Court of Appeal (WA)|2008-10-10|Before: Lure JA, Buss JA

SOUTHSIDE AUTOS (1981) PTY LTD -v- COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2008] WASCA 208 (10 October 2008)

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION : SOUTHSIDE AUTOS (1981) PTY LTD -v- COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2008] WASCA 208

Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Taxation - Appeal from State Administrative Tribunal - Whether appeal out of time - Written transcript of proceedings of a decision given orally satisfies requirement that reasons be in writing - Whether court may extend time within which to appeal - State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) and Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) are part of an overlapping legislative scheme and should be construed accordingly - Sections 92 and 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act to be read with s 43A of the Taxation Administration Act - Court has power to grant extension of time to appeal

Taxation - Stamp duty - Issuing of motor vehicle licences - Whether assessment of stamp duty was made by licensing authority - Assessment requires the making of a decision or determination by the licensing authority - Where the appellant as an agent of the licensing authority registered and licensed vehicles in its capacity as agent, and appellant had been granted an exemption from stamp duty under s 76C(6) of the Stamp Act 1921 (WA) for demonstration vehicles - Whether in issuing licenses the appellant made a decision or determination as to whether stamp duty was payable - Whether licensing authority performed merely administrative functions

Taxation - Stamp duty - Whether assessments made under Stamp Act prior to the enactment of the Stamp Amendment Act 2003 (WA) are self-assessments or official assessments for the purpose of the Taxation Administration Act - Where licensing authority had previously determined that no duty was payable, the determination was an official assessment - Whether the Commissioner had power to issue reassessments under s 16 of the Taxation Administration Act - Whether s 35 of the Taxation Administration (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002 (WA) precluded or restricted the Commissioner's power to make a reassessment - Whether regard may be had to subsequent events for the purpose of discovering the appellant's purpose at the time when a motor vehicle licence was issued

Stamp Act 1921 (WA) s 16, s 31, s 31AA, s 31A, s 32, s 33, s 34A, s 76B, s 76C, 76I, Second Schedule item 14

Taxation Administration (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002 (WA) s 33, s 34, s 35

Application for an extension of time to appeal granted

1 McLURE JA: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Buss JA. I agree with him for the reasons he gives that the appellant requires an extension of time within which to appeal, that this court has power to extend time and that an extension of time should be granted. I also agree with Buss JA that grounds of appeal 3 and 4 should be dismissed for the reasons he gives. However, I propose to state my own reasons in relation to grounds of appeal 1 and 2. I agree with Buss JA that ground 1 should be upheld but have reached a different conclusion on ground 2 which I would dismiss.

2 The facts, grounds of appeal and relevant statutory provisions are set out in the reasons of Buss JA and not repeated here unless required for an understanding of these reasons.

3 The appellant challenges the validity of assessments of stamp duty made by the respondent in 2005 (the 2005 assessments). The alleged liability to pay stamp duty arose in relation to the issue of motor vehicle licences prior to 1 July 2003. Prior to the issue of the motor vehicle licences the appellant claimed exemption from stamp duty under pt IIIC of the Stamp Act 1921 (WA) as it was prior to 1 July 2003.

4 It assists to have an understanding of the general statutory background and the issues in dispute. The Stamp Amendment Act 2003 (WA) (2003 Amendment Act), which came into effect on 1 July 2003, deleted the majority of the administrative provisions of the Stamp Act. The Stamp Act as it was immediately prior to the commencement of the 2003 Amendment Act will be referred to as the 'old Stamp Act'. The administrative provisions relating to the Stamp Act and other specified taxation statutes are now in the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) (TAA) which also commenced on 1 July 2003. The relevant transitional provisions consequent upon the commencement of the 2003 Amendment Act and the TAA are contained in the Taxation Administration (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002 (WA) (CPA).

5 Part 3 of the TAA deals with assessments. It defines the term 'assessment' (s 13) and provides for three categories of assessment, being self assessment by either the tax payer or a responsible authority (s 14), an official assessment, being an assessment made by the Commissioner of State Revenue (Commissioner) (s 15) and a reassessment by the Commissioner (s 16). Reassessment is defined in the glossary to the TAA as not including an 'original assessment'. An original assessment means a self assessment or the first official assessment made in relation to the tax if no self assessment was made, but does not include a reassessment.

6 The liability of the appellant to stamp duty relating to the issue of motor vehicle licences arose under the old Stamp Act as the liability was incurred prior to 1 July 2003. Accordingly, the transitional provisions in the CPA apply. Sections 34 and 35 of that Act are central to the appeal and it is convenient to set out the relevant parts.

(1) Section 37(1) of the Interpretation Act 1984, except paragraphs (a) and (b), does not apply in relation to the repeal of an old Act.

(2) The repeal of an old Act does not, unless the contrary intention appears -

(a) affect any right, interest, title, power or privilege created, acquired, accrued, established or exercisable or any status or capacity existing prior to the repeal;

(b) affect any duty, obligation, liability, or burden of proof imposed, created, or incurred prior to the repeal;

...

(a) a right, interest, title, power, privilege, duty, obligation, liability or burden of proof referred to in subsection (2)(a) or (b) may be exercised or enforced;

...

as if the substantive provisions of the relevant old Act -

(d) had not been repealed;

(e) were a taxation Act for the purposes of the Taxation Administration Act 2003; and

(f) had been amended to make any modifications necessary for this section to have effect.

(4) If an objection, appeal or other legal proceeding (the 'action') was instituted under an old Act and was not finally determined before the commencement day -

(a) the action may be continued;

(b) any requirement to pay interest on an amount of tax determined in the action to have been overpaid applies and may be enforced;

(c) any penalty may be imposed and enforced; and

(d) any decision, order or determination made in the action has effect, and may be enforced,

as if this Act and the taxation Acts had not commenced.

(5) If the time limited by an old Act for doing anything is longer than the time limited by a taxation Act for doing the equivalent thing under that Act, then in relation to a matter to which subsection (3) applies, the time limited under the old Act applies in relation to the doing of the thing under the taxation Act.

(6) If the time limited by an old Act for commencing proceedings in relation to an offence under that Act is shorter than the 5 year period limited by section 111 of the Taxation Administration Act 2003, then despite section 111, proceedings in relation to an offence under the old Act (including an offence under a provision of the old Act that is continued in force under this Part) cannot be commenced after the expiry of the shorter period provided for by the old Act.

(7) In this section a reference, in relation to the Stamp Act 1921, to the repeal of the old Act is a reference to the amendment of the Act by the Stamp Amendment Act 2003.

Despite Part 3 Division 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 2003, the Commissioner must not make a reassessment that increases the amount of tax a person is liable to pay in relation to anything that happened before the commencement day if the reassessment could not have been made under the relevant old Act.

7 The appellant contends that the 2005 assessments are reassessments under s 16 of the TAA and are beyond power by virtue of s 35 of the CPA because they increase the amount of tax the appellant is liable to pay and the reassessment could not have been made under the old Stamp Act.

8 The respondent contends there was no assessment as that term is defined in s 13 of the TAA prior to the 2005 assessments; if there was an assessment, there was no self assessment or official assessment for the purposes of the TAA and thus no reassessment; if there was a reassessment, it could have been made under the old Stamp Act. Thus, the broad issues are:

(1) whether at or around the time of the issue of the motor vehicle licences in question there was an assessment of stamp duty as that term is defined in s 13 of the TAA;

(2) if the answer to question (1) is yes, whether the assessment was a self assessment within either limb of the definition in s 14 of the TAA;

(3) if the answer to question (2) is no, whether the assessment was a first official assessment under s 15 of the TAA;

(4) if the answer to (2) or (3) is yes, the 2005 assessments are reassessments in which event the question is whether the reassessments could have been made under the old Stamp Act.

9 But for s 34 of the CPA, the provisions of the old Stamp Act alone would govern the question whether the Commissioner had the power to issue the 2005 assessments. Both parties accept that by virtue of s 34(3) of the CPA, that issue is to be determined by reference to the provisions of pt 3 of the TAA.

10 Two issues arise. The first is the proper approach to take when applying the TAA statutory framework to conduct already carried out under the old Stamp Act. In my view the proper approach is to identify the elements of the relevant concept under the TAA and determine whether as a matter of substance those elements are satisfied by the actions taken under the provisions of the old Stamp Act. The approach can be explained by reference to the term 'assessment' under the TAA. An assessment is relevantly defined in s 13 of the TAA as a determination that no tax is payable or that a person is exempt from tax or that an instrument is exempt from tax. The question then is whether such a determination was in substance made under the old Stamp Act.

11 Applying that approach, I agree with Buss JA for the reasons he gives that at the time of the issue of the motor vehicle licences the subject of the 2005 assessments: (1) a determination was made by the Director General of Transport (Director General), through the agency of the appellant, that the issue was exempt from stamp duty and thus there was an assessment within the meaning of the TAA; (2) in the absence of any necessary modification under s 34(3)(f) of the CPA, that assessment was not a self assessment or a first official assessment with the consequence that the 2005 assessments are not reassessments.

12 The remaining question is whether there is any necessary modification required under s 34(3)(f) which alters that outcome. That raises the second and more difficult issue concerning the scope of s 34(3) of the CPA.

13 Part IIIC and (inter alia) s 31 (assessment of duty by Commissioner), s 31AA (reassessments) and s 31A (default assessments) of the old Stamp Act were repealed by the 2003 Amendment Act. However, by s 34(2) of the CPA the repeal does not affect any accrued right or power existing prior to the repeal or any duty, obligation or liability imposed, created or incurred prior to the repeal. However, such a right, power, duty, obligation or liability may be exercised or enforced on the basis set out in s 34(3) of the CPA. That subsection refers to 'substantive provisions of the relevant old Act'. In this context that is a reference to the old Stamp Act.

14 Under s 34(3) of the CPA a power may be exercised or a liability enforced as if the substantive provisions of the old Stamp Act:

(2) were a taxation Act for the purposes of the TAA; and

(3) had been amended to make any modifications necessary for s 34 to have effect.

15 Buss JA has concluded that the provisions of pt IIIC of the old Stamp Act under which assessments by the Director General, through the agency of the appellant, were made are 'substantive provisions' of the old Stamp Act because those provisions deal with a matter that is not reproduced or otherwise dealt with in the TAA. He further concludes that it is necessary to modify those substantive provisions by inserting a new provision to the effect that assessments made by the Director General under pt IIIC are assessments of the Commissioner. I have come to a contrary conclusion on both questions.

16 In my view, the provisions of pt IIIC of the old Stamp Act relating to the Director General's assessment powers are not substantive provisions for the purposes of s 34(3) of the CPA. The phrase 'substantive provisions' in relation to the old Stamp Act is defined in s 33 of the CPA to mean 'the provisions of the old [Stamp] Act other than those dealing with matters dealt with in the Taxation Administration Act 2003'.

17 The term 'matters' is not defined. Having regard to the statutory context it means the subject matters dealt with in the TAA: In Re the Judiciary Act 1903 - 1920 and In Re the Navigation Act 1912 - 1920 [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265. The subject matters dealt with in the TAA include assessments of tax, objections and review proceedings and payment and refund of tax. It is apparent from the language and purpose of s 34(3) that the provisions of the TAA are intended to cover the field to the exclusion of the provisions of the old Stamp Act on the same subjects. It was not the intention that the assessment powers of the Commissioner and the Director General continue as if the old Stamp Act had not been repealed save perhaps in the case of positive inconsistency with the TAA.

18 Thus, the provisions of the old Stamp Act relating to assessment, which includes those provisions conferring power on persons including the Commissioner and the Director General to make assessments, are not substantive provisions of the old Stamp Act. A liability to pay stamp duty on the issue of motor vehicle licences under s 16 and item 14 of the Second Schedule of the old Stamp Act would be a liability under the substantive provisions of the old Act.

19 Even if, contrary to my view, the Director General's assessment powers under pt IIIC are substantive provisions, I am not persuaded there is a proper basis to modify the provisions under s 34(3)(f). The phrase 'necessary for [section 34] to have effect' in s 34(3)(f) means necessary in order to have an accrued power under the old Stamp Act or an incurred obligation or liability under the old Stamp Act exercised or enforced respectively under the powers in the TAA.

20 Neither party raised the question whether there was a relevant preserved obligation or liability under s 34(2) of the CPA if the Director General's determination was in effect final under the old Stamp Act (because the powers in s 31, s 31A or s 31AA did not apply). If the answer is that the obligation or liability is not preserved under s 34(2) then s 34(3) has no application. My preliminary view is that if the Director General's determination is in effect final, there is no preserved liability of the appellant under s 34(2) of the CPA. However, it is unnecessary to decide that question because I agree with Buss JA for the reasons he gives that the Commissioner would have been entitled to issue a default assessment under s 31A of the old Stamp Act. Accordingly, I will proceed on the basis that the appellant's alleged liability is preserved under s 34(2) of the CPA.

21 It is not necessary in order to enforce the preserved liability under the TAA to modify the substantive provisions of the old Stamp Act to insert a provision to the effect that when the Director General acted under pt IIIC of the old Stamp Act he was acting on behalf of the Commissioner. The absence of such a provision simply means the 2005 assessments are first official assessments and thus not reassessments. This has the consequence that when the TAA is applied under s 34(3)(e) there can be an assessment under s 13 of the TAA that is neither a self assessment nor an official assessment under that Act. Such an outcome is not in my view inconsistent with the proper construction of the TAA. The term 'assessment' in s 13 is simply an element of the broader concepts of self assessment and official assessment and reassessment is defined by reference to those broader concepts. I see nothing in the language or purpose of the TAA requiring a conclusion that an assessment must be either a self assessment or an official assessment. Moreover, a default assessment under s 31A of the old Stamp Act was separate and distinct from the reassessment power in s 31AA. In this case s 34 of the CPA can be given effect to without modifying the substantive provisions of the old Act.

22 For these reasons I am satisfied that the Deputy President wrongly concluded that no assessments were made under pt IIIC of the old Stamp Act but correctly concluded that the 2005 assessments were not reassessments under the TAA. I would uphold ground of appeal 1 but otherwise dismiss the appeal. I would uphold ground 1 of the notice of contention. In view of my conclusions in the appeal it is unnecessary to address ground 2 of the notice of contention.

23 BUSS JA: On 28 January 2005, the respondent (the Commissioner) made various stamp duty assessments (the 2005 assessments) referred to in a written notice of assessment of stamp duty (the Assessment Notice), purportedly pursuant to s 15 of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) (the TAA).

24 The Assessment Notice relates to licences for new motor vehicles issued to the appellant between 1 July 1998 and 30 June 2003. The amount of the Assessment Notice was $718,770.90, comprising duty of $552,901.90 and a fine of $165,869.

25 On 25 February 2005, the appellant objected to the Assessment Notice, and on 1 December 2005, the Commissioner disallowed the objection.

26 On 20 January 2006, the appellant applied to the State Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of the Commissioner's decision to disallow the objection.

27 On 17 July 2006, there was a hearing before a Deputy President, Judge Eckert, to determine two preliminary issues, namely:

(a) Did the Commissioner have power to make the 2005 assessments under any and, if so, what provisions of the TAA, the Stamp Act 1921 (WA) (the Stamp Act) or the Taxation Administration (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002 (WA) (the Consequential Provisions Act)?

(b) If the Commissioner had power to make the 2005 assessments, was the Commissioner, when determining whether to make each of those assessments, able to take into consideration the circumstances, matters and events that occurred or existed after the date of grant of a licence and, in particular, the use of the vehicle after that date?

28 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Eckert reserved her decision.

29 On 19 July 2006, Judge Eckert orally delivered her decision and reasons for decision.

30 On 10 November 2006, Judge Eckert made written orders, as follows:

(a) the Commissioner had, pursuant to s 15(2) of the TAA, the power to make the 2005 assessments; and

(b) the Commissioner, when determining whether to make each of the 2005 assessments, and when considering the objection to the Assessment Notice, was entitled to take into consideration the circumstances, matters and events that occurred or existed after the date of grant of a licence and, in particular, the use of the vehicle after that date.

31 Since 1981 the appellant has carried on business under the name 'Southside Mitsubishi' from premises at 1261 Albany Highway, Cannington.

32 At all material times, the appellant has been a licensed motor vehicle dealer under s 15 of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973 (WA).

33 By letter dated 3 June 1997, Arthur Andersen, on behalf of the appellant, wrote to the Commissioner seeking confirmation of the availability of a stamp duty exemption under s 76C(6) of the Stamp Act on the issue of motor vehicle licences for vehicles used in an arrangement which became known as the 'Drive-A-While Program'. The letter outlined the proposed arrangement, as follows:

[The appellant] is currently considering a variation to its current method of demonstrating new motor vehicles and the subsequent disposal of new motor vehicles which it acquires from Mitsubishi. The proposal is as follows:

[The appellant] will acquire new motor vehicles from Mitsubishi as it would normally do for resale.
[The appellant] proposes to make some cars available to prospective buyers for hire for a maximum period of three months.
Either during the three months period or at the end of the three months the hirer of the motor vehicle can acquire that car for a predetermined market value price.
If the hirer of the vehicle does not proceed with the acquisition the vehicle will become part of the trading stock of [the appellant] and the vehicle will be sold as a demonstration vehicle.
The vehicle once it has been hired for a period will not be rehired to the public, it will automatically be reinstated as trading stock of [the appellant].

34 By letter dated 24 June 1997, the Commissioner wrote to Arthur Andersen in relation the Drive-A-While Program and confirmed the circumstances in which the exemption under s 76C(6) would apply. In the letter the Commissioner said, relevantly:

It is confirmed that the exemption contained in s 76C(6) of the Stamp Act would apply to the issue of the initial licence for a motor vehicle in the circumstances where in the course of endeavouring to sell it, it is hired to a prospective purchaser for a period of up to three months.

35 Between 24 June 1997 and 30 June 2003 the appellant licensed 1026 new motor vehicles in its name for use in the Drive-A-While Program. It claimed exemptions from duty under s 76C(6) for each of these vehicles.

36 Before 24 June 1997, the appellant had licensed some new motor vehicles for use in the Drive-A-While Program. By letter dated 15 July 1997, Arthur Andersen, on behalf of the appellant, applied to the Commissioner for a refund of duty previously paid on these vehicles. The Commissioner accepted the appellant's claim for a refund. On 28 November 1997, the Commissioner refunded $67,356 to the appellant for duty paid on vehicles claimed by the appellant to have been previously licensed in its own name and used in the Drive-A-While Program before the Commissioner's letter dated 24 June 1997.

37 After a stamp duty audit of the appellant in 1999 and pay-roll tax and rental business duty audits in 2002, a further audit was carried out. Following the completion of this audit, the Commissioner made the 2005 assessments and issued the Assessment Notice.

38 The Assessment Notice relates to 673 of the 927 vehicles that were acquired and licensed in the name of the appellant for use in the Drive-A-While Program between 1 July 1998 and 30 June 2003.

39 The appellant licensed the new motor vehicles in its name, for use in the Drive-A-While Program, in the following manner:

(a) a scheme known as the 'Dealer Network Registration Scheme' allowed the appellant, as a participant in the scheme, to undertake registration transactions for certain vehicles;

(b) the appellant made application (an Application) to the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DPI) (formerly the Department of Transport) in accordance with the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) and s 76C(7) of the Stamp Act for the registration of the vehicles and the issue of a motor vehicle licence in the appellant's name in respect of each vehicle;

(c) accompanying each Application was a 'Form S13 Dealer's Certificate - Section 76C(7) Stamp Act 1921' (the Certificate), which was a declaration by the appellant made pursuant to s 76C(7) of the Stamp Act that the vehicle described in the declaration and the subject of the Application would be used for demonstration purposes;

(d) the Dealer Network Registration Scheme allowed the appellant to access and use the computer program of the DPI and to register each vehicle in the appellant's name, and allowed the appellant to generate a licence and a third party insurance policy; and

(e) the appellant sent the Application and the Certificate to the DPI, and the licence and third party insurance policy details were recorded in the DPI vehicle licensing computer system.

40 The Dealer Network Registration Scheme was implemented administratively by the DPI, presumably in reliance on the Carltona principle. See Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24, 37 - 38 (Mason J); Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51; (2001) 207 CLR 391, 449 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). The Scheme had no statutory basis.

41 The Dealer Network Registration Scheme is described in a 'User Manual', published by the DPI, which was tendered in evidence before the Tribunal. Relevant features of the Scheme, for present purposes, as described in the Manual, are these:

(a) The nature and principal features of the Scheme are outlined, as follows:

Licensing Division, Department of Transport will appoint your licensed Motor Vehicle Dealership to the Dealer Network Registration Scheme as an agent. You will be allowed to register new vehicles and conduct other approved transactions for vehicles owned and sold by you.

The scheme gives you authority to assess and collect fees and issue registration labels and number plates to vehicles. The service will be available to you during Dealer trading hours and enable you to provide customers with immediate registration for vehicles.

Dealers authorised under Bulk Licensing Certification are included in the Dealer Network Registration Scheme to register new vehicles and to conduct certain licensing transactions relating to vehicles traded to those Dealers.

As an approved Licensed Dealer, you may undertake registration transactions for any vehicles traded through any of your 'Certified Registered Premises' (as advised by the Motor Vehicle Dealers Licensing Board).

...

Your authorised organisation will be granted limited access to the vehicle licensing computer system of Licensing Division to create immediate records for the registrations you issue and vehicles you trade.

Under the scheme, the Traffic Board delegates to you some of its authority to license vehicles. Any breach of the procedures or requirements of the scheme may result in your membership being withdrawn (AB 191).

(b) The Manual stated, in relation to s 76C of the Stamp Act:

Section 76C of the Stamp Act requires Licensing Division, Department of Transport and its Licensing Agents to collect Stamp Duty on all Motor Vehicle Licence or Transfer applications (other than those specifically exempted), on behalf of the State Taxation Department (AB 301).

Section 76C(6) of the Stamp Act provides that no Stamp Duty is payable by Dealers where:

a licence is granted to a person to carry on a business of selling motor vehicles.
a vehicle has been sold to a dealer for the purpose of resale to another person and it is in the ordinary course of the business of the dealer.
a vehicle is registered for the purpose of demonstration to prospective purchasers.

Licensed dealers who trade in vehicles are required to submit a Notice of Acquisition to Licensing Division immediately upon acquiring any licensed vehicle.

NOTE: A Dealer is not required to pay Stamp Duty when registering an unlicensed vehicle providing the licence has been obtained for purposes listed above.

Dealers in trailers, boat trailers and earth moving vehicles are not required to be licensed under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act. However, Dealers are exempt from Stamp Duty subject to the producing the following:

Stamp Act Certificate form S13 issued under Section 76(c) [sic]
Advice of Disposal of Vehicle form is signed by the previous owner
Current Licence papers (AB 306).

The Commissioner's reasons for disallowing the appellant's objection

42 In a letter dated 1 December 2005, the Commissioner set out reasons for disallowing the appellant's objection.

43 The basis for the disallowance was the Commissioner's opinion, formed after his audit of the appellant's business activities, that the Drive-A-While Program was in fact a car hire business which the appellant operated concurrently with its Mitsubishi dealership. According to the Commissioner, the appellant should not have relied upon the exemption in s 76C(6) of the Stamp Act with respect to vehicles purchased by it and used in the Drive-A-While Program. The Commissioner said that evidence in his possession supported the conclusion that the use of the vehicles in the Drive-A-While Program did not satisfy s 76C(6) for these reasons:

I do not accept the proposition that an overseas visitor who hired a Drive-A-While vehicle for a period of some two weeks with a pick up and drop off at the airport, or a Victorian family visiting Perth for a few days, could be properly characterised as prospective purchasers of Mitsubishi vehicles from Southside. In that regard, the Commissioner contacted some of the customers of the program, and what has emerged is that not one had any intention of buying the hired vehicle, or another Mitsubishi vehicle, from Southside; rather they simply entered into vehicle rental arrangements, and nothing more. In other words, the motives concerning their dealings with Drive-A-While were limited to those of a customer requiring a short term car rental, or a longer hire (by predominantly companies and medical professionals) as a means of transportation for the duration of a visit, project, employment contract, or the like. All the customers contacted by the Commissioner confirmed that they viewed the program as constituting a vehicle hire business, and had no intention of buying the vehicles so hired, or another Mitsubishi vehicle from Southside.

At this juncture, the question that needs to be posed is what persuaded them to deal with Drive-A-While?

The participants in the program were enticed to do so by a variety of means including: advertisements of the Drive-A-While program in the 'Yellow Pages' (listed along side other companies engaged in the hire of motor vehicles), and by visiting the Drive-A-While site on the Internet. At the time of the audit, and at present, the material website profiles Drive-A-While as a company specialising in corporate and long term leasing, while also offering its services to people visiting Perth on an employment contract or an extended vacation.

I note that even the standard contract entered into by the customers of the Drive-A-While program is headed as 'Vehicle Rental Agreement'.

Based upon these findings, I am satisfied that the customers of the Drive-A-While program cannot be termed as genuine potential purchasers of Mitsubishi vehicles from Southside, nor that the Drive-A-While program is anything other than a car rental business.

Judge Eckert's reasons for decision in relation to the preliminary issues

44 An examination of the transcript of Judge Eckert's oral reasons for decision indicates her reasoning was as follows:

(a) Section 76C(1) imposes duty:

There is no need for a separate assessment to be made for the duty to be paid; that's subject to some qualifications later on in the section (ts 7).

(b) The licensing authority is not an agency or emanation of the State of Western Australia (ts 7).

(c) The licensing authority is performing administrative functions on behalf of the Commissioner. It receives the duty imposed under the Act. There is no separate assessment as such:

They perform an administrative function of collecting revenue imposed and stamping the relevant instrument accordingly by printing a receipt across them, as I understand it, across the licence (ts 7).

If a person doesn't agree with the amount of duty they don't take on the licensing authority ... the taxpayer objects to the Commissioner under the relevant statutory provisions (ts 8).

(e) The Commissioner's power of assessment has not been delegated to the licensing authority:

There is no delegation, in my view, of the Commissioner's power to make a determination that I am aware of and although I have not looked at it in depth I doubt that the Commissioner could delegate that fundamental function to a licensing authority under s 6 of the old Stamp Act (ts 8).

(f) The licensing authority acts as the agent of the Commissioner for the collection of revenue (ts 8).

(g) Section 76C(13B) applies to an assessment or determination of the licensing authority under s 76C(9) or (10) only. It does not apply to the administrative functions undertaken by the licensing authority (ts 9).

(h) Section 76C(1) and (6) do not constitute an official assessment 'as they are not determinations by the Commissioner as is required by s 15 [of the TAA] and in light of the provisions of s 13(1) [of the TAA]' (ts 10).

(i) The motor vehicle dealer does not make an assessment under s 76C. Nor does the licensing authority make an assessment (either an official assessment or a self-assessment) within s 76C (subject to qualifications). As a result, the Commissioner's 2005 assessments do not constitute a reassessment in that a reassessment requires that there first be an official assessment or a self-assessment (ts 13).

Instruments under s 76C are stamped pursuant to the old Stamp Act but the Commissioner has not raised an assessment on them and he is not prohibited from making an assessment. He can do so under s 31A of the old Stamp Act and he has always been able to do that during the relevant period (ts 13).

(k) Even if 'something' has been deemed to be an assessment under s 76C(13B), the Commissioner can still assess under s 31A as a default assessment because that provision is merely a deeming provision with respect to subsections (9) and (10) of s 76C (ts 14).

(l) The 2005 assessments were not reassessments within the meaning of the TAA and therefore the Commissioner's assessment power was not subject to the statutory limitations that apply in the making of a reassessment (ts 15).

(m) As the Commissioner is entitled to make the 2005 assessments, 'he is entitled to do so in an essentially unfettered capacity' (ts 15).

In my view, evidence of the circumstances, matters or events that occurred or existed after the date of the grant of the licence where relevant to determine that earlier purpose, can be taken into account by the [Commissioner] and by this tribunal when reviewing the objection to the assessments (ts 15).

The Commissioner's application to strike out the appeal

45 Section 43A(2) of the TAA prescribes the period for bringing an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal on a review application in connection with a revenue assessment or decision. It provides that the appeal has to be instituted in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 28 days after:

(a) the day on which the Tribunal's decision is made; or

(b) if the Tribunal gives oral reasons for the decision and the appellant then requests it to give written reasons under s 78 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (the SAT Act), the day on which the written reasons are given to the appellant.

46 On 14 November 2006, the appellant filed its appeal notice.

47 By application dated 12 March 2007, the Commissioner applied for an order that the appeal be struck out and dismissed on the ground that the appeal notice was filed out of time. The application was supported by an affidavit of Bradley John Prentice sworn 12 March 2007. Mr Prentice deposed, relevantly, that:

(a) He is a solicitor in the State Solicitor's Office and has the carriage of the appeal on behalf of the State Solicitor who represents the Commissioner.

(b) On 17 July 2006, the preliminary issues were argued before Judge Eckert.

(d) On 19 July 2006, Judge Eckert orally delivered her decision and reasons for decision in relation to the preliminary issues.

(e) On 27 July 2006, Mr Prentice received a copy of a letter dated 26 July 2006 from the Tribunal which attached a copy of the transcript of the decision and reasons for decision delivered on 19 July 2006.

(f) On 10 November 2006, at the instigation of the appellant, the Tribunal issued an authenticated written order recording its findings in relation to the decision which was delivered orally on 19 July 2006.

48 According to the Commissioner, the appeal not having been commenced within 28 days after 19 July 2006, the appeal is incompetent and should be struck out.

The appellant's submissions in opposition to the application to strike out

49 The appellant submitted that the appeal notice was not filed out of time in that the Tribunal did not pronounce a 'final decision' until it made the order on 10 November 2006. It was submitted that Judge Eckert merely gave oral reasons for decision on 19 July 2006, and that oral reasons do not constitute a 'decision'.

50 The appellant contended that the SAT Act distinguishes between 'reasons for decision' on the one hand and a 'decision' on the other. It referred, in this respect, to s 76 and s 79. Section 76 provides, relevantly, that if the Tribunal reserves it decision in any proceeding, it is to give its 'decision and the reasons for the decision' within 90 days. Section 79 provides that a written transcript of the part of the proceedings in which a 'decision' is given orally 'or reasons' are given orally is sufficient for a provision of the Act that requires the 'decision or reasons' to be in writing. According to the appellant, the SAT Act leaves no doubt that a 'decision' is not the same as the 'reasons for decision'. It follows that reasons for decision do not necessarily incorporate a decision, and an appeal lies only from a decision and not from the reasons.

51 The appellant submitted that the time limited for commencing an appeal did not begin to run until 10 November 2006, when the Tribunal made its 'decision' by virtue of the sealed orders pronounced on that date. It was submitted that an authenticated decision (in the present case, in the form of an order) was required before the 'decision' could be the subject of an appeal.

52 Alternatively, if the court were to find that the appeal notice had been filed out of time, then the appellant sought an extension of time.

The merits of the Commissioner's application to strike out

53 By s 43A(2) of the TAA, relevantly, the appellant was required to file its appeal notice within 28 days after the day on which the Tribunal's 'decision' was made.

54 The glossary to the TAA provides that, unless the contrary intention appears, 'decision' includes a direction. By s 3(1) of the SAT Act, unless the contrary intention appears, 'decision' of the Tribunal includes an order, direction or determination of the Tribunal.

55 In the present case, the relevant 'decision' of Judge Eckert was her determination of the two preliminary issues. An examination of the transcript of the proceedings on 19 July 2006 reveals that in the course of those proceedings her Honour published both her determination of the preliminary issues and her reasons for that determination. In other words, on 19 July 2006 the learned judge published the Tribunal's decision (within s 43A(2)) and also the Tribunal's reasons for that decision.

56 Section 74 of the SAT Act requires that certain decisions be given in writing and authenticated in accordance with the rules. By s 74(b), a decision of the Tribunal has to be given in writing and authenticated in accordance with the rules if the Tribunal reserved the decision. As to the authentication of decisions, see r 19 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA).

57 In the present case, the requirement of writing was satisfied by the written transcript of the proceedings on 19 July 2006 in which the decision and the reasons for decision were delivered orally. By s 79 of the SAT Act, a written transcript of the part of the proceeding in which a decision is given orally or reasons are given orally is sufficient for a provision of the Act that requires the decision or reasons to be in writing.

58 The 'order' of the Tribunal, signed by Judge Eckert on 10 November 2006, represented the written authentication of the decision made on 19 July 2006, and not a separate decision which itself was the subject of a right of appeal.

59 By s 82 of the SAT Act, a decision of the Tribunal comes into effect immediately after it is given or at such later time as is specified in it, except as otherwise provided in s 29(5). In the present case, no later time was specified and s 29(5) is not relevant.

60 Section 74 of the SAT Act does not have the effect that a decision of the Tribunal is not made until it has been authenticated in writing. By s 81 of the SAT Act, a failure of the Tribunal to comply with a requirement of Pt 4 div 4, which includes s 74, does not affect the validity of a decision.

61 In my opinion, subject to the appellant's application to extend time, the appeal not having been commenced within 28 days after the making of the decision on 19 July 2006, the appeal is incompetent and liable to be struck out.

62 The Commissioner opposed the appellant's application to extend time on the ground that neither s 43A nor any other provision of the TAA empowers this court to grant an extension. It was submitted, on behalf of the Commissioner, that the power to extend time in s 105(7) of the SAT Act does not apply to an appeal under s 43A. The Commissioner conceded, however, that he would not oppose the appellant's application to extend time if this court decided that it had power to grant an extension.

The merits of the appellant's application to extend time

63 At common law (that is, independently of s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)), a court is permitted, in construing a statutory provision, to have regard to the words used by the Parliament in their legal and historical context and, if appropriate, to give them a meaning that will give effect to any purpose of the legislation that can be deduced from that context. See CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ); Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd [1997] HCA 53; (1997) 191 CLR 85, 112 - 113.

64 It is well-established that where two or more statutory enactments comprise an overlapping legislative scheme, the enactments should be construed accordingly. See Sweeney v Fitzhardinge [1906] HCA 73; (1906) 4 CLR 716, 726; R v Wheeldon [1978] FCA 11; (1978) 18 ALR 619, 622; Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 719, 722 - 724; Le Blanc v Queensland TAB Ltd [2002] QSC 323; [2003] 2 Qd R 65 [42].

65 In Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd, Kirby P said:

Upon the hypothesis (which is admittedly often sorely tried) that there is a rational integration of the legislation of the one Parliament, it is proper for courts to endeavour to so construe inter related statutes as to produce a sensible, efficient and just operation of them in preference to an inefficient, conflicting or unjust operation. This is the approach which I take to the task of statutory interpretation in hand (722).

Later, his Honour said in relation to the legislation under consideration in the appeal before the court:

The result is that, in construing the legislation under consideration here, I will prefer that construction which is available in the language used and which facilitates the sensible operation together of the four statutes mentioned, avoiding inefficiency and the capricious operation of revenue law which would seriously impede or discourage the availability of beneficial statutory provisions for the sale or partition of property held by co-owners. In the case of ambiguity of the legislation I consider this to be the modern approach which this Court should adopt in implementing the will of Parliament. We should presume that Parliament intended its legislation to operation rationally, efficiently and justly, together (723 - 724).

66 It is instructive, in evaluating the Commissioner's submission that this court does not have power to extend time, to review the legislative framework relating to appeals from the Commissioner's disallowance of an objection to a stamp duty assessment before the introduction of s 43A of the TAA and s 105 of the SAT Act.

67 At all material times before 1 July 2003 (when relevant provisions of the TAA and the Stamp Amendment Act 2003 (WA) came into operation), s 33(1) of the Stamp Act provided:

A person who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner on an objection by the person may, within 42 days after service of notice of the decision of the Commissioner, appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision.

By s 33(2) of the Stamp Act, a person entitled to appeal against a decision of the Commissioner on an objection by that person may, whether before or after the expiry of the time for appealing, apply for an extension of time, and the Commissioner may, for reasonable cause shown by that person, extend the time for appealing for such period as the Commissioner considers reasonable in the circumstances. Section 34A(1) of the Stamp Act provided, relevantly, that a person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Commissioner to refuse to extend the time for appealing against the Commissioner's decision on an objection, may appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision.

68 Section 22 of the Stamp Amendment Act 2003 repealed, relevantly, s 33 and s 34A of the Stamp Act with effect from 1 July 2003.

69 Also, on 1 July 2003, Pt 4, div 3 (comprising s 40, s 41, s 42, s 43 and s 44) of the TAA, and certain other provisions of that Act, came into operation. Section 40(1) provided, relevantly, that a person dissatisfied with the Commissioner's decision on an objection may appeal against the decision. Section 41 conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in relation to, relevantly, any stamp duty appeal under s 40(1). Section 42 provided:

(1) An appeal must be commenced within 60 days after notice of the decision to which it relates is served on the taxpayer.

(2) However, the court or tribunal to which the appeal lies may, on application by the taxpayer, extend the time for commencing an appeal.

Section 43(1) provided, relevantly, that on hearing an appeal against a decision, the appellate court may, relevantly, confirm the Commissioner's assessment, or direct the Commissioner to make a reassessment in accordance with any directions given by the court; if the court varies or revokes a decision, substitute for the decision any other decision that the Commissioner could have made in the circumstances; and make consequential and ancillary orders (including orders for costs). By s 43(2), the onus of establishing that an assessment or decision to which the appeal relates is invalid or incorrect lies on the taxpayer. Section 43(3) and s 43(4) provided, in substance, that if the final reassessment of the taxpayer's liability indicates that duty has been overpaid, the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit of the overpaid amount, and interest on the overpaid amount. Section 44 made provision for the Commissioner to state a case on a question of law arising under a taxation Act and for the Supreme Court to decide the question of law and make orders for costs and other incidental matters.

70 The TAA was amended in material respects by the State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA) (the Conferral of Jurisdiction Act) with effect from 1 January 2005. Relevantly, for present purposes:

(a) Section 40(1) was amended to replace the right of appeal conferred by that subsection with a right to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the decision.

(c) Section 42(1) was amended to refer to the commencement of an application to the Tribunal for a review rather than to an appeal.

(e) Section 43(1) and s 43(2) were repealed and replaced with provisions dealing with proceedings before the Tribunal on a review application in connection with a revenue assessment or decision.

(f) A new section, namely s 43A, was inserted. I reproduce the new section at [72] below.

71 Also, on 1 January 2005, legislation came into operation which established and conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal. The legislation comprised, relevantly, the SAT Act and the Conferral of Jurisdiction Act.

(1) An appeal from a decision of the State Administrative Tribunal can be brought on a question of law, of fact, or mixed law and fact, without having first obtained leave to appeal.

(2) The appeal has to be instituted in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 28 days after -

(a) the day on which the Tribunal's decision is made; or

(b) if the Tribunal gives oral reasons for the decision and the appellant then requests it to give written reasons under section 78 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004, the day on which the written reasons are given to the appellant.

73 The appellant did not make a request within s 43A(2)(b).

74 Section 3(1) of the TAA specifies various enactments as 'taxation Acts' for the purposes of the TAA. The enactments specified include the TAA and the Stamp Act. By s 3(2), each other taxation Act is to be read with the TAA as if they formed a single Act. The SAT Act is not a taxation Act for the purposes of the TAA.

(1) A party to a proceeding may appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in the proceeding, but only if the court to which the appeal lies gives leave to appeal.

(2) The appeal can only be brought on a question of law.

(3) The appeal lies to -

(a) the Court of Appeal, if the decision was made by -

(i) a judicial member; or

(ii) the Tribunal constituted by members who include a judicial member;

(b) the Supreme Court exercising its other jurisdiction, in any other case.

[(4) repealed]

(5) An application for leave to appeal has to be made in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 28 days after -

(a) the day on which the Tribunal's decision is given; or

(b) if the Tribunal gives its decision without giving written reasons for its decision and the party then requests it to give written reasons under section 78, the day on which the written reasons are given to the party.

(6) If leave is granted, the appeal has to be instituted in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 21 days after the day on which leave is granted.

(7) The court to which the appeal lies may extend a time limit fixed by this section, and the extension may be given even though the time limit has passed.

(8) A party instituting an appeal is to notify the executive officer but the Tribunal is not a party to the appeal and nor is any Tribunal member.

(9) The court dealing with the appeal may -

(a) affirm, vary, or set aside the decision of the Tribunal;

(b) make any decision that the Tribunal could have made in the proceeding; or

(c) send the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration, either with or without the hearing of further evidence, in accordance with any directions or recommendations that the court considers appropriate,

and, in any case, may make any order the court considers appropriate.

(10) If the court sends the matter back to the Tribunal under subsection (9)(c), it is to give directions as to whether or not the Tribunal reconsidering the matter is to be constituted by the member or members who made the original decision.

(11) If the Tribunal's decision is made in a proceeding prescribed by the regulations, a party cannot apply for leave to appeal under this section unless the party agrees to indemnify each other party to the proceeding against that other party's reasonable legal costs of the appeal.

(12) In the case of a decision in a proceeding coming within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction, any leave to appeal granted to the decision maker is to be granted on the condition that the costs of each other party are to be met by the decision maker, unless the court considers that it would be unjust or unreasonable to impose that condition, whether generally or in respect of the costs of a particular party.

(13) Despite subsection (2), if the Tribunal's decision -

(a) is made under a relevant Act or in a proceeding for the review of a decision made under a relevant Act; and

(b) has the effect of depriving a person of the person's capacity to lawfully pursue a vocation,

an appeal under this section may be brought on any ground whether it involves a question of law, a question of fact or a question of mixed law and fact.

(14) In subsection (13) -

'relevant Act' means -

(a) an Act specified in Schedule 1, if it is an enabling Act; or

(b) an enabling Act prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of subsection (13).

76 Section 5 of the SAT Act provides that if there is any inconsistency between that Act and an 'enabling Act', the enabling Act prevails. The term 'enabling Act' is defined in s 3(1) of the SAT Act to mean, relevantly, another Act, or a portion of another Act, under which jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal. The TAA is an enabling Act for the purposes of the SAT Act.

77 Section 18(1) of the SAT Act provides that, in exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to deal with a matter in accordance with the SAT Act and the enabling Act. By s 18(2), the enabling Act may modify the operation of the SAT Act in relation to a matter that comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.

78 Section 92(1) of the SAT Act provides, relevantly, that the rules of the Tribunal may provide for the Tribunal to extend a time limit for doing anything in connection with a proceeding, or the commencement of a proceeding, even though the limit is imposed under the SAT Act or the enabling Act. By s 92(2), the extension may be authorised even though the time for complying has passed. Section 92(3) provides that s 92 has effect, despite s 5 of the SAT Act, except to the extent, if any, that s 92 is expressly excluded by the enabling Act.

79 The TAA does not expressly exclude s 92 of the SAT Act. Further, r 10(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules confers on the Tribunal power to extend any time fixed under the SAT Act, an enabling Act or the rules for the commencement of a proceeding. Rule 10(2) empowers the Tribunal to extend time even if the time fixed expired before an application for an extension was made.

80 Section 94 of the SAT Act applies, relevantly, if a party appeals under s 105 from a decision of the Tribunal. By s 94(3), the Tribunal's executive officer is to give the Supreme Court:

(a) all documents and other material that were before the Tribunal in connection with the proceedings to which the appeal relates; and

(b) any other documents and other material in the Tribunal's possession that the Tribunal is required by rules of the Supreme Court to send to the court.

(a) At all material times before 1 July 2003, there was statutory provision for a taxpayer to apply for an extension of time to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's objection. See s 33(2) and s 34A(1) of the Stamp Act.

(b) Between 1 July 2003 and 31 December 2004, there was statutory provision for a taxpayer to apply for an extension of time to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's objection. See s 42(2) of the TAA.

(c) Since 1 January 2005 there has been statutory provision for a taxpayer to apply for an extension of time to apply for a review by the Tribunal of the Commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's objection. See r 10 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules read with s 92 of the SAT Act.

82 Section 105(7) of the SAT Act provides that the court to which an appeal lies pursuant to s 105 may extend a time limit fixed by s 105 (including the 28-day period prescribed by s 105(5) for filing an application for leave to appeal), and the extension may be given even though the time limit has passed. Section 43A of the TAA does not, however, provide for a taxpayer to apply for an extension of time to appeal from a decision of the Tribunal.

83 The critical question, in determining the merits of the Commissioner's submission that this court does not have power, in the present case, to extend time, is whether s 43A of the TAA is to be read with s 105 of the SAT Act, so that the power in s 105(7) to extend time applies to an appeal under s 43A.

84 In my opinion, the legislative scheme embodied in the SAT Act and the TAA, and the relevant legislative history, suggest that s 43A of the TAA is to be read with s 105 of the SAT Act. Section 43A was not intended to cover the field in relation to revenue appeals from decisions of the Tribunal.

85 First, the TAA is an enabling Act for the purposes of the SAT Act. By s 18(1) of the SAT Act, in exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to deal with a matter in accordance with the SAT Act and the enabling Act. By s 18(2), the enabling Act may modify the operation of the SAT Act in relation to a matter that comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. It is true that s 43A modifies the operation of s 105(1), (2) and (13) in that s 43A confers an appeal as of right and is not confined to a question of law. That modification of s 105 does not, however, in my opinion, indicate that none of the other provisions of s 105 is to apply to an appeal under s 43A.

86 Secondly, neither s 43A nor any other provision of the TAA makes provision for the powers of the appellate court in relation to the appeal as of right conferred by s 43A(1) or for any ancillary or incidental matters. For example, neither s 43A nor any other provision of the TAA contains any provisions comparable to s 105(8), (9), (10), (12). In other words, the TAA does not require the party instituting the appeal to notify the executive officer of the Tribunal for the purpose of facilitating the executive officer's compliance with s 94 of the SAT Act, or otherwise; does not set out the powers of the court dealing with the appeal; does not enable the appellate court to give directions to the Tribunal if the matter is sent back to the Tribunal; and does not empower the appellate court to require that the decision-maker pay the costs of the other parties to the appeal where the decision-maker is the appellant.

87 Thirdly, although the TAA, as it currently stands, does not make any provision for the matters I have just mentioned, the TAA did make such provision in s 40, s 41, s 43 and s 44 before those provisions were amended and, in some respects, repealed by the Conferral of Jurisdiction Act which came into operation on 1 January 2005. On that date, legislation also came into operation which established and conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal.

88 Fourthly, it is most unlikely that the Parliament would have intended that an appellate court hearing an appeal under s 43A should not have powers of the kind set out in s 105(7), (8), (9), (10), (12) of the SAT Act, especially against the background that comparable provisions had been included in s 40, s 41, s 43 and s 44 of the TAA before the Conferral of Jurisdiction Act came into operation.

89 Fifthly, it is plain from the general language of s 94 of the SAT Act, which I have summarised at [80] above, that s 94 applies both to appeals under s 105 of the SAT Act and appeals under s 43A of the TAA.

90 In my opinion, the TAA and the SAT Act, at least to the extent that they deal with appeals (either as of right or with leave) from decisions of the Tribunal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court are interrelated statutes. Subject, of course, to the language of the TAA and the SAT Act, it is therefore proper to construe the relevant provisions of each statute, at least to the extent that they relate to appeals to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, to produce a sensible, efficient and just operation.

SOUTHSIDE AUTOS (1981) PTY LTD -v- COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2008] WASCA 208 (10 October 2008)

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Judgment (459 paragraphs)

SOUTHSIDE AUTOS (1981) PTY LTD -v- COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2008] WASCA 208 (10 October 2008)

Legislation Cited (12)

Cases Cited (10)