Pursuant to a summons filed on 31 January 2024, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks orders against the defendant, Christian Paul Keech, under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ("the Act").
The plaintiff's application for preliminary orders has already been determined. On 2 May 2024, Yehia J made preliminary orders and an interim supervision order ("ISO") (State of NSW v Keech [2024] NSWSC 408).
As part of the ISO, her Honour imposed a number of conditions sought by the plaintiff, although not all. The defendant has previously been subject to an extended supervision order ("ESO") for a period of 5 years commencing 15 December 2015 (see State of NSW v Keech [2015] NSWSC 1898).
Unfortunately, the defendant has been convicted of breaching that ESO on a number of occasions. He is currently in custody, bail having been refused, in respect of an alleged breach of the ISO said to have occurred on 6 July 2024. He has entered a plea of guilty to that offence and is due to be sentenced on 25 September 2024. In the circumstances, unless there is a further application for bail, the defendant will remain in custody until at least 25 September 2024.
The defendant is subject to the regime imposed by the Act as he has been convicted of a number of offences which would satisfy the meaning of "a serious sex offence" under the Act, including:
1. one count of aggravated indecent assault with the victim being under the age of 16, contrary to s 61M of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (offending on 25 November 2007);
2. a further three counts of aggravated indecent assault, the victim being under the age of 16 (offending on 4, 11, 17 December 2009); and
3. a further count of indecent assault, the person being under the age of 16 (offending on 5 and 19 April 2012).
Since being released from custody and first being subject to an ESO in 2015, the defendant has not committed any further serious sex offences. His offending is limited to breaching the conditions of the ESO.
The defendant did not oppose the imposition of an ISO and does not oppose the imposition of an ESO. However, I must still be independently satisfied that an ESO should be imposed and satisfied of the conditions and terms of that ESO.
There is a dispute between the parties as to the conditions which should be imposed. The plaintiff maintains that some of the conditions which were not imposed as part of the ISO nevertheless should be imposed as part of the ESO. The defendant disputes this.
Prior to the final hearing, and in accordance with the preliminary orders, the defendant was examined by Dr Sathish Dayalan, who prepared reports dated 24 July 2024 and 5 August 2024, and Dr Katie Seidler, who prepared a report dated 25 July 2024 and 1 August 2024. Dr Dayalan and Dr Seidler gave evidence concurrently on the final hearing.
The parties also relied on a number of affidavits as follows:
1. affidavit of Nicholas McArdle affirmed 30 January 2024;
2. affidavit of Jessie Slattery-McDonald affirmed 28 March 2024;
3. affidavit of Jessie Slattery-McDonald affirmed 31 July 2024;
4. affidavit of Nicholas McArdle affirmed 15 August 2024;
5. affidavit of Joseph Harding affirmed 22 March 2024; and
6. affidavit of Tracy Reynolds affirmed 2 April 2024.
Exhibited to the affidavit of Mr McArdle affirmed 30 January 2024 is a large bundle of documents including risk assessment reports, treatment reports, case notes from the NSW Department of Corrective Services and records relating to the defendant's offending.
The parties also relied on a joint statement of agreed facts.
During the hearing of the matter, Mr Dalla-Pozza appeared for the plaintiff and Ms Kennedy appeared for the defendant. I received helpful written and oral submissions from both parties.
The focus of the hearing was on the conditions which would be imposed, although I must be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under an ESO prior to considering the conditions which should be imposed.
[2]
Legislative scheme
As set out in s 3 of the Act, the primary object of the Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders, so as to ensure the safety and the protection of the community. Another object of the Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation. In making any orders under the Act, I must have regard to the objects of the Act.
Section 5B of the Act specifies the circumstances in which the Court may make an ESO:
5B Making of extended supervision orders - unacceptable risk
The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if:
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
Being satisfied to a high degree of probability means something beyond "more probable than not". The existence of the risk, that is, the likelihood of the defendant committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof although not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt (Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 at [21] per Mason P, Giles and Hodgson JJA).
The meaning of "unacceptable risk" was considered in Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636 at [50]-[51] per Beazley P ("Lynn"):
"As the respondent pointed out in its submissions, by reference to dictionary definitions, the word 'unacceptable' requires context in which, or parameters against which, the 'unacceptable' risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is 'so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed'. The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym 'acceptable'. Something is 'acceptable' if it is 'tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters'.
What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the 'risk' that the offender poses 'of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision'. The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made."
Importantly, the impact that an ESO may have on the defendant's liberty is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of assessing whether the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision, but the Court may take that factor into account in determining whether to exercise its discretion pursuant to s 9 of the Act (Lynn at [44], [56]-[58] per Beazley P, [126]-[128] per Basten JA and [148] per Gleeson JA.
Section 9(2) of the Act requires that in determining whether or not to make an ESO, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Court.
Further, in determining whether or not to make an ESO, I must have regard to the factors set out in s 9(3) of the Act.
[3]
Threshold requirements
The defendant accepts that the threshold requirements set out in ss 5B(a), (b) and (c) of the Act are satisfied.
The defendant is a person who was serving a sentence for a serious offence and is a supervised offender within the meaning of s 5I of the Act. Further, an application was made in accordance with s 5I.
For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under the supervision of an ESO and s 5B(d) of the Act is thus also satisfied.
Having regard to the focus of the issues between the parties, it is not necessary that I merely recite all of the evidence presented on the final hearing. I have considered all of the evidence and have regard to the factors set out in s 9(3) of the Act.
[4]
Defendant's personal circumstances
The defendant's personal circumstances are set out in the agreed facts as well as many of the documents including medical reports and case notes.
The defendant is 48 years old. He is subject to an ISO although he is currently in custody. He is also subject to a community corrections order ("CCO") which will expire on 18 December 2026. He has been in custody since 25 July 2024 and is charged with failing to comply with the conditions of the ISO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He was subject to the previous ESO but the ESO has been suspended on a number of occasions due to his return to custody. Because of that, the ESO only expired on 12 March 2024.
The defendant is the eldest of three children. He was born in Mudgee in New South Wales. From an early age he experienced significant physical, emotional, developmental and behavioural problems which required specialist intervention. He was given hormonal supplements in early adolescence in order to facilitate delayed puberty. He was bullied in school and in due course would experience rejection from sexual partners and feelings of sexual inadequacy which have persisted throughout his life. This has led to him associating emotionally with young children who he felt were more appealing.
At 13 he turned to drugs, in particular marijuana. His drug use escalated in his late teens when he commenced using amphetamines and other drugs such as hallucinogens. In his early 20s he began using heroin, but that ceased after a friend overdosed. He married at the age of 24 and had 2 children but the marriage only lasted 3 years. He admits being abusive to his wife and continuing to sexually offend during the marriage.
The defendant has a long history of sex offences, not all of which would constitute serious sex offences within the meaning of the Act. The offending commenced in 2000 and has included:
1. conviction on 3 counts of using a carriage service in an offensive manner relating to leaving sexually explicit messages and threats of rape on the answering machines of 3 teenage girls;
2. committing acts of indecency and inciting persons to commit acts of indecency contrary to s 61N(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (September - November 2000);
3. failing to comply with reporting obligations under the Child Protection Register which included failing to report a change of address and loitering in a public park, which included a playground, and at a library (May 2003); and
4. peeping over a public toilet cubicle (18 May 2005).
In 2007, the defendant commenced the offending conduct which constitutes "serious sex offences" under the Act.
On 25 November 2007, he approached a 12-year-old girl and felt her buttocks and then followed her around the shopping mall. He was arrested and charged with aggravated and indecent assault of a person under the age of 16 contrary to s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act.
On 4 December 2009, he approached a 15-year-old girl who was dressed in a school uniform and touched her buttocks. On 11 December 2009, he approached a 13-year-old girl and touched her on the buttocks. He was again charged with assault of a person under the age of 16. He was convicted and sentenced to cumulative terms amounting to three years imprisonment.
On 5 April 2012, whilst on parole, he approached a 15-year-old girl who was shopping with her mother and lightly squeezed her buttocks. He again brushed up against her. On 19 April 2012, he followed the same victim. He was arrested on that day, charged and subsequently convicted again of indecent assault contrary to s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 16 months commencing 4 May 2014 and concluding on 3 September 2015, with a non-parole period of 10 months, concluding 3 March 2015.
On 10 December 2015, Hulme J imposed an ESO for a period of 5 years. He has, since being released from prison in respect of the serious sex offending, breached his ESO a total of 15 times on 7 different occasions. The first two breaches involved the use of drugs. Other breaches involved maintaining contact with convicted sex offenders. He has been found with pornography on his phone and messages in which he and a person known to him shared sexual fantasies about his 5-year-old niece.
On 3 November 2023, he approached 2 children aged 18 months and 3 years old playing in the common area of his unit complex. He was convicted and sentenced to a CCO which is due to expire on 18 December 2026.
Finally, it is alleged that on 25 July 2024 he knowingly had contact with a convicted sex offender contrary to condition 24 of his ISO. On 6 August 2024, he entered a plea of guilty and the matter is listed for sentence on 25 September 2024.
Since 2000, the defendant has engaged in various types of sexual offending, involving young children and teenage girls. The offending is as I have described. It has involved approaching them, talking to them, making sexualised comments to them and in some cases grabbing their buttocks.
All of his offending has occurred in public places. There is no suggestion that he has ever perpetrated violence or engaged in higher level offending such as sexual intercourse without consent. That is not to in any way minimise his offending, but it is important to understand the nature of his offending when considering what conditions might be imposed.
Further, he has also shown himself incapable of complying with the conditions of his existing ESO/ISO. In particular, he has been unable to refrain from placing himself in positions where young children are or having contact with other convicted sex offenders.
The defendant lives in rental accommodation in the Central Coast. He receives a disability support pension. He is receiving that pension on the basis that he suffers from anxiety and depression.
[5]
Expert medical reports
In accordance with the preliminary orders made by Yehia J, the defendant has been examined by Dr Sathish Dayalan, a forensic psychiatrist, and Dr Katie Seidler, a clinical and forensic psychiatrist. Their opinions are generally similar.
The history obtained by the doctors is consistent with the history I have outlined.
The defendant reported that in more recent times, and prior to being arrested, he spent most of his time playing games on his phone. He was often bored. He admitted that from about the age of 14, he engaged in conduct such as making demands of females through letters and phone conversations for sex and that he had been touching females sexually in public places and on public transport.
He denied any intent to rape anyone and denied any intent to carry out any threats. He acknowledged voyeuristic tendencies from the age of 23. He acknowledged that from time to time he had experienced sexual urges to touch a female and acted on that impulse. He also confirmed that he had not committed any offending since 2013, suggesting that he had been put on medication (depot) whilst in gaol and that there had also been a shift in his attitude towards sexual offending.
He admitted that he initially did not want to be on an ISO and that he had struggled to adhere to the schedule of conditions. He disputed any diagnosis of paedophilia and did not have an adequate understanding of his psychiatric condition. He was willing to engage in further treatment.
According to both experts, the defendant suffers from paedophilia (non-exclusive type) and is sexually attracted to children as per the criterion in DSM-5. There is some support for the diagnosis of exhibitionism, voyeurism, frotteurism, and fetishism. Dr Dayalan considers his growth and sexual development has been adversely affected by hormone deficiency in childhood. Dr Dayalan also considers that the defendant suffers from an antisocial personality disorder. On the STATIC-99R instrument, the defendant scored 8 (Dr Dayalan) and 7 (Dr Seidler) out of 10 in terms of risk factors which placed him well above the average risk level.
Similarly, the dynamic risk factors relevant to the defendant's risk formulation were significant, resulting in a high loading of static and dynamic risk factors associated with sexual recidivism. Dr Dayalan considered that the defendant does pose a risk of committing a further serious sex offence. Further, lack of supervision in the community would increase the risk of non-compliance with treatment, relapse into use of substances and association with other sex offenders, increasing the risk of him committing a further serious offence.
Dr Seidler came to somewhat similar conclusions. Dr Seidler suggested that the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that the defendant is a persistent and deviant sexual offender who has a problematic and enduring sexual interest in teenage girls and frotteurism. For much of his life since adolescence he has demonstrated little ability to manage his sexual arousal and behaviour and this has led to repeated offending, sanction, treatment and control.
However, Dr Seidler considered there had been some positive change in recent years. This is primarily a function of maturity in addition to consistent treatment with anti-libidinal medication. The reduction in sex drive has allowed the defendant to better utilise offence focused treatment such that he has been able to develop and, more importantly, utilise management strategies.
According to Dr Seidler, the defendant's history indicates that he has various deviant interests, and he has offended in diverse ways including offending in ways that are both contact and non-contact in nature. The most likely victim of any future sexual offence is an adolescent girl who is a stranger to him. A less likely scenario is that he may sexually abuse a young female child or another female. Sexual deviancy has been chronic for him. He previously suffered from a substance use disorder.
Both the experts support the imposition of an ESO. According to both, the defendant's risk factors are well above average.
A similar conclusion is reached in the risk assessment report completed by Gillian Tulloh, a senior psychologist, and Kate Harle, an acting chief psychologist. They conclude that the defendant's risk of sexual reoffending is well above average relative to other men who have offended sexually. He should be subject to intensive supervision, strict monitoring and case management by Corrective Services NSW, which would include ongoing psychological treatment, restriction in social contacts, monitoring, supervision wearing electric monitoring and receiving anti-libidinal medication.
[6]
Conclusion on unacceptable risk
In addition to the evidence to which I have referred, I have had regard to all the other extensive evidence made available, including evidence relating to his earlier offending, sentencing and psychological assessments.
Having regard to all of the evidence, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if he is not kept under supervision under an ESO. As I have indicated, the prerequisites for the making of an ESO are satisfied in terms of the threshold questions and the finding of unacceptable risk. However, I still have a discretion as to whether to make the ESO. Having regard to the risk level in this matter, I am satisfied that I should exercise my discretion and make the orders for an ESO.
[7]
The conditions
The parties have come to substantial agreement on the conditions which should be imposed but some remain in dispute. The plaintiff presses some of the conditions which were rejected by Yehia J when making the orders for an ISO. The plaintiff does not press other conditions.
I am generally satisfied that the conditions are appropriate for the purposes of addressing the defendant's risk factors and informing the defendant what he needs to do to comply with the conditions as well as assisting in providing support to the defendant in terms of direction and supervision that would reduce his risk factors.
The conditions which I impose are attached to this judgment.
I will now deal only with the disputed conditions.
[8]
Conditions 5, 6 and 7
The plaintiff seeks conditions to the effect that, if directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) which must be provided three days before the week is due to commence. Further, if the defendant wants to change anything he must notify the Departmental Supervising Officer ("DSO") about the change 24 hours in advance and he must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
The defendant opposes these conditions. Yehia J declined to impose the conditions in the ISO. Neither Dr Dayalan nor Dr Seidler support the need for such conditions. Dr Dayalan suggested that the imposition of such conditions might be counterproductive. Despite counsel for the plaintiff putting a series of alternative assumptions, Dr Dayalan did not alter his view, continuing to suggest that the imposition of such conditions could be more harmful rather than significantly reducing the risk of re-offending. It was put to Dr Dayalan that those responsible should have a discretion to impose a schedule of movements in the future should it be required. He agreed that if such a discretion was used judiciously it may be appropriate but said there was always a concern that it might be used in circumstances in which it may not be warranted.
Dr Seidler adopted a similar view, suggesting that, in general terms, scheduling movements does not do anything to reduce the risk of a serious sex offence. Dr Seidler considered that a schedule of movements might reduce the risk of a further breach offence, suggesting that perhaps providing structure around the defendant might help him reduce the risk of breaching existing orders.
However, Dr Seidler emphasised that there was no inherent value to a schedule of movements in terms of reducing the risk of further sexual offending.
It is important that the defendant not be set up to fail. Plainly, he has problems complying with existing orders in some respects. Imposing a schedule of movements might increase the risk of further breach, albeit according to the experts, it does not have any effect in terms of reducing the risk of further sexual offending.
His earlier sexual offending has been opportunistic. It has not been dependent on where he might be at any particular time. There is no evidence that he tends to seek out particular persons or any evidence that he acts violently.
I do not consider that a schedule of movements and associated conditions should be imposed.
[9]
Conditions 11 and 12
The plaintiff seeks conditions that the defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or alternative approved addresses and must promptly notify the DSO of any visitor entering or remaining at his approved address. The plaintiff submits that these conditions facilitate monitoring of the defendant's intended movements in advance and give the DSO advance notice so that any risk assessments can be concluded prior to him residing at another address or inviting someone home.
Again, Dr Dayalan and Dr Seidler do not fully support the imposition of such conditions, mainly for the reason that all of the offending occurred in public places rather than in the home. There is no earlier incidence of the defendant inviting children home or forcing them to come with him. His offending is not associated with violence. Further, Dr Dayalan was concerned that imposing such conditions might again increase the risk of a breach of the conditions and a return to incarceration, such that it would not be helpful for his rehabilitation.
In addition, imposing such restrictions might impair his ability to develop more social supports. If he is not able to go to a person's place or have someone over without approval, it would increase his difficulty in making friends. Dr Seidler emphasised that the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour and the defendant has never committed an offence by having someone over to his house or going to someone else's house. Dr Seidler did not accept that the behaviour that is sought to be controlled by conditions 11 and 12 could be related to his offending behaviour.
In my view, the conditions do not assist in reducing risk and should not be imposed.
[10]
Condition 16
The plaintiff seeks a condition prohibiting the defendant from attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material or providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment without the prior approval of the DSO. This condition was imposed as part of the ISO.
Dr Seidler suggests that this condition was of questionable utility in terms of risk management of the defendant, there being no evidence of any prior offending that relates to either his use of sexual services or accessing material on the internet. Dr Seidler felt that it was a long bow to suggest that the use of such services increased the risk of sexual offending. Dr Seidler also agreed that in circumstances in which the services are legal there is a risk that, in restricting access for such a person, that might increase the risk of someone such as the defendant turning to other activities, that is some form of sexual offending.
As such, the restriction might increase rather than reduce the risk.
Similarly, Dr Dayalan did not support the imposition of the preclusion but suggested that it would be useful to have some sort of monitoring so as to determine what services he was accessing. The plaintiff then adopted an altered condition to the effect that the defendant must notify a DSO prior to attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material or providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment.
I remain uncertain as to how that condition would work in practice. If the defendant was not required to seek approval, then he could not be subject to a breach order if he went without approval. On the other hand, if he is required to notify that he was going, seemingly without seeking approval, then he could be subject to a breach if he went without notifying.
In the end, I accept the defendant's submission that the evidence does not rise to a level sufficient to justify the imposition of the condition.
[11]
Conditions 17 and 18
The plaintiff seeks conditions to the effect that the defendant must not start any job, work or educational course without the prior approval of a DSO and must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment, if practical, before the change occurs. I raised with the parties the qualification of the condition "if it is practicable to do so". In my view, the defendant should be permitted to obtain work and start work as and when he is able to do so and the requirement of notifying a DSO in advance should not be an impediment to that. However, it would be important that a DSO be aware of where he is working. Condition 17 should be amended so that it reads as follows:
"The defendant must not start, on his own initiative, any job, volunteer work or education course without the prior approval of a DSO, provided it is reasonably practical to obtain approval prior to commencing the job, volunteer work or education course."
Subject to that qualification, conditions 17 and 18 will be included.
[12]
Condition 23
The parties have put forward differently worded non-association conditions. The reason for this is really to ensure that the defendant would not be accidentally in breach of the order through some form of necessary contact. An example was given of the defendant purchasing something at the supermarket and having contact with a child in doing so. The second reason for the difference in the wording is that the defendant submits that the wording of this condition allows him to make appropriate decisions in advance and notify a DSO of those decisions.
Again, it is important to emphasise that none of the earlier offending has been committed against children known to him. As I said, it is opportunistic. The imposition of a condition other than as proposed by the defendant would not serve to reduce the risk and again increases the risk of the defendant being unable to comply. The condition proposed by the defendant should be included.
[13]
Condition 28
The plaintiff seeks to impose a condition requiring the defendant to obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation. The plaintiff submits that this will permit monitoring of potential settings which may give rise to high-risk scenarios.
At first impression, this may be an unnecessary condition. However, it seems unlikely that the defendant will ever be joining a club without intending or planning to do so. I accept the plaintiff's submission that such a condition would permit monitoring of potential settings which may give rise to high-risk scenarios. The condition is not onerous. I doubt that it could be said that it is setting the defendant up to fail. It is a condition which will serve to reduce the risk of reoffending. In the circumstances, I impose condition 28.
[14]
Condition 34
The plaintiff seeks a condition that the defendant not use any encoded or encrypted messaging application or service. The plaintiff wishes to monitor the defendant's access to the Internet and other electronic communication. I accept that monitoring of the use of such applications may assist the DSO in assessing the defendant's risk and undertaking proper risk management but, having regard to applications such as WhatsApp which is an encrypted messaging application, I consider it unduly onerous to impose a blanket preclusion on the use of such an application. Condition 34 will read:
"The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service without the prior approval of a DSO and further must make his use of such an application available for inspection by a DSO on request."
[15]
Condition 36
Condition 36 proposed by the plaintiff is in similar terms. Again, it is not a preclusion on the defendant joining social networking services or applications, but merely requiring the defendant to provide prior notice to a DSO. I agree it should be imposed.
[16]
Condition 39
The plaintiff seeks a condition requiring the defendant to provide consent for his telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO. I do not understand how that could reduce the risks. It will not be included.
[17]
Condition 42
The plaintiff seeks to preclude the defendant from accessing any form of pornography. Dr Dayalan and Dr Seidler do not support the imposition of such a condition. It places a restriction on the defendant accessing legal material and material which is generally available to other members of the community. Further, there is no evidence linking his prior offending with him accessing such material on the Internet. The need for conditions must be evidence-based. In my view, there is no evidence justifying the imposition of condition 42 and it will not be included.
[18]
Condition 44
The plaintiff seeks an order precluding the defendant from significantly changing his appearance without the prior approval of the DSO. Again, the plaintiff says this ensures general monitoring of the defendant. The defendant seeks a variation of the condition so that it reads:
"The defendant must notify a DSO of any significant changes in his appearance, including a description of the appearance, location and size of any tattoos the defendant gets or has removed."
I understand why the plaintiff may wish to know about any significant change in appearance as part of the monitoring and enforcement process which the plaintiff must undertake. However, again, the proposition that the defendant cannot change his appearance in any meaningful way without prior approval is really setting the defendant up to fail. Further, there is no evidence that this is something that the defendant has ever done in the past as if to avoid detection, or as part of some elaborate plan. For example, if the defendant wishes to grow a beard, he should not be required to notify a DSO in advance of not shaving for a while. However, he should be required to notify a DSO that it is happening. The condition suggested by the defendant will be imposed.
[19]
Condition 51
The plaintiff seeks a condition requiring the defendant to agree to share with his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners all information regarding his earlier sexual offending.
I do not agree that the defendant should be required to do so. In any event, the parties reached agreement as to the wording of the condition, the effect of which is to limit the obligation to those practitioners who are treating the defendant with respect to his sexual offending.
Condition 51 will now read:
"The defendant must agree to any of his treatment service providers and healthcare professionals, who are treating him with respect to his sexual offending, sharing information, including reports of his progress and attendance and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO."
[20]
Orders
I make the following orders.
1. An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order ("the extended supervision order") for a period of three years.
2. An order pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) directing the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule attached hereto.
3. Access to the Court's file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
4. An order pursuant to s 13(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) that the interim supervision order made on 21 July 2024 be revoked.
[21]
SCHEDULE A
SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
In these conditions:
"Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).
"Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services
"CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW.
"Defendant" means Christian Keech, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.
"DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.
"Electronic Identity" means each of the following:
a. an email address,
b. a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,
c. a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,
d. any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.
"Material" includes:
a. any written or printed material;
b. any picture, painting or drawing;
c. any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;
d. any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;
e. any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and
f. any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.
"NSWPF" means NSW Police Force.
"Search" includes:
a. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and
b. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched.
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.
Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.
Electronic Monitoring
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.
Schedule of Movements
[Deleted].
[Deleted].
[Deleted].
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant's address or living arrangements.
[Deleted].
The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
[Deleted].
[Deleted].
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.
The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district a DSO directs him not to frequent or visit on a basis that is reasonably related to his risk profile.
Without limiting condition 8 above, the defendant must not go to any of the following without the prior approval of a DSO:
a. Day-care centres, pre-schools and schools;
b. Amusement parlours, amusement parks and theme parks;
c. Cinemas;
d. Libraries and museums;
e. Camping grounds and caravan parks;
f. Children's playgrounds, parks, and areas with play equipment provided for the use of children;
g. Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities;
h. Concerts, theatre shows, movies, events and activities intended for the entertainment of children;
i. Residences where the defendant knows that persons aged under 18 years ordinarily reside; and
j. Internet cafes or other businesses which provide public access to the internet either for payment or for no charge (other than employment agencies).
[Deleted].
Part D: Employment, finance and education
The defendant must not start, on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or education course without the prior approval of a DSO, provided it is reasonably practical to obtain approval prior to commencing the job, volunteer work or education course.
The defendant must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment if practicable before the change occurs or otherwise at his next interview with a DSO.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not possess or use illicit drugs, or prescription drugs that are not prescribed to him.
The defendant must comply with any reasonable directions from a DSO about his use of alcohol.
The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as required by a DSO.
The defendant must comply with all reasonable direction from a DSO about participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities.
Part F: Non-association
Association with Children
The defendant is not to associate or make contact with any person he knows, or ought to reasonably know, is under 18 years other than:
a) Incidental contact in a public place; or
b) With prior notification to a DSO of the names and dates of birth of the children; the date, location and circumstances of the contact; and the name and contact details of an adult who will supervise the contact and is aware of the defendant's criminal history.
Associations with Others (not children)
The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.
Without limiting condition 24, the defendant must not:
a. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
b. associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.
[Deleted].
[Deleted].
The defendant must obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation
Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).
The defendant must not use any alias, electronic identity, log-in name, name other than Christian KEECH or any email address other than those known to a DSO. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet and advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers.
The defendant must only use an electronic device which has the ability to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.
The defendant must provide the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names as well as any relevant passwords, pin codes and pass codes used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.
The defendant must provide a DSO with all passwords, pin codes and pass codes used to access all electronic devices, electronic applications, internet sites and communication platforms of any kind.
The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service without the prior approval of a DSO and further must make his use of such an application available for inspection by the DSO on request.
The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication if discovered on the defendant's electronic devices or accounts as a result of a search or a remote inspection.
The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet-based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi-player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services.
The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.
The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO.
[Deleted].
Part H: Search and seizure
The defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is traveling or which is under his effective control, any computer, electronic and communication device, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order.
Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
[Deleted].
Part J: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from Christian KEECH or use any other name without notifying a DSO.
The defendant must notify a DSO of any significant changes in his appearance, including a description of the appearance, location and size of any tattoos the defendant gets or has removed.
The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.
Part K: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must comply with all reasonable direction from a DSO about participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities.
[Deleted].
The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners only in the manner prescribed.
The defendant must notify a DSO immediately if he ceases to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.
The defendant must agree to any of his treatment service providers and healthcare professionals, who are treating him with respect to his sexual offending, sharing information, including reports of his progress and attendance and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO.
The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.
The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any mental health care professionals and drug and alcohol counsellors who are treating him with respect to his risk of sexual offending.
[22]
Amendments
08 October 2024 - Orders amended in accordance with the consent orders made on 25 September 2024.
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Decision last updated: 08 October 2024