condition 29

1. Condition 29 is proposed as follows: "The defendant must not knowingly associate with any people who are consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the approval of his DSO". The purpose of the condition is clearly to avoid putting the defendant in the path of temptation for the reasons I have already rehearsed. I am of the view that the word "knowingly" is important. If he chances upon persons drinking or under the influence of alcohol, say after work or in some other spontaneous social situation, doubtless he will need to withdraw from their company. I would not change this condition.

Condition 31

1. Condition 31 is now proposed to be in the following terms: "If the defendant starts an intimate relationship with someone, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history". The defendant says that "intimate" should be replaced with "sexual". In my opinion this condition is important having regard to his criminal history and the risk he presents in relation to future sexual offending. It needs to be borne in mind that the November 2001 offending commenced with consensual sexual intercourse.
2. Since his release under supervision the defendant has commenced a relationship with a woman who persevered with the relationship for a period of time, but finally found the conditions of the interim supervision order too intrusive. And this is entirely understandable. There were difficulties because not only did the defendant's DSO inform the woman of his past, but the police unit concerned with extended supervision orders did likewise. This duplication was doubtless unfortunate. It must be recognised that while he is under an ESO, and with his record, the defendant will face many challenges in forming a stable personal or domestic relationship. I am of the view that this condition is legitimate in terms of managing the risk that the defendant presents. However, I would amend it to read as follows: "If the defendant starts a close personal relationship with a woman, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history."

Condition 32

1. This condition is a non-association condition and it is proposed in the following terms: "The defendant must obtain written permission from the DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based special networking service."
2. It must be pointed out that permission has been given to the defendant to join a number of different organisations, mainly support groups for returned service personnel. Moreover, a request that he "join" Linked-In has not been processed. He hoped to join that social networking service to reassociate himself with old comrades from the army and perhaps for employment purposes. The requirement for written permission avoids any doubt about what is permitted or not permitted. Looking at the risk, it must be said that internet based social networking services are capable of introducing the defendant to bad influences which may exacerbate the risk of future serious sexual offending. But any request for written permission should be vetted and decided promptly. It would be unsatisfactory for the reasonableness of requests made by the defendant not to be processed quickly. I would hope that in the future such requests will be dealt with promptly and reasonably. However, I am of the view that the condition is appropriate. Mr Carroll argued given the monitoring of the defendant's internet access and use of electronic communications provided by Condition 33, Condition 32 is otiose. I do not agree.
3. Some other matters in dispute were resolved between counsel and need not be dealt with here.

Determination

1. I am satisfied for the reasons I have given that the defendant relevantly presents an unacceptable risk in the statutory sense. Having regard to the nature of that risk as disclosed in the evidence I have accepted, I am satisfied that it can be managed in the community under an ESO by the imposition of somewhat stringent conditions. I am satisfied that an ESO should be made for a period of 5 years.
2. My orders are: 1. Under s 5B of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 Luke Daniel Slater is subject to an Extended Supervision Order for a period of 5 years commencing today, 12 March 2018 and expiring on 11 March 2023; 2. Under s 11 of the said Act direct that Luke Daniel Slater comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to these orders for the duration of the Extended Supervision Order.

SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION Luke Daniel Slater Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations Monitoring and Reporting

1. The defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) until the end of the Order.
2. The defendant must report to the Department Supervising Officer (DSO) or any other person supervising him as directed by the DSO.
3. The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO or any other person supervising him.
4. The defendant must attend the police station nearest to his approved accommodation within 3 days of the date of this order and provide a copy of this order. Electronic Monitoring
5. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the DSO or any other person supervising him. Schedule of Movements
6. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
7. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.
8. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
9. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing.

Part B: Accommodation

1. The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO.
2. The defendant must be at his approved address between 10 pm and 5 am unless other arrangements are approved by his DSO.
3. The defendant must allow his DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
4. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of his DSO.
5. The defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

1. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW.
2. The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner.
3. The defendant must not go to a place if his DSO tells him he cannot go there.
4. The defendant must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment without the approval of his DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

1. If the defendant is unemployed, he must make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by his DSO.
2. The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.
3. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by his DSO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

1. The defendant must not possess or use alcohol or illegal drugs, and he must not possess or use prescription medication other than as prescribed without the prior approval of his DSO.
2. The defendant must submit to testing for drugs and alcohol as directed by his DSO.
3. The defendant must not knowingly enter any licensed premises without the prior approval of his DSO.
4. The defendant must not knowingly attend any place where alcohol or drugs are illegally sold.
5. The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as directed by his DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of his DSO.

Part F: Non-association Associations with Others (not children)

1. The defendant must not associate with people that his DSO tells him not to.
2. The defendant must not knowingly associate with any people who are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
3. The defendant must not knowingly associate with any people who are consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the approval of his DSO.
4. The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers without the approval of his DSO.
5. If the defendant starts a close personal relationship with a woman, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history.
6. The defendant must obtain written permission from the DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based social networking service.

Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

1. The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.
2. The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.
3. The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by his DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet.
4. The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.
5. The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant's possession and advise the DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.

Part H: Search and seizure

1. If the DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to f below) is necessary:
2. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address;
3. to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or
4. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;
5. then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to:
6. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address;
7. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;
8. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or
9. search and examination of his person.
10. For the purposes of the above condition:
11. a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.
12. to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO.
13. NOTE:
14. "Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.
15. "Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.
16. During a search carried out pursuant to this Schedule , the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise:
17. the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address;
18. the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or
19. the defendant's compliance with this order;
20. or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.
21. The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.
22. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions in this Schedule .

Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

1. The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, without the approval of his DSO.

Part J: Personal details and appearance

1. The defendant must not change his name from "Luke Slater" or use any other name without the approval of his DSO.
2. The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "Luke Slater" or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 33 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.
3. The defendant must not change his appearance without the approval of his DSO.
4. The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him.
5. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide the DSO with such details.

Part K: Medical intervention and treatment

1. The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults within 24 hours of the consultation.
2. The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support and treatment that his DSO tells him to attend.
3. The defendant must take all medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners.
4. If the defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, the defendant is to notify the DSO within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication.
5. The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with his DSO.
6. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, his DSO and CSNSW.

Amendments 12 March 2018 - Cover sheet - Cases cited - "Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] 91 NSWLR 636" amended to "Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636"; Paragraph 11 - penultimate sentence ("Lynn Case") amended to ("Lynn"); Paragraph 13 - second sentence "evidence lead before me" amended to "evidence led before me". 13 March 2018 - Paragraph 1 - the acronym "("ESO")" appears after the words "extended supervision order; Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 33, 41, 48, 63, 67 - the acronym "ESO" replaces "extended supervision order" Paragraph 9 - after the "Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Amendment Act 2017" "(NSW)" has been added. Paragrah 16 - the acronym ("PTSD") appears after the words "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder"; Paragraph 30 - "ISO" is replaced by "ESO"; Paragraph 33 - "Drs Furst and Adam" is replaced by "Drs Furst and Adams" Paragraph 33 - "Mr Samuel Ardasinski" is replaced by "Mr Samuel Ardasinkski" and thereafter where "Mr Ardasinski" appears it is replaced with "Mr Ardasinksi"; Paragraph 54 - the acronym "("DSO")" appears after "Department Supervising Officer"; Paragraph 57 - the acronym "DSO" replaces "Department Supervising Officer"; Paragraph 63 - first sentence the words "interim supervision order" replaces the acronym "ISO"; 13 March 2018 - Paragraph 9 - "amending Act" is replaced by "Amending Act". DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 13 March 2018