I do think it is appropriate for me to determine this preliminary aspect now. I say that for three reasons.
First, I engaged in a very beneficial discussion with the Bar table earlier today, as the transcript will reveal, and there was a very useful refinement of the issues.
Secondly, although this judgment is being delivered on the same day of the hearing, I feel that I have had sufficient time in which to reflect upon the matter.
Thirdly, I think that the orders that I should make are tolerably clear.
[2]
Background
The proceedings under discussion were commenced by the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) filing a summons on 11 October 2022. Today, I am simply asked, as is orthodox, to appoint psychiatrists or psychologists or one of each to examine Mr McGee (the defendant) and to direct him to attend those examinations; as well as that, to impose an interim supervision order (ISO) renewable for a period of 28 days; and, finally, in terms of ancillary relief, which I understand to be completely unopposed, to impose a restriction on access to the court file by way of a non-party.
I think I can say, without further discussion, that that proposed order 4 should be made. I think that it is in the interests of everybody, because it protects the privacy of the defendant so as to further his rehabilitation. Also, it is not an absolute restriction; it merely provides something of a fetter on non-party access, in particular with regard to personal details about addresses and so forth. So it can be understood, without further discussion, that order 4 will be made.
The ultimate submission of the plaintiff is that Mr McGee should be subject to a two year extended supervision order (ESO). That is in a context of him coming to the end of a two year ESO, which will expire on 28 December 2022, which was itself founded on a very significant sentence that Judge Sides KC imposed upon the defendant many years ago.
A point of central importance in the plaintiff's case is that, really, for the majority of the current ESO, things were going quite poorly and, regrettably, Mr McGee was returned to custody three times, a topic to which I shall return later.
The personal background of Mr McGee can be sketched as follows. He is currently 37 years of age. He had a very difficult upbringing. Sadly, his mother suffered from a mental illness. Things were very disrupted, including his education. At one stage, as I understand it, he was being educated at a special school.
He commenced to abuse alcohol at the age of twelve; cannabis at the same age; and amphetamines, a notoriously damaging drug, at the age of seventeen. That was in the context of having been made a ward of the State at the age of eleven.
As one might expect, he had a number of intersections with the criminal justice system. Some of those were offences of violence, but there were certainly no serious violence offences as defined by the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act). And there were no offences that remotely approached the gravity of the offences that Mr McGee, regrettably, committed on 16 June 2010.
What happened on that day is that he engaged in a series of very violent and frightening carjackings, including by way of the use of at least one weapon, a hammer. Indeed, they were so violent as to have, to my assessment, a distinct flavour of irrationality. As part of that, in the course of him seeking to escape the police, I believe, two children were actually run over, though thankfully they suffered neither permanent nor serious injuries.
Undoubtedly, the offending, as Judge Sides noted, was of very significant gravity. It constituted, in itself, a real danger to the community. There was also a real question as to whether Mr McGee would constitute a danger to the community in the future.
I have spoken a moment ago of irrationality. In fact, it was accepted by Judge Sides that the applicant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time, unquestionably made worse by the ingestion of methylamphetamine. Having said that, my own assessment is that it is not entirely clear whether (as is common) that mental illness was perhaps precipitated, or badly aggravated, by that prohibited drug, or perhaps both; and, separately from that aetiology, whether or not there was some measure of psychosis coming from intoxication with the drug itself.
The upshot of that was, despite pleas of guilty, a very lengthy sentence was imposed: a total head sentence of 9 years with a total non-parole period of 5 years and 9 months.
Remarkably, Mr McGee served the entirety of the 9 years. There were a number of reasons for that. On some occasions, he saw fit to refuse parole, I infer wishing to have entirely unfettered liberty without conditions once he was released, not aware of the existence of the Act.
As well as that, the gravity of the offending and the cluster of problems from which Mr McGee suffered undoubtedly led to a cautious approach on the part of the State Parole Authority (the SPA).
Furthermore, Mr McGee was not prepared, at that stage, to engage in intensive anti-violence therapy in custody; though, as his counsel has said today, it is not as if he was entirely indolent in custody, and he did seek to better himself.
Eventually, Fullerton J imposed an ISO on him: see State of New South Wales v McGee (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 53. As I have said, Wilson J thereafter imposed an ESO of two years' duration which commenced on 29 March 2019: see State of New South Wales v McGee [2019] NSWSC 109.
Sadly, the majority of that ESO did not proceed well at all. I think it speaks for itself that, with regard to a two year ESO, Mr McGee has been returned to custody on three occasions for breaching it. One breach involved testing positive to a stimulant: cocaine. Another breach involved having contact with someone with whom he had been asked not to have contact; I infer a person who was seen to be damaging to his rehabilitation.
Those breaches can be thought of as serious enough. But what happened in April 2021 is that he had commenced a romantic relationship with a woman who, sadly, has had her own issues with prohibited drugs. People administering his ESO, in particular his departmental supervising officer (DSO) were cautious about the level of contact that they felt there should be between the two of them. There was a home visit at which it was found that that lady was present without permission. Mr McGee inferred that, in all likelihood, he would be returning to gaol yet again. It seems that he was just psychologically incapable of facing that happening again.
In a nutshell, he armed himself with two knives and a machete, and a nine hour siege ensued that was only brought to an end by specialist police. Thankfully, no-one was physically harmed. But one knows from experience and common-sense that, in those situations, it is not so difficult for someone to be gravely injured or indeed killed.
Mr McGee, for the offence (at least) of using a weapon to avoid apprehension, received a head sentence of 1 year and 8 months with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Again, for a time, things were proceeding very poorly. Mr McGee retained a recalcitrant attitude about things. He even spoke of, in due course, cutting off his electronic monitoring bracelet and "going on the run", and doing so until the authorities got sick of looking for him, or he passed away.
Remarkably, since this man has been released in April of this year, there has been a very positive change. As Mr Wilcox, his counsel, said today, it may be one of those cases where personal deterrence has played a part. By that I mean, it is possible that Mr McGee has come to see that, unless something changes, he is just going to keep spending time in gaol. It may be that he has just reached a point where he just cannot take that anymore, so rather than arming himself with a machete he has come to a more mature and constructive answer.
[3]
Submissions and primary determination
I think anybody can accept that, for a man who spent nine years in custody, who suffers from a chronic and serious mental illness, and who has been burdened with an issue with substances since the age of twelve, readjusting to society and being able to live a happy, constructive, and - for want of a better word - normal life is going to be a challenge. But I think Mr Wilcox is, with respect, correct to say that this man, in a sense, independently has been able to make excellent progress since April of this year, as follows.
He has found independent accommodation in an apartment in a Sydney suburb. He has been employed in a number of roles. Each time there has been a problem in a position of employment, it has not taken him long to find a new position. He is getting psychological help. As well as that, very importantly, although he has been regularly tested for prohibited drug use as part of the ESO, there has been no sign of that. It is possible that the course called "Explore, Question, Understand, Investigate, Practice, Succeed" (EQUIPS) that he did in his most recent stint in gaol was the turning point.
But I think it is more likely that, as this man approaches 40, he has simply come to see that, as it were, "the system" will not get tired of him and it is a matter for him, with appropriate help, as to whether or not he is just going to keep frittering his life away in gaol.
Having said that, in accordance with common-sense, as one would expect entirely, a risk assessment report continues to assess him as being at high risk of offending in the future. I say common-sense because this man suffers from a chronic underlying mental condition. He has had ongoing problems with substances for years. To repeat myself, it is going to take a lot of adjustment to get everything fully back on track.
The question with which I am confronted really has two aspects. The first is: should an ISO be imposed at all. The second is: if so, what should the conditions be?
As to the first question, Mr Wilcox for the defendant submitted that, really, the corner has been turned. His position was that so much has gone so right over the past eight months that things have reached a point where, speaking generally, even an ISO would be more harm than help. Speaking in particular, the statutory test for the imposition of an ISO as to what could be imposed down the track by one of my colleagues or me has not been established: see ss 5B and 10A of the Act.
Ms Jones for the plaintiff has submitted that there are undoubtedly grounds for optimism here, and one would hardly wish to interrupt all the good progress that has been made. Even so, in a nutshell, her position is there has been eight months of success in a context of at least twenty-five years of sadness and trouble since Mr McGee became a ward of the State, and started (I infer) seeking to assuage his psychological pain as a result of all that went wrong in his childhood by way of abusing substances.
Her position really is that these problems are chronic. They, in particular dependence on prohibited drugs, are by their nature subject to relapse.
As well as that, although things have gone very well since April 2022, it cannot be said that they have gone absolutely perfectly. Indeed, her position, as I understand it, is that, even if they had gone absolutely perfectly, one is entitled to guarded optimism, but one should not be naively optimistic.
I think the change that seems to have occurred here is most welcome. I think it is to be commended. I think there is a lot of force in what Mr Wilcox has said. I also think that care needs to be taken not to impose conditional liberty that does more harm than good, in that it becomes so micro-managerial or disempowering as to become in itself criminogenic, despite the best intentions of the Act and those who are administering it.
Even so, I think that at this stage the fundamental test set out in the Act has been established. I say that because it is a contingent one. It is understood to be not particularly demanding: see State of NSW v Baldwin [2016] NSWSC 1141. There is also authority to say that one is entitled to take an approach that errs on the side of caution at this preliminary stage: see State of New South Wales v Lynn [2013] NSWSC 1147, quoting State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118.
More fundamentally, I think the point is soundly made by the plaintiff that all that has gone right has gone right for a period of eight months, and all that has gone wrong has gone wrong for many, many years.
What has taken place over 2022 is to be encouraged, but I think it would simply be too adventurous to take the view that one's concerns about Mr McGee and one's concerns about the appropriateness of a further period of conditional liberty are just to be put to one side.
Coming to that view, I have not forgotten Mr Wilcox's submission that one would exercise particular caution in imposing a further period of conditional liberty on the conclusion of a previous one; that is, the ESO that is coming to an end later this month. I see the force in that, and I duly adopt that caution. But, to repeat myself a little, the vast majority of the current ESO was a significant failure.
For those reasons, I think it is appropriate to impose an ISO upon Mr McGee. It goes without saying that a different judge at the next phase, or indeed I myself, might take a different approach as to whether an ESO should be imposed. I also accept entirely that the matter is quite finely balanced.
To conclude my analysis of the primary question, it is not disputed that all of what I should call the mechanistic preconditions for the making of an ISO have been established. And I do believe that what I will call the fulcrum test in the Act at this stage is also established.
[4]
Secondary determination - conditions
Turning to the second contingent question then as to conditions of the ISO, I have reflected upon all of the conditions that have been agreed by counsel for the defendant with counsel for the plaintiff. My own view is that all of those are appropriate: see s 11 of the Act and State of New South Wales v Davison (Final) [2019] NSWSC 1140 at [17].
The assessment here of disputed conditions is a rather challenging one, because I think the delicate balance to be sought after is, on the one hand, to make sure that the ISO is sufficiently rigorous so that, if things do start to go wrong, that can be detected and Mr McGee corrected and helped; on the other hand, I agree with Mr Wilcox that if an ISO is too rigorous, that can be disheartening to a person who has been on conditional liberty and going very well, and one would not wish to impose something too harsh that actually moves things backwards rather than forwards.
Trying to achieve that balance is the approach that I have taken to the entirety of this dispute about conditions.
Of course, the statute speaks of "appropriate", an evaluative, normative judgment. Case law makes it clear that, in order to be appropriate, a condition need not be directly relevant to a particular problem: see State of New South Wales v Sotheren (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 754; Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28. Having said that, it cannot be a matter of simply unduly prophylactically circumscribing the life of a fellow citizen without good reason.
To repeat a little, I think there is a danger in being overly prescriptive whereby a person in the position of Mr McGee simply throws up their hands, and feels so ringed with restrictions as to lose any hope of leading a satisfying and satisfactory life in the community.
Applying that general approach, the first disputed condition is condition 5, with regard to electronic monitoring. Mr McGee is currently subject to that; but, having reflected on that, I do not think it is appropriate. I certainly do not think it is necessary, in light of the progress that has been made. I appreciate that the carjacking, well over a decade ago, was an explosion of violence. But I think that, if things were to go wrong in Mr McGee's life now, there would be a reasonably slow decline, and there would be other ways for the DSO to see that things are going wrong. I also think that there are other ways whereby what Mr McGee is actually doing can be monitored. I do not put Mr McGee in the category of someone who suffers from an impulsiveness that leads them perhaps to commit an offence very suddenly or opportunistically. I also think that that kind of imposition can have an adverse effect on rehabilitation.
To state things succinctly: I am not affirmatively satisfied that condition 5 is appropriate, and it will not be imposed.
Conditions 6, 7 and 8 relate to a schedule of movements. In the circumstances, although I believe that electronic monitoring goes too far, I do believe that, at this stage, a schedule of movements is appropriate. I appreciate that, at the moment, it is not being required by way of the discretion of the DSO, even though it is an available condition of the ESO imposed by Wilson J. I think that at this stage it is still appropriate for the DSO to have a very detailed idea of what it is that Mr McGee is doing throughout the week. I think it is also appropriate that, although there will not be electronic monitoring, there can be other ways of checking up that Mr McGee is being honest about doing what he says he will be doing. Finally, although I appreciate it is not thought to be required now, I think it would be a useful measure of structure if things did start to go wrong.
In short: opposed conditions 6, 7 and 8 will be imposed.
Condition 10 is a curfew. Again, that is not entirely rigid. It is subject to variation. I am told that the DSO has consented to variations; not just to accommodate work - the current employment of Mr McGee starts very early - but also to accommodate social events.
On the one hand, it is not the case that it has been alleged, for example, that over the years Mr McGee has spent an evening drinking, and in the early hours, for example, "glassed" someone in a hotel or inflicted other violence blind drunk. Even so, on the other hand, experience generally shows I think that things tend to go wrong more often during the evening than in the day. I also think that the point made by Ms Jones about socialising completely unrestrictedly with old associates, in particular people known from gaol or elsewhere who might have their own drug problems, could be very criminogenic. As well as that, I think, speaking generally, it is not inappropriate for this man to be, as he has been for months, focusing on work and focusing on a reasonably quite life in the evening.
I think that the curfew should still pertain. But I think it should be reduced, so that, for example, if Mr McGee wishes to go out to a restaurant and enjoy a slightly later night with his partner, he should be able to do that as a mature 37-year-old man rather than, prima facie, needing to be back at home by five to nine.
I think condition 10 should be imposed, but it will be altered to read between 11pm and 5am.
The next condition that is opposed is condition 17. It is said that, really, that is not required at this stage and it is simply too broad.
I think there is force in the submission of Ms Jones that there would be some employment positions, some volunteer work, and even some educational courses, that could expose Mr McGee to very negative influences. I gave the hypothetical example during our useful discussion of, for example, a job as a bouncer in Kings Cross. That is gainful employment; but I think, at this stage, although things are going very well, one would be troubled by that. I think there could also even be volunteer organisations or educational courses, although it is a little hard to bring them to mind, that could do more harm than good.
I think, to repeat myself, whenever anybody is battling a problem with prohibited drugs, one knows from experience that other people with the same difficulty can sometimes be bad company, and peer pressure can certainly play its role in relapse.
For all of those reasons, condition 17 will be imposed.
The position of the parties was that the decision with regard to condition 18 would follow condition 17. For that reason, condition 18 will also be imposed.
Condition 22 was opposed by Mr Wilcox on the basis that it was too rigorous, and any suggestion that Mr McGee might, for example, be ordered to go to a six month inpatient therapeutic rehabilitation centre would do more harm than good, to use my oft-repeated phrase.
I see the force in that, but that is not what condition 22 is speaking of. It is speaking of any reasonably directed programs and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and the need for the defendant to commit himself to those. That, of course, includes outpatient programs. It can include group therapy. It can include one-on-one counselling. It can also include, of course, the opioid replacement therapy from which Mr McGee is currently gaining benefit.
I think that prohibited drugs in the life of this man - to repeat myself, he commenced smoking cannabis at the age of twelve and graduated to amphetamines at the age of seventeen - have played a very, very big part in all that has gone wrong. I think it is appropriate that his DSO can make reasonable directions about that topic, even if they are quite rigorous directions.
For that reason, condition 22 will be imposed as sought.
The next condition that is the subject of dispute is condition 32, which is to do with digital devices. The point was made on his behalf that this man's offending is nothing to do with the digital world. In contrast to that, Ms Jones for the plaintiff submitted that at the least one might be troubled about the sourcing of prohibited drugs online.
I think the point here is more fundamental than that. In 2022, even people who did not grow up as so-called digital natives spend a great deal of their life online, and communicate with other individuals very largely online. I think, realistically, for a man of 37 not to be subject to reasonably rigorous access by his DSO to his online activities would simply render the ISO, as a monitoring exercise, at the least incomplete.
For that reason, condition 32 will be imposed as sought.
The final disputed condition is condition 45, with regard to which counsel for the defendant has proposed an alternative, whereby the "mandatory breaching" of doctor/patient confidentiality would be restricted to those who provide the defendant with treatment for drugs and, as needs be, alcohol.
One appreciates entirely that to interfere with doctor/patient confidentiality has its drawbacks. It may lead a person to be reticent in being entirely honest with their own doctor. But I think the point is soundly made here by Ms Jones that the current injury to Mr McGee's wrist (which has led him not to be able to work at the car wash, but despite which he has been able to obtain work in a fruit shop) is a good example of everyone needing to be informed as to precisely what has happened and what is to happen.
By way of example, one would want to know, I think, whether or not Mr McGee is being entirely frank about the gravity of that injury. If, speaking entirely hypothetically, the defendant announced that it was interfering with his work in the fruit shop and it meant that he could not work at all, I think that others should be in a position just to double-check that that is correct, even though - contrary to the thesis of Mr Wilcox - in itself the wrist injury is nothing to do with drugs or alcohol.
More fundamentally, although the defendant has needed pain relief for that injury, he (very wisely, with respect) is avoiding strong pain relief, for fear that that might rear its ugly head as a dependence. It is notorious that in the United States there has been a plague of opioid dependence borne of prescription drugs.
Again, in the circumstances here, although I fully appreciate the drawbacks of intrusion into a doctor's surgery and the confidentiality that normally exists there, I think that the wrist injury and, in particular, what medication is being prescribed for it and taken for it, is a perfect example of the need for more information rather than less.
For that reason, condition 45 as sought by the plaintiff will be imposed.
[5]
Conclusion and orders
In short, I am satisfied that a short renewable ISO should be imposed upon Mr McGee, because I am satisfied that the contingent, statutory fulcrum test has been made out.
I am also satisfied that a number of disputed conditions should be imposed. Having said that, I have done my best to strike a balance, on the one hand, between rigor designed to be protective; and, on the other hand, flexibility designed to be rehabilitative.
Accordingly, as soon as reasonably practicable, my Associate will provide the parties with those orders, and they will also be posted to Justice Link, as follows:
An order pursuant to section 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 ("the Act"):
a. Appointing either two qualified psychiatrists or two registered psychologists, or a combination of one of each, to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court;
b. Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.
An order:
a. pursuant to ss. 10A and 10C(1) of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order commencing on 28 December 2022 ("the interim supervision order") for a period of 28 days from that date;
b. pursuant to s. 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the interim supervision order, comply with the conditions set out below.
Ancillary relief
An order that access to the Court's file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar, so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
Charlie McGee
In these conditions:
"CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW.
"Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services
"Defendant" means Charlie McGee the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.
"Electronic Identity" means each of the following:
an email address,
a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,
a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,
any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.
"DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.
"NSWPF" means NSW Police Force.
"Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).
"Search" includes:
A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and
A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched.
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.
Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.
The defendant must not engage in any threatening, intimidating or abusive behaviour towards CSNSW or electronic monitoring staff involved in his supervision that would cause the staff member to fear for their safety and/or interfere with or impede supervision.
Electronic Monitoring
Deleted
Schedule of Movements
If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, he must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.
The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant's address or living arrangements.
The defendant must be at his approved address between 11PM and 5AM unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.
The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.
The defendant must not permit any person to remain past midnight at his approved address without the prior approval of a DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.
The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by a DSO.
Part D: Employment, finance and education
The defendant must not start on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.
The defendant must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment if practicable before the change occurs or otherwise at his next interview with a DSO.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not use prohibited drugs, or abuse drugs unlawfully obtained.
The defendant must not possess or use alcohol without prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant must submit to testing for drugs and alcohol as directed by a DSO.
The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.
Part F: Non-association
Associations with Others
The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.
Without limiting condition 23, the defendant must not:
a. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
b. associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.
If the defendant starts a close personal relationship with a person, he must tell a DSO and must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to the other person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. The DSO, after providing the defendant with an opportunity to disclose to the other person the criminal history that gave rise to the defendant's status as a serious offender, may disclose such criminal history to the other person, if the DSO is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the community.
Deleted.
Part G: Weapons
The defendant must not possess or use any of the following:
a. a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996;
b. a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998, or
c. a spear gun.
Without limiting or altering condition 27, the defendant must not possess or use any of the following, without a DSO's prior approval:
a. a knife, machete, sword or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened;
b. any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person; or
c. anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.
Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user-names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.
The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "Charlie McGee" or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 29 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.
The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this order.
The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by a DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet.
The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.
The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant's possession and advise the DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.
Part I: Search and seizure
35A. If a DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search is required, either to monitor the defendant's compliance with this Order, or for the safety and welfare of any other person, or because a DSO suspects the defendant of having engaged in behaviour or conducted associated with an increased risk of committing a serious offence, the defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is travelling or which is under his effective control, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility, and the seizure of any items object located during the search.
35B. The defendant must submit to the search of any computer, electronic or communication device in his possession or under his control and to the seizure of such devices.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order.
Part J: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from "Charlie McGee" or use any other name without notifying a DSO.
The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without first notifying a DSO.
The defendant must let a DSO photograph him.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.
Part K: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.
The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support and treatment that a DSO tells him to attend.
The defendant must take all medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners only in the manner prescribed.
If the defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, the defendant is to notify the DSO within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication.
The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with a DSO, where considered to be relevant to his ongoing risk management.
The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO and CSNSW, where considered to be relevant to his ongoing risk management.
[6]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 15 December 2022