State of New South Wales v Brown - [2021] NSWSC 148 - NSWSC 2021 case summary — Zoe

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State of New South Wales v Brown

[2021] NSWSC 148

Supreme Court of NSW|2021-02-15|Before: Cavanagh J, Garling J, Dr Christopher J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2021-02-15

Before

Cavanagh J, Garling J, Dr Christopher J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (34 paragraphs)

[1]

Judgment

By way of an amended summons, which I granted leave to file in Court on 15 February 2021, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales ("the State") brings proceedings against the defendant, Bruce Brown, pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ("the Act").
As set out in the amended summons, the State originally sought both interim and final relief.
There was a preliminary hearing on 30 November 2020 at which time Garling J made orders. The matter was then listed for final hearing on 15 February 2021. The orders made by Garling J included orders under s 7(4) of the Act for the appointment of experts to examine and report upon the defendant. His Honour also made an interim supervision order ("ISO") on the conditions referred to in the short minutes of order dated 30 November 2020.
On the preliminary hearing, the defendant did not dispute that he should be subject to an ISO or that he should be psychiatrically examined. The defendant was examined on 14 December 2020 by Dr Richard Furst, who prepared a report dated 22 January 2021. He was further examined on 14 January 2021 by Dr Christopher J Lennings, who also prepared a report dated 22 January 2021. Dr Furst had previously interviewed the defendant on 21 April 2016 and prepared a report dated 28 April 2016.
The defendant does not dispute that he should be subject to an extended supervision order ("ESO"). The focus of the hearing was on the conditions of the ESO.

[2]

Legislation

As set out in s 3 of the Act, the primary object of the Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders, so as to ensure the safety and the protection of the community. Another object of the Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation. In making any orders under the Act, I would have regard to the objects of the Act.
Section 5B of the Act provides the circumstances in which the Court may make an ESO: 5B Making of extended supervision orders - unacceptable risk The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if: (a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and (b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and (c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and (d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
As the defendant did not dispute that he should be subject to an ESO, it must be that he accepts that the Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence if not kept under supervision under the ESO. However, even though the defendant did not dispute this, it is necessary that the Court be satisfied independently that he poses an unacceptable risk.
Being satisfied to a high degree of probability means something beyond more probable than not. The existence of the risk, that is, the likelihood of the defendant committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof although not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. [1]
The meaning of "unacceptable risk" was considered in Lynn v State of New South Wales: [2] "[50] As the respondent pointed out in its submissions, by reference to dictionary definitions, the word "unacceptable" requires context in which, or parameters against which, the "unacceptable" risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is "so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed". The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym "acceptable". Something is "acceptable" if it is "tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters". [51] What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the "risk" that the offender poses "of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision". The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made."
Importantly, the impact that an ESO may have on the defendant's liberty is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of assessing whether the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision, but the Court may take that factor into account in determining whether to exercise its discretion pursuant to s 9 of the Act. [3]
That is, whilst an ESO may not be made unless the Court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk as referred to in s 5B(d) of the Act, even if such a finding is made, the Court still has a discretion in the making of an ESO.
In determining whether or not to make an ESO, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Court. [4]
Further, in determining whether or not to make an ESO, I must have regard to the factors as set out in s 9(3) of the Act.

[5]

The defendant's personal circumstances: s 9(3)(i)

The defendant is currently 36. He is a single man with a child from an earlier relationship. His daughter is in the care of the State of Western Australia. He suffers from an intellectual disability. He has been in receipt of a disability support pension since he was 16. He has no contact with his mother or sister and now no contact with his father. He appears to have no ties to the community at all.
He grew up in Bundaberg, Queensland, but had learning difficulties and struggled at school. He was teased, bashed and picked on at school. As a child, he moved around, finding himself in Western Australia with his father for a period. He was sexually assaulted by his father and he was also exposed to other forms of sexual deviancy within the home or the place where he was residing.
As I will detail in his criminal history, his sexual offending commenced at an early age. It seems that from the age of 16, he led a transient lifestyle, sometimes staying with his father and sometimes not. Other than employment for a few months in 2003 as a labourer, he has not worked.
At the time of commission of the index offence in 2015, he found himself living in a hotel in Bega. By that time, he had an extensive criminal history, primarily related to offending of a sexual nature. He was not working, he was not in a relationship and he was suffering from his intellectual disability.
As noted in the reports of Bonnie Duncan, psychologist, and Lauren Cooper, forensic psychologist, on behalf of the Corrective Services Department, addressed to the National Disability Insurance Agency, the defendant's intellectual disability has compromised his ability to form and maintain healthy relationships. His nomadic lifestyle deprived him of the opportunity to make lasting friendships. He has no friends in the community and he has not been able to maintain appropriate relationships with others in custody. He lacks community connections. His ongoing inability to regulate his emotions, particularly his anxiety, will affect his ability to form and maintain friendships. He is unable to respond to social cues. Further, his desire for social connectedness makes him willing to engage with individuals that may negatively impact upon him.
Prior to his most recent release from custody, an NDIS application was made and ultimately approved. He is living in supported accommodation and is able to access medical and psychological assistance as part of the NDIS plan.

[6]

The defendant's criminal history: s 9(3)(h)

The defendant has an extensive criminal history dating back to September 2003. The offending includes commission of offences in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia.
The offending is somewhat repetitive and of a similar nature. He approaches persons of the opposite sex, sometimes very young and sometimes adults, and assaults them.
In 2003 he entered a woman's caravan without her consent, threatened her with a knife and groped her breasts.
On 28 July 2004, he assaulted a woman at his place of work in Wodonga, Victoria in the same way. He and his father then fled to Western Australia.
On 8 February 2005, he similarly assaulted a person under the age of 16. He was delivering newspapers when he saw a schoolgirl walking down the street. He approached her and asked if he could touch her. She ran off but the defendant caught up with her and grabbed her and squeezed her breasts.
Then on two occasions between 1 April 2006 and 9 October 2006, he sexually assaulted a six-year-old girl by penetrating her vagina with his finger.
On 4 May 2007, he was convicted on two counts of sexual penetration with a child under 16, one count of possessing child pornography and one count of breaching an intensive supervision order.
On 17 August 2009, he committed an offence of criminal damage by fire and two counts of criminal damage, where he slashed the tyres on his girlfriend's car and later lit it on fire.
On April 2014, he was again convicted of indecent assault, this time, in Victoria.
He was then in Cairns in Queensland when he committed a further offence when he approached a 14-year-old girl in a supermarket, again squeezing both her breasts.
On 29 March 2015, he committed the offence of burglary in Mount Gravatt in Queensland. He moved back to New South Wales.
On 1 November 2015, he committed another assault, this time striking a person after a verbal argument.
Suffice to say, that from the age of 18 until commission of the index offence in 2015, he committed a number of offences of a sexual and violent nature. This offending included two offences against children.
As stated in the medical evidence, the combination of the defendant's mild intellectual disability and disorder from which he suffers (Frotteuristic Disorder) has led to repeat offending by the defendant.

[9]

Report and evidence of Dr Richard Furst

There is no dispute as to the opinion, diagnosis and recommendations of Dr Furst, except to the extent that they relate to certain conditions. Dr Furst first examined the defendant on 21 April 2016 and further examined him on 14 December 2020 for the purposes of this hearing.
He opines that the defendant meets the criteria for the diagnosis of certain mental disorders: "Intellectual disability (mild range); Alcohol Use Disorder; Frotteuristic Disorder".
He has a history of emotional problems and learning difficulties dating back to his early childhood. He also has a history of anxiety and panic symptoms, most likely being part of an adjustment disorder.
As Dr Furst notes, the majority of the defendant's sexual offending behaviour has involved non-consenting females of various ages, including children, teenagers and adults, with a primary focus being on non-consensual touching of the female victims, especially their breasts. This meets the criteria for the diagnosis of Frotteuristic Disorder.
His primary risk factor in relation to ongoing sexual offending is this disorder. Further, there has been evidence of sexual preoccupation over many years, preceding his arrest for the index offence in 2015.
Although he is not dependant on alcohol, intoxication with alcohol probably contributed to his offending.
Dr Furst opines that the imposition of an ESO is likely to have a positive impact on his future rehabilitation, providing structure and access to services and supervision he would not otherwise have.
In Dr Furst's opinion, the defendant poses a high risk of committing a further serious offence of a sexual nature, having regard to the conditions and risk factors which he identifies.
His score of 18 on the STABLE-2007 test is indicative of a high density of criminogenic needs relative to other male sexual offenders.
Dr Furst considers that the defendant's Frotteuristic Disorder, cognitive impairment and related social and cognitive deficits are relatively stable constructs that are likely to persist in the future.
His risk of reoffending is well above the average risk of reoffending when compared with the typical offender.
Dr Furst adduced further evidence orally. I will comment on this evidence when considering the issues relating to specific conditions.

[10]

The report and evidence of Dr Christopher J Lennings

The opinion of Dr Lennings is similar to that of Dr Furst. During examination, Dr Lennings asked the defendant whether he thought he was a high risk offender and he agreed that he was, although he felt that the ESO takes away too much of his freedom.
He said he had attempted to remove his electronic monitoring because he was "being an idiot". He could not use Facebook and he became resentful. He said to Dr Lennings that his sex drive remained high, although he was using Androcur, which has some beneficial or limiting impact on that. He informed Dr Lennings that one of the cues for him to become sexually aroused was watching sitcoms on TV such as Neighbours. He began to fantasise about having sex with the characters in the show.
The defendant said that he felt that he had responded appropriately to the therapy he had received in custody. He continued to see a psychologist. He identified his earlier problems with non-compliance as being in relation to his father who encouraged him to avoid his supervisory responsibilities. He now has no contact with his father or mother.
His weekly routine involves going shopping at Westfield for two hours with a support worker. Then on the next day, he will go to a psychologist and then go with a support worker to the library. It seems then on Wednesday and Thursday, he goes to the markets and shopping again. He has no scheduled activities on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. As is apparent from that schedule, his life revolves around going to ordinary places such as shopping centres and receiving treatment.
Dr Lennings generally supports the conditions which were provided to him with the original summons. I should note that there has been some modification to those conditions, having regard to the new conditions attached to the amended summons.
Dr Lennings said in his report: "The primary concern for Mr Brown is that his conditions force a degree of social isolation for him that can increase his stress level. The difficulty is that in meeting his needs for more social activity raises the likelihood of him reoffending. Finding the correct balance in that is going to be a matter of fine-tuning as his response to supervision unfolds over a period of time."
Dr Lennings identifies the lack of social interaction and borderline loneliness as long-term stressors for the defendant.
Dr Lennings considers that the defendant is in a difficult position. He lacks the ability to internalise the external restraints that have been placed upon him that will minimise his risk. He considers that any change that will occur will happen slowly and hence a five-year period would be appropriate for the ESO.
However, he considers that the defendant can be maintained safely in the community provided that he has the appropriate support.

[13]

The conditions

The focus of the oral evidence and, indeed, the submissions from the parties was on the dispute as to some of the conditions. As will be apparent from the conditions, many of the risk factors identified in the evidence are the subject of conditions which are agreed. The conditions that I impose are annexed to this judgment. The proposed conditions that were disputed, which were limited in nature, were as follows: Condition 8: 8. In addition to and without limiting any of the other conditions, the defendant must not go: a. within 1km of to Sydney and/or Bankstown Airports; b. to the Sydney Cove Passenger Terminal; or c. within 5km of any state border of New South Wales; except for the purpose of reporting to a DSO as directed, attending upon a Community Corrections office in accordance with his approved schedule or as directed, attending upon other government services in accordance with his approved schedule or as directed, or for any other reason with prior approval from his DSO. Condition 10: 10. The defendant must be at his approved address between 10:00pm and 06:00am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO. Condition 32: 32. If the defendant starts a romantic relationship with a woman or has a sexual relationship with a woman, he has to tell his DSO within 24 hours the name of that woman ("the woman") and truthfully answer any questions that the DSO asks regarding that relationship. Condition 33: 33. If the defendant starts an intimate relationship with someone, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history. If the defendant starts any other kind of intimate relationship with someone (including a personal friendship), he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. Condition 34: 34. The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person including but not limited to persons referred to in conditions 32 and 33 if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. Condition 44: 44. The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet- based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services. Condition 50: 50. The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence without the prior approval of a DSO.
The defendant originally disputed condition 8 but ultimately agreed there was no practical utility to that dispute. The conditions impose an obligation on the defendant to live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of an intention to change the defendant's address. He must provide a schedule of movements. He is not permitted to leave the state.
I cannot think of any reason why he would need to go to an airport or passenger terminal at this stage or go close to any state border. Be that as it may, if he needs to, he is able to seek the prior approval of his DSO. Condition 8 will be included as part of the conditions.
Condition 10 is a form of curfew. It requires the defendant to remain in his approved address between 10.00pm and 6.00am each day unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO. Whilst the index offence was committed late at night, there is no pattern of offending late at night or in the early hours of the morning. There is nothing about his cognitive impairment or disorders which would tend to suggest that he is more likely to reoffend at night rather than during the day.
Dr Furst said in cross-examination that the imposing of a curfew would have limited effect in managing the risk. He did not perceive it as adding to the value of the ESO. He thought curfews were more applicable to juveniles on bail, rather than cases of this kind.
He agreed that there has to be a balance between managing the risk and allowing the defendant to gain social connections. He must have the ability to communicate with people within a peer group, although Dr Furst emphasised that he did not consider that the defendant is capable of having "free leave in the community at all".
Dr Lennings shared those views, although Dr Lennings was less convinced that a curfew was not necessary, suggesting that the lifting of a curfew might be something that would be manageable over time. He considers that a curfew is one way of managing the community safety in the situation where the defendant becomes distressed or frustrated or just does something silly.
I accept the defendant's submission that he has made some progress since the commission of the last offences. The risk management report of 27 October 2020 suggests that the defendant appeared motivated to undertake interventions through addressing his offending behaviour. He receives support in the community through the NDIS package and has secured independent accommodation.
I am mindful of the observations of Fullerton J in the State of New South Wales v Bugmy, [5] as follows: "The Court is entitled to expect that that the conditions the plaintiff proposes that Mr Bugmy be subject to are drafted to address what are identified in the evidence as the risk factors to his further violent offending (State of New South Wales v Burns [2014] NSWSC 1014 at [59]). The conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous or simply punitive (see Wilde v State of NSW (2015) 249 A Crim R 65; [2015] NSWCA 28 at [45] citing RA Hulme J in State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003). Neither may they simply be an expression of State paternalism or imposed to meet what might be thought to be in the public interest in some generalised sense or because they might be a convenient or resource efficient means of the Department exercising supervision under an extended supervision order. The conditions to be imposed in this case must be at least capable of moderating or minimising the risk of Mr Bugmy inflicting serious violence, in contrast to reducing or minimising the risk of him offending in other ways."
I am not satisfied that the defendant is more likely to reoffend in the middle of the night than at some other time during the day. The State has not established that there is any particular or additional risk which must be reduced by a curfew. I prefer the views of Dr Furst on the issue. I do not think this condition is necessary in all the circumstances.

[14]

Conditions 32 to 34

The State seeks to impose an obligation on the defendant to inform the DSO if and when he commences a romantic relationship with a woman or even if he commences a personal friendship, so that the DSO might tell the person about the defendant's criminal history if the DSO considers it reasonably necessary.
Dr Furst expressed concerns in relation to the defendant using Facebook or similar platforms to communicate with women who are otherwise not known to him. He referred to the risk of grooming-type offences. He also considered that there was a need for those supervising the defendant to have the capacity to communicate matters directly relating to his criminal history with persons with whom he forms a friendship. He formed this view on the basis that there is risk of the defendant befriending and/or exploiting vulnerable people.
However, on cross-examination he accepted that there was no need for an absolute prohibition on the defendant using social media platforms to communicate with people. He also agreed that a too onerous restriction in respect of the defendant meeting people and forming friendships would make it very difficult for him to make friends. As I have already observed, there is a need for balancing these types of restrictive conditions with ensuring that the conditions are not so onerous so as to have the contrary or an undesirable effect.
The defendant agreed to the imposition of condition 32. Having regard to the defendant's history of prior offending, it will be important that the defendant inform his DSO when he becomes involved in a romantic relationship with a woman so that the DSO can make an assessment of the risks involved.
I hasten to add that condition 32 is not intended to preclude the defendant entering into a consensual relation with a woman. These conditions are not intended to preclude the defendant from having normal and regular social contact with other persons. I thus accept the defendant's submission in respect of condition 33. On one view, condition 33 is so broad that it requires the defendant to inform his DSO of anyone to whom he might speak on more than one occasion.
A condition which requires him to determine when the relationship might be intimate or could be considered a personal relationship and then assess whether he needs to tell his DSO is a condition that is so onerous that it almost sets up the defendant to fail. The defendant is subject to a condition imposing an obligation on him to prepare a schedule of movements. He is already subject to electronic monitoring. He is also required to inform his DSO of when he might be in a romantic relationship with a woman and the DSO then has a discretion whether to inform the woman of the defendant's criminal history. It does not seem to me that the broader obligation extending the reporting obligation even to friends he might make is necessary.
Proposed conditions 33 and 34 should be removed.
Condition 32 should be amended so as to add the following: "The DSO may disclose the defendant's criminal history to the woman if the DSO considers that the disclosure is necessary for the purposes of reducing any risk to the woman."

[15]

Conditions 44 and 50

These conditions relate to the defendant's use of social networking and dating sites and then access to pornography. Of course, they are different things but it is convenient to deal with them together.
In my view, proposed condition 44 is too broad. I understand that it is a reflection of the defendant's breach of a condition of the ISO when he sought access to a site, "Be Naughty", but it remains unnecessarily broad. Further, it is not clear to me why there would need to be a restriction to using multiplayer video games or email altogether. The condition is made too broad by the use of the words after "including, but not limited to…".
Again, there were somewhat mixed opinions from the experts on this condition. Dr Furst expressed it best during cross-examination when he agreed that he would not advocate a total prohibition. He would advocate access to platforms as directed by his supervising officer. Similarly, he would allow the use of the internet as a means of communicating or accessing friendships generally.
The following condition should be substituted for proposed condition 44: "Should the defendant wish to access or connect to or join any internet-based social networking services the defendant must first notify the DSO of the name of the service and seek the approval of the DSO. The DSO should not unreasonably withhold approval in respect of any mainstream networking service."
Condition 50 was subject to considerable debate. The State has proposed an amendment to include "without the prior approval of a DSO" rather than a blanket prohibition on the defendant accessing pornography. The defendant proposes a solution that he simply obtain pre-approval from the DSO to generally access certain pornographic sites.
The concern of the experts is that there are sites and search terms which should be prohibited. As Dr Furst says, the Police would be aware of terms which would be more paedophilic-related or rape-related. Dr Furst thought that the search terms could be defined or the web searches defined in a narrow area. He thought that might alleviate the problem of potential frustration and isolation and having no sexual outlet. On the other hand, he thought that allowing the defendant to spend hours a day might lead to the defendant developing an obsessional preoccupation.
Dr Lennings was concerned that allowing the defendant access to pornography could be a triggering factor and might increase his deviant sexual thoughts. He did not agree that denying access to pornography increased the risk.
Whilst I have regard to Dr Lennings's opinion, it seems to me that the views of Dr Furst achieve a more balanced approach. That is, I decline to impose an absolute prohibition. Apart from anything else, it seems to me to be unworkable, unless there is a condition prohibiting the defendant from using the internet at all (which is not suggested).
Whilst the defendant suffers from cognitive impairment, he is quite capable of understanding that there are certain sites which he must not access. He is also quite capable of seeking pre-approval from his DSO to access sites which have not been legally restricted.
In my view, the answer is to do as the defendant suggests which is to allow him to seek pre-approval from his DSO. The current condition might be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the defendant to contact his DSO every time he wishes to access a site. That is too onerous a condition. Condition 50 should read: "Unless he has obtained prior approval from his DSO to generally access a particular site (i.e. at any time of his choosing), the defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by a DSO."

[18]

ANNEXURE Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) In these conditions: "CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW. "Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services. "Defendant" means Bruce Leslie Brown, also known as Bruce Brown, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order. "Digital Blueprint" has the same meaning as in the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) and means any type of digital (or electronic) reproduction of a technical drawing of the design of an object. "Electronic Identity" means each of the following: (a) an email address, (b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service, (c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet, (d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service. "DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order. "Material" includes: (1) any written or printed material; (2) any picture, painting or drawing; (3) any carving, sculpture, statue or figure; (4) any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced; (5) any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and (6) any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced. "NSWPF" means NSW Police Force. "Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication). "Search" includes:

A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and
A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched.

[29]

Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication 37. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information). 38. The defendant must not use any alias, electronic identity, log-in name, name other than "Bruce Brown" (unless otherwise approved by his DSO) or any email address other than those known to a DSO. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet and advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. 39. The defendant must only use an electronic device which has the ability to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO. 40. The defendant must provide the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names as well as any relevant passwords, pin codes and pass codes used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed. 41. The defendant must provide a DSO with all passwords, pin codes and pass codes used to access all electronic devices, electronic applications, internet sites and communication platforms of any kind. 42. The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service. 43. The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication if discovered on the defendant's electronic devices or accounts as a result of a search or a remote inspection. 44. Should the defendant wish to access or connect to or join any internet-based social networking services the defendant must first notify the DSO of the name of the service and seek the approval of the DSO. The DSO should not unreasonably withhold approval in respect of any mainstream networking service. 45. The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order. 46. The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO. 47. The defendant must provide consent for his telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.