State of New South Wales v Brooks

First offence

1. On 26 November 2009 the defendant assaulted a woman at Central Station at around 9:30pm. According to the police facts the defendant followed the victim as she walked through the station, before reaching under her dress as she walked through the ticket gates. She felt him attempting to touch her near her vagina through her underwear. The defendant then ran off and was arrested shortly afterwards. He was heavily intoxicated and unfit to be interviewed.
2. The defendant was charged with committing an assault with an act of indecency contrary to s 61L of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). He was sentenced at the Downing Centre Local Court on 17 December 2009 to a good behaviour bond with a period of 12 months' supervision. At the time of the offending he was 19 years old.

Second offence

1. On 21 July 2011, when the defendant was aged 20, he assaulted a woman aged 26 in the carpark of Macarthur Railway Station at around 7:00pm as she walked towards her car. The defendant approached the victim from behind, grabbed her, and bent her forwards before putting his hand under her skirt and grabbing at her vagina over her stockings. The woman screamed at him to get off her, and he ran away. He was arrested about four weeks later. He initially denied the offence, but after a discussion with his mother and stepfather, and apparently his local priest, he admitted the offence to police.
2. The defendant was charged with committing an assault with an act of indecency contrary to s 61L of the Crimes Act. He was sentenced at Campbelltown Local Court on 26 October 2011 to a good behaviour bond with an order that he be supervised for two years.

The third offence

1. On 19 November 2011 the defendant assaulted another woman as she left Caringbah Railway Station at around 12.30am. He grabbed her from behind, placed one hand over her mouth and the other on her clothing, and grabbed at her vagina through her clothes before forcing her to the ground. The defendant lay on top of the victim and placed his head between her legs, firmly pushing his mouth into her vagina and sucking at the area as she screamed. He then stopped and ran away.
2. The defendant was not charged with this offending until after being charged with the index offence, when a DNA sample taken from him was matched with a white stain identified in the crotch area of the victim's pants following her assault.
3. The defendant was again charged with assault with an act of indecency contrary to s 61L of the Crimes Act. At the time of this offence, he was subject to the two year bond on which he was placed for the Macarthur offence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced by Huggett DCJ in the District Court to imprisonment for three years and four months with a non-parole period of two years. That sentence was imposed at the same time as the defendant was sentenced for the index offending on 5 June 2015.

Non-sexual offending

1. Subsequent to the third sexual offence, and prior to the index offending, the defendant was sentenced for two driving offences. The first was an offence of take and drive a conveyance without the consent of the owner. The second was drive with middle range PCA. He was sentenced on 11 September 2013 at Camden Local Court to two suspended periods of imprisonment with s 12 bonds of six months for the former offence and five months for the latter offence. At the time of the driving offences, the defendant was subject to the two year s 9 bond in respect of the offence at Macarthur.

The index offending

1. On 29 December 2013 the defendant attacked a woman aged 23 who was walking home in Surry Hills at around midnight. He grabbed the victim from behind, placed his hand over her mouth and pulled her into some bushes in Prince Alfred Park where he forced her to the ground and straddled her. The victim said, "Get the fuck off me", and started screaming. The defendant told her to "Shut the fuck up" repeatedly, and placed his hand over her mouth and nose, causing her to struggle for breath. At the same time, he was trying to undo his belt buckle. He attempted to undo it at least three times whilst holding his hand over her mouth and nose. He grabbed at her shorts and the top of her shirt.
2. The victim continued to scream out for help and for him to get off her which caused the defendant to put his hands around her throat and squeeze her neck.
3. Two men and a woman who were walking nearby heard her scream. As they approached, the defendant got off the victim and ran towards Central railway station. The two men followed him until they saw police stop him. The defendant was intoxicated.
4. The defendant was charged and ultimately convicted after a trial by jury with inflicting actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse contrary to s 61K(a) of the Crimes Act. This offending took place during the currency of the two s 12 bonds (for the motor vehicle offences), and he was called up for sentence on those bonds.
5. He came to be sentenced by Huggett DCJ on 5 June 2015 in relation to his breaches of the bonds for the motor vehicle offences, the breach of the bond for the Macarthur offence, for the Caringbah offence, and for the Surry Hills offence.
6. The sentences imposed were these: For the motor vehicle offences: 6 months and 5 months respectively commencing 29 December 2013; For the Macarthur offence: 15 months' imprisonment commencing 29 January 2014; For the Caringbah offence: 3 years and 4 months' imprisonment commencing 29 July 2014 with a non-parole period of 2 years; For the Surry Hills offence: Imprisonment for 8 years and 6 months commencing 29 January 2015 with a non-parole period of 5 years.
7. The overall effective sentence was imprisonment for 9 years and 7 months commencing 29 December 2013 and expiring 28 July 2023 with a non-parole period of 6 years and 1 month expiring 28 January 2020.
8. The defendant was ultimately released to parole on 25 August 2021.

Submissions

1. The defendant submitted that the evidence could not satisfy the Court to a high degree of probability that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence unless he is supervised under an ESO. The defendant submitted that the following matters are significant in that regard: (a) His offending is of some antiquity with the last offence having been committed on 28 December 2013 when he was aged 23. He is now 32 years old; (b) He has not committed any criminal offence in the last ten years; (c) He has remained in the community for the past 25 months without committing any offences, nor has he engaged in behaviour suggesting that he is at risk of doing so. There is no evidence to suggest he has used drugs or accessed pornography, nor was there any evidence of inappropriate use of alcohol. He has not been breached for a lack of compliance with supervision. He has a prosocial lifestyle, where he lives and works with his family; (d) Dr McSwiggan's opinion that he does not suffer from Asperger's syndrome should be accepted because of her specialised expertise; and (e) Since the defendant has been diagnosed with various conditions from time to time, most of which have been rejected by latter experts, the tentative diagnoses, or Dr McSwiggan's and Dr Smith's opinions, of a possible diagnosis of paraphilia should be treated with a high degree of caution.
2. The State relied on the report of Andrew Fordyce dated 16 November 2021. Mr Fordyce was a psychologist who worked with the Department of Communities and Justice sex offender programs. His report assessed the defendant's participation in the High Intensity Sexual Offender Treatment Program (HISOP), and the defendant's level of risk of sexual offending based on the STATIC-99R and STABLE-2017 assessment tests. The State also relied on the Risk Assessment Report ("RAR") of Dr Richard Parker of 2 December 2022 including his assessment of the overall risk levels for reoffending by the defendant, and the assessments made by Dr McSwiggan and Dr Smith, both of whom considered that the defendant's risk could not properly be managed without an ESO.

Consideration

1. The defendant has been assessed using risk assessment instruments on a number of occasions. He was assessed in June 2016 using the STATIC 99-R Protocol. His score was classified as Level IVb which equates to well above average risk. Dr Parker said in his RAR that he had reviewed that assessment and he agreed with the scoring.
2. In October 2021 he was assessed using the STABLE-2007 by Mr Fordyce. The defendant scored 20 out of a possible 26 and that is classified as high. Dr Parker reviewed the scoring and said he believed his scoring of the defedndant would not be substantially different. When the STABLE-2007 and STATIC 99-R were combined, the defendant yielded a Level IVb which equates to well above average overall risk level.
3. In December 2022, Dr Parker assessed the defendant using the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide-Revised, and the defendant's score was higher than the score of at least 85% of the construction sample. This placed him in the eighth of nine "bins". 58% of violent offenders with a similar score reoffended violently within five years, and 78% within 12 years.
4. The only assessment placing the defendant in a low/medium category was his assessment using the Level of Service Inventory-Revised on 20 September 2022.
5. In his RAR, Dr Parker identified that three of the five implicit theories among rapists, identified by Polaschek and Ward in 2002, were relevant or probably relevant to the defendant. These theories were entitlement (the idea that the person's needs and desires trump any concern over other people's wellbeing); that the world is a dangerous place, filled with people who will behave malevolently towards the offender (Dr Parker found some evidence for this in his dealings with other employees at the business where he worked); and the theory that women are unknowable and/or dangerous (Dr Parker noted the defendant's failure to establish ongoing relationships with women and his apparent lack of interest in doing so).
6. A number of the reports from experts who have examined the defendant reveal some disturbing aspects to his personality relevant to an assessment of risk.
7. Mr Fordyce prepared his report on 16 November 2021 to assess the effect of the HISOP on the defendant. Mr Fordyce made these observations (inter alia): 11. Overall, [the defendant's] engagement in treatment was superficial and progress was limited. He acknowledged having limited internal motivation for treatment and engaging in order to 'tick the box' to gain parole. He also expressed the belief that treatment was unnecessary for him. …Mr Brooks tended to demonstrate negative attitudes towards treatment and staff, which manifested in different ways, from overt hostility to passive aggressive comments and behaviour. … 12. Mr Brooks acknowledged most of his antecedents and how these related to his offences. However, he appeared to have judged what detail would be sufficient to complete core tasks and provided little further information. His account of his thought process prior to and during his offending was superficial, and this reduced the usefulness of the offence pathway tasks in identifying clear, future warning signs for recidivism. … Due to Mr Brooks' perception of his current and future potential for risk, he tended to dismiss attempts to engage him in such work. Mr Brooks' accounts of his psychological, social, and sexual functioning during treatment were superficial or dismissive, and he generally did not elaborate when questioned. … 15. In sum, Mr Brooks evidenced a conceptual understanding of his offence-related patterns and risks, but no meaningful attempts to develop skills or strategies to moderate these risks. Furthermore, his pattern of engagement was generally indicative of noncompliance, anti-authoritarian attitudes, disengagement, and impression management. When these issues were discussed with Mr Brooks, he opined he had already made necessary changes to mitigate his risk, received prejudicial treatment from staff, and would engage in further treatment with a private psychologist in the community.
8. Similar attitudes from the defendant appear from the reports prepared by the court appointed experts, Dr McSwiggan and Dr Smith.
9. Dr McSwiggan said: 20. Mr Brooks expressed his frustration at the repeat themes of remorse and guilt he believed he is supposed to continue to express. He explained if he did discuss his offending it would simply be used against him. Mr Brooks said he knows why he did the offences but that he did not have to articulate it (to me). … … 35. Mr Brooks expressed his frustration at times by appearing irritable. Exploring his family dynamics was a sensitive topic due to his concern with confidentiality. At one stage he stood to leave but halted before exiting my office and returned to complete the interview. 36. … He readily agreed he doesn't like being told what to do by others and the oversight he was experiencing from corrections. …
10. When discussing her diagnosis of the defendant, Dr McSwiggan said his lack of empathy and distant relationships were consistent with his egocentric personality and avoidance of disclosure. She said his rule-breaking was consistent with general criminality and maladaptive personality traits. Dr McSwiggan thought he would meet the DSM 5 criteria for Paraphilia consistent with a sexual sadism disorder. She said he would likely remain resistant to psychological treatment but would attend if ordered.
11. Dr McSwiggan noted that the defendant had not reoffended for the two years he had been monitored on parole. She said, however: His resistance to the process of treatment while both undesirable and consistent with his maladaptive personality suggests external controls (orders) could (and have) assist [sic] him to maintain a substantial time in the community offence free.
12. A reading of the report from Dr Smith makes for somewhat concerning reading because of what it indicates about the attitudes of the defendant and his lack of insight. Some examples of what are recorded in a very lengthy report from assessments of the defendant made by Dr Smith on two different dates are these: • He rather dismissively described being given only menial tasks [in custody] when he "would rather read books or exercises not that against work, but have to be doing something purposeful or learning a skill." … The whole tenor of this was that these tasks were beneath him. Whilst I accept there is probably a degree of reality basis to this, it came across as blunt and abrupt at best, and arrogant or haughty at worst. • A certain lack of worldliness and egocentricity that explains things in terms of his ability. • This is representative of an ongoing lack of insight into his early experiences. • I found his simplistic certainty on this to be characteristic. • I also note that his answer related to wrongdoing as related to deterrence and outcomes, not regarding the wrongness of the act. • [When discussing the first sexual offending] he suggested that he was not actively intoxicated, and I felt this was a continuation of a notable pattern where Mr Brooks' lack of insight and judgement into the nature of his substance use.
13. When Dr Smith was attempting to explore what sexual relationships the defendant had had, the defendant said that it was "mainly sex workers". Dr Smith went on to say: On enquiry, Mr Brooks stated that he had essentially had no relationship history at all, or regular sexual partners. I'm generally reluctant to label what is normal and what is not, but I think it is acceptable to categorise this as abnormal, and this should be viewed as relevant in the context of the subsequent offending.
14. Other comments of Dr Smith were these: • This [statement by the defendant] again speaks to decisions made on an outcome basis, rather than a theoretical basis of what is right. • I note the volunteering of a somewhat paranoid mindset - he feels it important to communicate to me that he is not allowed to be in a position where he is put down.
15. When the defendant was speaking about what somebody had said about his mother, although he would not say what it was, Dr Smith commented: This at best seemed to be a superficial understanding of the nature of forgiveness, and seemed to lack a theory of mind and reflective capacity given his past offending requires - at societal level at least - some degree of forgiveness and rehabilitation.
16. In her report, Dr McSwiggan noted that the defendant's risks were evaluated using the Sexual Violence Risk - 20 (Version 2), and those risk factors were these: his psychopathic personality disorder, substance use problems, repeat sexual offending, escalation in sexual offending, negative attitude to intervention, and negative attitude towards supervision. Dr McSwiggan said that those matters are considered not to be assistive in the management or reduction of the risk of the defendant committing a serious sex offence and/or they are potentially counterproductive to his rehabilitation.
17. Dr McSwiggan said that the level of intervention required to manage his current risk factors associated with preventing a further incident of sexual violence would be moderate. She said that any change to his current living or employment status should trigger a case review.
18. Dr McSwiggan also said: 110. Mr Brooks is no longer subject to parole conditions. He has remained resistant to engagement in treatment. This resistance reflects the hostility Mr Brooks has towards authority and supervision in general. Mr Brooks' resistance suggests a general rejection of awareness, and subsequently self-management of risk factors. External controls are reasonable in circumstances where Mr Brooks has (and will) persistently resist psychological treatment to manage his risk for reoffending.
19. Dr Smith said of the defendant: He continues to show little insight into his substance use or other external factors that led to this offending. He was evasive regarding his sexual fantasies. He had poor theory of mind and understanding of others' point of view. He was haughty, dismissive, and aloof at times. He had a paranoid and suspicious manner. He is negative about psychological work. These are all considered risk factor [sic] for the reasons I have outlined above.
20. Dr Smith said that there were some positive signs. The defendant's relationship with his family was stable and he had stable accommodation. He has been entirely abstinent from alcohol and drugs and, despite his protestations about the restrictions, he appears to have largely been compliant with them. There was no evidence of finding inappropriate sexual content on his computer or other devices. He supervised female staff, seemingly without incident. There was some progress to his psychological work. Dr Smith thought that Mr Brooks did have some understanding that the nature of his actions were wrong.
21. Dr Smith said that, given the defendant's issues around compliance, reflective capacity, and the seeming "external deterrent" aspect being important to him, Dr Smith did not think Mr Brooks could be managed under a legal framework short of an ESO.
22. It may be accepted that the defendant has made some progress since being released on parole on 25 August 2021. There is no evidence of any drug use and there are no concerns about any consumption of alcohol by the defendant. It appears to be the case also that the defendant has not accessed pornography. His time in custody, however, between 2014 and 2021 was somewhat chequered. He received a number of punishments in prison for institutional behaviour and breaches of discipline, including eight occasions between 2014 and 2018 for failing a prescribed drug test.
23. As noted earlier, the defendant submitted that his offending was of some antiquity, that he had not committed any criminal offence in the last ten years, and that since living within the community he had not engaged in behaviour suggesting that he was at risk of committing further offences. The difficulty about those submissions is that it has been a relatively short period of time that the defendant has been out of custody, and in that time he has been under parole supervision. The fact that his last offending occurred in December 2013 is a consideration of little weight when the defendant was in custody until August 2021. His time in custody was not spent free of offending, particularly relating to drugs, as has been noted above.
24. Other reasons put forward on behalf of the defendant concerned changes in his diagnoses over time, and the difficulty of the doctors being able to fix on a diagnosis.
25. Having discussed the difficulties in this regard, Dr Smith said this: The overall point I wish to make is quite clear, there is something, a certain aspect to Mr Brooks' personality and mien that really all the assessments observe and believe to be of concern. Exactly the label that you give this is not necessarily relevant. There are two potentially relevant aspects, which are linked. The first is whether it in some way influences or drives risk. One doesn't need to make a diagnosis to adjudge this, you can simply register the aspect as a risk factor. In this case I do believe it influences risk - it limits Mr Brooks' ability to understand his own behaviour and how it impacts others. It limits his ability to reflect on aspects of his presentation that clearly influence his risk, not just the sex offending but around it, for example his substance use disorder. The other is whether it dictates treatment. This is linked, because generally the provision of treatment is done so with the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of reducing risk. In this case I believe it does influence treatment, although not necessarily dictates it. (emphasis in original)
26. Having particular regard to the aspects of the defendant's character and attitude, disclosed in the report of Mr Fordyce and again in the reports of Dr McSwiggan and Dr Smith, when taken together with the assessments made of the defendant's risk on the various protocols, the particular risk factors identified by the two experts, and his lack of insight, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an order made pursuant to s 5B of the CHRO Act.

Duration of the order

1. The State seeks an order for two years. The defendant submitted that a further one year of supervision was adequate, relying partly on what Dr Smith had said. Both of the experts were asked to express an opinion about the length of any order that should be made. Dr McSwiggan said that the length of the order was one for the Court to determine. Dr Smith said this: Regarding length of time, … I have said I think it is important he needs to stay in therapy, which despite his protestations does seem to have had some effect. I would expect to see continued abstinence and better reflective capacity regarding his social interactions and relationships. If he continues in this manner for two years would fears be allayed? One would hope so. Would reducing it by 6 months make a difference? Possibly not. I will therefore say that broadly eighteen months or two years is appropriate. Certainly, no less than one year.
2. In my opinion, the period of the order should be for 18 months. I consider that 12 months is not enough in the light of the conclusions of the experts, particularly in relation to the defendant's poor engagement with therapy and his lack of insight into that, his interpersonal issues, and difficulty with mentalising and thinking things through. There needs to be some time for those matters to be appropriately dealt with, if they can be, given the high risk that he has been assessed on a number of protocols for future offending.

Conditions

1. Negotiations between the parties have reduced the differences concerning conditions to be imposed. I will now deal with the conditions where agreement has not been able to be reached. The numbering of the conditions follows the numbering in the further amended summons. The conditions will be later renumbered in the orders which will be made.

Schedule of movements (conditions 6 to 8)

1. The plaintiff proposed a condition as follows: 6. If directed, the defendant is to provide an honest summary of his anticipated movements each week (or over successive weeks) for approval, limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, the dates of travel, but not his travel route or precise timetable. If so directed, the defendant is to provide that summary no later than noon on the Monday immediately following the issue of the directions. It must be an honest summary of the defendant's anticipated movements.
2. The defendant opposed this condition. He pointed to the fact that it was not a condition of the ISO although the plaintiff had sought it. The reason it was not imposed by Ierace J was: [83] …So long as his current living and employment situation remains the same, which is likely to be the case for the duration of the ISO (particularly in light of condition 9, that obliges him to reside at a DSO-approved address), it is unnecessary in my view for conditions to these effects to be incorporated in his ISO. The ISO could not have extended beyond a three month period and, for that reason, a schedule of movements was not really necessary in the circumstances. However, the ESO will endure for 18 months.
3. To accommodate the stability demonstrated by the plaintiff in his living and working arrangements since being released from custody, but to allow for a change in those arrangements, the plaintiff has proposed a further restriction to the condition as follows: A DSO may only direct the defendant to provide a schedule of movements where there is a material change to any of the defendant's current accommodation, employment or family supports and the DSO has reasonable concerns that the defendant's risk is thereby elevated.
4. I do not consider, in the circumstances, that a schedule of movements is necessary whilst the defendant is living and working under his present arrangements. I consider, however, that the option must be given to the DSO if those arrangements change and the DSO has reasonable concerns about the defendant's risks of further offending. Condition 6 with the added sentence should be included.
5. Conditions 7 and 8 limit the circumstances where a departure from an approved schedule of movements amounts to a breach. In the circumstances where condition 6 contains the added sentence, these conditions are appropriate.

Employment, finance and education (conditions 17 and 18)

1. The plaintiff proposes the following two conditions: 17. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include, education, training or participation in personal development programs targeted to his risk factors including alcohol and drug programs. 18. The defendant must notify a DSO before he starts or ceases any job, volunteer work or educational course or as soon as practicably afterwards.
2. Condition 17 originally included the word "employment" before "education" but that is no longer pressed. The defendant opposes these conditions, submitting that the plaintiff has not provided any evidence to suggest a nexus between the defendant's offending and his employment, education or financial affairs. Further, the evidence is that the defendant has been gainfully employed since his release to parole some two years ago.
3. The plaintiff seeks the conditions in case the defendant reported a vulnerability to relapse or if drug or excessive alcohol use was detected during testing. The conditions would also enable the DSO to direct the defendant into personal development and training programs should he disengage with his current employment in the future.
4. There is something of an ambiguity in condition 17, in that it is not clear whether the words "education" and "training" are linked to the personal development programs. The fact that the word "employment" was previously in the conditions suggest they are not linked. In my opinion, the DSO should have the ability to take reasonable steps to direct participation in personal development programs targeted to the defendant's risk factors, but nothing in the defendant's history suggests any need for the DSO to have involvement in his general education or training.
5. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable for the defendant to have to notify the DSO before starting or leaving jobs or volunteer work. The experts identified that the defendant's present work arrangements are a positive and protective factor, but that a change in them could increase the risk the defendant presents.
6. Condition 17 should be included but omitting the words "education, training or", and condition 18 should be included but omitting the words "or educational course".

Non-association (condition 28)

1. The plaintiff proposes a condition as follows: 28. If the defendant starts a romantic relationship with a woman, has a sexual relationship with a woman or commences a friendship with a woman, he must tell a DSO within 24 hours from the start of the relationship or friendship the name of the woman and truthfully answer any questions that a DSO asks regarding the relationship or friendship.
2. The defendant opposes this condition, relying on what Dr McSwiggan said in her report. The plaintiff submits that if conditions 10 and 29 are retained it will not press this condition. Condition 10 is agreed. Condition 29 is set out below. For the reasons given below, I do not consider condition 29 should be imposed.
3. Dr McSwiggan did not consider that condition 28 would assist the defendant. She said: I do not believe that isolation will be helpful for Mr Brooks to promote ties to the community. In the event he does meet someone, there are laws available for protection. Mr Brooks has offended only against strangers and that is part of his motivation. He has no domestic violence background.
4. I do not consider that this condition should be imposed.

Access to the internet and other electronic communication (conditions 29 to 37)

1. The plaintiff proposes the following condition: 29. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).
2. It also proposes conditions 30-37 which deal generally with restricting the defendant's use of electronic devices, and requirements that he provide all information about them to the DSO including passwords and access codes.
3. The defendant has opposed all of these conditions for two principal reasons. First, he says that any risks relating to his past behaviour have not involved the use of the internet. Secondly, he says that there is potentially commercially sensitive material held by the defendant on his devices relating to his employment, and his employer is opposed to third parties having access to that material.
4. The plaintiff is prepared not to press all of the conditions 30-37 provided that condition 29 remains (and also condition 10 which is not opposed). The plaintiff submits that the conditions concerned are standard conditions but that, provided the DSO can give reasonable directions relating to internet access and use of devices, it will not insist on the other conditions. The plaintiff says that condition 29 is directed to accessing pornography and also to the defendant's interactions with women, in the sense that arrangements are made these days to meet up with people who have come into contact with one another on the internet.
5. In my opinion, condition 29 is not related to any risk associated with the defendant. The issue of pornography is adequately dealt with in condition 41. None of the defendant's offending has involved the use of the internet or arranged meetings with women. Condition 29 should be disallowed.

Search and seizure (conditions 38 and 39)

1. The plaintiff proposed the following conditions: 38. If a DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search is required, either to monitor the defendant's compliance with this Order, or for the safety and welfare of any other person, or because a DSO suspects the defendant of having engaged in behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of committing a serious offence, the defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is travelling or which is under his effective control, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility, and the seizure of any items or object located during the search. 39. The defendant must submit to the search of any computer, electronic or communication device in his possession or under his control and to the seizure of such devices.
2. The defendant opposed condition 38 and proposed an alternative to 39 as follows: If a DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search is required, either to monitor the defendant's compliance with this Order, or for the safety and welfare of any other person, or because a DSO suspects the defendant of having engaged in behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of committing a serious offence, the defendant must submit to the search of any computer, electronic or communication device in his possession or under his control and to the seizure of such devices. Such search would not extend to access to, or the seizure of any commercially sensitive information related to the defendant's employment.
3. The plaintiff submitted that if conditions 10 and 29 were retained it would agree to the deletion of condition 38 and to the defendant's alternative to condition 39. I have already determined that condition 29 is not necessary. I consider that the plaintiff's proposed search conditions are too widely drawn when consideration is given to the sort of risk the defendant presents. I consider that condition 38 should not be included, and that the defendant's alternative to condition 39 should be included.

Medical intervention and treatment (condition 50)

1. The plaintiff seeks the inclusion of condition 50 as follows: The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any treatment providers (namely, drug and alcohol addiction counsellors or relationship counsellors) and healthcare professionals (including psychologists and psychiatrists) that are treating him to the extent that it is relevant to his risk of reoffending or rehabilitation. Before any disclosure is made, the defendant must be first so informed and given the opportunity to make the disclosure himself. (emphasis added)
2. The defendant proposes an alternative to that condition as follows: The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any treatment providers (namely, drug and alcohol addiction counsellors) and healthcare professionals (including psychologists and psychiatrists) that are treating him to the extent that it is relevant to his risk of reoffending or rehabilitation. Before any disclosure is made, the defendant must be first so informed and given the opportunity to make the disclosure himself.
3. It may be observed that the only difference between the two conditions is the inclusion in treatment providers of "relationship counsellors".
4. The defendant submits that there is no evidence concerning any nexus between the defendant's offending behaviour and intimate or non-intimate relationships. Prima facie, that is so. But the experts identified, in substance, that the defendant has difficulties with women (Dr Parker identified that the theory that women were unknowable or dangerous was relevant to the defendant), and Dr Smith saw the lack of any relationships with women (in a heterosexual man) as problematic. Further, the defendant had used pornography that involved "rough stuff". His offending also involved an increasing level of violence.
5. It is not fanciful to infer that if the defendant resorted to a relationship counsellor it would be because of his difficulties relating to women by reason of these matters. A relationship counsellor could scarcely provide appropriate advice or counselling in the absence of knowing his criminal history of sexual offending. The condition contains the proviso that the defendant is given the first opportunity to disclose the information.
6. In my opinion, the condition, as sought by the plaintiff, is relevantly connected to the risk which I have found, and should be included.

Conclusion

1. I make the following orders:
2. An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ("the Act") that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 18 months from 20 October, 2023 ("the extended supervision order").
3. An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.
4. An order that access to the Supreme Court's file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application of access.

Conditions SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION Jason Brooks In these conditions: "Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication). "CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW. "Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services. "Defendant" means Jason Brooks, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order. "DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order. "Material" includes: a. any written or printed material; b. any picture, painting or drawing; c. any carving, sculpture, statue or figure; d. any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced; e. any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and f. any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced. "NSWPF" means NSW Police Force. "Search" includes: a. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and b. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched. Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations Monitoring and Reporting

1. The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.
2. Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.
3. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations. Schedule of Movements
4. If directed, the defendant is to provide an honest summary of his anticipated movements each week (or over successive weeks) for approval, limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, the dates of travel, but not his travel route or precise timetable. If so directed, the defendant is to provide that summary no later than noon on the Monday immediately following the issue of the directions. It must be an honest summary of the defendant's anticipated movements. A DSO may only direct the defendant to provide a schedule of movements where there is a material change to any of the defendant's current accommodation, employment or family supports and the DSO has reasonable concerns that the defendant's risk is thereby elevated.
5. It will not be a breach of condition [4] if the defendant departs from the summary but notifies his DSO of his change of plans before doing so, or as soon as is reasonably practicable afterwards.
6. The defendant must not deviate his approved schedule of movements except: a. in an emergency; b. as specified in condition [5] above; or c. where he has notified the DSO in accordance with condition [5] that he is working. Part B: Accommodation
7. The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant's address or living arrangements.
8. The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
9. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO. Part C: Place and travel restrictions
10. The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.
11. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.
12. The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by a DSO.
13. The defendant must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, without the prior approval of a DSO. Part D: Employment, finance and education
14. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include participation in personal development programs targeted to his risk factors including alcohol and drug programs.
15. The defendant must notify a DSO before he starts or ceases any job, volunteer work or as soon as practicably afterwards. Part E: Drugs and alcohol
16. The defendant must not possess or use prohibited drugs, or abuse drugs unlawfully obtained.
17. The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.
18. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing. Part F: Non-association
19. The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.
20. Without limiting condition [19], the defendant must not: a. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs; or b. associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.
21. The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers, without the prior approval of a DSO.
22. The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. Before any disclosure is made, the defendant must first be so informed and given the opportunity to make the disclosure himself. Part J: Search and seizure
23. If a DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search is required, either to monitor the defendant's compliance with this Order, or for the safety and welfare of any other person, or because a DSO suspects the defendant of having engaged in behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of committing a serious offence, the defendant must submit to the search of any computer, electronic or communication device in his possession or under his control and to the seizure of such devices. Such search would not extend to access to, or the seizure of any commercially sensitive information related to the defendant's employment.
24. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order. Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
25. The defendant must notify a DSO as soon as practicable if he has purchased, possessed, accessed, obtained, viewed, participated in or listened to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to the risk of committing a serious offence. Part L: Personal details and appearance
26. The defendant must not change his name from "Jason Brooks" or use any other name without notifying a DSO.
27. The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of a DSO.
28. The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.
29. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details. Part M: Medical intervention and treatment
30. The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
31. The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.
32. The defendant must agree to his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on his progress and attendance, and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO, where those practitioners consider such information to be relevant to his ongoing risk management and rehabilitation.
33. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW, where those persons and agencies consider such information to be relevant to his ongoing risk management and rehabilitation.
34. The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any treatment providers (namely, drug and alcohol addiction counsellors or relationship counsellors) and healthcare professionals (including psychologists and psychiatrists) that are treating him to the extent that it is relevant to his risk of reoffending or rehabilitation. Before any disclosure is made, the defendant must be first so informed and given the opportunity to make the disclosure himself.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 October 2023