Submissions
61 Mr. Gleeson submitted that Mr. Lopatinsky knew and approved of the execution of the option agreement: however, I have rejected that factual submission.
62 He further submitted that, even if Mr. Lopatinsky's signature had been forged on that document, the plaintiffs can rely on the statutory assumptions in the Corporations Law. It did not matter that the signature was forged: see s.128(3) and cf. Story v. Advance Bank Australia Limited (1993) 31 NSWLR 722 at 732.
63 Mr. Gleeson submitted that s.129(6) meant that the plaintiffs could assume that the option had been duly executed, because the company's common seal appeared to have been fixed in accordance with s.127(2); and this fixing appeared to have been witnessed by a director and company secretary in accordance with s.127(2)(b), because the signatures appeared to be those of a director and secretary of Earlmaze by reason of the descriptions appearing under the signatures.
64 Mr. Alexis submitted that the option had not been signed, and did not appear to have been signed, by a director and secretary of Earlmaze. It was not in fact signed by Mr. Lopatinsky, and the other signatory, Mr. Elcham, was neither a director nor a secretary. A search obtained prior to the execution of the option by Ms. Sokol showed that Mr. Lopatinsky and Mr. Matar were the only directors and secretaries; and the loan agreement had been signed by Mr. Matar, and his signature plainly did not appear on the option agreement.
65 Mr. Alexis submitted that, for s.129(6) of the Corporations Law to apply, the signatures must purport to be those of persons shown on the register as directors and/or secretaries, or else persons otherwise held out by the company as directors and/or secretaries: cf. s.129(2) and (3). He further submitted that s.128(3) did not apply, because the forgery could be inferred to have been effected by Mr. Elcham who was neither an officer nor an agent of Earlmaze.
66 Alternatively, Mr. Alexis submitted, the plaintiff must, within the meaning of s.128(4), have suspected that the persons who signed the option had not been duly appointed, that Earlmaze's constitution had not been complied with, that Mr. Matar had not properly performed his duties, and that the document had not been duly executed.
Decision
67 In order that any of the assumptions referred to in s.129 may be made, it is first necessary that the assumptions be "in relation to dealings with a company" within s.128(1), and in my opinion, this must be dealings by the person seeking to rely on the assumptions: cf. Story at p.732-3.
68 In my opinion, on or about 23rd October 1998 the plaintiffs were engaged in "dealings with" Earlmaze. There could be a question whether the dealings they had had with Mr. Matar qualified as dealings with Earlmaze: although Mr. Matar was a director of Earlmaze, he did not in my opinion have actual or ostensible authority to negotiate in relation to an option to dispose of property of Earlmaze worth $625,000.00 or thereabouts for $1,000.00. However, by 23rd October 1998 the plaintiffs were, through their solicitor Ms. Sokol, dealing with Mr. Baron, a solicitor who had been engaged by Earlmaze to act in relation to an option for the disposal of Earlmaze property. In my opinion, Mr. Baron did have instructions from both directors to act in relation to that matter, albeit that his instructions from Mr. Lopatinsky were given under a mistake by Mr. Lopatinsky as to the nature of the option which was proposed. I do not think that mistake negatives Mr. Baron's authority, on behalf of Earlmaze, to act as a solicitor in relation to the proposed option. Accordingly, I find that the plaintiffs were entitled to make the assumptions in s.129 of the Corporations Law in relation to their dealings with Earlmaze through Mr. Baron.
69 The next question is whether the plaintiffs are disentitled to make any particular assumption, on the ground that, at the time of the dealings, they knew or suspected that the assumption was incorrect, as contemplated by s.128(4). In my opinion, the onus of proof in relation to that provision lies on whoever is challenging the person's entitlement to make the assumption.
70 In my opinion, entitlement to make an assumption is lost under s.128(4) only if it is shown that the person in question actually knew or actually suspected that the assumption in question was incorrect: the words are plainly not apt to cover the case where circumstances are such as to put a reasonable person upon enquiry, but where the person in question has no actual knowledge or actual suspicion. An argument to the contrary can be mounted by reference to the explanatory memorandum to the Company Law Review Bill 1997, which states in relation to s.128(4):
This objective test is stricter than the current law and makes it clear that the common law "put upon enquiry" test has no application to the statutory provisions: see Bank of New Zealand v. Fiberi Pty. Limited (1994) 12 ACLC 48; 14 ACSR 736.
71 There is in that memorandum a possible internal conflict between the suggestion that the test in s.128(4) is an objective test, and the suggestion that it does away with the common law "put upon enquiry" test. In my opinion, it is the reference to an objective test which is potentially misleading in the Memorandum: it could perhaps be explained on the basis that the actual holding of a suspicion, although in one sense subjective, is a matter of fact, and is in that sense objective; whereas something of a value judgment is required in order to decide whether or not someone is put on enquiry. The fact that the "put upon enquiry" test is said to be displaced confirms the clear meaning of the provision, namely that it is actual knowledge or actual suspicion which is necessary. Accordingly, I disagree with the suggestion put forward in (1998) 16 Company & Securities Law Journal at 562-5, and agree in general terms with the contrary suggestion put forward in (2000) 18 Company & Securities Law Journal at 50-61. In the latter reference, there is a suggestion that the requirement of knowledge also embraces "wilful blindness": I disagree with that, but probably it makes no difference, because wilful blindness almost inevitably involves actual suspicion.
72 In this case, I have held that the plaintiffs had no relevant knowledge or suspicion; and it was not submitted that Ms. Sokol had any relevant knowledge or suspicion.
73 The next question is whether it can be said in this case that the fixing of the common seal appeared to have been witnessed in accordance with s.127(2), that is, relevantly, by a director and a company secretary of the company. The document contains two illegible signatures, respectively above the words "director" and "secretary". However, the names of the persons purporting to sign are not indicated on the document, and in fact the name of one of the actual signatories, Mr. Elcham, was not included among the names of persons held out by the company to be directors or secretaries of the company or shown on information provided by the company to ASIC to be directors or secretaries of the company. Furthermore, the information provided by the company through ASIC showed that Mr. Matar was one person whose signature was necessary; and it was obvious from Mr. Matar's signature on the loan document that he did not sign the option document.
74 Section 129(6)(b), in combination with s.129(2), (3) and (8), makes it clear that it is sufficient, for the assumption in s.129(6) to be made, that the signatures give the appearance of being by persons shown in the information provided by the company through ASIC or otherwise held out by the company to be the appropriate signatories. The question is whether this is necessary. On one approach, it could be said that the appearance that the fixing of the company seal has been witnessed by a director and a secretary of the company is given by a document containing the common seal, and containing signatures, even illegible signatures, above the words "director" and "secretary".
75 However, the contrary is assumed in the article referred to earlier in (2000) 18 Company & Securities Law Journal, at 52. I note that, under the relevant provision applicable prior to 1st July 1998, namely s.164(3) of the Corporations Law, the relevant assumption depended upon the appearance that the witnessing of the seal was by person(s) who "may be assumed to be" the relevant officer(s), by reason of returns lodged or other holding out by the company. That wording is absent from s.129, although it could be argued that it is implicit in s.129(8), which in effect permits assumptions to be accumulated. And the explanatory memorandum in relation to s.129 makes no suggestion that a change is intended in this respect.
76 It could be suggested that the first approach mentioned receives some support from the last sentence of s.129(6). If the signature(s) accompanying the seal must appear to be those of named persons who either are the appropriate officers in fact, or else appear from information provided by the company through ASIC or are otherwise held out by the company to be the appropriate officers, it could be argued that, where a person thus appears or is held out to be sole director and sole secretary, it could be assumed that this person was duly appointed as such and the last sentence of s.129(6) would be otiose. On the other hand, if it is sufficient that there be a seal with signature(s) appearing to be that of the person(s) described as having the appropriate office, then something more would be required to establish or justify an assumption of the precondition in s.127(2)(c), namely that the company in question "has a sole director who is also the sole company secretary", this precondition not being part of the mode of execution which may be assumed.
77 I do not think this is a strong argument. Even if the signature(s) did have to appear to be those of named persons who are, or appear or are held out to be, appropriate officers, it may be sufficient for this hurdle that a single signatory be held out as a director and/or a secretary, in which case the last sentence in s.129(6) would have work to do. Further, even if information to ASIC showed the named person to be the only director and secretary, it could be argued that s.129(2) only justified the assumption that this person was duly appointed as a director and a secretary, not that he or she was the sole director and sole company secretary.
78 Ultimately, in my opinion, it is a question of what the words of s.129(6) mean, in their context. It seems that the appearance in question there is not appearance to the person dealing with the company, having regard to that person's actual knowledge or assumptions; and indeed that there is no need that the person in question actually make any of the assumptions in question: see the second sentence of s.128(1), and cf. Lyford v. Media Portfolio Ltd. (1989) 7 ACLC 271. Rather, it is that the company's seal objectively appears to have been fixed and witnessed in accordance with s.127(2), that is, relevantly, "witnessed by ... a director and company secretary of the company". With some hesitation, I consider that a document bearing a company seal with signatures respectively above the words "director" and "secretary" does objectively appear to be so witnessed.
79 The next question is whether the appearance that a document has been witnessed as required by s.127(2) would be negatived if there is other material available to the person dealing with the company which would, if understood, show that one or more of the signatures was not that of a director or secretary of the company. In my opinion, it would not: for such material to preclude the entitlement to rely on the assumption in s.129(6), it must in my opinion give rise to the knowledge or suspicion referred to in s.128(4). Accordingly, I do not think the presence of Mr. Matar's signature on the loan agreement, and its absence from the option agreement, precludes reliance on ss.128 and 129.
80 Mr. Alexis submitted that s.128(3) only applied if the relevant fraud or forgery was by an officer or agent of the company; and that Mr. Elcham was not an officer or agent of Earlmaze. However, in my opinion the fraud or forgery does not need to be within the agent's authority in such a way as would make the company liable for it within the principle of Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. (1912) AC 716. In my opinion, it is sufficient that the person in question be an agent of the company in the sense of having some legitimate role on behalf of the company in relation to the dealings in question; and it is not suggested that Mr. Elcham did not have such a role, for example in conveying documents to Mr. Baron.
81 It might be said that all this makes it too easy for persons dealing with companies to establish the liability of the company under a sealed document. However, if such a person is dealing with persons associated with a company who execute documents honestly but mistakenly on behalf of the company, I do not see that the company should benefit from discrepancies with its published documents; while if, as in this case, the person is dealing with persons associated with the company who are apparently prepared to be fraudulent and to forge signatures, it gives little more protection to a company to require that a forger state a name on the document which is the correct name of a director or secretary shown in information given through ASIC.
82 In fact, some protection to the company is given by the requirement that the person must be engaged in dealings with the company in the first place; which in my opinion means that there must be dealings (in the sense of negotiations or other steps in relation to a contemplated transaction) with someone on behalf of the company which are dealings authorised by the company, and the document in respect of which the assumptions may be made must be a document which is "in relation to" those authorised dealings (and I take this to extend to a document arising out of authorised negotiations or other steps). I note that in Story at 733, Gleeson, CJ suggested that the concept of having dealings with a company must embrace purported dealings, because if the provisions only applied where the person representing the company had actual authority, they would be largely unnecessary. I take this as meaning that it is not necessary that the person representing the company have authority from the company to commit the company to the relevant transactions or execute the relevant documents; but in my opinion, it is necessary that the person have authority to undertake some negotiation or other steps, so that the dealings, in relation to which the document is executed, are properly considered to be dealings with the company.
83 Finally, I should note an argument which was not advanced at the hearing, but which is put in an article in (1999) 10 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 38-53; namely that it is necessary to consider separately the questions of formal authority (whether company's assent to the transaction is in proper form) and substantive authority (whether the company has authorised the transaction). I agree with the authors that there is some support for that proposition, in relation to the general law position, in the judgments of the High Court (apart from Mason CJ) in Northside Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146. However, I do not think the other authorities cited in the article support that proposition in relation to a person entitled to make the statutory assumptions; and if it can be assumed (and cannot be denied by the company) that a company has duly executed a document, I do not think there is any separate question as to whether this was duly authorised. In any event, under s.129(8) of the Corporations Law, the assumptions in s.129 are cumulative; and once one can assume under s.129(6) that a document has been duly executed, one can also assume under s.129(1) that the company's constitution has been complied with, so as to authorise that due execution. Of course, a person who fails in relation to formal authority may still possibly succeed if substantive authority is shown.
84 Accordingly, in my opinion, the plaintiffs are entitled to rely on an assumption that the option agreement was duly executed by the company, and the company Earlmaze is precluded by s.128 from asserting to the contrary.