70 Spencer Industries submits that the evidence reveals that Mr Collins made the Invention within the course and scope of his employment by Spencer Industries with the consequence that the benefit of the Invention vested in Spencer Industries.
71 The respondents submit first, that on 1 August 1991 Mr Collins' employment with Spencer Industries ceased and that his employer thereafter until his resignation was Bijay. On that basis the respondents contend that the Invention could not have been made by Mr Collins in the course of his employment by Spencer Industries. Secondly, the respondents submit that the Invention was not made by Mr Collins within the course and scope of his employment.
72 It is convenient to deal first with the submission that Mr Collins' employer at the time that he made the Invention was Bijay and not Spencer Industries.
73 It does not appear that it was claimed before the Delegate that Mr Collins was not, at the relevant time, an employee of Spencer Industries. It seems clear that Mr Collins at all relevant times regarded himself as an employee of Spencer Industries. By way of example, his notice of resignation, which is dated 5 June 2000, advised Mr Pincott that:
'… I wish to relinquish my position as Sales Manager and terminate my employment with Spencer Industries.'
74 The parties' submissions assumed that the question of the identity of Mr Collins' employer (i.e. whether he was employed by Spencer Industries or Bijay) was a critical question. I am inclined to doubt this assumption is correct. It is accepted by all parties there is no enforceable written or oral assignment of the benefit of the Invention to Spencer Industries. For this reason I consider that Spencer Industries will be entitled against Mr Collins to the benefit of the Invention only if Mr Collins held the benefit of the Invention on a constructive trust in favour of Spencer Industries (Electrolux Ltd v Hudson [1977] FSR 312 per Whitford J at 325-326; Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v Patchett [1955] AC 534 per Viscount Simonds at 543-544 and Lord Reid at 547; Worthington Pumping Engine Co v Moore (1902) 20 RPC 41 per Byrne J at 49). If Mr Collins had made the Invention within the course and scope of his employment as Sales Manager of Spencer Industries, I incline to the view that it would be immaterial that Mr Collins was technically employed by Bijay; the constructive trust would arise in favour of the company entitled to the benefit of his work, not the company which technically employed him (see, for example, Avtex Airservices Pty Ltd v Bartsch (1992) 107 ALR 539 per Hill J at 561-562).
75 However, I do not regard it as clear that the fact that Bijay commenced to pay Mr Collins' salary in August 1991 had the legal consequence that Mr Collins ceased at that time to be an employee of Spencer Industries and became an employee of Bijay. In circumstance that the authority to direct, and if occasion arose to dismiss, Mr Collins remained, as I find that it did, in the Managing Director of Spencer Industries acting in that capacity, it is arguable, in my view, that Mr Collins remained employed by Spencer Industries and that Bijay paid Mr Collins' salary for and on behalf of Spencer Industries.
76 However, as I have concluded that Mr Collins did not make the Invention within the course and scope of his employment as Sales Manager of Spencer Industries, I need not give further consideration to the issue of the true identity of Mr Collins' employer after 1 August 1990 or to any related issue.
77 I turn to consider whether the Invention was made by Mr Collins within the course and scope of his employment as Sales Manager of Spencer Industries. The case of Spencer Industries is that the Invention was made by Mr Collins:
'… in the course of the execution of his general duty to Spencer to make technical improvements to Spencer's retreading equipment, and in particular rasp blades.'
78 There is no written employment contract between Spencer Industries and Mr Collins which defines with precision the scope of Mr Collins' employment. I accept the submission of Spencer Industries that in this circumstance, in considering the scope of Mr Collins' employment, it is necessary to give consideration to the nature and seniority of the employee's position with Spencer Industries, the nature of his duties as Sales Manager and whether he received a specific directive relating to the invention.
79 In my view the evidence makes it plain that the position that Mr Collins held within Spencer Industries was principally a sales position. However, as might be expected in a relatively small, family owned, company he occasionally undertook tasks outside his area of principal responsibility. I find that it was in the nature of Mr Collins' employment that he could be given reasonable directions to perform duties outside of the area of sales that were within the area of his technical skills and that were not incompatible with his principal responsibility for sales.
80 More particularly, I find that it fell within the scope and course of Mr Collins' employment as Sales Manager for him to recommend expansion of the product range of Spencer Industries where his contact with purchasers and potential purchasers suggested that expansion would be in the interest of Spencer Industries. I further find that it fell within the scope and course of Mr Collins' employment as Sales Manager for him to use his technical skills to demonstrate the function and utility of the products that it was his responsibility to sell.
81 I find that Mr Collins in fact contributed to the invention of the air-cooled hub and the design of the tyre rasp spacer. These activities, I find, fell outside his ordinary duties as Sales Manager but within the residual area in which it was open to Spencer Industries to direct him, whether expressly or implicitly, to use his technical skills to undertake additional duties.
82 However, I reject the submission of the appellant that because Mr Collins had a duty as Sales Manager of Spencer Industries to advance the sales of Spencer Industries any invention made by him which was capable of advancing Spencer Industries' sales was an invention made by him within the course and scope of his employment. This submission is, in my view, unacceptably broad in ambit.
83 It was no part of Mr Collins' ongoing duties to invent products for Spencer Industries. Mr Pincott, the evidence discloses, on more than one occasion reminded Mr Collins that his ongoing duties were exclusively sales related. Nor was the Invention the outcome of a direction given to Mr Collins within what I have described as the residual area in which he could be directed to perform tasks other than sales tasks. Mr Collins was not directed by Mr Pincott, or anyone, to invent a new rasp blade or to undertake any inventive activities which resulted in the Invention. Mr Collins advised Mr Pincott of the Invention, which he had conceived and developed in his own time, only when the inventive steps concerning it had been completed. The Invention was not, in my view, the product of the work which Mr Collins was paid to do (Sterling Industries Co Ltd v Patchett per Lord Reid at 547).
84 In arguing to the contrary of the above, the respondent placed weight on Mr Collins' seniority within Spencer Industries. As is mentioned above, Spencer Industries is a family owned company. The evidence satisfies me that at all relevant times actual authority within the company vested almost exclusively in Mr Pincott and members of his family ('the family'). Mr Collins did not in any way control the business of Spencer Industries. Nor was his relationship with Spencer Industries of the close and confidential character considered by Byrne J in Worthington Pumping Engine Co v Moore at 46. The fact that Mr Collins' salary exceeded that of the Managing Director and the General Manager, both members of the family, does not indicate to the contrary. It was for the family, and particularly I assume Mr Pincott, to determine how, when and in what form family members should reap the benefit of the company's success.
85 The respondent also placed weight on conduct of Mr Collins by which he appears to have acknowledged that Spencer Industries was entitled to the benefit of the Invention. The fact that Mr Collins envisaged, as I find that he did, that the Invention would be exploited by Spencer Industries does not establish that he undertook the invention within the course and scope of his employment by Spencer Industries. I am satisfied that Mr Collins had little understanding of intellectual property law while he was employed by Spencer Industries. I am also satisfied Mr Collins hoped that he and Spencer Industries would work together to exploit the Invention; that it would be added to the Spender Industries range of products which he was responsible for selling. However, I am also satisfied that Mr Collins expected that Spencer Industries would appropriately reward him if the Invention proved a commercial success. It was when Mr Pincott made it quite clear to Mr Collins that Spender Industries proposed to assume complete control of the benefit of the Invention without negotiating any financial reward for Mr Collins that Mr Collins unequivocally refused to sign the deed of assignment offered to him by Mr Pincott.
86 In my view, the decision of the Delegate that the Invention was made by Mr Collins outside the course of his duties as an employee of Spencer Industries should be upheld. Mr Collins has not assigned the benefit of the Invention to Spencer Industries. Spencer Industries would not, on the grant of a patent for the Invention, have been entitled to have the patent assigned to it within the meaning of s 15(1)(b) of the Act.
87 The appeal will be dismissed with costs and the decision of the Delegate affirmed.
I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Branson.