State of New South Wales v Cruse
[2013] NSWSC 1733
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2013-12-05
Before
Davies J
Catchwords
- 198 A Crim R 149 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206
- 176 A Crim R 110 State of New South Wales v Brookes [2008] NSWSC 150 State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (6 paragraphs)
Judgment 1This is the preliminary hearing of proceedings which seek an order under s 9 Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006. The Plaintiff seeks an interim supervision order for 28 days under ss 10A and 10C with the conditions set out in Schedule 8 of the Summons. The Plaintiff also seeks an order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists to conduct separate psychiatric examinations of the Defendant and directing the defendant to attend those examinations. 2The Defendant does not oppose the orders that are sought today but does not thereby accept that he will agree to orders being made on a final basis.
The application and the preliminary hearing 3On 9 November 2007 the Defendant was sentenced in respect of three serious sex offences being two counts of assault with an act of indecency and sexual intercourse without consent. The victim of these offences was a female known to him who was 16 years old at the time. He was sentenced overall to a non-parole period of four years commencing 10 December 2007 and concluding 9 December 2011 with an additional term of two years expiring 9 December 2013. He did not seek, and has not been granted, parole and his overall sentence is due to expire on 9 December 2013. 4The Defendant's conviction for these offences means that he is a sex offender within the meaning of s 4 of the Act. Since the Defendant remains in custody at the present time he is a supervised sex offender - s 5I. That enables the State to make the present application - see s 5H. 5Section 7(4) of the Act provides that if, following the preliminary hearing, the court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order the Court must make orders for examination of the Defendant by (inter alia) two qualified psychiatrists. In addition under ss 10A and 10C, if the Defendant's current custody will conclude before these proceedings are determined, the Court may make an interim supervision order for a period not exceeding 28 days. 6The task of the Court at the preliminary hearing stage is not to predict the ultimate result. Rather the test is one similar to the prima facie test applied by magistrates in committal proceedings: Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119; Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Haytar [2007] NSWCA 993 and State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118 at [11]. 7In State of New South Wales v Brookes [2008] NSWSC 150 Fullerton J discussed the requirements when an interim order is sought and drew attention to the fact that because two of the objects of the Act are to ensure the safety and protection of the community and to facilitate the rehabilitation of serious sex offenders it is appropriate to give weight to risk avoidance. 8The test that must be satisfied was formerly found in s 9(2) of the Act but is now to be found within the definition of a high risk offender in s 5B(2). Nevertheless, the wording is identical and the learning which had developed in relation to s 9(2) is equally applicable under the amended form of the Act. 9Section 5B provides that if and only if the offender is a high risk sex offender can an extended supervision order be made. Section 5B(2) of the Act provides: An offender is a high risk sex offender if the offender is a sex offender and the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision. 10In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASC 206; 176 A Crim R 110 Wheeler JA (with whom Le Miere AJA agreed) said at [63]: In my view, an "unacceptable risk" in the context of s 7(1) is a risk which is unacceptable having regard to a variety of considerations which may include the likelihood of the person offending, the type of sexual offence which the person is likely to commit (if that can be predicted) and the consequences of making a finding that an unacceptable risk exists. That is, the judge is required to consider whether, having regard to the likelihood of the person offending and the offence likely to be committed, the risk of that offending is so unacceptable that, notwithstanding that the person has already been punished for whatever offence they may have actually committed, it is necessary in the interests of the community to ensure that the person is subject to further control or detention. 11In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; 198 A Crim R 149 Steytler P and Buss JA said at [27]: The word 'unacceptable' necessarily connotes a balancing exercise, requiring the court to have regard, amongst other things, for the nature of the risk (the commission of a serious sexual offence, with serious consequences for the victim) and the likelihood of the risk coming to fruition, on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the offender, on the other, if an order is made (either detention, without having committed an unpunished offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order). As John Fogarty points out, albeit in a rather different context (Unacceptable risk - A return to basics (2006) 20 AJFL 249, 252), the advantage of the phrase 'unacceptable risk' is that 'it is calibrated to the nature and degree of the risk, so that it can be adapted to the particular case ... '. 12In State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276; (2011) 210 A Crim R 220 I said at [90]: Two things seem to me significant when assessing the evidence and the likelihood of re-offending. The first is the higher standard of proof imposed by the words "a high degree of probability". The second is the notion that "unacceptable risk" involves a balancing exercise between the commission of a serious sexual offence and the likelihood of that risk coming to fruition on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the Defendant either because he will be detained beyond the period of his sentence although he has not committed any further offence or he will be subject to an onerous supervision order, on the other hand. It is because of that balancing exercise that it is open to the Court to be satisfied to a high degree of probability that there is an unacceptable risk but that the result of that finding (either a continuing detention order or a supervision order) may vary in a given situation. ...