Court of Appeal (Qld)|1997-05-27|Before: Before Fitzgerald P, McPherson J, Moynihan J

Stanbridge v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] QCA 131 (27 May 1997)

On 3 June 1996, the appellant was convicted in the District Court at Gympie of wilfully insulting a Judge of District Courts during his sitting in court contrary to sub-s. 129(1)(a) of the District Courts Act 1967,[1] and was sentenced to imprisonment for nine months. It was ordered that the appellant's imprisonment be suspended after he had served three months and that there be an operational period in respect of that suspension for four years, and that a conviction be recorded. The appellant has appealed against both conviction and sentence, and it may be stated immediately that the Director of Public Prosecutions has properly conceded that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. If the conviction stands, there is no purpose in reducing the sentence beyond the period of imprisonment served by the appellant, which was two months and twenty days. However, it should not be taken that the Court considers that such a sentence was called for.

The appellant appealed against the dismissal of his application to set aside the original order, and his appeal came on in the District Court at Gympie on 3 June 1996. There was no appearance by any other person and the appellant appeared to conduct his own case. The record of that proceeding reveals discussion and debate between the appellant and the District Court Judge before whom his application came, who understandably seems to have been puzzled by the purpose of the appeal having regard to the further order made under the Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act. Many of the appellant's statements to his Honour were legally nonsensical, and his persistent assertion of untenable propositions must have been quite frustrating for the judge. Further, his Honour's attempts to dispose of points raised by the appellant frequently led on to some other equally irrelevant matter or perhaps elicited a comment such as "I don't see that at all". Not long after that was said, the following exchange is recorded:

"APPELLANT: With respect, Your Honour, the law is quite clear that Your Honour is to be impartial ----

APPELLANT: ----- it appears to me that you're simply arguing the case for the defence in this matter.

HIS HONOUR: I am here asking you what your case is about and don't you dare give me cheek or you will be somewhere else.

HIS HONOUR: It didn't sound so well from here. I have been very patient with you.

HIS HONOUR: Just a minute, don't interrupt me. I have been very patient with you up to now trying to understand what your hearing is all about, Stanbridge.

HIS HONOUR: And you are going to tell me about impartiality? That's insulting and it's gratuitous and I won't take it from you. Now, you better consider whether you are going to withdraw that and be very careful, very careful indeed.

Later, after reference to various legislation, including the Magna Carta and the Commonwealth Constitution in the course of further discussion and debate, the following exchange occurred:

"APPELLANT: Then I will ask Your Honour - I won't ask Your Honour. I know that Your Honour took the Oath of Office because I have a copy here and you swear to -----

APPELLANT: Through the Coronation Oath that requires Your Honour to uphold the laws of God and maintain the true profession of the gospel, as well as upholding the laws of the land.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. I take it you are able to deal with the Submission of the Clergy Act and how that will impact upon that.

HIS HONOUR: It is quite obvious you don't know what you are talking about, that's the whole point. Now get on with this appeal, please, if you have anything that is useful.

HIS HONOUR: What was that? One moment, you said something I didn't hear.

APPELLANT: I said I can understand why my former wife didn't send a lawyer in. Can I draw Your Honour's attention to the -----

HIS HONOUR: That's Stanbridge. That's the second time that you have asserted of me impartiality here. I think you better consider your position and I will go away until 4 o'clock. My present inclination is to deal with you in a serious way at 4 o'clock unless you consider that there is a withdrawal appropriate."

When the court resumed, the judge asked the appellant what he had to say for himself, and the appellant replied that he would like to proceed with the case. Then, the matter proceeded as follows:

"HIS HONOUR: Twice this afternoon you have made quite serious assertions of me in my office. On the first occasion I drew your attention to it, Stanbridge, and you did not then retract but continued. You then at a later stage made a further very serious assertion and I have adjourned for 15 minutes telling you that you should take time to reflect on your position. That 15 minutes is up and you have an opportunity to deal with those two matters now in any way that you see fit.

HIS HONOUR: We might be coming to that in a minute but right at the moment I have just finished telling you and I am not going to say it again.

APPELLANT: What you are saying is, I presume, Your Honour, that I have disagreed with some of your views.

HIS HONOUR: No, I don't have any views but listen: you have made two assertions this afternoon on two distinct occasions. They were serious assertions and I referred to them at the time. I have already mentioned that you should consider retracting them and you have retracted neither up to this moment. It is a matter for you, Stanbridge, where you're going from here. I am waiting to see whether you are going to retract anything and whether you do so unreservedly or not.

APPELLANT: Well, I presume Your Honour is accusing me -----

HIS HONOUR: I haven't accused you of anything, yet, yet.

APPELLANT: Well, I presume Your Honour wanted me to consider whether I didn't think -----

HIS HONOUR: I don't give one jot about what you think about. You have prevaricated almost long enough.

APPELLANT: I am not clear what Your Honour is looking for. Can you enlarge on that, please?

HIS HONOUR: I am waiting to see whether you are going to retract unconditionally either one or the other or both of the very serious assertions that you have made of me this afternoon.

HIS HONOUR: I don't propose to enlarge on anything. You were here and I spoke to you about them at the time.

APPELLANT: Well, Your Honour, it is a fact that there is no-one here for the defence, no-one at all and ----

HIS HONOUR: So you wish to justify that remark, do you?

APPELLANT: I am saying that I have been trying to give my submissions and Your Honour has been disputing them.

HIS HONOUR: I think I have been patient for long enough, Stanbridge. I have given you adequate time and clear indications about the seriousness of your conduct and you are taking a stance in persisting in it.

APPELLANT: Is Your Honour saying that I don't have the right to argue my case?

HIS HONOUR: No. I charge you, Stanbridge, with wilfully insulting me as a judge of this Court during my sitting at this Court here in Gympie on this day 3 June 1996 contrary to paragraph 105(1)A of the District Courts Act. I give particulars of that charge. They are that at Gympie on this day while here as an appellant in pursuant of your own appeal, Stanbridge, first, you asserted of me that I was untrue to my oath of office and that I was denying you justice.

Second, that you decline to withdraw or retract or modify that remark in any way notwithstanding that I pointed out to you the seriousness of this assertion that you made and I pointed out further clearly that you could carry that type of conduct too far, at the same time explaining to you that I was bound to expose to you what I was thinking of your submissions so that you could deal with the matters that were in my mind.

Thirdly, that you did not retract on that occasion that assertion.

Fourthly, that you stated to the effect later in the proceedings and after the foregoing matters that you then understood why your former wife did not need a lawyer here to defend your appeal, plainly implying that I was somehow defending your wife's cause contrary to my obligations under my oath of office.

Next, Stanbridge, after time granted, namely 15 minutes, for you to reflect upon your position and after a further warning you do not now withdraw either of the statements or retract any of them in any way. Those are the particulars of your conduct. As I must, I call upon you now to show cause why I should not punish you for the offence that I mentioned. Do you have any cause to show?

APPELLANT: Yes. I was just carrying out my application and my submissions as I see it according to the constitution, the Bill of Rights, Magna Carta and the Criminal Code Act.

APPELLANT: Yes. Your Honour is bound by your oath of allegiance. You are required to uphold the laws of God.

APPELLANT: You are required to administer justice, it says here, without fear or favour or affection.

APPELLANT: And you are required by the Magna Carta not to deny me justice.

APPELLANT: I have not made insulting remarks to Your Honour and I have not lost my temper. I have merely disputed some of the decisions that were made by Mr Swan and I believe they were unlawful and I believe that my case should be heard and my appeal should be upheld and Mr Swan's decision overturned.

HIS HONOUR: Do you have any other cause to show in relation to the charge that I have charged you with?

APPELLANT: Yes. I plead not guilty and I am required to be heard by a jury.

APPELLANT: Section 80 of the constitution takes my right to be heard before a jury.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you. You have nothing further?

APPELLANT: The law makes it quite clear in light of the constitution and the Magna Carta that I have not committed any offence against Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. That is all, is it, that you wish to say? Remember that I am calling upon you to show cause why you should not be punished for the offence that I have mentioned and I have given you the particulars and I don't wish to hurry your statement if you have any further cause of any type to show.

APPELLANT: I haven't committed any offence, Your Honour.

APPELLANT: There is no defence here for my former wife.

HIS HONOUR: I note that even now you decline to retract either imputations and you assert in justification of your cause, if I can put it that way, that it was quite right of you to assert things of me whilst I was sitting in Court. That is enough to label this, Stanbridge, as a very serious example of an offence of this type which under the applicable laws you are not entitled to a trial by jury. I adjudge you guilty of the offence with which I have charged you.

In relation to that, there will be orders to this effect:

first, there will be conviction entered of that offence against you;

second, you will go to prison for this offence for nine months from this day;

thirdly, that sentence will be suspended after you have served three months of that sentence from this day;

fourthly, that there will be an operational period in respect of that suspension which will run four years from this day.

Under the statutes under which I am acting, I am obliged to give you this statement by way of explanation of those orders: the effect of that is that you will be sentenced at once as you are now to nine months' imprisonment. You will serve three months of that. The following six months will be suspended and if you get yourself into any sort of trouble at all during the ensuing four years from this day, you will, among other things, be brought back to serve the outstanding or suspended six months. Those are the orders.

As to the appeal, I adjourn the further hearing of that appeal to a date to be fixed. In all of the circumstances, it will be quite wrong for me to continue with hearing of the appeal in the circumstances prevailing here and I reserve all questions of costs, if any.

Take him away. Gentlemen, if he utters one word between now and the door you will stop at once while I deal with it. The order is you will take him into custody and remove him from the Court to the appropriate place. The order was to remove -----

The first two passages quoted contain assertions that the judge was not impartial but "simply arguing the case" against the appellant and that, although the judge had taken an oath, in effect of impartiality, the appellant could "understand why [his] former wife didn't send a lawyer in". Those words were insulting and were adequately particularised by the judge's statement that the appellant "asserted of [the judge] that [he] was untrue to [his] oath of office and that [he] was denying [the appellant] justice". The statements by the appellant on those occasions and when the court resumed after the appellant had been given an opportunity to consider his position entitled the judge to be satisfied that the insults were wilful. While a different course might have been chosen, it was open to the judge to convict and punish the appellant for a breach of sub-s. 129(1)(a) of the District Courts Act.

The appellant's arguments to this Court, made in writing and orally, involved perseverance in his legal views which, for the most part, are hopelessly misguided. It is not intended to record them or to say more than that they showed no basis for deciding that the appellant was erroneously convicted.

Nor has it been demonstrated that the judge erred in recording a conviction.

The appeal should therefore be disallowed except to the extent that the sentence of imprisonment for nine months should be set aside and a sentence of imprisonment for 2 months and 20 days substituted.

THE APPEAL IS DISALLOWED, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR NINE MONTHS IS SET ASIDE AND A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR TWO MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS IS SUBSTITUTED.

CATCHWORDS: CONTEMPT OF COURT - appellant convicted of offence under s. 129(1)(a) District Courts Act 1967 and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment suspended after three months with operational period of four years - self-represented appellant asserted that District Court Judge was untrue to his oath of office and denying the appellant justice - appellant's legal arguments misguided - whether sentence manifestly excessive.

Solicitors: The appellant appeared on his own behalf.

Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent.

District Courts Act 1967

Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act 1989

Stanbridge v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] QCA 131

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (70 paragraphs)

Stanbridge v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] QCA 131 (27 May 1997)

Parties

Legislation Cited (2)