State of New South Wales v Fuller-Lyons
[2014] NSWCA 424
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Court of Appeal (NSW)
Decision date
2014-11-14
Before
McColl JA, Macfarlan JA, Beech-Jones J
Catchwords
- 214 CLR 118 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8
- 101 CLR 298 Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (12 paragraphs)
HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] On 29 January 2001 the respondent, Corey Fuller-Lyons, who was then 8 years of age, fell at Dora Creek near Morisset from an intercity train that was travelling to Newcastle at about 100 kilometres per hour. Tragically, he sustained severe injuries. In the present proceedings he sued the State of New South Wales, as operator of the train, for damages as a result of its alleged negligence. By judgment of 15 November 2013, Beech-Jones J of the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court upheld Corey's claim. His Honour found that it was likely that Corey's body had prevented the doors of the train from closing and locking when the train left Morisset station, and that Corey fell as he attempted to open one of those doors. His Honour also found that when the train left Morisset station, Corey had at least an arm, a leg and part of his torso protruding from the train doors and that this should have been observed by the State's Customer Service Attendant ("CSA") who was on duty at the station at the relevant time. His Honour therefore held that the State was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. His Honour was unable to conclude whether Corey had become unwittingly trapped or had intentionally interfered with the doors, but accepted the denials of Corey's brothers (with whom he was travelling) of any observation of Corey's fall and any knowledge of how it occurred. Held, allowing the appeal (per Macfarlan JA; McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing): (1) As the primary judge found that he could not give any weight to Corey's evidence by reason of his cognitive impairment, there was no direct evidence of how Corey came to fall from the train. A finding as to how that occurred therefore needed to be based on inferences. Inferences are reasonable deductions from proven facts and are to be distinguished from mere conjecture, although the dividing line will often be difficult to identify ([30]). Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; 49 NSWLR 262, applied. (2) In an action for negligence, the plaintiff fails unless the evidence supports a positive inference implying negligence. This inference must arise as an affirmative conclusion from the circumstances proved in evidence. The facts proved must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degree of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture ([31]). Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298, applied. (3) There is no reason to exclude the possibility that, when the train was about to leave Morisset station, Corey used an object to keep the doors open to a sufficient extent to enable him to insert at least his shoulder between the doors ([34]). Furthermore, it is possible that the wedge that initially kept the doors from closing was Corey's shoulder, arm and leg. These possible mechanisms for preventing the doors from closing did not necessarily involve a significant part of Corey's body protruding from the train in such a way that it would, or should, have been visible to the CSA on the platform ([36]). (4) There is no reason to suppose that Corey did not have available to him an object that was sturdy enough to prevent the doors from closing. It was not for the State to prove what the boys did or did not have with them or to otherwise negative reasonable possibilities. The onus of proof was on the plaintiff. It was incumbent on him to show that there were no other reasonable hypotheses of equal or greater probability than that upon which he relied ([41]). (5) These possibilities are no less likely than that found by the primary judge ([37], [45]). Accordingly, the evidence did not warrant an affirmative conclusion that Corey's body was protruding significantly from the train doors when the train left Morisset station ([46]). As this was, subject to his proposed notice of contention, the only circumstance in which Corey contended that a reasonable person in the position of the State or its employees would have taken action that would have avoided his fall, Corey did not prove that the State or its employees were negligent ([46]). (6) The respondent should be refused leave to file a proposed notice of contention asserting that the State's employees were negligent, even if Corey's body was not protruding significantly from the train doors, by allowing the train to leave Morisset station without all of its doors being closed and locked. That further contention, if allowed to be put, would be bound to fail ([54]). (7) The primary judge's acceptance of the evidence of Corey's brothers that they were not involved in, and did not observe, Corey's fall was not contrary to "incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony", "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences" ([60]-[61], [63]-[67]). In light of the passage of over 12 years between the incident and the trial, there could have been no reasonable expectation that the brothers' evidence about details of their trip other than their (lack of) involvement in or observation of Corey's fall would be accurate. The primary judge would have been alive to this possibility in assessing their evidence ([61], [63], [66]). Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118, applied. (8) The State is not entitled to have the primary judgment set aside on the ground of denial of procedural fairness. If the State suffered any prejudice by the supposedly late formulation of the case ultimately found by the primary judge, it had the opportunity to seek to have that prejudice overcome by an adjournment or other indulgence. It is bound by its forensic decision not to avail itself of that opportunity ([69]-[70]).