State of New South Wales v Skinner - [2022] NSWCA 9 - NSWCA 2021 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCA

State of New South Wales v Skinner

[2022] NSWCA 9

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2021-10-15|Before: Basten JA, Brereton JA, McCallum JA

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2021-10-15

Before

Basten JA, Brereton JA, McCallum JA

Catchwords

[1990] HCA 20 Sills v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 4 State of New South Wales v Briggs (2016) 95 NSWLR 467
[2016] NSWCA 344 State of New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486
[2007] HCA 20 Strategic Formwork Pty Ltd v Hitchen [2018] NSWCA 54 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[1990] HCA 20 Sills v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 4 State of New South Wales v Briggs (2016) 95 NSWLR 467[2016] NSWCA 344 State of New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486[2007] HCA 20 Strategic Formwork Pty Ltd v Hitchen [2018] NSWCA 54 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537

Judgment (24 paragraphs)

[1]

Solicitors: SMK Lawyers (Appellant/Cross-Respondent) Prominent Lawyers (Respondent/Cross-Appellant) File Number(s): 2021/83723 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court Jurisdiction: Civil Citation: [2021] NSWDC 49; [2021] NSWDC 115 Date of Decision: 5 March 2021; 9 April 2021 Before: Abadee DCJ File Number(s): 2017/90426

[2]

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

[3]

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] The respondent (the plaintiff at trial), Ms Kristen Skinner, was employed as a police officer in the New South Wales Police Force. She commenced training at the Goulburn Academy in October 1992. Her career in the Police Force was marked by several traumatic events. These included being in a vehicle that was approached by a man firing a rifle, three suicides, a fatal motor vehicle accident, and the discovery of a heavily decomposed body hanging from a tree. Ms Skinner also experienced personal and work-related problems including several interpersonal conflicts with fellow officers and supervisors between 2006 and 2008. In 2007, Ms Skinner's father died and two colleagues committed suicide. She received psychological and psychiatric counselling and assessment on several occasions from 1998. Some appointments were initiated by Ms Skinner; some by the Police Force. In 2006, Ms Skinner was placed on restricted duties due to a back injury. In October 2007, she expressed opposition to a proposal to transfer her from the role of station manager at Morisset Police Station to general duties at Toronto Police Station. In January 2008, she sought to join the mounted police and was assessed by a police psychologist, Ms Hanna. Ms Skinner did not disclose any difficulties that she had with a return to general duties, nor any symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In February 2010, Ms Skinner was discharged on medical grounds. At that time, she was suffering from a major depressive disorder and PTSD. In March 2017, Ms Skinner commenced proceedings in the District Court seeking work injury damages from the State for the negligence of the Police Force. Ms Skinner alleged that the Police Force owed her a duty of care and was negligent in failing to provide adequate supports for her psychiatric conditions. On 5 March 2021 Judge Abadee held that the Police Force breached its duty of care as Ms Skinner's employer by failing to conduct a thorough mental health assessment of Ms Skinner from May 2007. This breach caused Ms Skinner to suffer major depression, but not her PTSD. A 40% reduction was made for the contingency that her disability would have arisen in any event from non-tortious PTSD and a pre-existing disposition to depression and anxiety. A 10% reduction was also made for Ms Skinner's contributory negligence in failing to report her psychological condition to Ms Hanna. The trial judge awarded her damages of $743,780. The State appealed against the finding of liability. Ms Skinner cross-appealed against the findings that the breach did not cause her PTSD, and the reduction of damages for contingencies and for contributory negligence. The main issues before the Court were whether: (1) the Police Force breached its duty of care to Ms Skinner by failing to conduct a thorough mental health assessment after May 2007; (2) the risk of injury to Ms Skinner was reasonably foreseeable; (3) the breach of duty caused the major depressive disorder and/or PTSD; (4) the non-tortious psychiatric conditions were independent causes of harm and properly taken into account in reducing the damages by 40%; (5) Ms Skinner was contributorily negligent; and (6) Ms Skinner was entitled to recover pre-judgment interest on the damages. Held by Basten JA (Brereton and McCallum JJA agreeing) dismissing the appeal and allowing the cross-appeal in part: Issue 1 - breach of duty (1) The primary judge did not err in identifying the scope of the duty owed by the Police Force at a level of generality sufficient to cover the relevant harm, without relying upon hindsight: [70]. (2) By May 2007, Commander Clarke knew, or should have known, about Ms Skinner's depressive condition. The psychological assistance provided to Ms Skinner was inadequate and not appropriately directed to Ms Skinner's circumstances. Commander Clarke did not obtain any relevant reports about Ms Skinner's mental condition from the psychologist or the Employee Assistance Program counsellors who saw Ms Skinner. Further investigation should have been prompted by Ms Skinner's strong resistance to resuming general duties in 2007-2008: [73]-[75]. State of New South Wales v Briggs (2016) 95 NSWLR 467; [2016] NSWCA 344 applied. Issue 2 - reasonable foreseeability of injury (3) Foreseeability is determined objectively. While it depends on an assessment of particular circumstances, it does not require a finding that Commander Clarke actually foresaw, or should have foreseen, a risk of injury. Ms Skinner's history of traumatic incidents was sufficient to show that such events were mostly unavoidable when performing general duties and, at least in a person suffering from a depressive condition, will foreseeably cause further psychological harm: [78]-[79]. Issue 3 - causation of major depressive disorder and/or post-traumatic stress disorder (4) The judge did not err in finding that the events of May to October 2007 exacerbated Ms Skinner's pre-existing depressive condition. The Police Force failed to refer her for formal psychiatric assessment. It was probable that, had she been referred in 2007, she would have disclosed her depressive condition. The exacerbation of, or failure to ameliorate, an existing condition was sufficient to establish causation: [101], [103], [106]. (5) Nor was the judge in error in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that, had Ms Skinner been referred for psychiatric assessment in 2007, PTSD would have been diagnosed. There was limited contemporaneous evidence of her reactions to the traumatic events: [111]-[112]. (6) The evidence was insufficient to show that the mere prospect of a return to general duties materially exacerbated the symptoms of her PTSD: [117]. Issue 4 - non-tortious psychiatric conditions as independent causes of harm (7) Ms Skinner suffered both tortious and non-tortious harm. The calculation of damages required an evaluation of Ms Skinner's earning capacity that was caused by the Police Force's negligence. The trial judge appropriately reduced the damages for the possibility that she would have been disabled as a result of non-tortious exposure to traumatic events causing her PTSD: [124]-[126]. Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, applied; Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL); DC v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 198, referred to. Issue 5 - contributory negligence (8) Ms Skinner was not contributorily negligent in failing to mention her depressive condition to the police psychologist, Ms Hanna. Ms Hanna should have inquired whether Ms Skinner had symptoms of PTSD when Ms Skinner did not answer that question on a form. The award of damages should not have been reduced by 10%: [130]-[131]. Issue 6 - prejudgment interest under the Workers Compensation Act (9) An entitlement to prejudgment interest depended on whether the State's offer in mediation was unreasonable. That depended on what it knew and took into account at that time. There was no indication as to likely costs incurred by Ms Skinner at the date of the offer. The State was entitled to base its offer on particulars of negligence that were asserted, but not ultimately relied on, by Ms Skinner. The State was also entitled to have regard to the possibility that the case would not proceed at all since it was commenced out of time, and the likelihood of any liability being established: [134], [141], [146], [148], [152]. Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 151M, applied

[4]

Judgment

BASTEN JA: From 1993 until February 2010 the respondent, Kristen Skinner, was a member of the NSW Police Force. In February 2010 she was discharged on medical grounds. In March 2017 she commenced proceedings in the District Court, seeking work injury damages from the State as her employer. (It is convenient to refer to Ms Skinner as "the plaintiff".) There was no dispute that, by the time of her discharge, she was suffering from two psychiatric conditions, being a major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although proceedings were not commenced until March 2017, a notice of intention to make a claim had been given in April 2012. The application for an extension of time was not dealt with until the final hearing, which commenced on 8 February 2021. The trial judge, Abadee DCJ, granted the extension of time and gave reasons for that decision in the principal judgment. [1] There was no challenge to that order.
Following an eight day hearing in February 2021, the trial judge gave judgment with admirable expedition on 5 March 2021. The findings made in that judgment were as follows: [2] "(a) The Police Force' breach of duty in failing to conduct a thorough mental health assessment of the plaintiff from May 2007 and through and beyond October 2007 caused the plaintiff to suffer Major Depression; (b) The plaintiff has not established that the breaches of duty I have identified as against the Police Force caused her to suffer PTSD or worsen the severity of that condition; (c) The plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against the defendant, being vicariously liable for the conduct of personnel within the Police Force; (d) There should be a 40% reduction in damages on account of the contingencies; (e) There should be a 10% reduction for contributory negligence."
Final orders were dealt with in a further judgment delivered on 9 April 2021. [3] The claim, though not subject to the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), [4] being a claim for work injury damages, was limited to the heads of economic loss permitted by the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151G. The parties agreed that the various components of loss totalled some $1.9 million. The judge assessed, for reasons which will be addressed below, that there should be a 40% reduction for vicissitudes and a further 10% reduction for contributory negligence. From the balance so calculated, the claimant was required to repay workers compensation payments. The result was a judgment in her favour for $743,780.
Both the scope of the finding of liability and the reduction for vicissitudes required a disentangling of her psychiatric conditions. Thus, while it was accepted that both psychiatric conditions from which the plaintiff suffered were caused, or at least contributed to, by her employment, the judge concluded that only the major depressive disorder was caused by tortious conduct on the part of her employer, the State. [5] The disentangling of the two conditions resulted in a global assessment of damages, which was reduced by 40% by way of vicissitudes, that is, in effect assessing that proportion of her injury to the non-tortious PTSD, and a pre-existing disposition to depression and anxiety.
Two factors were left to be resolved, namely a claim for interest on the award of damages and the proper order as to costs. In Skinner (No 3) the judge rejected the claim for interest and determined that each party should bear her and its own costs of the proceedings.
Both parties appealed. The State appealed the finding of liability; Ms Skinner cross-appealed on the basis that (i) the State's breach of duty should have extended to a finding of causation that included the post-traumatic stress disorder; (ii) the finding of contributory negligence was erroneous; (iii) the reduction of the damages by 40% for contingencies was excessive, and (iv) there should have been an award of pre-judgment interest. There was no challenge to the failure to award costs, but she claimed her costs of the trial, on the basis that the cross-appeal would succeed on all or some of the grounds.

[5]

Nature of claims at trial

In the last 15 years, the principles governing the tortious liability of the Police Force for psychiatric injury suffered by officers in the course of their employment have been clarified. The principles were crystallised in two recent decisions of this Court, namely State of New South Wales v Briggs [6] (Briggs) and Sills v State of New South Wales [7] (Sills). As pithily summarised by the trial judge, there are two main categories of such cases: "[458] Briggs was a case where a police officer failed because of his failure to identify a system of work which was not, but allegedly should have been, in place. By contrast, the Court of Appeal's decision Sills, upon which the plaintiff relied, did not challenge the adequacy of the system of work itself, or argue that it was negligent not to have had a better system of work. It was the failure of the Police Force to properly implement … its system of work, in relation to its dealings with the officer, who was known to suffer from PTSD, which gave rise to the breach. In that case, the breach of duty was partly established by the Police Force's failure to act upon recommendations of the PMO [police medical officer] and a police psychologist, generally, relating to providing protective strategies and the appointment of a mentor to help and monitor the officer to deal with the stress. It was also partly established by its failure to respond to the knowledge that the officer had accumulated exposure to multiple incidents within a short period."
Clearly the two categories are not entirely independent of each other and do not cover the field. However, relevantly for present purposes, the plaintiff's case fell within the latter category illustrated by Sills. As the trial judge noted: "[460] The plaintiff centrally contends that it was negligent for the Police Force not to direct her into the care of treatment providers until after the PTSD condition was entrenched. This, it was said, was contrary to what was 'mandated' by the Commissioner of Police's Circular, 'Major Incidents Policy' and the NSW Ombudsman's report of 1999, which introduced the Critical Incident Management Guidelines. I note, however, that the Circular referred to by the plaintiff was not in evidence." Thus, the case was one involving a failure to implement a policy for dealing with traumatic stress. There was some degree of ambivalence as to whether the claim was limited to a failure by senior officers to act on evidence of stress of which they were aware, or whether, to some extent, it extended to circumstances of which they should have been aware.
The trial judge identified the content of the duty of care, which was said to have been breached in the following terms: "[448] In my view the duty of care required the Police Force to: (a) identify officers who, through the performance of their duties, were at risk of suffering, or were suffering, psychiatric or psychological harm; (b) take steps to ensure that any officer so identified received appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of his or her injury; (c) consult with appropriate persons in the workplace to identify hazards associated with the work environment and systems of work if and when the injured worker returned to duty, including the assessment of the risks of injury or further injury. [449] These matters were all accepted by the Police Force as comprising its duty of care in Sills v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 4 ('Sills') per Sackville AJA (Payne JA and Simpson AJA agreeing) at [9]. The defendant did not suggest any distinguishing factors in this case."
The trial judge dealt with the allegations of breach of duty according to the following headings: "[461] In his oral submissions, Counsel for the plaintiff identified the following breaches of duty: (a) 'targeting the plaintiff' in 2002. This was alleged to cause her depression and anxiety; (b) Commander Shearer's interfering with the plaintiff's move from the Waratah Command to the Lake Macquarie Command; (c) The failure to pass on the plaintiff's history and depression at the switch of command from Waratah to Lake Macquarie; (d) not allowing the plaintiff to continue as a station manager at Morisset because of budgetary reasons when there was a holding out that the plaintiff could continue in that capacity; (e) not following up the plaintiff after her EAP counselling session in May 2007; (f) putting the plaintiff 'back on the truck' in late 2007, after the suicides of two officers who were close to the plaintiff after 'disclosures' had been made about her psychological symptoms. These 'disclosures' were identified as having occurred: (i) in June 2005, at the point of the plaintiff's exposure to the fatality (Mr Garland) in the motor vehicle accident; (ii) on 15 October 2005, after the 'dead man Danny' incident; (iii) the plaintiff's taking sick leave in March 2007 and 22 March 2007; (iv) her expressed resistance to Commander Clarke's allusion to the prospect of her going back to general duties, after a Neighbourhood Watch meeting in May 2007. (v) not following up with the plaintiff after the EAP counselling session on 16 May 2007; (vi) the suicides of officers the plaintiff's reaction to the psychologist briefing after the suicides of colleagues in 2007; and (vii) notifications given by the plaintiff on 25 October [2007] and 5 February 2008."
The division into these categories was, as the judge explained, not entirely satisfactory. Paragraphs (a) and (b) identified intentional conduct of an administrative kind which may or may not have caused stress, but was not demonstrative of negligence.
Paragraph (c) related to a transfer from Morisset Police Station (under the Waratah Command) to Lake Macquarie. The plaintiff had been examined by the police medical officer in April, May, June and August 2002. The failure to pass on the reports of the medical examinations when the plaintiff was transferred to Lake Macquarie Command was found by the trial judge to involve negligence. [8] That in turn required an assessment of the incidents which had occurred prior to April 2003 which involved direct or vicarious trauma.
With respect to par (d), the judge rejected the plaintiff's contention that there was a breach of duty by her superior, Commander Clarke, in not assigning her to a foreshadowed role as station manager and directing her "back on the truck", that is performing operational duties on the street (general duties). Accepting that there were operational reasons for that change of plan, the plaintiff did not establish that the change constituted a breach of the duty of care owed to her. That finding was not challenged and in any event was, as the trial judge noted, of limited significance when compared with other events which took place shortly thereafter in 2007. That was because the decision to return her to general duties, though taken in May 2007, was not effected until October 2007. The manner of giving effect to the decision from May to October 2007 was critical to the plaintiff's case.
In these circumstances, it is convenient to consider the critical events in periods, being (i) prior to May 2003; (ii) 2005; (iii) April 2006 (when the plaintiff suffered a back injury) - January 2007, and (iv) 2007-2008.

[6]

First period - 1992 to May 2003

Before she had completed her training, the plaintiff spent time on duty at Newcastle Police Station. In October 1992, when she was 20 years old, the vehicle in which she was a passenger (and then unarmed) was approached by a man in Navy uniform, who fired a rifle in the air. She was concerned he would shoot at the police vehicle; he eventually turned the gun on himself. She was involved in dealing with the body with its shattered face.
When the plaintiff returned to the Goulburn Academy to continue her training, she started a silly joke with some friends which came to the attention of the Academy psychologist. The psychologist thought her odd behaviour was due to post-traumatic stress because she was having psychotic delusions after the Newcastle incident. The plaintiff was referred to a psychiatrist who apparently dismissed the suggestion that she was having psychotic delusions. There is no evidence as to what the psychiatrist considered in relation to possible PTSD. The psychologist at the Goulburn Academy apologised but the plaintiff described in her first statement the "witch hunt" she was put through at the Academy. The incident demonstrated the fine line between psychological support and intrusive interventions which may be resented and treated as evidence of victimisation.
In her first statement the plaintiff referred to completing her training and then moving to North Sydney for three months before being transferred to Mona Vale, Hornsby and then Mayfield.
The first statement (Ex A), although typed on solicitor's letterhead, was clearly prepared by the plaintiff without the assistance of a solicitor. It was 50 pages in length and was accompanied by 57 annexures. The evidence revealed that it may have been prepared in August 2019, although it was undated. A second statement (Ex B) prepared as an "evidentiary statement" was in fact dated 16 August 2019 and contained much of the material contained in the closely typed statement prepared by the plaintiff (Ex A).
Her second statement identified an event whilst at North Sydney Police Station, her first placement after leaving the Academy. She described attending on a 19-year-old girl who had committed suicide in a hotel by taking pills and wrapping a plastic bag around her head. Two years later (1995) she attended another suicide (by hanging) at Hornsby Heights when she was stationed at Hornsby Police Station. She also recounted attending a third suicide in Newcastle in the "mid to late 1990s". Although each of the events had occurred more than two decades earlier, the plaintiff was able to include harrowing details of the occasions, including dealing with members of the deceaseds' families.
In March 1998 the plaintiff was referred by her general practitioner to Dr F R Spruce for a psychiatric consultation. The history elicited at that time was one of anger and distress at the break-up of a personal relationship and difficulties in her relationship with her mother. She also informed Dr Spruce that her father had suffered from depression and erratic behaviour. Dr Spruce noted in his report of 2 March 1998: "Away from that at work there are no problems with discipline, no problems with attendance and no troubles in dealing with members of the public which one would expect if this was secondary to any more pervasive psychiatric disorder. Of course here again I am relying on her observations."
Dr Spruce prepared a second report in February 2003 at the request of solicitors in Newcastle apparently acting for the plaintiff in relation to a compensation claim. The further report repeated his findings of 1998.
The issue on which the plaintiff had apparently sought legal assistance related to stress caused by the handling of a complaint she had made about Sergeant and Acting Inspector Dave Matthews. She described in her statement Mr Matthews using sexually suggestive gestures and language towards another female police officer which the plaintiff had found offensive and highly inappropriate. Her reporting of the incidents to her immediate supervisor, Sergeant Neil Robertson, appears to have resulted in an investigation which continued until mid-2000.
A team involving two psychologists undertook an investigation which resulted in a "stress" assessment report. The dates on the report are confusing, but the report was probably prepared in February 2002, after a referral in January 2002. It described an incident on 26 August 2001 where, in the course of a shift, the plaintiff had been asked to do something she thought was a low priority task and had become extremely distressed. She had attended a doctor on 29 August 2001 and, according to the psychologists, had not returned to work by the date of their interview with her, apparently in February 2002. Under the heading "Brief medical history", the report, referring to the plaintiff's account, read: "She denied ever having had a serious illness or a serious accident or ever having been hospitalised. She also denied that she had taken time off work prior to this claim for emotional reasons nor had she applied for compensation prior to this claim. She stated that she had seen a psychiatrist on one occasion in 1997 as a result of a personal relationship breakup. She stated that her father had suffered depression between 1986 and 1988 and had not had a relapse since. Ms Skinner denied experiencing problems with stress prior to this claim and also denied having taken medication for depression, anxiety or disturbed sleep prior to this claim."
On 30 October 2001 Dr Murray Wright, consultant psychiatrist, reported to the referring general practitioner that the plaintiff presented to him "with symptoms of depression arising in the context of work-related stresses." Dr Wright reported: "Kristen's concern arises largely from her perception that she received no support having made the complaint against another officer and that she remains concerned about the management style and the lack of resolution of her issues. … I believe that Kristen has experienced a major depressive episode arising from work-related stresses, and that this illness is resolving as a result of antidepressant treatment and absence from work. The differential diagnosis is that of an adjustment disorder with depressed mood."
On 28 June 2002 Dr Wright signed a WorkCover medical certificate stating that she was fit for half-time full operational duties. On 24 June 2002 a police medical officer, Dr Chern, had assessed the plaintiff as fit for return to full duties. [9] However, Dr Chern recommended that she work for no longer than the 19 hours per week she was currently working, unless an extension were to be advised by Dr Wright, and that she work with another officer when carrying out operational duties. Dr Chern also noted the possibility of "psychological counselling via EAP" to assist her deal with her anger and depression.
The term "EAP" referred to an "Employee Assistance Program" through which counselling was available to members of NSW Police and immediate family. Although records showed that the plaintiff later engaged in EAP sessions in 2007 and 2008, the possibility raised by Dr Chern in 2002 appears not to have been pursued.
To summarise the state of the plaintiff's psychological health in May 2003, two points stand out. First, it was true that the plaintiff had, over a 10-year period, been involved in at least four traumatic incidents involving death and, on at least two occasions, had dealings with family members of the deceased in highly distressing circumstances. There was, however, no evidence that she had experienced distress or depression as a result of those events. She had reported none, although she had seen general practitioners, psychiatrists and psychologists in relation to other issues.
Secondly, there was no doubt that she had suffered disabling distress and depression which, in 2001-2002, had resulted in a lengthy period of sick leave. However, there was no evidence that, although the stress was employment related, it resulted from any breach of duty owed to her by superior officers in the NSW Police Force.

[7]

Second period - 2003-2005

The next step in the inquiry is to address the circumstances of the plaintiff's transfer to Lake Macquarie Command in the second quarter of 2003. The trial judge made the following findings in respect of the circumstances at the time the plaintiff was transferred to Lake Macquarie Command in April 2003: "[497] I now address the plaintiff's complaint ([461(c)]) about the failure to pass on the plaintiff's medical history to the commander at LAC Lake Macquarie before sending her out to front line duties. [498] I accept that the unexplained omission in passing on an officer's health history, including, in this case, suggested diagnosis of the anxiety and depression (the latter being treated by antidepressant medication) from August 2002, when the plaintiff move from Waratah to LAC Lake Macquarie suggests a failing somewhere within the organisation. I accept Commander Clarke's evidence to the effect that, as an LAC, at the handover from a predecessor, would wanted, if not expected, to have had that information. Although he did not give evidence, I have no reason to think that Commander Kenny (Commander Clarke's predecessor) would have thought differently. [499] I also note that on 28 August 2002, Dr Chern had recommended a review of the plaintiff in 6 months' time. That did not occur for reasons which were not explained. [500] These omissions meant that the Police Force was not able to discharge one of the incidents of the duty I referred to at [448(a)], namely identifying officers who may be at risk. Given the plaintiff's identified anxiety and depression from at least August 2002, the plaintiff fell into that category. I am willing to accept that these facts suggest a breach of duty prior to the plaintiff commencing front line duties in April 2003."
Curiously, in the period up to August 2002, as appears from a complaint made by the plaintiff on 25 August 2002, her concerns at that stage were that she had been cleared by her treating doctor to work "full duties but on restricted hours", which she said Commander Lee Shearer of the Waratah Local Area Command obstructed. She complained about a referral by Commander Shearer to the police medical officer seeking a further assessment.
It is clear that the plaintiff clashed with Commander Shearer, but there was no indication that there was inadequate medical assessment at that time. The resolution of the problem lay in a transfer of the plaintiff to the neighbouring area command, Lake Macquarie. The Commander at Lake Macquarie was Superintendent Michael Kenny. There was an exchange of emails between Shearer and Kenny seeking to organise a swap of officers. On 14 March 2003, Ms Shearer emailed Mr Kenny in the following terms: "At this stage I am not in a position to take [TB] or even prepared to consider it. Kristen Skinners issue was entirely different to you sending over a long term sick officer she was virtually on full duties. The Commander has changed at Lake Macquarie and it is my view that the rehabilitation of this officer rests, in the first instance, with Lake Macquarie. The problem with Kristen Skinner was with me and her ability to be managed in this Command having regard to her relationship with me. …"
It is reasonably clear from the exchange of emails and other communications within the regional command that senior officers at Lake Macquarie were aware of the fact that the plaintiff was undergoing rehabilitation, having been on sick leave and was working full duties, but subject to restrictions. It is possible that Lake Macquarie Command did not have her medical file, but the evidence as to what files were held (and where) was sparse and was not the subject of any particular finding by the trial judge. Further, it is unclear that there was any causal connection between this finding of breach of duty and the plaintiff's subsequent psychiatric conditions. In considering causation, the trial judge identified the relevant finding as that set out in [499] above, namely "omitting to review the plaintiff's capacity in April 2003". [10] The judge concluded that there was no causal connection in relation to that omission, [11] explaining: "[591] There are several difficulties with the argument for causation associated with the failure to have the plaintiff reviewed prior to her return to front line [duties] in April 2003. First, there is no proof that had a review taken place in February 2003, when Dr Chern said it should have occurred, or prior to her return to frontline [duties] in April 2003, that the plaintiff would not [have been] medically fit, physically or mentally, to engage in frontline duties from that point. Secondly, other than a clear difficulty that the plaintiff had working with Michelle McSweeney, there was nothing to objectively indicate trouble in the plaintiff being able to cope with frontline [duties], until, arguably June 2005, which I will come to below. For example, from late 2004 through early 2005, she appeared to be performing operational duties well. She received praise from Chief Inspector Rae and [Morisset] hospital staff in relation to separate incidents occurring in August 2004."

[8]

(a) the fatal motor vehicle accident (Garland)

The plaintiff encountered two traumatic events in 2005. In June 2005 she attended a motor vehicle accident with Senior Constable Richardson. She entered the vehicle from the passenger side and clambered into the wrecked vehicle to reach across to the driver. She stated that she tried to pull the driver upright and was "still trying to reposition him when the ambulance arrived." The ambulance officers placed a monitor on his chest and found no response. They were unable to revive him.
The officers were also required to locate the next of kin of the deceased (Peter Garland), who were the parents. In her statement, the plaintiff recounted in detail meeting the young man's mother and telling her about the accident. The officers stayed with the family for about two hours until the father arrived home. [12] The officer in charge of the station directed the plaintiff and Constable Richardson to prepare the death notices.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff performed admirably in difficult circumstances and received letters of appreciation from both the Commander at Lake Macquarie and the Commissioner, after the parents wrote a letter to the Commissioner commending the work of the officers. [13]
The trial judge found that there had been a breach of duty on the part of her senior officers (presumably Sergeant Sharman) in failing to activate a "critical incident team" in accordance with guidelines in a report prepared by the New South Wales Ombudsman in 1999. One circumstance in which such a step was required was where an officer had been exposed to "prolonged rescue work." [14] Accordingly, there was a breach of duty in failing to organise a "critical incident debriefing". [15] The judge found there was no breach of duty in Sergeant Sharman directing the plaintiff and Senior Constable Richardson to prepare and deliver death notices to family members of the deceased. [16]
Before turning to the consequences of the breach that was established, it is convenient to deal with a second event which occurred in October 2005 and was dealt with by the judge in combined findings with the motor vehicle accident.

[9]

(b) decomposing corpse (Danny)

In October 2005, bushwalkers had reported seeing a deceased person in Watagan Forest. The plaintiff and Constable Richardson discovered the body hanging from a tree and extensively decomposed. It was undoubtedly an horrific experience: the man's flesh was rotting and the plaintiff described "the stench" as "unbearable". She and Constable Richardson assisted the rescue squad in pulling the body down and removing his wallet. The body had to be placed in two bags given the extent of the decomposition. They recovered the car keys from his pocket and searched his nearby car.
Over the ensuing days the plaintiff spent some time cleaning the contents of the deceased's wallet so that his personal effects could be returned to the family. She was relieved of the duty of preparing the death statements and contacting the family face-to-face. She obtained no counselling to cope with the emotional stress and, although aware of the employee assistance program, was not encouraged to use it, and did not at that time.
The 1999 Ombudsman report specified that one of the mandatory circumstances in which debriefing should be offered to officers was after "exposure to gruesome sights". [17] The judge found that there was a breach of duty in not activating a critical incident team in the circumstances in October 2005. There remained, however, an issue as to the consequences of failure to provide any form of debriefing or counselling in June and October 2005.
It will be necessary in due course, in the context of the cross-appeal, to address the expert medical evidence and the manner in which the trial judge dealt with aspects of it. It is convenient at this stage to note the careful reasoning with respect to the failure to conduct debriefings in 2005. The essence of the judge's reasoning was as follows: "[593] Whether or not a critical incident debriefing was 'mandatory' or needed to be 'considered', the NSW Ombudsman's report indicated that the debriefing required the voluntary participation of the serving officer. For the debriefing to be effective, then, two (related) things were required: first, the consent of the officer to participate; and secondly, the preparedness of the officer to genuinely and honestly participate in the provision of relevant information. [594] Further, it is necessary to posit what consequences would likely flow from the debriefing. Questions would arise as to what treatment the plaintiff would require, whether the plaintiff would be assessed as fit to undertake further general duties, and if not, what steps the Police Force might take; before a comparison is made with the situation that actually occurred. [595] I find that it is more likely than not that had the debriefings been proposed for the plaintiff after each incident in 2005, the plaintiff would have consented to participate and she would have provided an honest account of her difficulties. … [596] I am, unable, however, to determine what difference it would have made if the plaintiff did receive a thoroughgoing psychological assessment in 2005. SC Richardson did not notice any ongoing behavioural concerns about the plaintiff in 2005. The chronologies of the parties do not indicate any significant event occurring in the plaintiff's service from October 2005 until April 2006, when the plaintiff sustained a back injury. As I noted earlier, in the period from 2004 to June 2005, the plaintiff appeared to be travelling well at work, at least in the performance of her duties, save for her dispute with Officer McSweeney. … [600] Accepting, as I do, that it was the exposure to a large range of incidents over a long career which contributed to the PTSD, in my view, the plaintiff has not proven that the negligence [of] the Police Force in its lack of response to the two incidents in June and October 2005, respectively, altered the risk of her suffering psychiatric illness, or alleviating the severity of that condition in 2005. I consider that the position is the same in relation to her condition of Major Depression. [601] However, the omission to conduct critical incident debriefings was procedurally significant and had consequences for causation findings on other breaches of duty that I have found, occurring in 2007. … [602] That being so, had the critical incident debriefings occurred, as I consider that they should have, there would (or should) have been a record for those health practitioners of the plaintiff having endured the incidents that she had in relation to the Garland MVA and 'dead man Danny', which would (or should) have been accessible for any health practitioner assessing her in 2007, and thereafter. Records of her exposure and, at least, some identified reaction to traumatic incidents would, in my view, have been relevant evidence for a health practitioner considering her mental health in 2007."
There was no challenge to any part of that reasoning, either by the State or by the plaintiff in her cross-appeal. It is, in any event, persuasive.

[11]

Fourth period - May-December 2007

The plaintiff had a history of conflict with fellow officers and supervisors. The trial judge set out parts of that history for the period from 2006 to 2008. [20] The judge noted that between "22 May and 6 June 2007 the plaintiff was again on sick leave due to what was described as 'situational stress'": at [198]. On 16 May 2007 she consulted an EAP counsellor, who completed a "client call record" as follows: "Kristen is currently on a workplace rehabilitation program, having injured her back last year. She has been relieving office manager at [Morisset] Police Station for the past three months and was informed last week that the position would be rotated. Reported acute anxiety and stress with underlying depression (for which she is currently receiving treatment with anti-depressants). Provided CBT [cognitive behavioural therapy] & solution focused counselling strategies (eg requesting job performance appraisal in current position, lodging a formal complaint re workplace bullying, harassment by a colleague in relation to a past ICAC investigation). Requested follow-up face to face counselling appointment. Please call today."
On 28 June 2007 an officer in the plaintiff's team at Morisset, Sergeant Ian Muir, committed suicide by hanging himself at home. Some two months later, another colleague and a friend, Leading Senior Constable Scott Gray, committed suicide. It is clear from the emotional tone of her written evidence that the plaintiff was not only greatly distressed by the death of a colleague and friend, but was also deeply concerned at what she considered was the failure of the police force to identify officers who were at risk. During 2007, the plaintiff spoke to an EAP counsellor on three occasions, namely 16 May (noted above), 21 August and 4 October 2007.
In September 2007 the plaintiff was treated for a broken finger, an injury which had occurred outside her work environment, whilst riding a horse. She also spoke to a psychologist, Dr Ross Leembruggen, on 5 October 2007. She saw the psychologist in early September 2007 and again in October 2007. She said that she was "extremely upset and angry in both meetings." The aftermath of one meeting resulted in the plaintiff being uncontrollably distressed and an exchange with the sergeant at Morisset as to whether she needed to complete her shift. She advised the duty officer that she was "a mess and didn't want to hang around in tears at Toronto anymore because it brought up too many emotions. Scott [Gray] and Ian Muir were from Toronto Station when they committed suicide."
On 15 October 2007 the plaintiff was advised that Commander Alan Clarke was proposing to transfer her from station manager at Morisset to general duties at Toronto. Commander Clarke responded the following day seeking to arrange a time to speak with her.
On 16 October 2007 she referred Commander Clarke to the fact that her doctor had placed her on restricted duties for a further month due to the injury to her finger. (The finger required surgical correction.) She also sought a statement of reasons for her transfer to Toronto. Commander Clarke responded with an explanation for the decision on Monday 22 October 2007 and asked to see her on the following morning.
After speaking with Commander Clarke, and apparently being dissatisfied with the outcome of the conference, the plaintiff completed an "accident/incident notification" identifying "anxiety/depression due to work-related issues including the suicide of two work colleagues and other matters", with the date being given as "prior to 25/10/2007". She then went on leave.

[13]

Evidence of breach of duty

In discussing the systems of work operating in the Police Force between 2000 and 2008, following the release of the report by the New South Wales Ombudsman, "Officers Under Stress" in June 1999, the trial judge outlined the lay evidence and the expert psychiatric and psychological evidence in some detail. The evidence covered both the circumstances of the plaintiff and the facilities available, and those which should have been available, in the Police Force. It is not necessary to repeat the careful summary given by the trial judge of the evidence. However, two qualifications should be noted.
First, the judge stated that the joint expert report of the psychiatrists did not address the systems of work in place at the time of the plaintiff's service. [26] However, when the experts gave concurrent evidence the questioning was directed to "the adequacy of the Police Force's response to certain events, on the basis of limited assumptions said to be borne out by the facts." As the judge rightly understood, the relevance of that evidence turned upon whether the factual findings supported the assumptions. [27] In addition to noting that the assumptions were "narrowly framed" by the plaintiff, the judge noted some general issues: "[444] The first of those is the danger of hindsight bias. There was a danger that these experts were being asked, in retrospect, including information they possessed at the trial but which was not in possession of decision-makers at the time, to evaluate conduct when the test for breach is prospective. The second tendency was that the technique was apt to elicit what the experts, from their psychological or psychiatric perspectives, would have wanted to have happened. But the test for negligence is what was, or were, the reasonable response, or responses, in the position of the plaintiff's supervisors or commanders in the light of an assessment of risk. As authorities in this area (which I refer to below) indicate, issues of breach have to take into account the exigencies of a police officer's service in an inherently hazardous workplace where responsibilities and statutory obligations are owed to the community in general. A third tendency, associated with the second, is that the question on breach is not whether something else that was not done could have been done which might have produced a different outcome, but whether the failure to take that step was unreasonable. To take an example. A prominent theme throughout Professor McFarlane's written and testimonial evidence was to emphasise that in his experience associated with the Australian Defence Force, and possibly other organisations, formalised steps were taken to ensure that certain members receive mandated monitoring for their mental welfare at discrete intervals. He believed those steps would also be appropriate for the New South Wales Police Force. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether that policy is desirable, and there is no question about Professor McFarlane's suitability to express [that] view, but a question, not seriously addressed in the evidence or submissions, is whether any omission to institute such policy at an organisational level was unreasonable. Plainly that would involve cost and also have other implications for the distribution of resources. But if it was not unreasonable at an organisational level, it would be easy for a proponent of such policy, like Professor McFarlane, to consider that at a unit level, or even more narrowly, in the case of an individual supervisor, the policy should have been implemented. However, the issue remains the same, even at the lower level: the question is whether the failure to take a suggested step was unreasonable."
It will be appropriate to turn shortly to the findings of breach accepted by the trial judge. At this stage it is convenient to note the evidence of the two experts preferred by the trial judge. In terms of general factors, the judge noted that the psychiatrists giving evidence concurrently often deferred to the views of Professor McFarlane, whose experience and expertise were undoubted. [28] Secondly, the judge noted that in relation to the individual circumstances of the plaintiff, Professor McFarlane gave weight to the views of her treating psychiatrists, Dr Murray and, to a lesser extent, Dr Spruce. [29] However, Dr Murray, whilst having on average three consultations a month with the plaintiff from September 2012 until December 2015 (being the date of his report), was first consulted on 10 September 2012, that is some four years after the plaintiff effectively ceased working as an officer. There were in evidence earlier medical reports, more nearly contemporaneous with the events which caused the illnesses.
In February 2002 the plaintiff's general practitioner at the time, Dr Lawrence Moses, saw the plaintiff, diagnosed "depression and anxiety" and prescribed an antidepressant, Cipramil. [30] Dr Moses referred the plaintiff to Dr Wright, consultant psychiatrist. The source of the plaintiff's problems at that time was identified as internal dissension at the workplace and an internal affairs investigation into her complaint against another officer. In a report dated 30 October 2001 Dr Wright noted: "There is no past history of any psychiatric illness although she saw a psychiatrist on one occasion after a relationship breakup in 1997. There is no sustained history of alcohol or drug problems although there was a period when she drank excessively. There was no past history of any significant medical problems." His diagnosis has been set out at [24] above. He recommended that she remain on Cipramil but might benefit from "further psychotherapeutic treatment with a cognitive-behavioural type strategy."
Dr Wright saw the plaintiff again in January 2002. The plaintiff indicated that her depressive illness had improved but Dr Wright thought that she "remained unfit for work" and sought to review her progress in February. [31] There was no further report from Dr Wright.
Dr Spruce first saw the plaintiff on 24 February 1998, and then some 10 years later in 2008, on three occasions in May 2008 and again in June, July, October and November 2008. For the purposes of preparing a report, he saw her again in July, August and September 2009. Noting that her first appointment related to her relationship with her then boyfriend, Dr Spruce stated that when she returned in May 2008 "she presented with depressive symptoms that she attributed to difficulties she had experienced at work over the previous decade." [32] She gave a history of moving to Morisset in 2003, where her co-workers were "generally suspicious of her, and then she had a series of confrontations with another constable after Ms Skinner had criticised her performance." The confrontations (with Constable Michelle McSweeney) came to a head not long before she went off work and attended Dr Spruce. She recounted other difficulties, including hurting her back, attendance at a fatal accident and dealing with a decomposing corpse. She also reported the suicide of a fellow officer in 2007. Dr Spruce stated: "From the history provided to me, Ms Skinner has presented with Major Depression predominantly as a result of her inability to resolve conflict with her Employer and a number of fellow workers in a situation in which she found herself ostracised, isolated and mistreated. This appears to have begun on 1998 and continued on throughout the last decade in various settings. She was treated with Efexor antidepressant, and with that, her depression improved to the point that she returned to work, but nothing had changed at work and her ability to continue to function at work once again deteriorated. Nowadays any return to that situation appears to provoke a powerful emotional response and associated physical and emotional dysfunction."
Of the earlier incidents, Dr Spruce identified the consequences in terms of inter-personal isolation. After referring to the fatal accident, and the decomposing corpse, Dr Spruce stated: "She said that following those incidents there was a suicide of a fellow Officer in 2007 and since the fatal [sic], she had become heavily involved in Occupational Health and Safety issue with the Police and tried to raise the issues of two suicides of Police Officers from the Toronto Office, but her passion in those matters had further ostracised her."
The evidence contained written reports from Dr Spruce to the plaintiff's general practitioner, Dr Graham Benney, of 2 March 1998, 9 May 2008, 23 May 2008, 30 May 2008, 13 June 2008 and 25 September 2009.

[14]

Grounds 1 and 2 - Duty and breach

The State accepted that the judge correctly formulated the duty of care owed by the Police Force, as an employer of the plaintiff, in the following passage: "[448] In my view the duty of care required the Police Force to: (a) identify officers who, through the performance of their duties, were at risk of suffering, or were suffering, psychiatric or psychological harm; (b) take steps to ensure that any officer so identified received appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of his or her injury; (c) consult with appropriate persons in the workplace to identify hazards associated with the work environment and systems of work if and when the injured worker returned to duty, including the assessment of the risks of injury or further injury."
However, the State submitted that the judge fell into error in applying those principles. The error was succinctly stated in ground 1 as finding breach in the State's "failure to conduct a thorough mental health assessment [of the plaintiff] from May 2007 and beyond October 2007". The error was said to lie in the following part of the judge's reasoning: "[524] In my opinion, once a subordinate non-commissioned officer informs her Commanding officer that she has 'had enough' of psychological injuries and has manifested resistance to returning general duties, Commander Clarke was on notice that holding out the prospect of her performing general duties to her was likely to give rise to the high risk in her of causing psychological injury. The plaintiff's highly sensitive reaction - bordering on insubordination - was, objectively, a clear indication that she was not mentally well, which required further assessment. [525] The reasonable response of a commander in Commander Clarke's position, to the circumstances that he knew or (if there was a functioning system in place for the dissemination of relevant information to Command) should have known, was to take steps to reasonably satisfy himself that the plaintiff was mentally fit to return to operational duties. This was the reasonable response that should have been taken both in response to the plaintiff's reaction, in May 2007, to the prospect of returning to frontline duties, and continued up to the execution of the decision, from mid-October 2007. [526] Only in this way could the Police Force discharge one incident of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, which was identified in [448(a)] above. This state of 'reasonable' satisfaction required him to arrange for a full diagnostic assessment of her within the Police Medical Office. The Commander had the power to do so. In this regard, by May 2007, it was not enough, in my view, for there to be a generalised assessment of mental fitness, in the sense of a capacity to serve on the frontline. By this point, Command had or should have had a corpus of records indicating concerns about the plaintiff's history suggestive of mental problems. It needed to get to the bottom of the underlying cause(s). …"
In one sense, the impugned reasoning was no more than an application of the general principles to which no objection was taken. The function of the court in a case where the challenge is not to the adequacy of systems used by the employer, but their engagement in a particular case is not to focus on broad principles, but rather to determine whether a duty of care, according to a standard of reasonableness, has been satisfied. However, it is not clear that this was an application case, rather than an adequacy of systems case. The two possibilities remain open on the reasoning set out above. Thus, at [524] there appears to be a finding that the plaintiff's response to the prospect of returning to general duties should have been sufficient to trigger the requirement for a full mental health assessment. By contrast, at [525] the judge left open the possibility that the real problem was the lack of a "functioning system" for the dissemination of medical information within the Police Force. The latter approach is consistent with the statement, at [526], that the breach was to be found in a failure to identify officers at risk of suffering, or suffering, psychological harm (as described in [448(a)]). Nevertheless, there was an absence of evidence as to the record-keeping systems of the Police Force and no detailed consideration of what records were available to the Local Area Commander.
Nor was there any express finding as to what Commander Clarke in fact knew. He was unable to recall the detail of conversations he had had with the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave evidence as to what she had said to him on occasion, including in the following circumstances, as noted in the judgment: "[203] On 22 May 2007, the plaintiff said that she unexpectedly received a call from Commander Clarke. She recalled him inquiring why she was off sick and reminding him that she was struggling and of her concern that whilst she was using the station manager's position to get herself back together, she thought that he was trying to take it off her and put her 'back on the street'. She recalled Commander Clarke indicating that she was taking too much leave and that this was impacting upon her ability to perform her role. She recalled that part of the exchange involved her mentioning to him the difficult situation within her family (both her father and sister being diagnosed with cancer within weeks of one another) and what she perceived was his unsympathetic response. [204] She took sick leave from 22 May 2007 to 6 June 2007. The plaintiff indicated that she took umbrage at Commander Clarke's requirement for her to provide medical certificates to support her taking sick leave."
The family problems may well have continued. When the plaintiff saw Dr Spruce on 28 May 2008, she reported that her sister had attempted suicide two weeks earlier. [33] Her father had died in January 2007. [34]
Whether Commander Clarke ought to have inferred from her resistance to going back to general duties that she feared suffering further traumatic assaults might be open to question. Her motivation may well have been to retain the position of station manager in which she was then acting and which she hoped would become permanent. Further, the finding that her reaction was "highly insensitive" and "bordering on insubordination" may have been consistent with her history of aggravating personal relationships within the Police Force. A full account of the evidence reveals that she clashed at some stage with many of her superior officers. If her reaction was "a clear indication that she was not mentally well", it did not follow that she was not capable of performing general duties without a high risk of psychological injury.
On the other hand, it may have been sufficient that Commander Clarke "knew that the respondent was suffering psychiatric or psychological harm", whatever the cause, the assumption being that such a person would then be at risk of suffering an exacerbation of the condition in the performance of general police duties.
The State submitted that the trial judge had failed to address the scope and content of the duty owed to the plaintiff in accordance with the principles articulated by Leeming JA in State of New South Wales v Briggs. [35] Subject to two qualifications, Leeming JA accepted that the duty of care owed by the State to police officers was equivalent to that owed by an employer to employees. The first qualification was that the State was in effect a deemed employer and vicariously liable for tortious conduct by police officers; the second was that the equivalence arose where the duty was framed at a high level of generality. [36] Leeming JA continued: "[45] It is necessary to identify the scope or content of the duty in any particular case, and obviously that will turn on the relationship between the parties. The scope or content of the duty of care in this particular case must be moulded having regard to statutes which apply peculiarly to the NSW Police Force."
The State's complaint was that the duty must be expressed in terms which are apt to apply across the NSW Police Force as a whole. [37] That conclusion, however, referred to a claim that there should have been a different and specific system of work implemented and maintained, across the NSW Police Force as a whole. That was not this case. In this case the system was not challenged; rather the question was whether it should have been engaged, but was not. As noted above, there was no direct challenge to the statement of the duty identified by the trial judge at [448]. That duty was expressed in terms which were relevant to the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but expressed at a level of generality sufficient to cover the relevant harm, without relying upon hindsight. That aspect of the challenge raised by ground 1 of the appeal should be rejected.
More specifically, the appellant's challenge to the findings as to breach of duty relied on four factual propositions, namely: 1. Commander Clarke wished to return the plaintiff to full operational duties as soon as possible; 2. the assessment of officers with health issues was undertaken by the police medical officer and assessed by the HR Committee within the Command; 3. Commander Clarke oversaw the system and implemented the findings of a medical assessment; 4. the communication between Commander Clarke and the plaintiff as to her return to general duties was an informal conversation and not a direction.
In addition to the chronology of events set out above, the State relied upon a medical assessment undertaken by Ms Diane Hanna, a psychologist in the Police Medical Office. The assessment was described as "rigorous" and resulted in the plaintiff being certified fit to resume full-time general duties.
These submissions did not adequately engage with the proposition that Commander Clarke knew, or should have known, of the plaintiff's fragile mental condition. It is true that, since April 2006, her sick leave and restricted duties were largely a function of her back injury. It is also true that aspects of her mental fragility were a function of personal difficulties, including her relationship with her boyfriend and the dual diagnoses of cancer of her sister and father, and her father's death in February 2007. However, the question was not whether her depressive condition was due to workplace issues, but rather the fact that she had a depressive condition.
Further, although it was true that Commander Clarke and those under him appreciated the need for psychological help when two officers committed suicide within a short period, it was also true that the assistance provided was not directed specifically to the plaintiff's circumstances. That did not matter if the assistance was appropriate and sufficient; the problem was that whatever assistance the plaintiff obtained either from seeing a psychologist, or from using the EAP counsellors, both of which she did, no report as to her mental condition was obtained by Commander Clarke.
While the issue is finely balanced, I am not persuaded that the trial judge erred in finding a breach of duty on a limited basis. It was true that the plaintiff was not, from 2005-2008, directed to be assessed by a police medical officer. Despite an attempt to join the mounted police in early 2008, she was resistant to resuming general duties. It was right to conclude that this resistance required investigation in her own interests.

[15]

Ground 2 - foreseeable injury

The State challenged the finding of the judge at [524], [38] that the plaintiff telling her commanding officer that she had "had enough" of psychological injury and was resisting returning to general duties should have put Commander Clarke on notice of a high risk of psychological harm. The State challenged that finding on four grounds: [39] "(a) there was no evidence called to demonstrate that mere knowledge of the prospect of a resumption of general duties was capable of causing injury; (b) such a proposition was never put to Commander Clarke; (c) the Trial Judge's characterisation of the 'Plaintiff's highly sensitive reaction - bordering on insubordination' as objective evidence that she was mentally unwell was not consistent with the evidence relating to the meeting in May 2007 or interactions after that date. On the contrary, signs of insubordination were consistent with the [plaintiff's] normal interactions with her superiors; (d) furthermore, caution needs to be exercised when making observations of a person's physical reactions when considering the issue of psychological injury."
In response, the plaintiff submitted that the trial judge had correctly identified the correct legal principle by reference to the following passage in the reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ in State of New South Wales v Fahy: [40] "[60] There can be no doubt that performing the duties of a police officer can often be very psychologically stressful. That is the inevitable consequence of the kinds of work police officers are required to perform. That a police officer may suffer psychiatric injury as a result of performing that work is, therefore, readily foreseeable. The risk of such injury is not far-fetched or fanciful; the risk of injury may not even be remote (if 'remote' is understood as meaning extremely unlikely to occur)."
It does not follow that all officers are always at risk of suffering psychiatric harm. However, the plaintiff's history of traumatic incidents is sufficient to demonstrate that such events are largely unavoidable when performing general duties and, at least in a person suffering from a depressive condition, will render further psychological harm readily foreseeable for an officer carrying out such duties.
Further, the test of foreseeability is an objective test which, whilst it will turn upon an assessment of particular circumstances, did not require a finding that Commander Clarke actually foresaw such a risk, or should have done so. Nor did the assessment of risk properly require a finding as to the interactions between the plaintiff and Commander Clarke.
Ground 2 of the appeal should be rejected.

[16]

Ground 3 - Harm and causation

Having determined that a "full assessment" of her mental health was required, the judge further found that, pending such an assessment, the plaintiff should have been told "from May and up to October 2007, that no transfer to [general duties] would occur unless and until she received full assessment." [41] How the assessment would be undertaken and what might be reported was critical to determining the extent of any harm which was suffered as a result of a failure to refer the plaintiff for assessment at that stage and, to the extent that her condition thereafter deteriorated, the causal connection between that factor and the harm suffered.
After referring to the need to advise her there would be no transfer until the assessment occurred, the judge continued: [42] "Once it fell within the purview of the PMO, in my opinion there should have been at least a diagnostic assessment by an internal psychologist or, preferably, the plaintiff should have been encouraged to obtain a referral from her general practitioner to a psychiatrist, for such assessment."
The identification of two possible courses required resolution. The judge was conscious of this fact and continued: [43] "As to which of these routes should have been taken, the plaintiff should have been consulted about her opportunity to have an external specialist perform such assessment; rather than simply present an internal psychologist within the Police Force itself. This is not to cast any aspersion upon the competence or care of the internal psychologist, but reflects the circumstance that the plaintiff's previous history with the PMO was, from her perspective, unsatisfactory; given the inputs of colleagues and supervisors which, again from her point of view, were unbalanced and fed in her a mistrust of the process."
As noted above at [46], the plaintiff consulted an EAP counsellor on 16 May 2007, there being a note of the consultation. As the trial judge noted, the record was available to illuminate her condition at the time and how it may have been exacerbated by subsequent events throughout 2007. [44]
Whilst not critical of the service provided by the EAP facility, the trial judge observed that it did not serve the purpose of informing the Commander as to the psychological state of the plaintiff. [45] The communications were intended to be, and were, kept confidential. The counsellors were private psychological consultants, contracted to provide services to police officers in distress.
As noted above, in June and September two officers from the Toronto Station committed suicide, one of whom was a friend of the plaintiff. The judge noted that those events carried a high risk of aggravating the plaintiff's pre-existing psychological condition. [46] That was no doubt so, but the events did not constitute breaches of duty in themselves. The question was, rather, whether further steps were required to be taken by the Commander in the light of those events. The judge was somewhat dismissive of the steps taken, stating: "[538] Some effort was made by Commander Clarke, by arranging for the psychologist Leemburgen to be accessible on a weekly basis. This occurred in October 2007, and the plaintiff availed herself of this particular facility. Further, the Commander arranged a Black Dog Institute presentation, which occurred on 31 October 2007, at which, apparently, psychologists were present. [539] Were these responses by command, individually, or collectively, a reasonable response to the risk that the plaintiff who was, or who should have been, identified as being at risk of psychological harm? In my view, on balance, they were not. The evidence from SC Richardson indicated that such psychological assistance as was rendered from October 2007 appeared to be generic, without being tailored to the personal needs or circumstances of officers. SC Richardson alluded to officers lining up in a queue or queues. The Police Force did not adduce evidence of what topic, or topics, were covered in any psychological consultation in which the plaintiff participated in or about 5 October 2007 to dispel such inference, despite tendering the plaintiff's psychological file (Exhibit 7). There was no reference, in particular, to any follow up session to monitor the plaintiff's psychological progress. It is also unclear what, if any, input the psychologist, Mr Leemburgen, supplied to command about the plaintiff's fitness to return to general duties. As it happens, the plaintiff was observed to be in significant distress after her psychological consultation on 5 October 2007. One inference that might be drawn was that this might have signified that the consultation was cathartic for her. The inference which I draw is that the plaintiff left the consultation with a psychologist whom she had not met before and who, apparently, had a queue of other officers waiting to attend him, and that the experience was unsatisfactory for the plaintiff."
The evidential basis for the last conclusion is not apparent. It tended to elide the evidence of Senior Constable Richardson that the assistance rendered was "generic" and that there were queues lining up to see the psychologists, with an absence of any similar evidence as to the situation which the plaintiff encountered. She did not give evidence that the distress she suffered as a result of the consultation on 5 October resulted from it being generic in kind.
In considering the question of causation, the judge accepted that, had the plaintiff been referred for a psychiatric assessment, she would have consented and the assessment would have disclosed that she was suffering depression. [47] The steps in the reasoning were as follows: "[606] If that diagnosis was made, then the plaintiff was not fit to continue general duties and the apprehension and dread felt by her from May through October 2007, which only exacerbated that depression, would have been avoided and, in that way, would have alleviated her symptoms. Further, until medical or psychological assessment was made to the contrary, she continued to remain unfit for general duties. [607] This was likely to present a choice for the Command at LAC - Lake Macquarie. If Command was unable to accommodate an officer who could not perform general duties, then, in my opinion, which was accepted by Professor McFarlane, the duty of care of the police force was to see to it that the plaintiff received the treatment she needed and discharged for medical reasons. I understood Commander Clarke gave evidence to the same effect. [608] This did not occur. Instead, although she did not actually serve in the capacity as a general duties officer, the prospect of her doing so hung over the plaintiff's head and in my view caused psychological injury from May 2007 and was exacerbated with the events in 2007 which I have described: the suicides and the difficulties with colleagues in October 2007, including Sgt Boyd, until 25 October 2007, when the plaintiff submitted a psychological injury report due to work-related stress. She was experiencing frustration with what she regarded as a lack of support for her advocacy in OH&S committees. Thereafter in November, she received further unwelcome exposure to Ms McSweeney, with whom she had previously had a bad workplace history and, throughout late 2008, she had her dispute [with] Superintendent Rae."
The judge concluded: "[617] In my opinion, Commander Clarke's omission to reasonably satisfy himself about the plaintiff's mental capacity to return to frontline duties before deciding to transfer her to Toronto by arranging proper assessment, did lead to a worse outcome in exacerbating her depression. The plaintiff was left in a vulnerable state, unable to manage or cope with the prospect of a return to general duties and unable to cope with tensions in the workplace that eventually boiled over in her dealings with Sgt Boyd. She was also unable to cope with the advice that she would be moved to Toronto, to be put on general duties contrary to her expectation, facilitated by the Police Force (late in 2006 or early 2007), that she would remain on station duties, in [Morisset]. It caused stress to her to face the prospect, again, of dealing with officer McSweeney. Eventually, also, she was unable to cope with the distress occasioned (inadvertently) when Superintendent Rae threatened to revoke her special sick leave in 2008. Her responses to all of these events were, in my opinion, consistent with an officer with deep-seated depression and that, if properly investigated, before the decision to transfer her in October 2007, the added distress would have been avoided. [618] The negligence, more probably than not, did alter the risk of the plaintiff suffering from major depression. In this sense factual causation to contribution to Major Depressive Disorder is established."
The trial judge did not, however, find that the omission to have the plaintiff psychiatrically assessed in 2007 materially contributed to her PTSD, stating: "[619] In contrast, however, I am not persuaded that if a thorough (diagnostic) assessment of her mental health had been undertaken in 2007, it altered the risk of the plaintiff suffering Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or the chronicity or severity of that particular disorder. There were no further traumatic incidents of the kind identified in Dr Murray's report (Exhibit T, p 25) to which the negligent failure to perform a thorough psychological assessment left the plaintiff exposed, after 2007. She had been insulated from frontline duties since ANZAC Day 2006."
The plaintiff's cross-appeal challenged the last finding and will be addressed below.
The fact that the plaintiff had not (with a few immaterial exceptions) undertaken general duties since April 2006 meant that the contribution of the negligence to her depressive condition was founded entirely upon the prospect of being returned to general duties. That is not to say she was not exposed to further trauma in 2007: the suicide deaths of two colleagues in three months were undoubtedly distressing. However, as the State submitted, Commander Clarke organised for the attendance of a psychologist at the police station and the event with the Black Dog Institute.
The judge's finding as to causation commenced with the following reasoning: "[581] In light of the consensus amongst the experts, there is no serious doubt, and I find, that the plaintiff's exposure to the series of traumatic events in the course of her duties as a general duties officer contributed to her suffering from PTSD and a Major Depressive Disorder. However, conduct which contributes to psychological injury, or the risk of injury, although necessary, is not sufficient proof of causation. The plaintiff needs to establish the link between the negligent conduct and the psychological injury. [582] To reiterate, and in paraphrase, the breaches of duty against the Police Force that I have identified are: (a) omitting to review the plaintiff's capacity in April 2003; (b) omitting to conduct debriefings after the plaintiff's exposure to the traumatic incidents in June and October 2005, respectively; (c) Commander Clarke failing to satisfy himself, through direction that the plaintiff undertake a thorough assessment, that the plaintiff was mentally fit to return to operational duties from May 2007 until the decision was made in October 2007."
The judge carefully considered each of the three findings, but rejected a causal link between any breach involved in (a) and (b) and the harm suffered. Thus, with respect to (a), the judge was not persuaded of the necessary causal connection, [48] and therefore "not persuaded that the breach of duty in April 2003 caused the plaintiff psychological injury." [49]
With respect to par (b), the judge found: "[596] I am, unable, however, to determine what difference it would have made if the plaintiff did receive a thoroughgoing psychological assessment in 2005. SC Richardson did not notice any ongoing behavioural concerns about the plaintiff in 2005. The chronologies of the parties do not indicate any significant event occurring in the plaintiff's service from October 2005 until April 2006, when the plaintiff sustained a back injury. As I noted earlier, in the period from 2004 to June 2005, the plaintiff appeared to be travelling well at work, at least in the performance of her duties, save for her dispute with Officer McSweeney. … [600] Accepting, as I do, that it was the exposure to a large range of incidents over a long career which contributed to the PTSD, in my view, the plaintiff has not proven that the negligence in the Police Force in its lack of response to the two incidents in June and October 2005, respectively, altered the risk of her suffering psychiatric illness, or alleviating the severity of that condition in 2005. I consider that the position is the same in relation to her condition of Major Depression."
On the other hand, the judge did accept that, had critical incident debriefings occurred, there would have been a record of the plaintiff's responses to the incidents, which would have been available to a practitioner considering her mental health in 2007.
With respect to the failure to assess her fitness for general duties from May to October 2007, the judge identified a number of steps leading to the conclusion that the failure contributed to her later condition. First, he concluded that the plaintiff would have consented to a psychological assessment. [50] Secondly, he concluded that she would have disclosed to the practitioner relevant information as to her state of mind and past history. The evidence supported a conclusion that there would have been a diagnosis of depressive illness. [51]
Thirdly, the judge turned to the consequences of such a diagnosis, [52] concluding: "[609] There were multiple indications, subsequent to the last of those suicides, that for the balance of October 2007, the plaintiff had sustained a severe aggravation of a pre-existing susceptibility to depression. Mr Folwell, in his report of March 2008, referred to the plaintiff's experiencing of symptoms of depression 'in late 2007'; notwithstanding her attempts to work through to February 2008. In May 2008, Dr Spruce diagnosed Major Depressive Disorder. It was notable that the psychologist, Mr Peters, in his report of 2009 (following assessment of the plaintiff in December 2008), spoke almost entirely in terms of the plaintiff's depression; without express reference to traumatic symptoms. In his first report, Professor McFarlane noted symptoms of depression, explicable by her despair about the inability or unwillingness of others to resolve her difficulties in her workplace; which might have triggered a 'propensity to overreact'. This tendency to over-react, I think, was manifested in October 2007 with her abrasive interpersonal dealings with colleagues, especially, towards Sgt Boyd and apparent frustration from the lack of support the perceived she was receiving from the OH&S committee in her advocacy for officer welfare. On the latter point, I consider that Professor McFarlane made an insightful observation (Exhibit R, p 20) about the plaintiff championing the causes of officers in difficulty 'as a way of dealing with her own distress'."
Further, the judge accepted that the consequence of such an assessment would have been that, if the command was unable to accommodate an officer who was not able to perform general duties, she would have been discharged for medical reasons. [53]
That, however, was the consequence she was seeking to avoid in 2007. In her written statement (Ex B), the plaintiff said with respect to sick leave taken in March 2007: "290. This on top of the issues I was already dealing with and the fact that Mr Clarke was aware I was dealing with this issues [sic] compounded the problem and I took the leave because I couldn't face being at work, sitting there for ten hours with knots In my belly waiting to be fronted with the next thing I'd done wrong. 291. I did not submit HOD [hurt on duty] forms for these periods of sick leave because I felt that would just worsen the situation. I sought my own help through EAP through phone conversation as well as several appointments with psychologist Warwick Irvine from Gosford. 292. I first saw Mr Irvine in early to mid 2007. We spoke a great deal In relation to this issues [sic] I was having with Peter's fatal and the subsequent death messages. I became distraught as I normally did when I spoke of it and Mr Irvine strongly suggested I put In HOD forms for PTSD in relation [to] the 'Peter Incident'. I didn't follow through with his advice because again, I didn't want to cause waves at work and was aware from experience that this is what occurred when you did mention you were struggling."
The trial judge was undoubtedly correct to find that the plaintiff was in a state of "apprehension and dread" from May through October 2007 and that that exacerbated her depressive condition. What is less clear is whether her unwillingness to claim that she had been hurt on duty would have prevailed had she been required to undertake a formal psychiatric assessment. Although the State submitted there was "no evidence" of any such apprehension and dread exacerbating a pre-existing depression, that submission should not be accepted. [54] The State also submitted that such a finding was inconsistent with "her express desire to resume normal duties … in October 2006 and her application to join the mounted police in January 2007." [55]
The reference to events in 2006 is unpersuasive. She was at the time acting as station manager at Morisset and was cleared by her general practitioner, Dr Benney, to commence full duties in that position. However, wearing the appointments belt aggravated her back. Nevertheless, in 2006 she was hopeful that she would obtain a permanent position as station manager.
Reliance on the assessment by Ms Hanna is also unpersuasive. First, the assessment was not conducted in 2007, but in January 2008. Secondly, the judge accepted expert evidence disputing that Ms Hanna had undertaken an adequate assessment of a mental illness. The judge concluded: "[611] … There is nothing to suggest that she did anything more than simply ask questions, without reference to her medical and psychological record (such as that was, or should have been). Even the taking of the history was recorded as eliciting tears from the plaintiff but, to my mind, incongruously, Ms Hanna concluded that she had no symptoms at all. [612] Ms Hanna noted that the plaintiff had seen an EAP psychologist in the past, but her report of the assessment indicates that she made no follow up inquiry of the plaintiff as to whether, or what steps that may have led to in the plaintiff's on-going assessment and treatment. [613] As Mr Mutton - in one of the few occasions in which he ventured comment on the plaintiff's personal circumstances - noted, the context for Ms Hanna's assessment was the plaintiff's application to join the Mounted Police. From late October 2007, she wanted to get away from performing frontline duties out of Toronto Station. Hence her various expressions of interest in other positions, including the Mounted Police. The plaintiff wanted to put her 'best foot forward'. That is not to say that she would have been dishonest in answering questions, but it was understandable if she wanted to 'accentuate the positive' in her interaction with Ms Hanna such a way as to make it difficult for Ms Hanna to perform a clinical diagnosis. (I address later in these reasons the significance of the plaintiff's conduct on the issue of contributory negligence)."
In any event, it would have been unsafe to assume that the outcome of a referral for assessment in the context of a proposed (undesired) return to frontline duties would have been the same as in the context of a (desired) transfer to the mounted police. On the other hand, the following matters, taken together, provide a substantial basis for his Honour's conclusion that her pre-existing susceptibility to depression was aggravated in the latter part of 2007: namely, (i) the plaintiff's notification of psychological injury due to work-related stress on 25 October 2007; (ii) Mr Folwell's report of 19 March 2008 referring to the plaintiff experiencing symptoms of depression "in late 2007", notwithstanding her attempts to work through to February 2008; and (iii) Dr Spruce's diagnosis in May 2008 that she had major depressive disorder.
The State also took issue with the conclusion that the injury suffered was the exacerbation of a pre-existing condition. The State submitted that this was "reminiscent of the language of a loss of chance of a better outcome." [56] This issue had been identified at trial, and was identified by the trial judge in the following passage: "[584] A further complication arises where, as here, the plaintiff argues a case (either primarily, or in the alternative) that the loss or damage is the lost opportunity to obtain a better outcome than that which occurred. The plaintiff's case was that had she been properly assessed, between 2005 and 2007, she would have been identified as not being suitable to perform the duties of a general officer and, further, had the decision been taken to ensure that she did not perform such duties, the severity or chronicity of her condition would not have been as bad as it eventually became. [585] This brings into question the status, in law, of the principle that the loss of an opportunity to obtain a better outcome, in the context of an action for damages for personal injury, is available. The defendant argues that the principle does not exist and has been foreclosed by the High Court's decision in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. The plaintiff argues that Tabet v Gett does not extinguish the principle where the opportunity, or chance, is greater than 50%, that is, the opportunity of a more beneficial outcome is more probable than not."
The judge did not accept the State's reasoning in this respect. Rather, he concluded that a plaintiff could recover for the exacerbation of an existing condition, or for a failure to ameliorate an existing condition, if the adverse outcome were established on the balance of probabilities. That, the judge concluded, was consistent with the reasoning of the High Court in Tabet v Gett, [57] and of this Court in Coote v Kelly [58] and Carangelo v State of New South Wales. [59] The challenge to this conclusion was not developed in oral submissions and should be rejected.
For these reasons, the trial judge's assessment of causation should be upheld and ground 3 rejected.

[17]

Cross-appeal - ground 1: post-traumatic stress disorder

The expert evidence established that, by the time of her discharge in 2010, the plaintiff was suffering from both a major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. It was common ground that the PTSD was a consequence of exposure to traumatic incidents in the course of the plaintiff's employment in the Police Force.
The trial judge found at [609] [60] that in 2008 the plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression by Dr Spruce and by a psychologist, Mr Peters, "without express reference to traumatic symptoms." After reasoning that the breach of duty had materially contributed to the plaintiff's major depressive disorder, the judge continued: "[620] As I have found, had the 'systems of work' been functioning as they should have been, critical incident reports about the plaintiff arising from the 2005 incidents involving the MVA fatality and 'dead man Danny' would have been accessible to the health practitioner. But it is speculative to consider how, if the plaintiff was asked about those events during an assessment in 2007, she might have responded in a way that might have been significant. [621] There are several problems in attributing a likely diagnosis of PTSD in 2007 even with the information that was, or which should have been, available. The first is that one of the symptoms, as identified by Professor McFarlane, is a sufferer's likely natural (if unintended) avoidance of discussion about the traumatic events. A second is that any diagnosis of PTSD was affected not only by what a patient disclosed (or did not disclose) but other intrinsic matters such as a sense for how the patient presented. A third and related problem is that some of the symptoms of PTSD overlap with other comorbid conditions, such as here, major depression, or an anxiety disorder of some kind. A fourth, in this plaintiff's case, was the omission to refer to symptoms which do distinctively mark out PTSD: nightmares and flashbacks. The evidence before the Court was to the effect that these symptoms were not evident until after the plaintiff was medically discharged. [622] All of the contemporaneous medical evidence, including evidence of a psychiatrist (Dr Spruce) and psychologists made no reference to the sort of symptoms associated with PTSD until after the plaintiff's medical discharge from the Police Force. Although it is true that her witness statements are filled with vivid details of the traumatic episodes, it was not until those statements that the plaintiff identified symptoms consistent with that particular disorder. Professor McFarlane identified the plaintiff's back injury as being a turning point, in April 2006. But the psychological consequences of that event contributed to the discrete psychiatric illness of depression; and not, in my view, to PTSD. [623] In so concluding, I acknowledge the opinion evidence of Professor McFarlane and Dr Murray to the contrary. But their evidence as to the likelihood of PTSD being diagnosed, whilst strongly asserted, did not persuade me how or why the disorder could have been identified in 2007 and accordingly I am not persuaded that it is more probable than not that the PTSD would have been diagnosed in 2007. [624] That being so, in my opinion, it is unnecessary to assess the vexed question of whether any negligence of the Police Force, at any time, increased the risk or the severity or chronicity of her suffering PTSD."
The plaintiff's submissions in support of her cross-appeal tended to elide two propositions. One was that the plaintiff in fact had PTSD by mid-2007 and therefore the failure to carry out a mental health assessment exacerbated that condition. The second was that, had there been a mental health assessment in mid-2007, there would have been a diagnosis of PTSD.
Both complaints confront the difficulty that, while there was evidence of traumatic events in the course of the plaintiff's work as a police officer, there is limited contemporaneous evidence as to her response to those events. (There was no suggestion that the level of exposure to such events was unusual for general duties officers.) The trial judge identified the problem in those terms at [622]. The contemporaneous records are those of her treating doctors and her applications for sick leave or Workcover compensation. The basis of the diagnosis by Professor McFarlane and Dr Murray, whom the trial judge found to be impressive witnesses, did not purport to rely upon contemporaneous information. Professor McFarlane saw the trigger event for PTSD as the back injury in April 2006. However, the contemporaneous records did not demonstrate a basis for concluding that the plaintiff saw that as a traumatic experience, rather than the source of a physical disability, nor, importantly, that her superior officers should have so seen it.
So far as the likelihood of diagnosis in 2007 was concerned, the judge set out in some detail the numerous reports of Dr Spruce, whom the plaintiff saw throughout 2008. Neither her general practitioner, Dr Benney, nor Dr Spruce was called by the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the weight of the evidence did not support the view that, had she been medically assessed in 2007 in the way proposed by the trial judge, her PTSD would have been diagnosed. It may have been: but the evidence did not support the view that such a diagnosis was probable.
There was a separate question as to whether that matters. If in fact the failure to obtain a mental health assessment led to an exacerbation of her condition, it might follow that, so long as that exacerbation was foreseeable, it was a compensable consequence of the negligence. On the other hand, if the failure to obtain a diagnosis, and the prospect of possibly returning to general duties were together sufficient to aggravate PTSD, that would provide a different form of causal connection from the mere absence of treatment.
In the passage at [619], the judge appeared to reject the possibility that the failure to diagnose PTSD in 2007 would have increased the chronicity or severity of that disorder. That finding was based on the observation that there were no further traumatic incidents suffered in or following 2007. However, having returned to the question as to whether a diagnosis of PTSD was likely in 2007 and not being so satisfied, the judge concluded that it was therefore "unnecessary to assess the vexed question of whether any negligence of the Police Force … increased the risk or the severity or chronicity of her suffering PTSD": at [624]. The plaintiff submitted that the judge was in error in eschewing that exercise. That submission may be accepted, but the consequence is that this Court must make that assessment.
The plaintiff relied in this Court on evidence given by Professor McFarlane in response to a question from the judge towards the end of the joint evidence given by the psychiatrists: [61] "HIS HONOUR: … If there is a prospect after the middle of 2007 when the plaintiff is meant to believe that there is a prospect of her returning to the street or getting back on the truck, does that have the effect on the prospects of an exacerbation of her - of PTSD? WITNESS MCFARLANE: Your Honour, I think that's a very important issue, because one of the [symptoms] of post-traumatic stress disorder, as we've discussed, is the issue about triggered psychological distress and triggered reactivity and the challenge for an officer is that she would have … felt safe -relatively safe in the station, but when she is then confronted with the probability of being put back on the street, that is likely to really reinforce and bring back many of her feelings of not being safe and her reactivity and her beginning to imagine the exposures that were part of her career before. So, at that stage, I think, the actual exposures were not necessary, merely the probability of … those exposures was enough to really exacerbate her condition, I believe."
In response, the State submitted that the question (and the judge's finding) was that Commander Clarke had given her to believe that there was a "prospect" of returning to general duties, whilst Professor McFarlane spoke of a "probability" of future exposure. The plaintiff contended that Professor McFarlane was referring to her belief "that she would be returned to general duties", not to actual exposure to traumatic events. [62] That may be accepted; however, the plaintiff then contended that her "apprehension of returning to operation duties precisely satisfies Professor McFarlane's concept of probability." The latter proposition sidesteps the issue as to the strength of her belief, which would require reference to some evidence she gave. None was identified.
There appears to have been no other evidence addressing the issue. To the extent that the matter was not decided by the trial judge, the plaintiff would need to persuade this Court that the mere prospect of returning to general duties would, of itself, affect the severity of whatever symptoms of PTSD she was then suffering. Given the range of traumatic events, the most recent being the suicide of two officers, one being a close friend and the other a senior officer in her team, it is difficult to know whether a return to general duties would be necessary to trigger symptoms of PTSD. Further, the serious traumatic events of her career numbered no more than five over a period of some 14 years. In my view, the evidence is insufficient to persuade the Court that the holding out of a prospect of returning to general duties would have materially adversely affected the chronicity or severity of her PTSD.
That being so, the failure of the plaintiff to persuade the judge that a proper mental health assessment in mid-2007 would have led to a diagnosis of PTSD meant that no adverse effect was established on the balance of probabilities. In my view that finding should be upheld. It follows that the principal challenge in the cross-appeal must be rejected.

[18]

Appeal grounds 4 and 5; cross-appeal ground 4 - effect of co-morbidities

Ground 4 raised by the State alleged that the trial judge erred in failing to have regard to the plaintiff's "comorbid non-tortious psychiatric conditions of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder in assessing damages". Ground 5 alleged a failure to make an assessment of the extent to which the same non-tortious conditions contributed to the plaintiff's psychiatric conditions. The two grounds appeared in their terms to address the same issue and were dealt with together in the appellant's submissions. They appear to have been alternative propositions. On one view, the plaintiff was found to have been totally incapacitated from November 2008 by reason of PTSD and therefore the whole of the injury could be attributed to the non-tortious condition; in the alternative, the conditions needed to be disentangled and relative contributions attributed to each.
The trial judge dealt with the issue under the heading, "Deduction on DC v State of NSW principles". [63] The principle which was derived from DC [64] was the endorsement by Ward JA of a statement by Professor Luntz in Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (4th ed). It is appropriate now to refer to the statement in the current edition, which is as follows: [65] "Neither Watts v Rake [66] nor Purkess v Crittenden [67] was referred to in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd. [68] To reconcile these different lines of authority, it is necessary to say that the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant's negligence did contribute materially to the present symptoms (this is the legal onus that rests on the plaintiff). … Once the plaintiff has discharged that onus, there is an evidential onus of the defendant of proving that the alleged pre-existing or subsequent natural condition did exist and that this condition in its natural progression would have produced similar symptoms. If the defendant is unable to satisfy the evidential burden, the court may reduce the plaintiff's damages for contingencies to no greater extent than in the ordinary case. If, however, it appears that there was a real chance that the plaintiff would have developed similar symptoms from a natural condition attaching to the plaintiff, the court will make a greater reduction than normal to reflect this increased chance. In other words, the effect of Malec on the defendant's evidential onus of proof as established in Watts v Rake and Purkess v Crittenden is that the disentanglement of various causes of the plaintiff's damage is more easily achieved in relation to hypothetical past events and future events because the court evaluates possibilities in that respect." [69]
The extent to which this principle is generally applicable is not entirely clear. DC, upon which the trial judge relied, involved a question as to the liability of the State for psychiatric injury suffered by two sisters as a result of abuse by their stepfather. The liability of the State applied only with respect to harm caused after the abuse had been reported. Self-evidently harm was caused by ongoing abuse before any report was made. Ward JA adopted Professor Luntz' reasoning and accepted that a reduction on account of contingencies was appropriate. [70] However, the other member of the majority, Sackville AJA, declined to address the issue as it was not necessary in order to dispose of the appeal. [71]
As explained in Luntz and Harder, there are various categories into which the relevant cases may fall. One such category involves a distinction between divisible and indivisible loss. However, where the loss is truly divisible the issue is unlikely to arise. The problem is where there are two or more causal contributors to a particular disability or loss of earning capacity.
There will be different circumstances in which that problem will arise. For example, a plaintiff may have (i) an innate susceptibility (sometimes described as an eggshell skull or eggshell psyche); (ii) suffered an injury as a result of the conduct of a third person; (iii) suffered injury as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct, but where only part of the conduct was tortious; or (iv) suffered conduct of two separate tortfeasors contemporaneously. An example of both tortious and non-tortious harm caused by a single employer is found in the English case of Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw. [72] The plaintiff developed a disease from exposure to silica dust at the defendant's factory; part of the exposure was tortious and part not. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of his loss having established that the tortious exposure contributed materially to the disease. As Luntz and Harder explain, [73] the reasoning of the High Court in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd would require an evaluation of the extent to which the harm would have been suffered in any event as a result of non-tortious exposure and reduction of the damages accordingly.
The plaintiff challenged the application of the principle in the present case because she submitted there was "no independent non-tortious cause to the respondent's injury (the appellant having caused the respondent to suffer PTSD and major depression)". [74] That reasoning might be based on the approach adopted in Bonnington Castings. However, accepting that there was a real chance that the plaintiff's earning capacity would have been adversely impacted in any event by the non-tortious injury, the principled application of Malec requires that fact to be taken into account in assessing the appropriate deduction for contingencies. As explained by Brennan and Dawson JJ in Malec what is required is "an evaluation of the plaintiff's earning capacity which was destroyed in consequence of the defendant's negligence." [75] This principle is fundamental and does not depend upon whether the alternative cause of the disability was the result of conduct of the same employer or not.
It is possible that the plaintiff intended the term "independent" to refer, not to an injury sustained independently of the employer, but to a discrete and separate injury suffered in the course of the one employment. Thus, if the two sources of loss of earning capacity were a tortiously-caused depressive illness and a back injury sustained in the course of carrying out an arrest (for which the employer was not liable in negligence), an exercise in apportionment would be required. Unfortunately, because the submission was first briefly identified in those terms in reply and in writing, it is not possible to be sure of the precise scope of the intended constraint on apportionment. However, neither authority nor principle supports such an approach.
For these reasons, the trial judge was correct to apportion liability so as to increase the usual figure for vicissitudes to allow for the very real possibility (verging on a probability) that the plaintiff would have been disabled as a result of non-tortious exposure to traumatic events causing PTSD and the continuing sequelae of her back injury. On that basis, there was no separate challenge to the figure resolved on by the trial judge of 40%. It was, in any event, a reasonable reduction in the circumstances.
It follows that grounds 4 and 5 in the appeal and ground 4 in the cross-appeal must be rejected.

[19]

Cross-appeal - ground 3 - contributory negligence

In its defence, the State pleaded that any loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the plaintiff's own negligence. The relevant particulars were a failure to report or disclose her psychological symptoms to her supervisors when first she became aware, or ought to have been aware, of the symptoms.
The judge did not accept that the plaintiff concealed her psychological issues from her superiors: rather, in May 2007 she told Commander Clarke "that she could not cope." [76] Nor did she fail to seek medical assistance for herself, availing herself of the EAP facility, speaking to a chaplain, and speaking to a psychologist on two occasions in 2007. The judge's conclusion that there was a level of contributory negligence was expressed in the following terms: "[680] Given that I have found that the damage she suffered psychologically was occasioned by conduct amounting to a failure to assess, save for a qualification, I adopt the observation made by Sackville AJA in not dissimilar circumstances in Sills (at [172]) that it would be unjust for the plaintiff to be found contributorily negligent by reason of conduct which was the product of the very condition the Police Force should have detected and addressed. [681] The qualification is this. I consider that the plaintiff was depressed when she saw the police psychologist, Ms Hanna in late January 2008. Although I acknowledge that she had an interest in applying for a new position within the Police Force and a natural incentive to minimise her condition, had she been more forthcoming than she was with Ms Hanna, far from averting the situation of her being assessed as fully fit for general duties (including having access to a firearm), and had a truer picture of her psychological condition emerged, I consider it probable that some of the later stress occasioned to her arising, for example, from the looming withdrawal of her special sick leave by Superintendent Rae may have been avoided. Nevertheless, I consider that her own contribution to her psychological condition to be small, relative to that of the Police Force. As I have indicated, Ms Hanna's assessment in January 2008 was inherently inadequate for her needs at that time, and before. For someone with this officer's history, which was known or which should have been known, I consider it appropriate that there be a 10% deduction in her damages award because of contributory negligence. When comparing culpability and causative effect, it is not being excessively paternalistic to expect the Police Force to have acted upon multiple triggers to ensure an officer at high risk of significant psychological injury was properly assessed at the times I indicated here."
The contributory negligence so found occurred in January 2008. It arose in a context of the plaintiff seeking an alternative position within the Police Force, namely with the mounted police. In other respects, the judge dismissed the findings of the psychologist, Ms Hanna, as of little weight because she failed to inquire further into aspects of what she was indeed told. It is difficult to place responsibility on the plaintiff for the omissions of the psychologist. How much information she volunteered is difficult to know from Ms Hanna's one-page report. What is known is that the plaintiff did not tick 'yes' or 'no' on a form inquiring whether she was suffering symptoms of PTSD. She said in her evidence that she did not tick either box because she did not know what the symptoms were. [77] A competent psychologist would have sought to clarify that. The plaintiff did, however, reveal her depressive illness and the fact that she was taking Cipramil for it.
In those circumstances, the finding of contributory negligence cannot be supported. To that extent, the plaintiff's cross-appeal should be upheld.

[20]

Cross-appeal - ground 5 - interest on damages

A plaintiff's entitlement to recover pre-judgment interest on an award of damages is conditioned by s 151M of the Workers Compensation Act, which relevantly provides: 151M Payment of interest (1) Limited statutory entitlement A plaintiff has only such right to interest on damages as is conferred by this section. … (4) (a) Interest is not payable (and a court cannot order the payment of interest) on damages unless - (i) information that would enable a proper assessment of the plaintiff's claim has been given to the defendant and the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to make an offer of settlement (where it would be appropriate to do so) in respect of the plaintiff's full entitlement to all damages of any kind but has not made such an offer, or (ii) the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to make a revised offer of settlement (where it would be appropriate to do so) in the light of further information given by the plaintiff that would enable a proper assessment of the plaintiff's full entitlement to all damages of any kind but has not made such an offer, or (iii) the defendant has made an offer of settlement, the amount of all damages of any kind awarded by the court (without the addition of any interest) is more than 20% higher than the highest amount offered by the defendant and the highest amount is unreasonable having regard to the information available to the defendant when the offer was made. (b) The highest amount offered by the defendant is not unreasonable if, when the offer was made, the defendant was not able to make a reasonable assessment of the plaintiff's full entitlement to all damages of any kind. (c) For the purposes of this subsection, an offer of settlement must be in writing.
It is (and was at the date of the trial) more than 10 years since the plaintiff was medically discharged from the Police Force and some 14 years since her successful cause of action accrued. It is clear that the matters to be considered under s 151M require attention to the procedural history of the claim. Yet neither party filed a chronology in this Court which extended beyond the date of medical discharge in February 2010.
The trial judge dealt with the question of interest in a further judgment, Skinner (No 3), delivered on 9 April 2021. The judge considered the relevant procedural history, including an offer made by the defendant in the course of a mediation. The judge was satisfied that the State was then able to make a properly informed assessment of the case and made an offer in an amount of $425,000, "clear of workers compensation payments, plus costs". [78] The mediation took place on 11 November 2016. The reference to the addition on account of costs is significant, given that the statutory scheme for work injury damages required that generally the parties must bear their own costs of the proceedings. [79] No estimate of the costs then incurred was provided.
The judge noted that, although the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing that the offer was "unreasonable", her submissions were largely limited to the proposition that the State had not made any offer of settlement which qualified for the purposes of s 151M(4). [80] The State, on the other hand, had submitted that the offer was not unreasonable in circumstances where: "• the plaintiff required an extension of time to bring the proceeding; • the issues of liability, as to both breach and causation, were complex; • the quantification of damages was also complicated by the plaintiff's incapacitating back injury, a pre-existing psychological condition which was exacerbated; and a collateral post-traumatic stress disorder which was also incapacitating (but which was determined not to have been caused by the negligence of the Police Force), and where the extent of the psychological injury was affected by events whose consequences the Force was not legally responsible for; • the plaintiff's offer ($1.45 million, clear of the workers compensation repayments) was itself unreasonable."
The claim for costs was in an amount of $585,500.
The operation of the statutory scheme precludes an award of interest, subject to three exceptions. The first two in subs (4)(a), cover cases where the defendant has not made an offer (or a revised offer), having had a reasonable opportunity to do so. Subparagraph (iii) contains two cumulative elements, each involving the defendant having made an offer of settlement. The first is engaged where the defendant has made an offer but the award of damages is more than 20% higher; the second is engaged where the offer is "unreasonable" having regard to the information available to the defendant when the offer was made. It was not in doubt that the award was more than 20% higher than the offer, the offer being under $620,000. Two points should be noted in this respect. First, because there is no indication as to the likely costs incurred by the plaintiff as at the date of the offer, it is not clear what the monetary value of the offer was, but it was clearly above $425,000. Secondly, the first limb of subpar (iii) takes into account the actual award of damages, while the second limb requires a prospective assessment of reasonableness at the date of the offer. To the extent that the trial judge approached the matter on that basis, [81] the approach is not challenged.
The key passages in the judge's reasoning were as follows: "[24] I accept that the case which the plaintiff brought was complex, both in liability and in damages. Although a draft pleading may have been supplied at the time of the pre-filing, the particulars of negligence were pitched at such a high level of generality that it was hard to understand the case the defendant had to meet. The facts were of broad compass. Indeed, the allegations of negligence were sourced in a report by Mr Cockbain, which report was not ultimately relied upon by the plaintiff. Indeed, the arguments on breach of duty were ultimately only ventilated with greater specificity in Counsel for the plaintiff's final argument. The preponderance of the allegations of breach was rejected, and for some of the breaches of duty that were established, the plaintiff could not prove causation. There was, with no disrespect, something of a scattergun approach to the plaintiff's case which, in the end, succeeded, because at least one or more breaches were established and proven to have caused the injury. Some of what I have said, so far, is in retrospect. But the matters referred to underscore and therefore support the defendant's contention, viewed prospectively at the time that it made its offer, about the complexity of the case on liability. [25] There is, as I have indicated, force to the defendant's submission that, putting to one side the difficulties in establishing breach, at the time the offer was made, it was very difficult to estimate, with reasonable precision what the quantum would eventually be, having regard to the plaintiff's circumstances involving a back complaint, her pre-existing susceptibility to mental illness and the appropriate level of contingencies having regard to events in respect to which the defendant was not legally responsible."
Two further matters were taken into account, but given lesser weight: "[26] Moreover, it is not without significance that the offer made by the defendant was in response to the plaintiff's offer at the mediation prior to the proceeding which, relative to the quantum of the defendant's offer, was disproportionate to the claim. This again only underscores the complexity of the plaintiff's case, on liability and also on quantum. [27] Another consideration, of lesser weight, being that at the time the offer was made it was uncertain whether the plaintiff would obtain leave to commence the proceeding out of time. Nevertheless that matter was not irrelevant to the parties' mutual assessment of risk and, viewed objectively, weighed in favour of the conclusion that the offer was not unreasonable."
The plaintiff's challenge to the judge's finding, as identified in her written submissions, raised six points. The first related to the consideration at [24] as to the generality of the pleading and the complexity of the issues, both as to liability and as to damages. The plaintiff submitted that the judge erred in finding that her case on liability was "so complex that the appellant could not have made a reasonable assessment" of her full entitlements. [82] However, that did not fairly encapsulate the judge's finding. Rather, the difficulty faced by the plaintiff in establishing that the specific offer was unreasonable lay in the level of complexity and imprecision which effectively expanded the range of possible outcomes and thus the range below which an offer would be unreasonable. The particulars of negligence contained 29 paragraphs together with a direction to "see expert report of Mr Cockbain", which was not relied upon and the contents of which are not known to this Court, and the report of Professor McFarlane, particularly at pages 23-27.
The plaintiff alleges that the fact that Mr Cockbain's report was not ultimately relied upon was not a relevant factor to be taken into account. However, the fact that it was not relied upon permits an inference that there were other particulars of negligence asserted (and known to the defendant at the time it made its offer) which were subsequently abandoned. If those aspects of the plaintiff's case were untenable, the defendant would have taken that into account. It might also be inferred that they were more precise than the 29 tabulated particulars.
The second alleged error was that the judge gave no consideration to the fact that the expert reports of Professor McFarlane of 2015 and 2016 and the reports of Dr Murray had been served. It may be true that he did not give that material consideration in this context, but he was not asked to. Apart from the statement that the reports "set out in detail the events lead up to [sic] the total incapacity of [the plaintiff] due to major depression and PTSD", it is not clear what inference this Court should draw as to the range of possible outcomes of the trial, in reassessing the claim for interest based on that material. The submissions did not provide further assistance in that regard.
The third complaint was that the judge considered the question of reasonableness "retrospectively as opposed to prospectively." However, a fair reading of the reasons set out above is not consistent with that conclusion: the judge did refer to subsequent findings and events, but identified them as supportive of the prospective approach. The passage in the second half of [24] relied upon by the plaintiff expressly stated, "[s]ome of what I have said, so far, is in retrospect. But the matters referred to underscore and therefore support the defendant's contention, viewed prospectively at the time that it made its offer, about the complexity of the case on liability." That passage did not reveal error.
It may also be noted that the plaintiff's submissions as to the operation of s 151M commenced by referring to a judgment of Dunford J concluding that "a judgment sum that is more than 50% in excess of the effective value of the defendant's offer is prima facie unreasonable in all the circumstances." [83] In relying on that statement, the plaintiff herself resorted to retrospective reasoning.
The fourth alleged error was in accepting the State's contention "that it could not have estimated the quantum with reasonable precision on account of contingencies." The submission continued: "The appellant could have reasonably determined that a reduction in damages on account of contingencies could not have been more than 40%; a reduction calculated at a higher figure would have been unreasonable."
This complaint is misconceived. It appears to assume that the only reasonable approach available to the State in making an offer was to determine a reasonable figure by way of quantum of damages and then discount for contingencies. That was not so. The State was entitled to have regard to the fact that there was an unresolved issue as to whether the case could proceed at all, having been commenced out of time, and the likelihood of any liability being established. There was no reason for the judge to find that a particular discount in excess of 40% would have been unreasonable, nor that the State adopted such an approach.
The fifth alleged error was that the plaintiff's offer was "disproportionate to the claim". It was said that the judge in that respect at [26] was "assessing the matter retrospectively by reference to the judgment sum." That was not so: the judge was merely noting the disparity between the respective offers and the disproportion between the offers and the ultimate judgment.
Finally, error was alleged with respect to the consideration at [27] as to the need for leave to commence the proceedings out of time. Obviously limited weight was given to that consideration: but the plaintiff asserted the issue was simply irrelevant, except for answering the question as to whether it was reasonable for the State to make an offer at all. That proposition cannot be accepted. The question of an extension of time was one of the unresolved contingencies affecting the likelihood of the plaintiff's success. It was not unreasonable for the State to have taken that into account, nor for the judge to have accepted its (limited) relevance in assessing the unreasonableness of the offer.
In submissions in reply, the plaintiff contended for a further error, referring to a statement in [23] of the judge's reasons to the effect that in November 2016 "it would not have been easy for the defendant to confidently predict the quantum of the discounts." The plaintiff submitted that s 151M(4)(b) did not require the defendant to be able to confidently predict the quantum of the discount. The plaintiff submitted that the "standard deduction is 15%."
The judge's reasoning at [23] was directed to the wording of s 151M(4)(a)(iii), not par (b). The judge did not conclude that the State was not able to make a reasonable assessment of the plaintiff's entitlement: rather, he concluded that the offer made was not "unreasonable" for the purposes of par (a)(iii). The reasoning as to complexity and uncertainty might have allowed a finding to be made in the terms of par (b), but it was not made in those terms, nor is there any notice of contention supporting such a conclusion. Further, if an inference is sought to be drawn that the State could reasonably only have relied upon the standard deduction of 15%, that inference should not be accepted. There were factors in play which patently warranted a higher deduction.
None of these specific challenges is made out.
The assessment of whether an offer made before the trial and before the commencement of proceedings was "unreasonable" involves an evaluative judgment as to which minds may undoubtedly differ. It is a judgment which is easily affected by hindsight reasoning (which may not be entirely irrelevant), and by ignorance as to what the defendant knew and took into account, other than the material supplied by the plaintiff by way of pleadings and witness statements, and in relation to the latter, in so far as that material was before the judge, usually because it had been relied on at the trial. In circumstances where the plaintiff has failed to establish any patent error in the judge's reasoning, this Court is left with the question as to whether, on the information available to it, it would have reached a different conclusion. The plaintiff's case is not made easier by the unchallenged assumption that she bore the onus of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the offer at the time it was made.
Further, care must be taken in attributing error to the trial judge's findings in circumstances where the plaintiff failed to present an affirmative case on the assumption that an offer had been made. She did not even seek to establish the one matter which was clearly within her knowledge, namely the value of the offer to pay costs, in circumstances where, generally, costs are not available even to a successful plaintiff.
Ground 5 in the cross-appeal must be rejected.

[24]

Endnotes

Skinner v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2021] NSWDC 49 (Skinner (No 2)) at [5]-[91].
Skinner (No 2) at [683].
Skinner v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2021] NSWDC 115 (Skinner (No 3)).
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B(1)(f).
Skinner (No 2) at [618]-[619].
(2016) 95 NSWLR 467; [2016] NSWCA 344 (McColl, Ward and Leeming JJA).
[2019] NSWCA 4 (Payne JA, Sackville and Simpson AJJA).
Skinner (No 2) at [500].
Report of Dr Inglis Chern, 26 June 2002.
Skinner (No 2) at [582].
Skinner (No 2) at [592].
Exhibit B, pars 86-124.
Skinner (No 2) at [164], [170].
Skinner (No 2) at [502].
Skinner (No 2) at [504].
Skinner (No 2) at [507]-[509].
Skinner (No 2) at [351], [510].
Report of Dr Abe Issacs, 20 July 2006.
Skinner (No 2) at [171]-[172].
Skinner (No 2) at [175]-[205].
Skinner (No 2) at [272].
Skinner (No 2) at [273].
Skinner (No 2) at [274].
Skinner (No 2) at [279].
Skinner (No 2) at [294].
Skinner (No 2) at [395].
Skinner (No 2) at [443].
Skinner (No 2) at [438].
Skinner (No 2) at [564].
StressSolutions Stress Assessment Report, p 20.
Report, Dr Wright, 29 January 2002.
Report of Dr Spruce, 11 September 2009.
Skinner (No 2) at [267].
Skinner (No 2) at [655].
See [7] above.
Briggs at [44].
Briggs at [140].
See at [63] above.
Appellant's written submissions, 20 July 2021, par 55.
(2007) 232 CLR 486; [2007] HCA 20.
Skinner (No 2) at [529].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Skinner (No 2) at [535].
Skinner (No 2) at [605].
Skinner (No 2) at [537].
Skinner (No 2) at [604]-[605].
Skinner (No 2) at [591] - see [32] above.
Skinner (No 2) at [592].
Skinner (No 2) at [604].
Skinner (No 2) at [605].
Skinner (No 2) at [606]-[608] - see at [88] above.]
Skinner (No 2) at [607].
Appellant's written submissions, par 62.
Ibid.
Appellant's written submissions, par 65.
(2010) 240 CLR 537; [2010] HCA 12.
[2013] NSWCA 357.
[2016] NSWCA 126.
Set out at [98] above.
Tcpt, 18/02/21, p 523(8)-(23).
Submissions in reply on Cross-appeal, par 2.
Skinner (No 2) at [654]-[670].
[2016] NSWCA 198.
H Luntz and S Harder, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (5th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2021) at [1.11.20].
(1960) 108 CLR 158; [1960] HCA 58.
(1965) 114 CLR 164; [1965] HCA 34.
(1990) 169 CLR 638; [1990] HCA 20.
References omitted.
DC at [355]-[357].
DC at [402].
[1956] AC 613 (HL).
Assessment of Damages, at [1.11.16].
Respondent's submissions in reply on cross-appeal, 20 September 2021, par 20.
Malec at 639.
Skinner (No 2) at [677].
Tcpt, 12/02/21, p 239(20)-(30).
Skinner (No 3) at [8].
Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (NSW), cll 94, 96.
Skinner (No 3) at [13].
Skinner (No 3) at [23].
Respondent's submissions on cross-appeal, 18 August 2021, par 50.
Van Opstal v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWSC 1125 at [7]. (Dunford J in fact said that he considered the offer would be prima facie unreasonable.)
CA Tcpt, 15/10/21, p 64(33).
Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (NSW), cl 96.
Strategic Formwork Pty Ltd v Hitchen [2018] NSWCA 54 at [118] (in my judgment, Sackville AJA agreeing). DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 February 2022

State of New South Wales v Skinner

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